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Preface: Crowded Lonesome Road 
 
Our triumphs can never compensate for this. 
Perhaps our triumphs are not even the point. 
Perhaps struggle is all we have because the god of 
history is an atheist, and nothing about his world 
is meant to be. So you must wake up every 
morning knowing that no promise is unbreakable, 
least of all the promise of waking up at all. This is 
not despair. These are the preferences of the 
universe itself: verbs over nouns, actions over 
states, struggle over hope (Coates, 2015, pp. 70-
71) 
 
Prefaces are always written in the end, perhaps because only in the end one knows how to start, or 
should have started. These a-chronic and a-synchronic starting words are meant to charm the reader 
into an investigating journey that has already ended; it is an act of seduction where promises are made 
for future and innovative questions, although answers will never come. The ecstasy of philosophy is 
its mad play with the new, which is always old, with the unwanted answers and forever delayed 
comforts. And perhaps it was this permanent postponement of ease to find an answer to the tragedy of 
refuge and statelessness in our time that has clogged my will to finish this dissertation. Each day the 
roads of those who leave their homes in order to live get more and more congested. So, who am I to 
make a sincere remark on the matter.  
 
Who am I? Am I a thinker or a refugee? The experience of flight, fleeing from one place to another in 
order to save my life, gave birth to my master thesis, my application for NWO (The Netherlands 
Organization for Scientific Research) and has empowered the endurance of this research. The fact that 
my personal experiences intertwine with my philosophical reflections is neither really surprising – I 
was once upon a time a refugee - nor exceptional – it is the consequence of loving (filo) wisdom 
(sophia) of a life. With Giorgio Agamben in mind, I state that each philosopher must recognize the 
personal experiences that form and deform the topology of one’s thought. This primordial scene is in 
some cases more than obvious and in other cases so hidden that one easily claims objectivity. In the 
case of this book, there is a clear indication of an intrinsic relation between my personal experiences 
and the written words. This personal involvement, nevertheless, does not make this dissertation a 
personal and subjective research of a self, a self-reflection in a psychological sense. This investigation 
is neither more subjective nor more objective than any other research on the notion of flight or the 
notion of other. So, although the event of flight has affected me as a writer on a personal level, the 
experience and reflections upon this experience are not the property of a self. The notion of flight 
rather functions in a political milieu: meaning a network of theoretical and political reflections. 
Fortunately, during the process of this research, the exclusiveness of the I of this writer is rather lost 
than found, but without abnegating the experience.  
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Still, it was the complexity of this experience that stagnated my ability to put an end to this long road 
of investigation. While I started this study with the raw childlike political hope to find vocabulary for 
the experience of refuge, for the past ten years my writing has rather been characterized by stuttering 
gestures. A lot has changed. Political atmosphere in Europe has become more hostile since my arrival. 
There is this painful realization that my words have nothing to add to the intensity of exclusion of our 
time, my efforts will not save a single refugee. The stagnation endured until in a conversation with my 
co-supervisor Henk Oosterling I realized that I was not speaking to the excluded ones. They never 
were in need of intellectuals to comprehend the intensity of their experiences. My writings are meant 
to give in to the critical task of philosophy to extend the academic thinking. I make an appeal to 
philosophy to generate a new rhetoric for the political discourse of our time beyond the cynicism of 
disappointed idealists and the fear of populists. Philosophy’s affirmation in our time is its capacity to 
unlock a new language in which ambiguity and difference become potent elements to create new 
forms of relationality. For this strategic discursive act, philosophy needs a form of alertness, not only 
toward the world, but also toward itself. Philosophy must implement an attitude in life, in which 
theory and practice are intertwined. Philosophy’s involvement is in Agamben’s words its capacity to 
create new gestures of communicability in order to commune differently. 
 
We1 are always part of a community, even in the loneliest hours of writing. Societies form and deform 
us as we are. My contemporary home, The Netherlands, seems to make a name in the world by anti-
refugee slogans. This country is, however, as pluralistic as any other place. It was the belief and 
funding of initiators of project Mozaïek of The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research 
(NWO) that created the opportunity for me to write these pages. In their care for equal academic 
opportunities for minorities they made these types of intellectual exercises possible. I am forever 
grateful for their confidence in me.  
 
A home is a world; a country; a city; and sometimes simply a family. I am fortunate to be a child of 
Haydeh and Reza. With their intellectual, emotional and daily support they have given me a sense of 
belonging. Their belief in change and their intense love of the world have made me to never give up 
the will to fight. Belonging is what we long for, a longing that is present in a sister’s love for her 
brothers: my older brother Nima, who has always been there for me my whole life, through war, 
exclusion, flight and survival; and my younger brother Sina, who could sense what I feel on the other 
side of the world, the impossible child of war who showed us to surpass the tragedies.  
Families extend and families are individuals that we want to call family. I am thankful for my 
sister-in-law Esther, for her sweet words and her immense sense of optimism, and the strength of my 
adopted sister Afra Rooble who has always reminded me to live rather than to survive. I am lucky that 
                                                     
1 Who is we? In The Communist Horizon, Jodi Dean (2012) adequately states that we suffer from a we-scepticism, a sense of 
loss of collectivity. It is this collective affect that enforces her political writing and therefore she states: “I write ‘we’ hoping 
to enhance a partisan sense of collectivity” (p. 12). I share her idea of collectivity. Whenever I state ‘we’ I do not intend to 
invite the one who goes along with my thought, thus not the one that simply agrees with me, but the one that thinks along 
with me, in the sense of producing thought instead of stagnating in agreement.   
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this busy busy aunt still can count on the love of her nieces and nephews: Dana, Isha, Sam, Yasmin 
and Ilia; and the welcome feeling in the house of my adopted aunts and uncles Sussan Sanobari, 
Mahmoed Chavoushi; Ilda Omrani and Mostafa Gholami, and my adopted cousins Sherman, 
Shermin, Jobin. In this sense of family at last but not at least, I thank John van Male, for his 
unconditional care, his daily encouraging SMS-messages, the fury of his engagement and his 
everlasting irony. Without his immense support I would not have come this far.  
 
I am not only blessed with a warm family but also with friendships that have made me surpass my 
fears and uncertainties. I thank Gregor Niedlich, Maurice Specht, Arnaud Zwakhals and Piotrek 
Swiatkowski – my philosophical companions – for combining the joy of reading with good food and 
inspiring conversations; Vincent Wiegel, Willem van Eekelen and Maha El-Metwally for their critical 
attitude that in the past 25 years has encouraged me to question prejudices that limited my growth; 
Beerend Winkelman for his willingness not only to share the terror of writing a dissertation with me 
but also the joy of finalizing it; Ivna Elsperman, Carla Delgado, Cindy den Herder and Karin Blom 
for their efforts to show me that there is a life beyond writing a dissertation; Siebe Thissen, Femke 
Kaulingfreks and Zihni Özdil for their intellectual support to acknowledge the reality of exclusion; 
Marianne Molendijk, Bert van Scherrenburg, Corina van der Laan en Claude Mushikangondo for 
never giving up their struggle against the harshness of the world; Parisa Yousef-Doust for sharing her 
intense talent to create images of the political reality in which we live; Rineke Kraaij and Izaak 
Dekker for their inspirational tireless energy to change the world; Cokky Kraaij for her rebellious 
desire to disrupt stagnated authoritarian relations, Josien Hofs for showing me that there is always a 
possibility of a sweet laughter that could break through the bitterness of politics; and finally Ton 
Westenbroek for his biography that despite its sorrows has always generated a doorway to happiness. 
 
Next to family and friends, in the past years colleagues have inspired me to deepen my thoughts on 
the subject. Due to the research team Iohannah I was fully introduced to the works of Hannah Arendt. 
I specially thank Dirk De Schutter, Marc De Kesel, Remi Peeters, Theo de Wit, Veronica Vasterling 
and Marieke Borren for their critical comments. I thank Jodi Dean and Halleh Ghorashi for showing 
me how intellectual reflections and plain activism against exclusion must coincide at all time. I thank 
the members of the International Network for Alternative Academia – especially Alejandro 
Cervantes-Carson, Charlene Delia Jeyamani Rajendran, Albin Wagener, Setsuko Adachi, Robert 
Burton, Michael Kearney and Paul Prinsloo. With their brilliant lectures and comments they have 
introduced me to new perspectives on academic thinking. At the Philosophy Department at the 
Erasmus University of Rotterdam I am grateful for the warm interest of Marli Huijer, Awee Prins, 
Donald Loose and Han van Ruler in my subject and perspective on philosophy. I am also thankful for 
the manner in which Heinz Kimmerle has put intercultural thinking on the agenda. I specially thank 
Paul Schuurman for always checking up on me, not only as a colleague but also as a friend. I also 
thank my colleagues at the both departments for Social Work at Universities of Applied Sciences in 
Rotterdam for their interest for my philosophical reflections and support. Especially Hans Streefkerk, 
Antonio da Silva, Jan Seters, Guido Walraven, René Akkermans, Evelyne Oorbeek, Hugo Gorissen, 
Patrick Pronk, Ragnar Dienske, Frans Spierings, Szabinka Dudevski, Jeroen Oversier, Yvonne 
Aronson, Jean Marie Molina, Paul van der Aa, Michiel de Ronde, Maud Belmer and Amina Kefi. 
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Their unexpected support has shown me that despite the immensity of cruelness in the world, there 
are always individuals that care for the sake of caring. And last but not least, I am blessed with my 
students, for due to their honesty, openness and willingness to learn in the past four years they have 
motivated me to connect philosophy to the practice of life.  
 
We do not only commune but also permanently communicate. And although writing seems to be a 
lonely process, every written work exists due to a vital conversation with others. Let me start with my 
supervisor Jos de Mul for his interest and commitment, his endless effort and patience. He was always 
prepared to listen and encourage despite the long pauses. Even through my momentary despairs he 
never hesitated to belief that I was able to end this process. Brenda Beckett has accompanied me with 
every word, every sentence and every hesitation. Her capacity to sharpen your language and broaden 
your vocabulary combined with her sincere love for creativity within language is an example for 
politicians and policymakers to how learning a language could be inclusive rather than an exclusive 
process. Next, Richard de Brabander did not only read through and comment on my first impossible 
draft, but during the past few years he intellectually challenged me to question my own normative 
standards and impossible demands by convincing me that a written work is never finalized. Wisely he 
persuaded me that there is no perfection or conclusion in writing but merely a moment of decision in 
which you let go, start to expose your words to a world and decide to become vulnerable for her 
critique.  
 
A special thanks to the two women who I am honored to call my paranymphs: Carolien van den Bos 
and Suzanne Kern. The battlefield of exclusion is an unending tiresome road, and it is a shared will to 
fight against impossibilities of the world we live in that can pull you out of the misery of becoming a 
disappointed idealist. It is in the inspirational manner in which these two individuals relate to life that 
I preserve myself to become a cynic. Carolien – for almost 19 years now – has given me the privilege 
to share every human emotion possible. She has walked with me on the edge of every word, she has 
screamed with me through every madness, and she has laughed with me with every mistake. There are 
only a handful admirable people in this world who could have her knowledge of the cruelty of the 
world yet the magnificent ability to love the world as she does. It is this love of the world that my 
paranymphs share. Suzanne, who touched my soul in minutes, has the admirable capacity to fight 
injustice in impossible times. This is the woman who never wanted to tempt me, nor make me a social 
acceptable speaker. She is the social worker that forces thinkers like me to feel the ground beneath, to 
feel the mud, to see beauty in ferocity. She thought me, as older sisters do, to become the women that 
I wanted to be.  
 
Indeed in the act of writing you are never alone. Every word communicates, and most probably every 
word I wrote communicated to my teacher, mentor and friend: my co-supervisor Henk Oosterling, 
who has guided me from the beginning to the end. Our engagement was far from the standard 
academic interaction. Him being the child of a common longshoreman and me being a child of war 
and refuge, we have never been at ease with distant intellectual philosophical exercises. It is through 
his sense of activism and political engagement that I have decided to think differently about the 
philosophical implications for refuge and migration. We have fought, yelled, disagreed, cried and 
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laughed through lines. Oosterling is not an easy road to walk; yet I am glad to state that it was in our 
conversations that I have been broken to the bones of my thoughts and have been rebuilt again. It is in 
this process that I have become the philosopher that I wanted to dare to be.  
 
And finally there is you to whom I dedicate this writing: Piet Molendijk. We have often not walked 
the same road. Our connection is in a sense a pure difference, you being the creature of stability and 
long soft talks; me being the arrhythmic sleepless presenter of short loud exclamations; you who 
absorbs thought and I who spits ideas immediately; you that adores rest and me that knows nothing 
but restless life. 16 years passed, losses were shared, promises changed and some were broken. Yet, 
some things remained. It was our difference that made me change my attitude in life. It was in your 
capacity to still shed a tear and your everlasting indignant glance that I learned that the world is not as 
it should be. It was through your tenderness that I started to love the world again, for which I am 
forever thankful. Amor fati, Vwieti, we will always share amor mundi.  
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Introduction: How to Enter? 
 
And when a child is born into this world  
It has no concept  
Of the tone the skin is living in  
And there's a million voices  
And there's a million voices  
To tell you what she should be thinking  
So, you better sober up for just a second  
(Youssou N’Dour & Neneh Cherry, 7 Seconds, 
1994). 
  
Starting Points of Thought  
There is always an initiating experience that motivates a writer. There is an event in life that initiates 
thought, and the need to express, whether on a personal or a scientific level. In my case the two levels 
intertwined years ago while reading Giorgio Agamben’s Means without End (2000), in which he 
states: 
 
The refugee, formerly regarded as a marginal figure … has become now the 
decisive factor of the modern nation-state by breaking the nexus between human 
being and citizen (p. x). 
 
And then a little further on; 
 
Only in a world in which the spaces of states have been thus perforated and 
topologically deformed and in which the citizen has been able to recognize the 
refugee that he or she is – only in such a world is the political survival of 
humankind today thinkable (p. 26). 
 
This deformation of contemporary political thought is a result of the decreasing distance between the 
so-called citizen and the so-called non-citizen. This claim shocked me. As a child refugee and as a 
philosophical observer I had experienced and reflected upon the marginality of being a refugee. 
Agamben’s approach challenged my ideas. The facts that I believed to be true for many years 
suddenly began to crumble. The figure, called refugee, whom I considered to be marginal, became a 
decisive factor. I considered flight as an experience to belong to a group: the refugees. However, after 
studying Agamben’s work flight transformed into an event that entangles all citizens. In the end, the 
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disquieting experience of refuge – that I was determined to forget in order to move on – articulated a 
paradigm shift that, according to Agamben, may bring about the survival of humankind and the 
coming of a new community.  
 
The two experiences – that of finding refuge (political/flight) and that of finding the truth 
(philosophy) – overlapped. By this I do not mean that a life-experience does simply express itself in 
philosophical reflection. Rather, the experiencing and thinking started to share each other’s focus and 
perspectives. In my personal experience the focus was on the many roads my family travelled through 
different countries to finally arrive in The Netherlands. In my reflections on Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1987) philosophy I encountered the concept ‘lines of flight’ as strains of thought that rupture fixed 
categories and lead thought to unexplored levels of thinking. Flight as a frightening experience with a 
political focus was mirrored in a philosophical perspective in which thought starts to feel uncanny, 
misplaced in a sense. Forced to leave because of a subversive political orientation, finding new ways 
to express what matters in order to create a new life, finding new ways of looking at daily life, 
constructing new alliances, learning to speak in a different tongue; these are all aspects that will be 
connected to philosophical and political reflections of the below-mentioned four philosophers. I will 
argue that a politics of flight entails different forms of subjects and different forms of expression, all 
intertwined as in a Gordian knot.  
 
Companions in Thought 
Scholarly and artistic works have always been my sources of inspiration. Although this research is 
inspired by a diversity of philosophers, artists, writers and political thinkers, there have been a few 
companions in thought that provided me with the most crucial notions to explore a politics of flight: 
Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Giorgio Agamben (1942), Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) and Félix 
Guattari (1930-1992). On the background, the texts of Michel Foucault (1926-1984) and Jacques 
Derrida (1930-2004) have also been very helpful. 
Arendt’s personal experiences were a tremendous inspiration for thinking a politics of flight. 
Her elaborations on daily policies and political ideologies in relation to the ‘other’ provide insight in 
realities such as migration and refuge. She is a born outsider, in life and in thought. And although her 
biography is there for the picking as an obvious justification of her involvement in this research, it is 
rather her thoughts and reflections on the notions of totalitarianism, politics and exile that have been 
crucial in my explorations. Her thought on natality, as well as her discourse on the notions action and 
speech constituting inter-esse open a vast landscape with new perceptiveness.  
Agamben is another important inspiration. He is inspired by Arendt’s critique on human 
rights and by Foucault’s elaborations on different types of political discourses. He criticizes the reality 
of the law as an expression of a specific form of life. His exploration has been crucial in the 
thematization of political and legal patterns through which different notions and relationalities2 are 
defined and organized. Deleuze and Guattari’s reflections on the method – or rather non-method – of 
                                                     
2 With this notion, I indicate the process of becoming relational. In my further analysis, I will argue that in relationalities the 
event of relating precedes fixations such as isolation, exclusive distinction and identification.  
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rhizome – rhizomatics – have provided me with yet another set of tools to analyze a politics of flight. 
These tools enable me to delineate the escape patterns through which this politics demonstrates its 
potential to deform and reform itself.  
Notwithstanding their differences, these thinkers are connected by their specific philosophical 
attitude. First, their critical considerations always focus on affirmative thinking. Second, they share a 
passion for multiplicity, resulting in dismantling of rigidity and permanency of any form of subject or 
identity. Third, they consider philosophy to be inherently political. Finally, they disconnect creativity 
and modern subjectivity by defining their connection as an event – a relational occurrence – instead of 
a merit of a subject. It is due to this attitude that these four political philosophers challenge the 
contemporary discourse on exclusion.  
 
Next to philosophical reflections on the contemporary state of society and interdisciplinary scientific 
approaches on the matter, the artistic expressions of flight have an affective impact. Art dissolves the 
distinction between pathos and logos. Art produces another form of ‘knowing’. Modern art is the 
subversive engine in which being affected has its own logic: a logic of sense (Deleuze, 1990) 
becomes a logic of sensations (Deleuze, 2004). Thus, while scientific research maps out the general 
line of connections and disconnections between different types of subjects, and while philosophical 
reflection differentiates on an abstract level different types of discourse that produce and inform 
subjects, artistic practices form a milieu in which subjectivity loses its exclusive discursive space. Art 
shows how affects and concepts, body and subject, i.e. the living person and its discursive milieu, 
never exhaustively overlap. There is an in-between that insists. 
 
Trilogical Focus 
The focus of this research is a politico-philosophical elaboration on the contemporary event of flight. 
The trilogy ‘life-expression-politics’ is crucial for my reflections. What instantly matters in this event 
by empowering the act of fleeing is apparently survival as a compulsion of life. This is a biological 
impulse of an organism intuitively fleeing danger in order to stay alive. The event of life is, however, 
more than the surviving of an organism or a political subject. In this research, life is considered as a 
vital force. Life is a becoming, a process, which is common to every living being. As in wartime, even 
within the experience of flight, life is an ongoing process that is sensed as such. Life always exceeds 
the experience of a personal life; it is never fully captured by an individual, not even in extreme 
experiences. In its extremity life rather divides an individual or better: one’s supposed coherent 
identity. Events such as severe illness or malnutrition can change a person unrecognizably. What is 
this ongoing event of life and how is such an event related to the notion of politics? Can a life be 
perceived as such beyond any expression? Or is expression – from daily communication to other 
forms of expressions like art – crucial for the political experience of life? 
I pose these questions because an inquiry into a flight is on the one hand obliged to thematize 
life in a political context and on the other hand it needs to deal with the inability to comprehend or 
determine the full meaning of life. Due to its ‘fundamental’ trait of becoming, life expresses itself in a 
great variety of forms. The foundation and object of the modern state is the modern citizen that by 
philosophers has been conceptualized as an autonomous subject that takes care of his/her own life. 
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This research rather focuses on multiple processes of subjectification. Life as a force does not only 
refer to this specific modern subjectification. It is by virtue of its variety that expressions of life 
transcend any notion of universal thinking or ideology that fixates this movement in general 
categories. In itself this is already a political statement: by seeing politics as a strategy to redistribute 
given power relations we do justice to the differences between people.  
Flight is a political expression in itself. How does politics as a collective expression of life 
relate to flight? First of all, it is perceived as a state of exception. Yet, more than an outcry of survival, 
flight is implicitly a plea for another community. Just like the political society that refugees enter, this 
community is shaped and framed by ideas, some even with universal claims on what it means to be a 
human being or a citizen, i.e. a political subject. The expression of flight is thus also bound to a 
discourse as a coherent set of practices and concepts that explains and legitimates the acts of groups 
and individuals. The differences in expression are not simply explained by the use of different 
languages and ‘isolated’ cultures, but rather emerge out of a multiplicity of experiences, ideologies 
and religious beliefs, cultural, social and economic backgrounds, and finally different political 
discourses.  
Although the analyses in my research are limited due to the philosophical point of view taken, 
this inquiry is already implicitly influenced by a multiplicity of academic disciplines, different forms 
of ideology, processes of subjectification and expressions of resistance. Nevertheless, the current 
discourse on flight is based on the state of exception and fully dependent upon the modern Western 
discourse of civil- and human rights. In spite of the fact that expressions of flight are exceptional 
expressions of a politically exceptional life, an analysis of flight thus does not only need to deal with 
an unending variety of expressions of life, but also with multifarious frameworks that shape the 
experience of flight. At best a study of flight is done in a vast interdisciplinary field of knowledge.  
 
Given these preliminary remarks, what is an expression of flight? I will be clear that there is no 
coherent and simple expression but rather a cacophonic field of expressions with unending affects, 
voices, noises and images, from within and from without. The human rights discourse that envelops 
the images of disillusioned people knocking on the gates of Fort Europe is punctuated with 
opinionated slogans of politicians, analytical comments of scientists, performances of artists, and the 
banal daily routines of civil servants. For those that succeed in being accepted, especially Muslims, 
the need to explain themselves against the background of global terrorism, resonates in an observation 
of what Hannah Arendt (1978a) describes as the position of Jews as refugees during the Second World 
War: 
 
We wonder how it can be done; we already are so damnably careful in every 
moment of our daily lives to avoid anybody guessing who we are, what kind of 
passport we have, where our birth certificates were filled out – and that Hitler 
didn’t like us. We try the best we can to fit into a world where you have to be sort 
of politically minded when you buy your food (p. 61). 
 
Thinking how flight expresses itself is immediately intertwined with the way politicians typify this as 
a problem. This inquiry is initiated by the obligation to map out the third element of the trilogy: 
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politics. How do political framings reduce the unending variety of life forms and multifariousness of 
their expressions? How does politics relate to the process of flight? Politics is an immense centipede 
thudding its countless legs through all aspects of life. This research explores and tries to comprehend 
the potentiality of life and communities as well as the permanent intimidation of this potentiality. 
Consequently, a crucial question insists. Given this vast spread of the notion, is it still possible to 
define and apply politics analytically? For me it is obvious that in the process of flight there are no 
apolitical spaces, in the sense that every aspect of one’s life is connected to and penetrated by political 
discourse. In order to answer the question on quiddity of a politics of flight and to handle the vastness 
of the notion of politics still analytically, we need to explore multiple approaches. In order to see the 
relationality within such multiplicity we need to forge tools that enable us to make adequate 
distinctions, yet respecting the differences.  
 
In spite of the current globalization and multiplicity of the media that connect people all around the 
globe, the idea of macropolitics still owes its legitimization to modern policies that are founded on the 
sovereignty of the state and the autonomy of the subject. Within the process of flight such policies 
have severe implications for the formation of a subject and a sense of belonging. The first step – in 
order to tackle the problematic state of autonomy and sovereignty – is to differentiate the notion of 
politics. This concept has been differentiated in diverse directions. Claude Lefort distinguishes 
between two French notions: la politique (politics of the state) and le politique (the political). La 
politique refers to the daily governmental, institutional, cultural and intellectual practices that were 
qualified already as macro-politics. Le politique indicates a discourse on the production of a 
community (Loose & Van Houte, 1992, p. 16). In his lectures Lefort states that this distinction is not 
ontological: the two types of politics relate to one another (Steinmetz-Jenkins, 2009). The level of this 
political discourse in relation to macro-politics can be qualified as meso-politics. It is on this meso-
political level that Isabelle Stengers (2010) situates the political activities of critical groups in western 
society that oppose la politique. If the resistance and self-organization of citizens against the 
exclusion of so-called illegal refugees has a political impact, then this is an example of meso-politics 
that intervenes on behalf of human interests.  
 There is yet another level of politics: a micro-politics of bodies and desires. This affective 
domain has been thoroughly analyzed by Foucault (1977, 1978, 1985 & 1986b) in his texts on 
discipline and sexuality. Deleuze and Guattari’s (1983 & 1987) analyses in Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia 1. Anti-Oedipus and Capitalism and Schizophrenia 2. Thousand Plateaus – are also 
explicitly micro-political. Analyzing the affective relations as part of a bigger power play – macro and 
meso – the distinction between the private and the public, between desires and interests is 
problematized. We need to disclose this micro-political dimension in order to understand the violent 
reality of a refugee’s private life in which the (threat of) death of men and women as individuals – 
private – gives simultaneously birth to a life that is public, yet lacks a voice within the public domain. 
The disruption of the private is the glitch as well as the engine of this speechless experience. The 
erasing of the distinction between the private and the public eventually problematizes the clarity of 
different levels of politics such as micro-, meso- and macro-politics. It is therefore relevant to 
reevaluate the relation between private and public against the background of this threefold political 
landscape. 
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A politics of flight also problematizes the absolute distinction between religious and secular politics. 
Less than the explicit religious beliefs of individual refugee this problematization targets the non-
metaphysical – and apparently objective – claim of secular forms of politics. Totalitarian state politics 
bears witness to this diffuse milieu of ideologies with homogeneous tendencies. In order to thematize 
this I will not exclusively refer to philosophical analysis. Art practices and especially literature 
address this subtle shift far more insightful. Orhan Pamuk is an exemplary ‘political’ writer who 
permanently undermines a clear distinction between secular and non-secular forms of politics. In his 
book Snow (2005), through the story of the writer Ka, Pamuk stages the metaphysical tendencies of a 
religious group and that of the secular military power. Within the setting of one small snowbound 
village he systematically pictures the modern history and the contemporary state of Turkey. The story 
starts with the image of young Muslim women who live in a world in which their political urge to 
resist through wearing the symbolic headscarves is neither understood by their religious parents nor 
by the secular public system. They see no other way out than committing suicide, a blasphemous act, 
by hanging themselves from the ceiling using the same scarf. Although the ‘crypto-religious’ 
tendencies of secularism have been scrutinized thoroughly in some political sciences and philosophy,3 
within the political discourse of Western policymakers it is imperative to map out the underlying 
dominant normative tendencies of secular politics.  
 
In literature, a current political discourse produces this double affect of repulsion and attraction. As 
such, it is the domain of contradictions. On the one hand, it refers to banishment and loss of a ‘way’ 
of life – action is prohibited and speech is silenced – and on the other hand it refers to the political 
hope for a better way of life. Politics incorporates both destructive and repressive terror and a 
potentiality to build new communities. Politics of flight cannot but address explicitly multiple forms 
of violence; not only physical, political and social, but also psychological and mental as a result of the 
impact that multiple, contradictory discourses have on the bodies of those that are lost somewhere in-
between. Still, dealing with brutal politics also refers to a potentiality, a force to change one’s course 
of life. Thus, the process of flight does not only emerge out of fear of death, but also out of a critical 
and affirmative attitude, i.e. a process of transforming, deconstructing and creating new communities. 
Therefore, my final argument will be that flight is not merely a traumatizing experience of an 
exceptional phase of one’s life, but it is also an experience of self-conscious political life. This would 
be an affirmative inscription of what I call ‘politics of flight’. 
 
Politics of Flight: Exile, Segments, Inter-est 
That is why my final chapter ‘Politics of Life’ is on a coming community, a notion conceptualized by 
Agamben (1993b). In this community, an affirmative politics of flight transforms fear into being 
interested. The result is a politics of inter-est, as Arendt (1958) proposes in The Human Condition. 
The German and Dutch notion of ‘interesse’ has a double meaning in English: interest as being 
                                                     
3 To mention just one rather idiosyncratic example, Marc De Kesel (2010) states that each monotheistic religion originates in 
a critique towards its predecessors. The Enlightenment is so understood as the next big ‘religion’, or ‘myth’.  
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interested and as a return in investment or benefit. I will emphasize the first meaning, by criticizing 
the second. The coming community demands a type of ethics, not based on identities, but firmly 
rooted in interest as being interested, i.e. on relations and differences, as Deleuze and Guattari sketch 
in the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. In order to understand the focus of Part II of my 
research we have to understand that this inquiry is neither a simple plea for, nor a charge against 
democracy. Democracy and coming community are not one and the same. They ought to be 
approached differently. In line with Ghorashi (2010), I argue that the current democratic states are 
complex, historical communities with totalitarian, multicultural and open communing tendencies. 
Coming community distances itself from an idea of democracy as a form of representation that 
presupposes an identity. Coming community is not about representing a people in the same way. It 
rather gives in to Derrida’s (1992b) idea of democratie à venir. It criticizes the idea of such 
representation. According to Lefort the representation of a people neither refers to the permanent 
identity of a people nor to representation of a reality. Representation always appears in a symbolic 
field of order or what he calls the political. And within this symbolic process identity of a people is 
formed and deformed permanently (Steinmetz-Jenkins, 2009, pp. 110-111). 
Different interests are assembled within a discourse based on inter-est in the Arendtian sense. 
It is the event of a common interest creating a people, rather than the other way around, namely 
individuals – as the people – being represented in order to have their specific interests served. The 
coming community is not based on management of interests, but the interest itself creates a 
community. This is why coming community does not depend on institutions or types of government. 
It can appear on every level of a community. As long as an interest is practiced on all these levels – 
micro, meso, macro – coming community is in becoming. This also happens within totalitarian 
regimes, be it in an opposite and repressive way. To understand democracy is to understand all its 
effects, its beauty as well as its possible horrors. Claude Lefort (1988) states that democracy is 
centered on an empty space that belongs to no one. This anonymity has different outcomes, as he – 
inspired by Tocqueville – suggests. Lefort is ambiguous on the fact whether exclusion is something 
that precedes/comes after democracy or appears in the middle of it. I will plead that democracy 
contains inclusive and exclusive forces simultaneously.  
 
I will argue that different types of political regimes do not follow one and other sequentially, but 
presuppose one and another. Although in Part II three types of politics are described separately, they 
are always intertwined. The fifth chapter - ‘Politics of Segments’ – sketches the second layer within a 
politics of flight: a multiculturalist approach. This approach differs from the way the coming 
community is speculated upon. In order to disclose the coming community within the multicultural 
society, I will describe the transition from multicultural to intercultural politics. I will elaborate on the 
notion of loyalty within multiple communities. Could an individual have multiple loyalties within a 
multicultural setting? In current multicultural societies, this is experienced as a problem. In this 
chapter I will explain how political ideas on ethnicity, culture and contextuality create a tension that 
cannot be resolved within the nationalistic discourse that still dominates the debates in western macro-
political policies. Vertovec’s (2007) notion ‘superdiversity’ shows how third generation migrants are 
politically disadvantaged due to rigid multicultural categorizations. And how can we explain the 
decision of city mayors to allow illegal stateless persons – i.e. refugees – to be sheltered – bread and 
 12 
 
bed – and sustained by groups of volunteers – i.e. citizens – while neglecting national policies? These 
contradictions and dilemmas are infrastructural aspects of multicultural societies. Yet, this dissertation 
does not opine the failure of multiculturalism but rather criticizes multiculturalism’s tendency as a 
final solution. Multiculturalism, specifically in its tendency to empower separate identifiable groups, 
is a phase in the process of politicizing flight. 
These integrative, yet – in daily practice – excluding tendencies of multicultural society are 
triggered by a collective fear of post-war societies: fear to fall into the trap of fascism or Stalinism, in 
short, the fear to repeat totalitarianism, denying democratic politics. Current debates with nationalist 
chauvinistic overtones have fueled this collective affect. But how do notions such as migrant and 
refugee function within this totalitarian discourse that I characterize in chapter four as ‘Politics of 
Exile’? Does the idea of refugee camps fit into the discourse of multiculturalism? And if not, what 
kind of community and politics are still implicitly insisting in the global political discourse? With 
Agamben’s analysis of exclusion and Arendt’s elaboration on totalitarianism, combined with her 
reports on the banality of evil, I will sketch a layered milieu in which these three types of politics – 
politics of exile, politics of segments and politics of life – are intertwined in the process of flight. 
 
Paradigm as a Tool 
In order to sketch these three types of politics we need analytical tools. In Part I of this research these 
tools are forged. I apply the Foucaultian idea of philosophical thought as a toolkit, an idea that is 
shared by Deleuze and Guattari. In chapter three I will explicate the way Deleuze and Guattari 
distinguish different approaches in thought: philosophy with its concepts, sciences with its formulas 
and functions, and art with its affects and percepts as two aspects of sensations that are triggered by 
works of art. After applying these ‘objects of thought’ to a politics of flight I will – inspired by 
Agamben – conclude that they do not suffice to analyze the explosive situation of refugees and 
migrants. We need to pay attention to the effects of policies within politics, that are, as René ten Bos 
(2015) argues, full of bureaucratic contradictions and dilemmas. In order to elucidate this dimension, 
we need a fourth tool, i.e. object of thought: paradigm. Let’s take the notion of ‘citizenship’ as an 
example. This is a concept. Through the history of philosophy this notion has been explored as a 
critical tool to empower and emancipate individuals within modern societies. It is a function. Sciences 
like economics and sociology have provided factors that effectuate this emancipatory process. It is an 
affect too. Citizenship is also a disciplining category. Avant-garde art practices have critically 
reflected upon these disciplining aspects of citizenship. It is precisely this dimension that is not 
thematized paradigmatically in this threefold exploration. Paradigm thus refers to the discursive 
tendencies within politics that define, enforce and create potential forms of belonging.  
 
This idea of paradigm – introduced by Agamben – is different from Kuhn’s (1970) paradigm. Kuhn’s 
paradigm concerns the basic discursive infrastructure of science of nature. Neither is this paradigm 
comparable with Foucault’s (2005a) episteme. Episteme is the discursive infrastructure of human 
sciences. Foucault’s (1980) transformation of episteme into dispositives by including power structures 
that regulate the knowledge production of human sciences is not adequate either. Agamben’s 
paradigm is implicated as an element of Foucault’s dispositive. Agamben’s paradigm shapes the 
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discursive infrastructure of state of affairs in politics and policy-making. It is however comparable to 
what Deleuze and Guattari call an object of thought, which in philosophy is inscribed in concepts, in 
art as affects and percepts, and in science as functions. In adding the political as an affective 
transversal, cutting through concepts, functions and sensations, yet being a concept itself, I will 
introduce another idea of politics, which in the third part of chapter three will be specified by adding a 
hyphen in-between politics and philosophy: politico-philosophy. This programmatic gesture will be 
elaborated on in chapter three in such a way that paradigm can be used as an analytical tool to 
examine the excluding and including mechanism within a politics of flight. In this study with politico-
philosophy I do not refer to the sub-category of academic philosophy. It is rather the necessary fine-
tuning of the focus of contemporary philosophy. 
 
This is the affirmative focus of this research. Each research needs a focal point of view, even more 
when one moves in a layered domain that connects life, expression and politics. Initially there was a 
central notion.4 Reading Agamben’s radical analysis of the state of being of refugees and paradigm I 
decided to take flight as a leading notion. However, concentrating on this notion led to endless other 
themes, such as citizenship, identity and belonging, human rights, nation-state, homo sacer, 
totalitarianism, multiculturalism, communities to come. This dissemination eventually undermined the 
dominant position of my focal point. In further analysis flight and refugee gradually became tools to 
disclose an even more complex field of research in which other aspects of political discourse demand 
to be addressed. The ever-increasing emergence of multiple ‘sub’-questions and related topics have 
for a long time challenged my ability to formulate the main question. On top of that the inadequacy of 
our language to communicate the subtlety of certain experiences made me highlight the importance of 
other forms of expression, such as literature, cinema and visual arts. Philosophy and art complement 
each other in my effort to comprehend the specific politics and policy on flight. More than often 
‘reading’ a work of art explains more than reading a philosophical essay as Foucault showed when he 
added Diego Velasquez’ Las Meninas in The Order of Things (2005a). In implementing works of art, I 
hope to sensitize 5  my readers for understanding the effects of paradigms. Thus, although flight 
initially was the exclusive object of this inquiry, it eventually started to function as a crowbar to 
disclose a milieu that ‘harbors’ a politics of flight.  
 
An Unconventional Flight 
Conventionally milieu refers to a person’s social environment or our physical environment. In this 
study, however, the notion milieu emphasizes the physical, social and political interactions, i.e. the 
relational infrastructure as a territory that disposes both bodies and discourses. Shortly: milieu is the 
discursive carrier that binds and unbinds bodies. In what kind of dimension of thought does this 
                                                     
4 In this study words such as notion and theme are neutral indications that could refer to all four objects of thought: concept 
(philosophy), function (science), percept/affect, i.e. sensation (art) and paradigm (policy). In this inquiry flight relates to all 
these four objects of thought.  
5 In this study, the term sensitize is more adequate than the verb visualize, due to the fact that it refers to all senses, thus an 
experience of a body as a whole. In the first chapter I will explore the importance of this experience. 
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interaction take place and how does it acquire meaning? What do we see and sense when watching the 
lifeless corpse of the three-year-old Alan Kurdi on the shores of Turkey? And also, what do we 
experience knowing that the conclusive argument for the Brexit was an anti-migration sentiment and 
xenophobia? Flight is rooted in a discourse far more complex and layered than most of us are 
prepared to acknowledge. We are right in the middle of it all. In the second chapter I will elaborate on 
and argue for flight as an eventive milieu that can and needs to be conceptualized and sensitized in 
different ways. This event accumulates and creates different contents and expressions, i.e. different 
types of territories and different political utterances. The world of Alan Kurdi in its expression and 
bodily experience radically differs from the world of the citizens voting for Brexit. Yet, as I will 
argue, these two separate worlds globally inherently constitute each other. Milieu is not merely the 
physical territory from the body to the earth. It also has an affective layer where people are connected 
and informed into a community by a specific discourse. The latter is also part of a milieu. Thus 
thinking – which for that matter is also inherent to the milieu – of a milieu of flight has an ontological 
as well as an epistemological vector.  
 
Briefly we can thus state that flight is a discursive construct, connecting ideas and bodies. It creates a 
milieu, a topos: a space where something happens, an event. In this inquiry flight chiefly refers to a 
relational event, in contrast to the conventional, psychological interpretation of the notion of flight as 
will be argued in the first chapter. The conventional analysis reduces the event or the experience of 
flight to a particular subject: the refugee, who is often defined through (inter-)national juridical 
discourse. With this particular subject as the main socio-psychological focus the event becomes an 
exclusive personal or group-bound event that, given a conventional juridical definition of flight has 
the following characteristics: 
 
1. A particular dual set of geographical territories:   
a. the place from which the refugee flees, usually addressed as the country of origin; 
b. the place of refuge; which is called the country of arrival or refugium. 
 
2. A typical act: refuge, which indicates a specific act of fleeing from a specific form of 
repressive power by a specific subject from a country of origin to a country of arrival. 
 
3. A specific experience as a result of a political gesture: exclusion, in which both country of 
origin and country of arrival take their part. Denying rights such as freedom of speech or 
assembly in the country of origin, and the legal-system of the country of arrival once this 
denies the refugee access.  
 
4. A (juridical/political/affective) state of affairs: exile. Characterized as a limbo, such as refugee 
camps, exile takes place in-between the country of origin and country of arrival.  
 
Flight refers immediately to verbs such as belonging to or being excluded from a community. The 
limbo undermines the distance between the country of origin and the country of arrival. In this study, 
however I will – in line with Ghorashi (2003) – criticize the idea of exile as “a transitional phase 
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between separate social realities, namely homeland and the new country” (p. 125). The limbo has the 
tendency to grow beyond political predictions. This limbo gives rise to the question whether the event 
of flight connotes more than a momentary change in the course of a particular action and the 
transformation of a specific subject such as a refugee. As Agamben (2000) suggested a politics that 
excludes a refugee does not only affect refugees but non-refugees as well. Flight is a process that 
affects various subjects. By ‘transversalizing’ the limbo called exile as an in-between that affects all 
political relations in a society I will argue against the analytical relevance of the opposition between 
the country of origin and the country of arrival; as well as politics for refugee versus politics for non-
refugee. Limbo is not only a no man’s place; but in words of Marli Huijer (2016) also a no man’s time 
in which not only those who leave but also those who stay behind – the ones who sense an enforced 
immobility – are intertwined (p. 41). By implication flight as a political notion refers to a more 
complex milieu than the exotic personal experience of a refugee. By defining limbo in such a manner, 
not a particular state of politics but politics in general (i.e. being part of a community) is at stake. As a 
result, flight does not only discursively change due to different types of society, but in its process also 
creates multiple communities that emerge simultaneously. In other words, the process of flight 
engenders different levels of relating. Flight brings about multiple discourses of subjectivity that 
relate permanently to multiple coinciding territories. 
 
It is through this idea of coinciding territories that I reconsider the discursive setting in which the 
current crisis of the refugees is reflected upon. In my view, the contemporary political analysis that 
give rise to policies concerning refugees are outdated. Contemporary theoretical and practical 
‘dominant’ discourses are insufficient to adequately portray this so-called crisis in the 21st century, let 
alone address it effectively. To summarize, the crisis of the refugee, migrant or so-called minorities as 
Harry Belafonte (2016) and Noam Chomsky (2016) state, is not an external problem or the problem 
of the other. As Schinkel (2008) argues integration is not the problem of the other but a problem 
implemented by policies that define individuals as integrated us and non-integrated other. The crisis 
of the so-called newcomer is immanent to the Western world. In order to visualize the various 
responsibilities of all the parties involved, I rather reverse the perspective. Not looking from here to 
there; but looking from there to here, as well. What does the eye of the other say about our 
presuppositions such as oppositional thinking and categorization of others. In order to do so, in my 
research I implement critical conceptual tools which are introduced by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) in 
their A Thousand Plateaus. What are the intrinsic dimensions of this crisis and how do we enforce 
critical thought into daily and theoretical understanding of the state of refugees?  
  
In this research, the relationality in-between life and expression is viewed on through Deleuze and 
Guattari’s semiotic quadrant: matter/form and content/expression. In the first part, the methodological 
context is elaborated and brought into relation with Arendt and Agamben's work. After Part I 
Dispositioning a Milieu in which I dispose the conceptual and paradigmatic frameworks of thinking 
within politics of flight; in Part II Exposition of Milieus the quadrant is used to approach the diversity 
of practices within the politics of flight. This provides a politico-philosophical diagnosis in which the 
relationships between bodies and expression are always carried out in the same way in each chapter: 
from form of content to form of expression to matter of expression to matter of content. Form of 
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content is the territorial setting in which bodies are assembled in a certain way; these assemblies are 
strengthened by form of expression. Yet forms break and degrade, they never fully touch the 
unthinkable reality. They do not always give room to the voices, gestures and images (matter of 
expression) that defy the absoluteness of these forms. Yet, I end each chapter with the matter of 
content; which simply indicates life itself in all its varieties and in all its possible connections to a 
discourse. Each chapter ‘concludes’ with matter of content, due to the fact that, as I argue, life is the 
most neglected phenomenon in politics. The ending is however not for the sake of finality; but for the 
sake of a process. As a feedback loop this ‘recapitulation’ bends back toward the start; toward 
enforced forms of content and forms of expression, in order to create another form of politics. How do 
we express endlessness? How do we approach a limbo as a topos of in-between that escapes our 
discursive vocabulary of here versus there? Let us start with a question: 
 
 
How do we approach a politics of flight? 
 
 
 
  
Part one: Dispositioning a Milieu 
Tools of Thought for a Politics of Flight  
 
 
 
 
What I came to understand is that change is not a choice.  
Not for the species of plant, and not for me.  
It happens, and you are different. …  
Maybe the only distinction between the plant and me  
is that afterward …  
I lied about my change  
(Kaufman & Kaufman, 2002, p. 80). 
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Chapter 1: A Matter of Approach 
 
 
What I offer is a model of the archive not as the 
conversation of self into a textual gathering, but as 
a ‘contact zone’  
(Ahmed, 2014, p. 14). 
 
1.1 Approaching from Within  
 
In order to research a subject, a researcher must find and set forth the manner in which she 
methodologically approaches a subject. This chapter thus starts with ushering three questions: 
 
1. How to approach a politics of flight?  
2. Who is the subject of politics of flight? 
3. What is flight as an event? 
 
In the first two sections (1.1 & 1.2) the manner of approaching a politics of flight will be examined. 
On an experiential level, which is needed in order to surpass the conventional way of approach, a 
politics does not only thematize a global event, but – as Foucault (1977) argued with his thesis on 
disciplining – also concerns the embodiment by individuals. In order to understand the effects of 
flight as a discursive practice we have to start from within this experience.  
Approaching from within leads us to reconsider not only how this multiple discourse 
fragments identity of people but also shows how these identities are always already problematic. They 
always assemble multiple discourses. Applying the notion of rhizome, proposed by Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987), elucidates the transformative quality of the experience of flight in which the 
fragments of identity or individual dots are assembled by acting and speaking, as Arendt (1958) 
shows through her idea of interest. In the third section (1.3) this connection will lead to extend the 
types of subjects that are interested in this politics through their different involvements within the 
process of flight.  
In the final section (1.4) flight is analyzed as an event from which unpredictable connections 
can emerge as a result of its potential (Agamben) and virtual (Deleuze) supplement. Acknowledging a 
creative production of new political coherence as Arendt does in her notion of natality opens 
dimensions in a politics of flight that surpass, yet does not neglect, the sheer negative and 
  
traumatizing experiences that are associated with flight and refugees. Flight does not appear as a 
deterritorializing yet critical experience and event. It rather emerges from a desire that is immanent in 
life: the will to be born again, the will to begin.  
 
What is a method? The etymology of the word shows that this notion originates from the Greek word 
méthodos, which is a combination of meta, meaning ‘after’ and ‘above’, and hodos, meaning ‘way’. 
Method thus means the way that one retrospectively has been traveling. The road is already there, and 
the one who uses this method pursues a thing that is already there. Methodology means scientific 
inquiry that retrospectively legitimates its pursuit. The contemporary meaning of the word refers to a 
procedure through which structural elements of an investigation, whether in thought or in the physical 
world, are explored. Reflection on methodology has regularly been presented as finding the right 
method, and has also often been criticized due to this assumption. Paul Ricœur (1970, pp. 33-36)1 and 
Michel Foucault (1994) refer to the three great ‘masters of suspicion’ – Marx, Nietzsche and Freud – 
who have invalidated the linearity of and truthness2 in methodological thinking and the presumption 
of the interpretation of an objective reality outside language. Within the works of these suspicious 
minds, Foucault suggests, lies “once again the possibility of a hermeneutic” (p. 272). 
 
Interpretation can never be completed, this is quite simply because there is nothing 
to interpret. There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, for after all 
everything is already interpretation, each sign is in itself not the thing that offers 
itself to interpretation but an interpretation of other signs (p. 275). 
 
Such hermeneutics thus does not plead for an evolving historical process toward a true interpretation 
and understanding, as Jos de Mul (2004) in line with Dilthey and Schleiermacher points out. This 
hermeneutic rather taking its interpreting character seriously, present itself as an infinite task and 
remains critical in movement by defining itself as incomplete (p. 119).  Along with a philosophical 
and historical critical attitude toward truthness of an interpretation and the method, contemporary 
thinkers – in sociology, cultural studies and gender studies – problematize the moralistic assumptions 
                                                     
1 Ricœur at first appreciates Marx’s, Nietzsche’s and Freud’s attempts to problematize consciousness respectively through 
notions of economic necessity, perspectivism and unconsciousness. While Descartes doubted the material world but not his 
consciousness, these ‘masters of suspicion’ explore the problematic forces within consciousness. However, Ricœur also 
criticizes these three masters due to the fact that according to them the liberation from the illusions of consciousness lies in 
the same unreliable consciousness. Hence creating an aporia. Michel Foucault on the other hand appreciates this aporia as an 
engine of hermeneutics and thought. In his Door schijn bewogen: Naar een hyperkritiek van de xenofobe rede, Oosterling 
(1996) explores the effects of this aporia on methodology in French philosophies of difference.  
2 I prefer to use the neologism truthness, instead of the common notion truthfulness. In truthfulness lies a moral obligation of 
honesty and the involvement of the subject in this obligation. What I rather indicate by truthness is the assumption of 
methodology to be independent of the subjectivity of a researcher as well as the discourse to which a researcher belongs. 
Truthness intends to surpass the moral approvals and judgments of such a discourse. It refers to the presumption of factuality 
and objectivity. Truthness also differs from truthiness. Truthiness refers to a feeling, an intuition for truth without the need to 
justify itself. Truthness on the other hand refers to a process of analysis and objective evaluation independent of feeling and 
intuition.  
  
of a ‘right’ method.3 They argue that each method in its procedure creates its own rightness and its 
own reality. A method creates its own truth. It is in this attitude that methodology has become a 
science of finding a path rather than walking the path. Martin Heidegger even speaks of creating a 
path instead of finding one.4 
 The truthness of methodology and interpretation is also problematic due to the experiences of 
multiple structures of thought and logics. The political and social transformations within and outside 
the academic world have weakened the certainties of a right method. Different genders, sexual 
preferences, social classes, economic and cultural backgrounds create different truths and different 
types of consistency. This does not, however, justify a disengaged attitude, let alone indifference. The 
flows of migration in the twentieth century, as well as the aftermath of enslavement, (de)colonization, 
First and Second World War, Cold War, Balkan War, Golf War, the massacre of Bosnians, Syrian 
War, war on terror and the movement of millions of refugees nowadays have challenged the idea of 
unrelatedness between different forms of truth. Different forms of emancipation, due to multiple 
backgrounds, have confronted the so-called ‘majority’5 in their homogeneous lines of argumentation. 
New sciences such as gender studies and postcolonial studies, as well as multiple alternative medical 
treatments emerge. The 20th century is not only a century of wars, and great confrontations, but it is 
also a century of multiple types of confrontations. Geopolitical confrontations on the macro-level as 
well as clashes on multiple micro-levels of bodies have begun to defy the concept of a single ruling 
group. The 21st century will be a century of minorities, not necessarily in the sense of occupying 
power but in the sense of visibility.6 
                                                     
3 In social studies, we could think of Karl Marx’s idea that different social classes cause different types of thought, or Max 
Weber’s idea that religious backgrounds influence economic discourses. On the level of cultural studies thinkers such as 
Edward Said refer to cultural bias in anthropology. They criticize the western approximation of non-western cultures. In 
gender studies Luce Irigaray played a significant role by visualizing the male preferences within the language. Language is 
often structured hierarchically: masculine designations are more appreciated than feminine designations.  
4 In Off the Beaten Track, Heidegger (2002) introduces this idea in a motto: “‘Wood’ is an old name for forest. In the wood 
there are paths, mostly overgrown, that come to an abrupt stop where the wood is untrodden. They are called Holzwege. 
Each goes its separate way, though within the same forest. It often appears as if one is identical to another. Nonetheless, it 
only appears so. Woodcutters and forest keepers know these paths. They know what it means to be on a Holzweg.” This idea 
is also apparent when Heidegger connects Dasein to design (Entwurf). Although, Dasein is thrown in the world, it 
nonetheless has the ability of designing this thrownness. Understanding thus appears in this amalgamation of being thrown 
in-the-world and the idea of designing thrownness. Awee Prins (2007) states that in this urge to design our Dasein we are 
fixated to define and structure our state of being and in this process, we eliminate the secrecy that is inherent to our existence 
(pp. 284-285). 
5 In this document, the term majority indicates those having political power and not numbers of individuals. I will come back 
to the topic in a more systematic way in third and fourth chapter. 
6 I will elaborate on this rise of the minorities in the fifth chapter that concerns the multicultural society. For now, it is 
crucial to notice that the 20th and 21st century are unprecedented due to the revolt of the working class, feminism, anti-
colonialism, anti-enslavement, emancipation of LGBTQQ and migrants. The emancipation of minorities is slowly changing 
the image of the ruling class. The rise of Internet has further affected this process of visibility in which not only the control 
society has become stronger but it has also stimulated different types of relations between minorities beyond the national 
borders around the world. Emancipation, due to its transnational trait, is in current times not merely a local issue, but is 
shared as well as imposed all around the globe. Jos de Mul (2010) thus calls Internet a meta-organization, which cannot be 
characterized by old terminologies such as big brother on the one hand and democratic open source on the other. It contains 
 
  
 
The methodological line of thought on flight in this chapter follows the lines of a development of this 
visibility. The notion of flight, as an act of refuge, is as old as men’s knowledge of its being. In the 
well-known creation myth in the Abrahamic religions, it is mentioned that Adam and Eve were 
banned from paradise; in their experience of shame they were forced to flee towards displacement and 
homesickness. Nevertheless, in the 20th and 21st century the immensity of numbers of refugees as well 
as the political relevance of the subject of flight is unprecedented in comparison to the centuries 
before. In 2012 there were more than 45 million and in 2014 almost 60 million refugees and internally 
displaced persons worldwide (UNHCR, 2013b & 2015). Refuge and forced migration are nowadays 
not incidental consequences of wars and famine, but paradoxically an exceptional, yet permanent state 
of affairs. The refugee camps in Jordan and Pakistan inhabited by generations of Palestinians and 
Afghanis, the transformation of the biggest refugee camp in Dadaab in Kenya into an urban 
infrastructure by mostly refugees from Somalia and also from Sudan and Ethiopia, and the mass 
refuge of Syrians to Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan are some examples of the long duration of these 
affairs. Refuge, migration and statelessness have become some of the main problems of modern 
politics. Due to the immensity of the problem it has become impossible to find a method in order to 
resolve or dispose of this impasse of permanent exceptional state of affairs. How does one handle the 
migration of millions of people, and even more so, how does a state react to ‘a group’ that except for 
their act of forced migration have no other commonality?7 Knowing no homogeneity, refugees and 
migrants are from all over the globe. The spectrum of differences – in culture, gender, political and 
religious orientation, and economic and social background, not to mention that of different 
generations – obstructs the search for a method to orientate action and thought on these issues. Flight 
has different expressions and contents, as a result of which it gives rise to a complex setting of notions 
and discourses, defining both body and mind of the involved subjects, which in further analysis I will 
call politics of flight. 
  
Striving to reach a common goal or following a single road suggests a preformatted method. 
However, a single method, whether it is created or found, is inadequate due to the complexity of 
politics of flight. Already in the first steps of an examination I have discovered that by choosing a 
single method one not only limits one’s thought on the matter, but one can even make lies sound like 
truths. Human trafficking does not only appear on the road, but – as Schinkel (2008) argues – also 
within the rigidity of a methodology to enforce subjects into one form of existence and thinking. 
Truthness functions within its own logic. Within the multiplicity of thought, unitary truths become 
problematic and in some cases even deadly. Yet, I do not simply plead for a lack of method. The 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the fears of pessimists as well as the hopes of optimists. It is fundamentally out of control, containing active and reactive 
forces at once (pp. 41-49). 
7 The notion of commonality is in line with the notion of relationality. Commonality refers in the first instance to a trait, a 
state of being or an identity, that multiple individuals share. I like to point out that a gathering of individuals identified as 
refugees have no common trait in their identity except their act of flight from one place to the other. In the sixth chapter the 
notion of commonality will instead indicate a common relationality that is neither determined by an identity nor predicts a 
certain formation of an identity.   
  
critique of a single method is deconstructive: in destructing the idea of a single method there is the 
acknowledgement of the multiplicity of methods, disciplines, structures and discourses within politics 
of flight. Next to the previously mentioned differentiation, the articulation of this politics occurs 
academically on multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary levels. Refugees and refuge are familiar 
notions in juridical, political and social sciences, as well as in feminist, cultural and anthropological 
studies. The chaos within a politics of flight is thus not caused by a lack of something, but rather by 
the abundance of discourses and their ongoing transformation. The experience of chaos is not one of 
emptiness but rather the disability to keep up with the speed of transformation within this politics. As 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue: 
 
Chaos is characterized less by the absence of determinations than by the infinite 
speed with which they take shape and vanish … The problem of philosophy is to 
acquire a consistency without losing the infinite into which thought plunges (in 
this respect chaos has as much a mental as a physical existence) (p. 42). 
  
Chaos is not without structure. The unpredictability of chaos appears in the interwovenness in-
between causality and contingency. The goal of resolving chaos is only intelligible to those who 
believe in the permanency of structures. From the human perspective, we do not have the ability to 
survey the chaos and to determine its structure or the lack of it. Structured thought means in a sense 
making a cut within the chaos, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, in order to acquire consistency. This 
act, as they show, which is performed not only in science, philosophy and art, but also in politics and 
religion, must sense its own normative act of cutting. Within this act of cutting, multiple engagements 
and formations of structures become unavoidable. The analysis of politics of flight is therefore a 
philosophical act of decision too,8 a cutting through the excess of life and politics. Cutting means 
multiplying differences. Due to its multidisciplinary trait, this politics is therefore gifted as well as 
burdened with a multiplicity of expressions. Its Babylonian chaos does not only appear in philosophy, 
science and politics but is also uttered in other forms of expression such as art practices. Philosophical 
engagement in cinematic and literary works expresses in yet a different way this Babylonian tension. 
So, no matter how thorough a thinker engages herself within her own field of research, a politics of 
flight remains an immanently multifaceted surface. Chaos is permanently present within its 
methodological approach of its object.  
 
Due to this methodological multiplicity within the chaos of paths, I prefer to speak of another act than 
that of finding the right method. Politics of flight is not in need of a final and definitive method but its 
multiplicity needs multiple approaches. In order to relate to the notion of flight one must start to 
                                                     
8 Decision (de = stopping & caedo = to cut) has the double meaning of parting as well as coming together: stopping to cut. It 
is however crucial to note that in its complexity, decision is not the equivalent of choice. As is suggested by Heidegger 
decision is a) not a sheer choice, b) not a sheer human act, even when they are involved. Decision is according to Heidegger 
owned by being and not an anthropological phenomenon (Maly, 2008, pp. 58- 63). In 1.3 I will argue that even if decision is 
considered to be a form of action, as Arendt would argue, it befalls the subject rather than being defined and calculated by 
the subject.  
  
approach this ‘object’ rather than structuring it according to a particular form of thought. The idea of 
approach, in its etymology as well as in its contemporary meaning, has multiple useful elements. 
 
1) First, approach means coming near or nearer to something or someone in distance. There is a 
territorial and vectorial element implied. In 2.4 the territorial effect of politics of flight will be 
delineated as a milieu of flight. An approach refers to positioning and in this sense, refers to the 
second part of the word milieu, lieu as in place. The nearing aspect of this act could be reduced to a 
measure and a distance. Being further away is in opposition to being closer and hence suggesting a 
greater distance in view and perspective. In this distinction, the act of approaching is placed 
somewhere between a general view – a bird’s eye view – and a particular view – as is the case with 
the humble worm’s eye view. Throughout this study, however, I will time and again argue that the 
events of a politics of flight cannot be categorized as generalities or particularities. Being an 
unprecedented event (1.4) it is rather experienced as a singularity. Individuals are neither particular 
outcomes of general notions such as ethnicity, like Moroccan or Dutch, nor idiosyncratic expressions 
of an identifiable amalgamation of culture, such as Dutch Moroccans (5.3.1). An individual is a 
complex singular event and cannot be exclusively defined in clear categories. The mayor of 
Rotterdam Ahmed Aboutaleb has lived through endless processes of identification, in which any form 
of identity would fail to fixate him. With his public statement “je suis Charlie” after the terrorist 
attack on the Charlie Hebdo office in 2015 he even radically means to present himself as mayor of a 
European city. 
 Philosophical insight, in this analysis of politics of flight, is not something that is gained or 
possessed. As we will see in 2.2, thought in this politics, as problematizing vector, functions as an 
engine to keep processes going, instead of ending a process. It is all about transformative knowledge 
rather than final judgments. There is so to speak a sense of emergency in an approach. It has no 
previous agenda. The experience of approaching does not necessarily refer to measuring physical 
distances or spaces. It also points at an affective9  dimension of nearing someone or something. 
Heidegger’s (1996) notion of de-severance (Ent-fernung) refers to such dynamics. De-severance does 
not indicate farness or closeness in space but refers to the intensity of Dasein’s engagement in the 
world, its being-in-the-world (pp. 138-144). On this affective level, to approach is to decrease the 
farness of something even when you are near. Being-near is here understood as being-placed in the 
middle of a discourse as a milieu (see in this study: 2.4). 
 
2) Instead of the physical far and near, the coming near of the act of approach implies a second 
meaning: dealing with. Approach also indicates engagement and the act of relating to. This, however, 
must not be understood as an intentional act wherein someone relates itself to someone or something 
already existing in a definitive form and matter. Approach means relating. It is a process in thought in 
which the researcher and the research are born simultaneously. The emphasis is on the engagement as 
a relation rather than on the engaging relata. Think of the discovery of penicillin. The approach was 
                                                     
9 In Deleuze and Guattari’s oeuvre affect contains the idea of sensitization. It is the full involvement of the body, while 
measuring refers mostly to the reflective processing of what is conceived by the eyes. Affect indicates (e)valuation through 
the body. See for a summary: Colman, 2005, pp. 11-12. 
  
neither intended by the subject, nor could be defined as a preliminary methodology. Approach rather 
indicates that the subject as the discoverer Alexander Fleming is set in the middle of a process. It is 
the unintentional and non-methodical engagement of Fleming that gives rise to a spontaneous 
emergence that led to the discovery of an object: penicillin.10 The approach is, nonetheless, not a 
random process. The manner of approach gives rise to a certain structured context. Each individual 
who approaches politics of flight is influenced by a set of reference frameworks that predetermine 
one’s manner of approach. Still, this does not imply that it is limited to a previous set out goal. The 
approach is open, meaning it allows spontaneity and gives room to new engagements. It creates a 
context in which the subject as discoverer and the object as discovered emerge simultaneously. Any 
form of foundation or justification retrospectively appears within the context of approach and is not 
simply prior to it.  
 
3) Third, approach refers to the notion aggress. As such an approach contains elements of attacking. 
This aspect of approaching is rather deconstructive than hermeneutical. The violence of an approach 
lies in its eventuality; it deactivates existing coherent relationships and creates new consistencies. In 
the notion of approach the act of cutting into the chaos is not camouflaged. It is aware of its own 
violent nature, its own tactical moves and strategic focus. Approach also refers to the notion advance, 
which refers to the confrontational approach of an enemy as well as to seduction as understood in the 
expression making advances.11 Approach has thus an affinity with the notion of force – as not yet 
articulated power – in order to gain access to or enforce a passage; and to the notion accede, meaning 
producing an entrance in order to enter. To enter as in to arrive12 and to come, does not imply a 
coming from an outside, entering an inside. Chronologically it does not distinguish itself from being-
in-the-middle. One is always already in media res, in-between, i.e. inter-ested, an Arendtian notion 
that is explored in her The Human Condition (1958). Arriving – which means that one is always 
already in the middle of an event – in approaching indicates becoming connected and related to, 
predispositioned by an ontology of being in the middle, of a milieu. Approaching is thus dealing with 
this being positioned in an ever-changing middle, as a result of the ongoing analyzing and 
categorizing.13 The idea of dealing with means dealing not from a confrontational distance, but within 
the engagement that places the subject in the middle, completing the meaning of the word milieu in 
this study: mi-middle – lieu-place. As such an approach deals with a certain intensity of immanent 
                                                     
10  "When I woke up just after dawn on September 28, 1928, I certainly didn't plan to revolutionize all medicine by 
discovering the world’s first antibiotic, or bacteria killer … But I guess that was exactly what I did” (Brent, 2017). 
11 See: Oxford English Dictionary. “Advances made to a person for the purpose of improperly influencing his action.” 
12 Derrida (1993) speaks of absolute arrivant, which indicates a subject, an act, a place, or an event. Nevertheless, in all 
cases it is not possible to indicate or define this arrivant. It is, as he puts it, de-identified. It is not the entrance of a refugee or 
a migrant, due to the fact that such entrance identifies a territory by its borders, defining the other as foreign. Arrivant is that 
which is not expected, there is no prior knowledge, it does not realize a promise, it is not the invention or occupation of a 
promised land. There is no telos, and thus in this sense not a defined chronology of past, present and future. Whatever it may 
be, wherever it may occur, it takes us by surprise (pp. 33-35).  
13 In intercultural perspective, the Japanese notions ma (in-between/harmony) and kiri (cutting/rupture) are clarifying. They 
indicate the eventuality of a milieu rather than qualities or results of a subjective action. Oosterling (2000a) states: “‘Ma is 
the place in which a life is lived’ … In ma, in other words, communis is both sensed and embedded, while in kiri the 
operative, deffering and differentiating forces that ‘work’ ‘within’ this continuum are stressed” (pp. 73-74). 
  
engagement within a milieu. There is neither outside nor inside, neither interiority nor exteriority. In 
less technical and a more jargonistic terminology: we are part of the problem and part of the solution. 
Still, this exclusive distinction situates us again within an oppositional thinking that we want to avoid. 
This is done in this research by problematizing the problem. In chapter three I will tackle this by 
introducing the notion of paradigm. As an object of thought within politics different types of 
paradigms create different types of relationality that lead to multiple types of communities on micro-, 
meso- and macro-level. It will be argued that politics of flight is not only polyparadigmatic on a 
philosophical level or scientific level (De Mul, 2004, 124); but more so on a political level.    
 
4) Finally, the porosity of the notion of approach allows the taking of a position, the making of a 
statement and the offering of a proposal, a proposition. Nonetheless, this proposition is never absolute 
nor final. It is always preliminary. In this research Agamben’s notion of potentiality (1.4.1) is applied 
to analyze the options that these three types of approach could offer. Through these options thus I 
intend to engage with the potentiality of politics of flight.  
 
In the next paragraph this multifaceted idea of approach is rephrased using Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1987) elaboration on the concept and the ontology of a rhizome. Since rhizome resists the idea of 
finality within potentiality, this notion is an adequate tool to configure complexity and multiplicity of 
the philosophical act of approaching flight and its politics. Yet, this is not the object of political 
philosophy as a separate branch of the philosophical trade. With Deleuze and Guattari I will argue 
that ontology and politics are equiprimordial. And in 3.3 I will draw the conclusion that politico-
philosophy – with the hyphen – is an image of thought that connects life to its expression, connects 
thought to its practice: life-expression-politics. 
 
Since, in approaching a politics of flight we have to deal with a variety of disciplines, a ‘rhizomatic’ 
approach seems adequate. First, a rhizomatic approach of flight opposes the need of a single 
methodology with its overall view on subjects, objects and events. Strictly spoken rhizomatics is a 
non-method; still it is not a destructive force. Rhizome de-ranks a method and resists the tendency to 
enforce a main entrance to an exclusive domain of knowledge that finalizes truth finding. By 
opposing the idea of a main gate a rhizomatic approach opens multiple entrances. In this research, I 
will argue for multiple entrances within politics of flight.  
 Second, a rhizomatic approach makes room for an interdisciplinary study of politics of flight. 
Politics of flight is intertwined by multiple academic approaches, but also by non-scholarly 
discourses, such as ideological, religious and journalistic ones. Due to the potential of multiple 
entrances, a rhizomatic approach de-ranks the relevance of sources by neither categorizing them as 
objective or subjective, factual or fictional, which remain in an anguish of the truthness of the matter. 
An artistic expression is as relevant as a juridical or philosophical work. Images can sensitize more 
than academic lectures and policy reports. The photographs of Yto Barrada’s project Sleeper 
expresses within the image of migrants and their sense of lost identity and dislocation more than 
extensive analyses on these themes. The faceless figures affect the viewer on another level (La 
Biennale di Venezia, 2007, pp. 26-29). On this experiential level, a rhizomatic approach sensitizes 
discursive networks that connect different forms of expressions. An approaching act of a politics of 
  
flight, even in an academic setting, needs to relate to these multiple entrances, because these are all 
states of affairs within this politics. This does not mean that a researcher is capable of being 
exhaustively interdisciplinary. Her research is focused, yet principally porous, and open to all sides. A 
researcher must be aware of her incapacity to open all of the many entrances. Nevertheless, she 
comprehends the necessity to engage despite this inability to identify.   
 Third, a rhizomatic approach, due to its non-hierarchical interdisciplinarity, does not only 
deconstruct the exclusiveness of some types of relationship, it simultaneously creates space for new 
manners of arrival. Rhizomatics is about different forms of inclusion, differences and engagement, 
than only about those types of inclusion that come along with exclusion, identity and indifference. 
Due to its violent nature of rupturing, it is full of optional roads. This approach, as we will see in the 
coming chapters is affirmative in its critical act. I would rather call this ethical, due to the fact that 
questioning the manner of approach means questioning the manner in which one relates, wants and 
needs to relate to others. Furthermore, a rhizomatic approach has no teleological tendencies: it is 
always leading somewhere, but this need of consistency emerges within its act of research. A goal 
presupposes an accurate path as the right way of thought or right method. As I will elaborate later on, 
through the trilogy life-expression-politics, it is precisely because of the different attitudes of 
communities that the image of flight is shaped and reshaped beyond any given finality. Finally, 
despite its ethical trait and due to the permanent multiplicity of approach rhizomatics lacks a specific 
morality, notwithstanding the fact that different forms of moralistic discourses appear and disappear 
on its surface. In the second part I will elaborate more on this ethical and moral character of a rhizome 
and its relevancy for politics of flight. 
 
1.2 Rhizome: The Logic of Roots 
 
1.2.1 An Open Book 
In order to elaborate on the notion of politics in politics of flight, and in order to understand the global 
setting in which it is positioned, it is important first to diagnose a politico-economic dynamic that is 
highly explicative for globalization: capitalism. In 1972, the cooperation between two thinkers, 
academic philosopher Gilles Deleuze and political activist and therapist Félix Guattari, led to the 
publication of a book that broke with the conventional critical theories on capitalism. Anti-Oedipus 
(1983) is the first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia and the first product of a long productive 
partnership between the two thinkers. In this first part, they introduce the notion of desire as a 
machinic dynamism: “Everywhere it is machines – real ones, not figurative ones: machines driving 
other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the necessary couplings and 
connections” (p. 1). 
 Machinic expresses that desire and interest, although two distinct features thematized in the 
oeuvres of Freud and Marx, are nevertheless interrelated. Deleuze and Guattari reach beyond Freudo-
marxism that had its heyday in the late 60’s. Desire, which refers to vital flows, is revolutionary in 
itself due to the fact that it is capable of escaping the structures of power and of creating interest of its 
own. Each desire has its interest(s) and each interest tends to capture desire. In contrast to the 
capturing mechanism in capitalism their ‘libidinal’ philosophy opens multiple vectors for an 
  
unconditional flow of desire. A subject is a desiring machine14 that results from the connecting and 
cutting of flows of desires that are generated within and between bodies. Power, in the case of the 
capitalist machine, attempts to instrumentalize these forceful desires for the concentration of power, 
as happens in the marketing and advertisement business. The power of capitalism operates by 
processes of simultaneously stimulating and fixing flows of desire: decode and recode.  
 That explains why Deleuze and Guattari characterize capitalism as schizophrenic. The 
decoding – stratified as de/reterritorialization and politicized as both anarchistic and fascist desire – 
tends towards destruction: desire desiring its own demise, its own death, as we witnessed in the past 
century in totalitarian systems. They reason that capitalism like no other ideology engages with the 
double structure of desire, due to its schizophrenic traits: opening and fixing. It permanently poses 
contradictory economic and social demands, creating double binds: if you want this, you need this. 
For instance, it simultaneously advocates a fully free market economy, yet sets boundaries with high 
import tariffs. As Ten Bos (2015) argues, while neoliberalism firmly opposes bureaucracy; 
nonetheless it permanently produces bureaucratic policies in order to control the economic flows (p. 
141). Capitalism continually strives for stabilized and institutionalized optimization while time and 
again creating a crisis in order to open up new markets. As Georges Bataille (1897-1962), one of the 
foundational sources for philosophies of difference, argues: economy is ruled by the logic of 
abundance and transgression. Scarcity is produced in abundance. Its logic is a permanent state of 
transgression.15 The crisis is a necessary condition for the sustainability of economy, just like the 
existence of ‘The Truth’ thrives on the deconstruction of other ‘truths’. Capitalism understands more 
than any other system that creation and destruction, i.e. production and consumption, cultivation and 
dissipation, are the two sides of the same coin. Values in capitalism refer to the same dynamic; they 
are also produced and consumed. Deleuze and Guattari argue that any critique towards capitalism can 
never escape its logic. Capitalism’s dynamic is immanent. It does not yearn for the definitive answer 
or solution, but merely for the next absolute solution. It consumes its own critique in order to keep 
moving fast forward.  
 Nevertheless, this immanency does not mean the end or the futility of criticizing capitalism. 
Critique must flow permanently in order to challenge the idea of ‘value’ or in an epistemological 
sense the idea of ‘truth’. Deleuze and Guattari (1983) do not plead for freedom of speech, but for a 
freedom of streams of critique: streams that within the schizophrenic logic can only exist due to the 
obstructions. This immanent flow of friction or resistance emerges when the death driven tendencies 
are no longer considered to be external, as competing transcendent forces: politico-economic 
infrastructure (Marxism) versus a repressive father figure (Freudianism). Given the primacy of desire, 
for Deleuze and Guattari there is no exclusive opposition between the collective (Marx) and the 
                                                     
14This idea of desiring machine must not be confused with ideas such as selfish gene of Dawkins. Machine here refers to 
complex processes that, as we will see, do not find their point of origin through one form of discipline, in this case biology. 
It refers to the complexity of processes and the relationality in-between processes.   
15 Although the western economy intends to characterize itself as an economy based on lack, with the Potlatch in mind 
Bataille argues that every economy is based on dissipation of abundance rather than the calculated use of scarcity. The 
western economy endures in wasting not only goods and products, but also men, truths and thoughts (Oosterling 1989, pp. 
84-88).  
  
individual (Freud). Moreover, schizophrenic desire is not ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in itself; it is both fascist 
and anarchist. Anarchism can become self-destructive; as does fascism, which on a bodily level is 
qualified by them as micro-fascism. The micro-fascist desire longs for its own termination. That is 
why Foucault in the preface of the English translation of Anti-Oedipus suggests, that their book is a 
“tracking down of all varieties of fascism, from the enormous ones that surround and crush us to the 
petty ones that constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday lives” (p. xiv). In Anti-Oedipus, the 
schizophrenic trait of capitalism – decode and recode, deterritorialize and reterritorialize – 
overdetermines all politico-economic processes. As I will show in the second part, it is not only in 
totalitarianism (chapter 4) that fascism becomes self-destructive, but even within multiculturalism 
(chapter 5) micro-fascism and capitalistic schizophrenia enter implicitly and explicitly in our daily 
lives. All this has consequences for approaching a politics of flight. A politics of flight has to 
diagnose this micro-fascism in order to understand multiculturalism in its double bind: both as an 
emancipatory force of inclusion and a segmenting force of exclusion. What comes to the fore depends 
on the manner of approach.  
 
This ‘multiversity’ of approaching political processes is further elaborated on in their Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia 2: A Thousand Plateaus. The chapters are labeled as plateaus, a notion they take from 
Gregory Bateson.16 The first chapter introduces their critique on methodology, which was already 
applied in the experimental style of Anti-Oedipus but was redirected, due to criticism it received. Due 
to their emphasis on the liberation of desire in its affirmative force – nomadic, resisting, liberating, 
fleeing the ‘system’ – in the reception of the book the anarchistic tendencies were favored. Still, for 
Deleuze and Guattari the doubling of re/decoding is imperative. Nomadic and sedentary ways of life 
are supplementary and not dialectically opposed. The same goes for lines of segmentation and lines of 
flight that disclose every attempt to close the system. The second volume is even more radical: in its 
content and in its expression. A Thousand Plateaus is not a book structured according to a 
methodological logic. It is a rhizomatic experiment in itself. Rhizome is thought and thought is life. 
Then again, this book as a rhizomatic book is not a book of life or on life, but rather the expression of 
the manner in which a book comes to life, and stays alive. It is a performative expression of how a 
book becomes active and engaged. The rhizomatic ontology – not as being but as continuous 
becoming within and without thought, i.e. affective – engenders different forms of philosophy. Their 
book thus does not intend to philosophically explain the process of flight, but rather intend to pro-
activate thought in its engagement within a world of flight. This notion of flight has been an 
inspiration for this research on politics of flight.  
 Deleuze (1990) has already explained this supplementarity in an analysis of the adventures of 
Alice in Wonderland. From the perspective of being Alice either gets taller or smaller. From the 
‘perspective’ of becoming, however, Alice rather grows into all directions. It is not the measure of 
taller and smaller that matters, but the process of growing, in which “becoming does not tolerate the 
separation or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future” (p. 1). As Patricia Pisters 
(2003) explains:  
                                                     
16 Deleuze and Guattari (1983) cite Bateson in A Thousand Plateaus as the inventor of the term plateau (pp. 21-22 and 520 
n.20). Bateson used this term for the first time in his Steps to an Ecology of Mind in 1972. 
  
 
 The paradox of becoming is that there are always two things happening at the 
same time: when Alice grows larger, she simultaneously becomes larger than she 
was and smaller than she will be (when she grows smaller, she is simultaneously 
smaller than she was and larger than she will be). … All these paradoxic 
movements of becoming also undermine the fixed personal identity – hence 
Alice’s doubts about her own name (pp. 108-109). 
 
It is due to this folded time that there is no linearity in becoming and thus no finality. It happens now 
and here, in the actual. Its core of virtuality (as I will show in 1.4.2) will become a crucial concept in 
explaining how becoming unfolds within politics of flight. It is evident that the Aristotelian notion of 
potentiality (as I argue in 1.4.1) is redefined and upgraded by introducing Agamben’s use of the 
notion of impotentiality.  
 
Let me summarize my approach of a politics of flight this far. Using all these notions of philosophers 
like Arendt, Agamben, Foucault and especially Deleuze and Guattari, when it comes to a 
(non)method, what I intend to show is that a refugee is not someone that we can define as a fixated 
being; it is a becoming that influences all those who are involved within this politics of flight. As such 
flight is never out there. It is an immanent trait, a vital vector, within our globalized societies. It does 
not only affect the lives of those who move, but also the lives of those who remain behind (Huijer, 
2016). As a line of flight, it traverses ‘our’ very way of thinking and acting. To be even more precise: 
the lines of flight within Iraqis, Syrian, Eritrean, Ethiopian and Somalian individual bodies in the 
refugee camps, erected at the outer fringes of Europe, are formatted by Western geopolitics. This idea 
of becoming – rather than being – also creates a different idea of life as an expression of politics, i.e. 
of political ontology.  
 However, approaching the idea of becoming, A Thousand Plateaus starts on an experiential 
level: as a revaluation of the way in which one experiences a book. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 
discern thought as a rhizomatic flow from mere analysis of a reality outside a book. Their book is 
neither about discovering and clarifying an object or a clear analysis of a factual matter, nor does their 
book function merely as a tool to acknowledge a rationalizing subject – the authors and their 
psychological state of mind, expressed in ideas and experiences. Deleuze and Guattari agree that the 
content of any book “is made of variously formed matters” (p. 3), but that this content still differs 
from its expression. Both content and expression do not oppose each other as theory and practice, but 
supplement each other in multiple time zones and on diverse scales. Eventually their focus is on 
pragmatics. 
 This distinction between content, on the level of embodied matter, and expression, on the 
level of discursive enunciation, are crucial in the rhizomatics of Deleuze and Guattari. This was 
already thematized by Saussurean structuralism. Yet, their rhizomatics reaches beyond structuralism, 
even beyond post-structuralism. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari criticize Saussurean 
structuralism that discerns solely matter from form. They acknowledge Hjelmslev’s addition of the 
notion content and expression (pp. 43-45) to analyze the logic of signs more adequately. The notions 
matter and form must not be seen as an alternative to body and mind. They are neither oppositional to 
  
one another, nor do they refer specifically to human beings. Deleuze and Guattari also adopt and 
adapt Hjelmslev’s notion of stratification. In order to explain the multiplicity of their ontology they 
unfold the earth – the rhizomatic setting in which we live – into layers. On the first layer, the zero 
degree, there are no differences. We cannot imagine this layer. It is not a foundation that can be 
grasped and analyzed by us. In a systematic sense – not chronologically – multiple layers unfold. Yet, 
these layers are not hierarchically stapled, they rest ‘upon’ the zero-degree layer, or better: are 
immanent to this ‘indiscernible’ zone. Upon this ‘indiscernible’ zone ‘something’ forces itself upon 
something else. Two distinct processes unfold: content and expression. This creates two different 
types of formed matter. Expression is not the form of content; and content is not the matter of 
expression. Content and expression each have their own matter and form.  
 
In the next chapter (2.3) I will elaborate on these two notions, but for the time being it is crucial to 
notice that content and expression, although distinct, unfold upon each other too. Their relation is not 
oppositional and dialectical, but differential. First, differential indicates that the oppositional 
difference is not the only form of difference but as we will see, difference is manifold. Second, 
difference does not only appear in-between things; but is inter as well as intra. An owl does not only 
differ from a sheep; but also differs from the owl in the next tree. The owl even differs from itself 
during the process of life. It does not only change biologically, but also within the manner that it 
expresses itself. With the term differential, I thus refer to the complexity of multiplicity of difference. 
Furthermore, content and expression are not complementary, but supplementary to each other. This 
indicates that they are not the two parts of a complete picture (as we will see in 1.4.2); in other words, 
they do not complete one another or move one another toward something in a form of a progress; but 
as supplementary processes they affect one another rather in multiple directions. Content appears 
within expression and expression appears within content.  
Finally, due to being distinct processes, content and expression create two different types of 
rhizomatic connections that constitute the previously mentioned desiring machine. Deleuze and 
Guattari now introduce the notion ‘assemblage’ as the successor of desiring machine. Bodies connect 
on an affective level; utterances connect on a discursive level. Both types of assemblage – 
assemblages of bodies and assemblages of enunciation – are systematically distinctive, but their 
interaction leads to an ontologically non-discernable relation between assemblages of bodies and 
enunciation. The original French term for assemblage is agencement. Assemblage highlights the 
relational element as well as the process, thereby accentuating the machinic aspect. Nevertheless, 
according to Oosterling and Thissen (1998), the notion of agens (agency) is lost in the translation of 
agencement to assemblage. Agens means ‘to put in motion’, ‘to steer’ and ‘to act’. The etymology of 
the word agens also problematizes the fixation of an entity, whether as subject or identity, but still 
contains an agency, be it not as an intentional subject, but as a vectorial force (pp. 15-16; 
Schuilenburg, 2009). Agencement then refers to processes of attraction and repulsion in which 
different contents (bodies), as well as different expressions (enunciations) are interdependently 
enveloped into a provisional whole, i.e. a consistent and coherent meaningful practice. In applying the 
English notion of assemblage these traits of agencement are included in the further analyses. In the 
three chapters in Part II the importance of the distinction between content and expression as well as 
their different operations in politics of flight will be elaborated on. For now, it suffices to state that 
  
totalitarian assemblages of bodies and assemblages of enunciation inherently differ from assemblages 
within multicultural society or a coming community. 
 
Let us return to the Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) idea of a book and elaborate on the implications of 
these two types of assemblages for reading a book. A book has content and expression. It contains 
formed matters – sometimes Deleuze and Guattari use the notion ‘substance’ instead of matter – in the 
sense that it refers to multiple types of assemblages, both bodily and enunciatively. The Bible, until 
recently in the Christian world perceived as the Book of all books, is a controversial, but nevertheless 
good example. It is an assemblage of different religions and thus different approaches. The Old and 
the New Testament refer to Judaism and Christianity and is acknowledged, though in different 
settings, by the Islam. The Holy Book, written in Aramaic, Hebrew and Greek is also multilingual due 
to a multiplicity of narrators and territorial settings. The Bible is a textual assemblage connected to 
assemblages of bodies: multiple communities. From the ancient Egyptians and the Romans to 
contemporary communities such as Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox Christians or other 
denomination, assemblages of bodies come along with assemblages of enunciation. Originally written 
in Hebrew and Greek, for Catholicism use of this book in Erasmus’ Latin translation depends on the 
clergy’s knowledge of this language. In Protestantism, it was proliferated in a variety of folk 
languages, starting with the Lutheran German translation. So, the Bible is not a timeless or 
unchanging inert body, but a dynamic rhizomatic network. The so-called ‘common source’ has shown 
multiple functions and entrances throughout centuries and throughout the world. In this sense, this 
book already exposes a sense of politics of flight in its long-lasting history, debunking classical 
oppositions such as the West and the East. 
 
This, however, does not mean that a book is necessarily chaotic. A book is an open assemblage, 
meaning that although it has a consistency and is coherent, it is nevertheless open to the world for 
whatever connection. Not only on a textual level – intertextuality – but also on an affective and ethical 
level. It can be read time and again in completely different registers. Therefore, Deleuze and Guattari 
argue that its consistency is not due to a particular subject, but to a process of agencement in which 
writing and reading ‘subjects’ are formed, deformed and reformed instead of being producers and 
consumers of a meaning.  
 
However, what does an assemblage of bodies imply? Foucault’s (1977) analysis of Bentham’s 
panopticon as the basic format of modern subjectification is a good example here. The construction of 
the prison building creates an assemblage of bodies. Not only inmates, but also guards, and beyond 
the human: bricks, walls, windows and lights. These are not separated entities, but they are 
interrelated and positioned in the formation of assemblages of bodies. This is the content of the 
panopticon. Senseless in a sense: formed matter. The panopticon also creates ‘assemblages of 
enunciation’: subjects are not only subjected to a physical regime, but also to a discursive regime that 
they internalize: a discourse of politicians, judges, moralists, psychiatrists, criminologists. It is a 
disciplinary discourse of visibility in which prisoners are seen without seeing the one that guards 
them. They embody the discourse. This envelops bodily assemblages, giving these meaning by 
naming them ‘delinquents’. The content as assemblage of bodies is supplemented by this discursive 
  
expression. These utterances that give breath to them, ‘inspire’ them, bring them to life, but are never 
fully covering all affects of these bodies as desiring entities. The assemblage of enunciation is 
internalized by the prisoner as delinquency. They ‘become’ delinquents. Delinquency individualizes 
and subjects the body. It is not about the individuality of a prisoner, but its formation as a docile body 
within this ‘assemblage of enunciation’ (pp. 195-228). In connection with this discourse on 
delinquency Foucault speaks of disciplinary power that – in words of Deleuze and Guattari – creates 
‘assemblages of bodies’ and ‘assemblages of enunciations’ that unfold consistency over a period of 
time.  
 
Panopticon Content  Expression 
Form Prison Delinquency/subjectivity  
Matter Bodies Penitentiary practices 
 
I too will argue that politics of flight consists of multiple ‘assemblages of bodies’ and ‘assemblages of 
enunciations’ that in overlapping constitute a discursive configuration: the refugee, the migrant. Once 
the docile body is fully stripped of any form of expression and is downgraded to numbed matter, the 
Agambian notion of homo sacer becomes highly instructive. I will elaborate on this in the fourth 
chapter.  
 
Could we by now provide an answer to the question ‘how to approach a book?’ It is not the how of 
the approach – méthodos – but the act of approaching itself that ‘matters’. There is no final how, only 
momentary hows. A book is an indefinable, yet consistent process – a network of networks of 
meanings and affects without hierarchy – engaging with everything that affects it or that is affected by 
it. It is indefinable due to the unpredictable ways it connects to everything over time. The reception of 
Karl Marx’ Das Kapital is a clarifying case. Through the 20th century not only in the West, but all 
over the globe different interpretations and connections have been developed and various activists 
have related their ideology to this book. While some religious leaders condemned it, others such as 
Khomeini implicitly introduced and accentuated Marxist economic and socialist traits into and within 
a theocratic discourse (Afary, & Anderson, 2005). The revolution against the capitalistic world thus 
mobilized the working religious class among others. It is reasonable to state that Das Kapital is 
multiple in its proponents as well as in its opponents.  
 The reduction of a book to a single subject, theme or object, overlooks the ability of a book to 
connect to different matters and forms as a result of which its content and expression changes all the 
time. This reduction gives a poor view on the multiple ways in which books connect, i.e. on “the 
exteriority of their relations” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 3). Deleuze and Guattari argue that 
whether we open or close a book, a book is more characterized by its function, by its exteriority 
instead of its interiority. Yet these oppositions miss the point. Interiority and exteriority are situated 
within an immanence. A book for Deleuze and Guattari is first and for all a surface and as such it is 
embedded in a context, due to its association to what lies outside its ‘subject’. In the ‘final’ instance 
for them a book is a performative expression, which substantiates and forms assemblages on a 
  
discursive level, while affecting its reader’s bodies, transforming their ‘being’ into an assemblage 
itself. In a strict sense a book is, in the phrasing of academic education, a body of knowledge (BoK).17  
 
1.2.2 The Body and its Procedures 
A book is a body. Bodies are connected and reconfigured on different levels. Although bodies aim at 
consistency, nonetheless this consistency is constantly deterritorialized by forces that work upon its 
matter and form. This unarticulated field of forces is by Deleuze and Guattari qualified as a body 
without organs (BwO). This notion, introduced by Cotard in the 19th century, was reused by 
playwright, actor and director Antonin Artaud in 194718 in his radio play To Have Done with the 
Judgment of God (1988): 
 
For you can tie me up if you wish, 
but there is nothing more useless than an organ. 
 
When you will have made him (God TR) a body without organs, 
then you will have delivered him from all his automatic reactions 
 and restored him to his true freedom. 
 
Then you will teach him again to dance wrong side out 
as in the frenzy of dance halls 
and this wrong side out will be his real place (p. 571).19 
 
In the transcendental focus of this judgment, due to the illusion of an exteriority (God), law and order 
are defined, regulated and executed. Judgment is a bifurcating – cutting – process in which different 
binary phenomena and actions are identified and related to a normative structure. Categories of good 
                                                     
17 I have experienced this openness in education during my teachings to future social workers at the two Universities of 
Applied Sciences in Rotterdam. Philosophy lessons for them are never merely academic. They have to implement their 
readings in their reflections on life stories and their concrete attitude toward others. With certainty, I could state that while I 
was teaching them how different philosophers thought about life, they taught me how philosophy can become a life, beyond 
its academic isolation, creating a body of knowledge (BoK).  
18 The notion of ‘Body without Organs’ is first used by the French psychiatrist Jules Cotard (1840-1889). He describes it as a 
syndrome. Patients that suffered from it have trouble experiencing their bodies as an organism, they either thought that they 
were going to die or that their body was a hollow space. They experienced their body as a body without organs. Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) are not explicit in their reference to Cotard. The French version of A Thousand Plateaus does not mention 
the name Cotard. He is cited without reference. In the English version translator Brian Massumi corrects this (p. 150, and p. 
531 translators note 2) See also: Ten Bos, 2009, p. 61. 
19 In this radio play another character calls Artaud, who himself is a character in his play, a mad man. Artaud chatters on and 
on about the Americans stealing the sperms of children in order to begin a war, to make soldiers. A war that always refers to 
multiple enemies, while their identity remains the same. The body is a pursuit of fecality, the shit is that which exists, and 
turning the body, his body, into a closed entity is that which suffocates him. But when the body explodes as the result of the 
suffocation it shows its untouchability, its ungraspability. Men, however, make themselves entities, make god entities, and 
make themselves gods. “They have found a new way to bring out god and to capture him in his microbic noxiousness” 
(Artaud, 1988, p. 569). In chapter 4 I will elaborate on this wholeness of identity and the multiplicity of the ‘enemy.’ 
  
and evil, allowed and prohibited, internal and external are some of the commonly known forms of 
bifurcating. Dancing wrong side out does not indicate becoming evil, but refers to a way of thinking 
beyond these oppositional categories. Inspired by Artaud, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that 
despite an omnipresent tendency of judging and its suggestion of inevitability, organizations are 
always supplementary to an unorganized body, the BwO or, as they also qualify it, earth. In this 
study, I will explore the manners in which different types of organization within different types of 
politics form and deform bodies of those who are involved within politics of flight. This study is 
focused on the connection of bodies; not their unrelated distinction.  
 
Only by realizing that my flesh is your flesh and also the flesh of the animal, rises 
the suspicion that there can be suffering, that there may be joy, that the planet has 
created sensitivities (Ten Bos, 2011, p. 34, Translation TR). 
 
Let us now examine the manner in which this BwO relates to regular bodies. In Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, Deleuze (2006) introduces his rather minimalist idea of a body: a body, he writes,  
 
is a field of forces, a nutrient medium fought over by a plurality of forces. For in 
fact there is no ‘medium’, no field of forces or battle … Any two forces, being 
unequal, constitute a body as soon as they enter into a relationship. This is why the 
body is always the fruit of chance, in the Nietzschean sense, and appears as the 
most ‘astonishing’ thing, much more astonishing, in fact, than consciousness and 
spirit (pp. 39-40). 
 
Conventionally, a body, let us say for example a human body, is defined as an organism, which is 
characterized by the internal interdependency of its specific and functional organs in opposition to 
external forces. The human body is further defined by dualities; the most encompassing is the 
opposition between body and mind, or body and soul. Identity thus contains and refers to the inside, 
an interiority, which in the science of biology indicates the interiority of a body and in religious or 
Cartesian context the interiority of a cogito – res cogitans – or consciousness as opposed to a double 
exteriority: the material body – res extensa – and the superior mind of God.20 Within this setting the 
bodies of the same type of ‘closed’ organisms show analogous structures and functions. The heart is 
placed on the left-middle side of the body, the mouth functions as an eating mechanism and the 
functions of the nose are breathing and smelling. Nevertheless, despite these commonalities, a body, 
even a human body, can do more than one assumes it to do. The act of breathing and eating already by 
definition connects to an outside. Bacteria penetrate our body all the time and pregnancy testifies of 
how organs can change their ordinary position.21 Nowadays we can even survive the loss of an organ. 
                                                     
20 Mysticism in most religions deconstructs this duality between individual souls and God(s). Individual souls become part 
of God, while losing their individuality, and potentially share godliness. 
21 See for example the quote on a pregnancy site: “But the bladder isn’t the worst of it. Your lungs get squashed up into your 
throat. Forget having room for them to actually fill with air. Your stomach is smushed up into your ribs, with barely any 
room to expand for food. And your intestines? They get pushed off to wherever they can fit” (Neal, n.d). 
  
It can be replaced by artificial objects or technology. Jean-Luc Nancy’s (2008) text on his experience 
of an artificial heart is an ode to this openness. A new organ, a heart, penetrates Nancy’s body. His 
identity and his immunity are undermined. There is a sense of strangeness from within his body. 
Although Nancy states that there always has been a distance between himself and himself, the intruder 
forces an opening, an incision, making him suffer in-between the force of intrusion and the desire not 
to be-penetrated by it (pp. 161-170). 
 It is such porosity that inspires Deleuze (2006), with Benedictus Spinoza and Friedrich 
Nietzsche in mind, to define a body neither as a fixed entity, a closed whole, nor even as a medium on 
which external forces operate. A body does not have a relationship to forces; it is a relation between 
forces, “whether it is chemical, biological, social or political” (p. 40). A body is a middle, a milieu as 
a transforming knot of forces that work upon each other. It is not a substance and as such not a 
medium. While consciousness referring to the ego indicates an inferior whole in relation to a superior 
whole – such as the soul of a human referring to the ultimate Spirit – a body is a network of inferior or 
reactive forces and superior or active forces. Body is a living thing not because it effects force or is 
affected by forces, but because it is an interactive plane of these two types of forces, in which the 
quality of a force corresponds to the “difference in quantity”, and creates a hierarchy (pp. 39-40). 
 
This idea of a body matures in A Thousand Plateaus against what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call a 
body without organs. BwO is a limit configuration; it is the interactive field of forces in which the 
conventional body as an organism and as a well-defined organization is deterritorialized. This 
deterritorialization does not indicate a lack of organs, but rather the absence of an all-encompassing, a 
unitary meaning and the normal positioning of formed matter. It has no content yet and no expression. 
References to psychopathology with its different ‘abnormalities’ and to art-practices enable Deleuze 
and Guattari to position this BwO. BwO is not without an eye, a mouth or a nose, but the functions of 
these parts are no longer determined and absolute, hence in terms of Artaud wrong side out.  
 
The BwO does not oppose the organs: it opposes the limits of the organism and 
makes multiple connections that go beyond the organism’s organization as it is 
traditionally defined (Pisters, 2003, p. 110) 
 
I see this in the picture taken from Miles Davis’ face. It is not only his nose that breathes the air in and 
the intensity of his mouth that pushes the energy out. His whole body, his whole face flows through 
the trumpet and the intensity of the closeness of his eyes. His face runs into his hands, and even more 
so into the trumpet. The musical instrument is not outside his body, nor an object that has penetrated 
the body defining an outside and an inside. Both body and artistic medium are expressions of an 
assemblage. The air and the face, the hand and the instrument have all become sound that is not 
organized along the axes of interiority and exteriority. It flows, without limitation, streaming living 
matter that in its expressiveness is connected to the world that surrounds it.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call the ultimate BwO: the earth. Despite the codifying power of 
judgment and power’s interests to stagnate the de-codifying process, the BwO or the earth is the non-
stagnating living process that escapes such desire. BwO is thus not a thing that we can long for, 
  
imitate, or strive for. With all its horrors and beauties, it is beyond the reach of an ego, beyond human 
will and intentionality. Nevertheless, we are merely seven handshakes away from any person on earth. 
As we will see, it is these types of bodily assemblages that create another idea of connection within 
politics of flight. 
 
The body without organs is not a dead body but a living body all the more alive 
and teeming once it has blown apart the organism and its organization (p. 30). 
  
How is this all related to their idea of a book? Along these lines Deleuze and Guattari argue that 
although a book seems to be a well-structured organism, a closed whole with a chronology, starting 
with introductions and ending with conclusions, it is nonetheless a BwO, a non-organized matter, 
because it opens to all sides, affecting, accumulating forces, eager to connect to whatever is within its 
reach. This means that there is no self-contained interiority to a book; it is a porous surface in 
permanent exchange. As such, Deleuze and Guattari qualify a book in a Nietzschean way as an 
intensity that undermines intentionality, a writing that deterritorializes both writer and reader. As 
Foucault shows, it triggers the birth and the death of an author.22  
 
Other art expressions also sensitize their audiences for this experience: an experience of an intensity 
of being plugged in, folding upon itself, trying to find consistency on whatever level or plane 
(plateau), as I will explicate in 2.4. The Wachowski’s Matrix Trilogy (1999 & 2003a&b) is illustrative. 
Although the protagonist Neo seems to long for the reality of the world beyond the Matrix, 
nevertheless only in the machinic intensity of the Matrix he becomes a real body. He becomes some-
body in the networks of machine and men. In the first part, he is still aware of the importance of this 
connection, the relevancy of being plugged in. The second and third part of the trilogy are in need of 
differentiation and dramatization of the world outside the Matrix, by highly sexually oriented dance 
parties and love scenes between Neo and Trinity. As De Mul (2003) suggests it is mostly the oracle 
that understands the non-distance between men and machine. The Canadian filmmaker David 
Cronenberg is in this sense more fearless. His eXistenZ (1999), despite its poor special effects and 
acting, is a daring sensitization of the machine and human body as an unorganized open living thing. 
The plugging-in object, in contrast to the Matrix, is as fleshy and alive as the body that it enters. In 
line with Pisters (2003), we could state that Cronenberg creates in the intense intersection in-between 
human and machine a new flesh (p. 171). In the end, it is not clear whether the protagonists are ever 
disconnected, or merely plugged-in in multiple ways. 
 
How does this imply the bodies of refugees? As we will see in 1.3.1, these bodies also escape 
identification due to the fact that shaping and deshaping of these bodies – their sense of living or 
dying – cannot be pinpointed to one form of discourse or one type of territorial politics. This is why 
                                                     
22 In his text ‘What Is an Author’, Michel Foucault (1986a) does not only problematize the one-on-one relation between 
work and an author, but also the unity of the author as well as the unity of a work. They are both open forces, and function as 
a discourse instead of subject and object. I will elaborate more on this in 3.2.1. 
  
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) prefer the term machinic. Machinic23 is a spontaneous process of folding 
and unfolding an open field of forces, the BwO. Deleuze and Guattari also speak of the abstract 
machine: the engine of the process of stratification, destratification and restratification, or 
de/re/territorialization (see in this study: 2.3.1). Think of the earth and its transformative processes in 
which mountains rise, rivers dig deeper, and volcanic emissions change landscapes and climate. These 
are processes, through which forces emerge, becoming trees, birds, mountains and humans, which are 
produced, changed and devoured by the earth. Since our current ‘geological’ period is marked as the 
Anthropocene men have become part of this earthly dynamics. They have become its generators and 
its victims at the same time. 
 Although within this machinic dynamics meanings and binary structures are time and again 
generated and degenerated, the abstract machine is nevertheless systematically ‘prior’ to dualities like 
good and evil, insider and outsider. As Deleuze and Guattari in their lectures often suggest, there are 
multiple machines: love-machines, war-machines, Kafka-machines, bureaucratic-machines, and hence 
fleeing-machines. These multiple machines are events unfolding upon the abstract machine. The 
abstract machine is the plane on which these multiplicity of machinic procedures function. In 
connection to a book, Deleuze and Guattari even argue that a book is never merely approached 
through one type of machinic procedure. For example, while we connect some books to one type of 
ideology or belief, such as religious books or Das Kapital, the machinic intensity of a book, according 
to Deleuze and Guattari (1987) doesn’t coincide with an ideology; literature is not about ideology (p. 
4). While ideologies define a writing through one type of methodology, they characterize literature as 
an assemblage, arguing that its approach is always multiple due to its intense relationality with BwO. 
  
1.2.3 Books: Trees, Roots, and Rhizome  
We shifted from books via bodies to literature as a specific art practice. Literature is more than a 
cumulative production of artistically valued books. Deleuze and Guattari firmly state that literature, 
although always already meaningful, has nothing to do with generating a meaning, or a specific 
signification. It is rather an act of mapping of that which is not there – let us call this provisionally: 
fiction. Creating literature, writing a book is not about something that is there – a research on existing 
matter – but rather a looking far ahead to that which is about to come, or as Derrida (1992b) calls it à 
venir. That which is to arrive – thus within politics of flight those processes that are overlooked by 
dominant discourse – is not something that will occur in the future. It is not non-present. It is the 
unexpected (p. 78). It is an ethics that such an arriving presents that initiates the approach in this 
research. A book, or to be exact: this book, is not about finding a method to understand what is or 
was, it is an approach, an essay to engage and to assemble. I will elaborate on different forms of 
engagements by examining three types of books distinguished by Deleuze and Guattari (1987, pp. 5-
7). 
 
                                                     
23 The term machinic must not be confused with the term cyborg. Cyborg often refers to organism, mammals or other, or to 
structures and networks. Machinic rather refers to the process, forces that create a context in which such thing as organism or 
forms of networks could unfold. 
  
1) The first type, the root-book is a classical book, the structure of which is visualized according to 
the image of a tree. It has a vertical axis like a tree with bifurcating branches. The world is defined 
according to an arborescent logic that is a binary logic. Every position bifurcates, branches into two. 
The root-book is based on the idea of a closed organism that pretends to reflect, imitate and 
understand Nature. It progressively explores the world, knowing it better and better, climbing higher 
and higher, just like a tree, like a pyramid. As Willem Schinkel (2008) shows, such idea of a closed 
organism with its hierarchical structure implements itself in political thinking. Not only humans and 
animals, but also a society starts to define itself as a closed organism, and a hierarchical unity in terms 
of a social ladder. The other becomes a disease entering the unity of a body. Such binary tendencies 
ramify the world into oppositional branches, a dichotomized logic of contrary double-unities of 
subject-object, truth-false, real-fiction, good-bad, beautiful-ugly. It is obsessed with causality and 
successions. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) take psychoanalysis and some linguistic procedures as 
exemplary cases. Fairy tales have also a strong binary structure of thought, the good fairy and the bad 
witch, the helpless princess and the heroic prince. Although these oppositions seem to be simplistic 
and outdated, nevertheless these still are effective in political, social and cultural discourses.24 Some 
Bollywood and Hollywood productions still visualize these simplistic thoughts and beliefs.25 In the 
fourth chapter I will elaborate on how nationalistic tree-minded mechanisms function within this 
binary machine of exclusion.  
 
2) The second type is the radical-system, also called the fascicular root book. This typically 
modernistic book has deactivated the main branch, the tallness of the tree. It has multiple roots and 
distrust the clarity of the objects. Nevertheless, despite its critical attitude, its suspicious approach 
towards the objects and the perception of an individual with respect to those objects, this book still 
holds on to a unity, namely the unity of a perceiving subject, no matter how dysfunctional this 
perception might be. There is nothing objective that can unite the subject, but a higher level of being 
can restore this tormenting disintegration. This idea of disintegration is also very popular in 
contemporary cinema. Christopher Nolan’s Memento (2000) plays with this idea of a sense of losing 
the objectivity of an event and a confused subject trying to gain some sense of consistency. The 
protagonist Leonard Shelby has lost his short-term memory, and through notes he tries to remember 
what has happened to his dead wife. The film starts at the end of the story and the image of the lost 
protagonist, trying to retrace the story back to its beginning. The film is shot in a double time 
sequence: real time in black and white, the reversed time sequences backwards in time in color. The 
                                                     
24 In his The Kite Runner Khaled Hosseini (2003) visualizes this tension between the old-fashioned sense of good and evil 
and the new forms of binary divisions of right and wrong. Although the protagonist Amir seems to feel shame for the social 
and cultural positions and status of himself and Hassan, he feels this shame not for the essential political hierarchical setting 
but merely due to the unknown brotherhood with the person he thought was merely his servant. Moreover, the book keeps 
the binary setting between the west and the east. Afghanistan remains in clear cliché setting of repression, and America is, 
despite its problematic attitude towards migrants, the land of the free. Donald Trump’s policy finally put an end to that 
illusion. 
25 Tarsem Singh’s Mirror Mirror (2012) shows this irony. While the story intends to break through the common idea of 
Snow White’s story, by little people’s efforts to teach her to be independent and rebellious, she is still the one that is 
expected to cook dinner and make breakfast for these men.  
  
image of a man he just killed on the picture he made and the fading dead body, while the scene is 
moving backwards, is powerfully illustrative. Still, despite the loss of memories, the story remains in 
search of a truth at the end, which is at the same time the beginning of the story. Another consistency 
is the repetition of Leonard’s grieving act, he burns his wife’s belongings time and again. This 
reminds us of Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) reference to a circular unity. They argue that thought 
lines in a fascicular root book present themselves within a circle, which binds the branching of 
thought in a bundle, a segment, in order to gain a higher calling. In the fifth chapter I will show how 
multiculturalism shape itself in terms of circular unities. 
 
The world has become chaos, but the book remains the image of the world: 
radicle-chaosmos rather than root-cosmos. A strange mystification: a book all the 
more total for being fragmented. At any rate, what a vapid idea, the book as the 
image of the world (p. 6). 
 
3) The final type is a book that emerges without any intention of finding a higher dimension or the 
unity of a subject. Deleuze and Guattari call this a rhizome.  
 
In truth, it is not enough to say, ‘Long live the multiple’, difficult as it is to raise 
that cry. No typographical, lexical, or even syntactical cleverness is enough to 
make it heard. The multiple must be made, not by always adding a higher 
dimension, but rather in the simplest of ways, by dint of sobriety (p. 6). 
 
The rhizome does not intend to manifest a unity; under the ground it branches rather through the 
unity. There is no ultimate or personal direction; every direction is possible. And the multiplicity of 
this possibility is the intensity of the rhizome, an intensity breaking through the stiffness of organism 
and the commonality of thought. “The rhizome includes the best and the worst: potato and 
couchgrass, or the weed” (p. 7). It is a burrow26 dug by rats and rabbits, without a certain and 
hierarchical direction, without a certain perspective. A rhizomatic book can be entered in various 
ways; there is no final interpretation. It could be read upside down, penetrable from all sides. We 
could even wonder whether there is a book that can be characterized as solely tree-minded or merely 
fascicular. Even the binary logic of fairy tales is not total, a girl talking to a wolf and a wolf becoming 
a grandmother, in a sense feeds our fear of the animal, but the absurdity of the communication 
between the two distinct species is, nevertheless, an entrance of another kind.  
 Nonetheless, rhizome is not a road to happiness. Neither does it oppose the root-book or the 
fascicular root. Eventually, the tree and the radicle are related to the rhizome. They are different types 
of multiplicities (differential) but also relational and supplementary. No matter how rigid a tree-line of 
thought and power is, the uncontrollable branches of the rhizome still penetrate the tree from its basis. 
For Deleuze and Guattari thus rhizome is the reality of an underground that does not only affect our 
bodies but also our way of writing and thinking. Thought is – as we will see in the next chapter – not 
                                                     
26 This is how Deleuze and Guattari (1986, p. 3) describe Kafka’s hotel in Amerika. See for an analysis of entering the 
burrow: De Brabander, 2000. 
  
in order to create unambiguous knowledge, but rather to disquiet the so-called certainty of knowledge 
as unchanging objective facts. In other words, rhizomatic thinking does not create the approach but 
multiple approaches.27 In the sixth chapter I will discuss the disquieting process of the rhizome by 
elaborating on Agamben’s and Arendt’s notions such as coming community and communicability.  
 
In line with this idea of multiplicity of approaches we could state that books are rhizomatic. 
Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that a writer intentionally can manufacture a rhizomatic book. Not 
even Deleuze and Guattari (and neither I) are capable of such a thing. Rhizome is what happens 
within a process of writing and reading, surpassing the subject-object relation. It is a process that 
breaks the book open, and decenters writer’s intentions and the reader’s expectations along the line. 
To state: “I will write a rhizomatic book”, is simply absurd. Every book is rhizomatic, which means 
that I do not know how this book will function in discourses that are already attached or will be 
attached to it. To state that politics of flight is a rhizomatic process, a burrow with multiple entrances, 
does not result in anyone knowing all these entrances. I merely intend to point out some generally 
known as well as unknown entrances as far as I can see them, fully aware of the fact that these will 
actualize a very few of the virtual entrances in politics of flight. Finally, I do not intend to show a 
rhizomatic process as opposed to arborescent and fascicular process. Everything that appears in 
politics of flight is not beyond its rhizomatic trait. Arborescent and fascicular traits appear in the 
middle of it. In Foucault’s terminology, this book is approaching different types of discourses that 
appear in this politics and does not create a methodology to define these discourses once and for all. 
In words of ancient philosopher Òrúnmìlà, as Sophie Bósèdé Olúwolé (2014) cites: 
 
No wise person can tie water unto the edge of a wrapper. No knowledgeable 
person knows the number of sands. No traveler can get to the end of the world. A 
sharp knife cannot carve its own handle (p. 32) 
 
                                                     
27 Hypertext fiction on the Internet is a good example of the multiplicity of approach. Flight Paths: A Network Novel 
(Pullinger, Joseph & Participants, n.d.) as a hypertext fiction narrates – in text, moving images, photography and sounds – 
the story of Yacub, a man from Pakistan. First, he moves to Dubai in order to find a job but then he finds himself working 
hard, not getting paid and starving in a working camp. He decides to leave, and is tipped by a smuggler to squeeze himself in 
a small airplane shelf. While he is “freezing hot and then burning cold” in the flying airplane, Harriet, a woman from 
Richmond, is shopping in a supermarket. Suddenly, she looks up, while Yacub, released from the airplane, crashes on her. 
The stories start separately, but intertwine eventually. However, Flight Paths remain straightforward. There is connection 
but no interaction. Van den Bos (n.d.) states along with Michael Joyce that there are two types of hypertext fiction, 
exploratory and constructive. While the first creates multiple outcomes within a fixed outcome, the second creates unending 
openings due to the fact that each reader can create their own entrances in the text. However, most hypertext fictions are 
rather exploratory than constructive. Nevertheless, hypertext fiction is not without consistency. Van den Bos (n.d.) states: 
"Those associations are not arbitrarily either, but may form a thematic structure. Both structures are closely related.” She 
describes a hyperfiction that is a map of a body, thematically as well as structurally. "The hyperlinks between the texts are 
placed within this framework, which creates the effect of associating all the textual information with this body." See also 
Van den Bos, 2000. 
  
1.2.4 Non-fixating Traits  
Within this multiplicity of approaches some approaches are at loggerheads with other types of 
approach. Deleuze and Guattari, as well as Foucault, criticize dialectical thinking, of which the 
exclusive trait is oppositional. The world is divided into mutually exclusive sections that are sublated 
in order to articulate a new, enriched opposition. This thought rests upon the idea of relational 
exclusion in overarching inclusion: eventually concepts and notions constitute one another due to 
their oppositions, before these are reunited on a higher level as the upbeat to a more enriched 
exclusive identity. Right constitutes left just by being its exact opposite. Dichotomies deduce their 
meaning from this negating logic. There is no day without a night, no inside without an outside and no 
subject without an object. Nevertheless, not every binary setting functions the same. Zoroastrianism 
or yin yang theories also have such binary logic. Some binary settings such as man and women in yin 
yang theory demand balance and harmony, others appreciate one above the other such as good and 
evil, and in some cases even day and night, by associating for example light to goodness and darkness 
to something sinister. In Nietzschean agonistic thought two mutually powerful forces are at war with 
each other, it is not harmony but this conflict that is appreciated in Nietzsche’s thought on tragedy. In 
Hegelian discourse the conflict between two forces or elements lead to a third option that annuls the 
two into another or higher level. In the logic of exclusion within politics of flight however another 
binary force is at hand. Exclusion creates normative and juridical oppositions such as friends and 
enemies, citizens and stateless, inhabitants and migrants. Nonetheless, here is neither balance of yin 
yang at work, nor Hegelian universalistic sublation: a sublation that is only applicable for western 
educated heterosexual male species. The totalitarian state cannot live without the permanent conflict 
between the two. Neither is it a Nietzschean agonistic setting of mutually combating forces. In the 
discourse of exclusion, as we will see in the fourth chapter, one position is always strategically 
stronger than the other.  
 
Philosophies of difference testify that although the previous forms of binary approach have the 
metaphysical, epistemological and ethical pretense of grasping and understanding the world, they are 
nevertheless far from it. The world exists of differences, but difference is not exclusively oppositional 
to comprehend. Difference is a becoming as well, a foundational differing that Derrida (1982) calls 
différance, which indicates that a definitive meaning is always postponed, temporalized; it is never 
‘over there’ to be grasped in thought and language. There is always an ungraspable supplement in the 
margins that is produced in the very process of understanding as a discursive restance and resistance. 
This ‘foundational’ differing is graphically grasped as the distinction between a and e: Différance 
motorizes all différences (pp. 1-27). That is why Derrida starts his text by stating that différance is 
“literary neither a word nor a concept” (p. 1). Différance can only be spoken of through a sheaf or as a 
sheaf. It is a discursive gesture, soundless,28 he states, a written word that functions through and in-
between text, through and in-between contexts. Derrida’s affinity with rhizomatic traits of différance 
is evident when he states that “the word sheaf seems to mark more appropriately that the assemblage 
to be proposed has the complex structure of a weaving, an interlacing which permits the different 
                                                     
28 In section 2.3 I will critically elaborate on notions such as silence and soundlessness. 
  
threads and different lines of meaning – or of force – to go off again in different directions, just as it is 
always ready to tie itself up with others” (p. 3). The graphical visualization of a philosophy of 
differences is a network, not a pyramid. 
 
Always differing and deferring, the trace is never as it is in the presentation of 
itself. It erases itself in presenting itself, muffles itself in resonating, like the a 
writing itself, inscribing its pyramid in différance (p. 23). 
 
Différance cannot be exposed, not because it opposes presence, but because it is beyond the 
oppositional thought, beyond present and non-present. It is rather secretive and discrete, Derrida 
states. It can only be spoken of indirectly, even in his own text: “différance is not, … it has neither 
existence nor essence. It derives from no category of being, whether present or absent” (p. 6). It is the 
non-ontotheological non-being, a non-foundation that gives rise to that which is called history, 
theology or ontology. Différance is thus in its effect both temporizing and spacing. And finally, 
différance is not just between things, but immanent to them. Things just differ, and they do not differ 
from something else specifically. It is within this setting that différance functions beyond oppositions 
such as active and passive, and oppositions that result from this opposition, such as subject and object. 
Différance is not punctual, but arbitrary, procedural. Différance is an interval. “In constituting itself, 
in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might be called spacing, the becoming-space of 
time or the becoming-time of space (temporization)” (p. 13). This does not imply that oppositions do 
not exist, but that these are aspects of this interval, traversed by différance. The so-called oppositional 
‘elements’ are already multiple in themselves. As we will see in the process of this study, it is this 
idea of différance in connection to the idea of rhizome that creates multiple political and ethical 
attitudes within politics of flight. 
 
In Derrida’s deconstructive discourse rhizomatic thought resonates. Rhizomatics (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987) subscribes the idea of approach as différance rather than as dialectical. What are the traits of the 
rhizome once it is no longer the opposite of the tree and the fascicular roots? First and second, the 
principles of connection and that of heterogeneity characterize the rhizome. Within a rhizome each 
line is virtually connected to all other lines. Rhizomes as forces are everywhere. Caught in power 
structures these life forces are momentarily stratified in discourses: political, social, artistic, 
philosophical or scientific. However, the rhizome traverses discourse and ‘forces’ ideas beyond 
stratified limits. If we return to politics of flight, we can now state that this politics is a double binding 
articulation given the double sense of ‘of’: genitivus objectivus and genitivus subjectivus: flight being 
both the object of politics and flight having a politics of its own. And as such politics of flight has an 
affinity with what Deleuze and Guattari mark as ‘lines of flight’, since within the rhizomatic dynamic 
they discern two forms of lines: lines of segmentation and lines of flight. Flight appears when a line 
becomes thinner: when within a unity as a cluster of power things start to fragment and disconnect. 
 
Within a rhizomatic field where root-thoughts and fascicular ones are permanently created, these roots 
are under permanent threat of dissolving in the exponential growth of rhizomes. In line with this 
interplay, in his Logic of Sense Deleuze (1990) is not surprisingly fascinated by Lewis Carroll’s 
  
(1982) Alice in Wonderland. The story is not about a simple negation of all that is normal; it is not a 
glorification of the absurd, of the madman. It is all about intensification, linking the rooted tendencies 
of Alice and her fascicular tendency to distinguish herself and the penetrating liquefaction of her inner 
and outer world, of what ought to be and what can be, of language as an object and a subject in itself: 
 
‘Have you guessed the riddle yet?’ the Hatter said, turning to Alice again. 
‘No, I give it up,’ Alice replied. ‘What’s the answer?’ 
‘I haven’t the slightest idea,’ said the Hatter. 
‘Nor I,’ said the March Hare. 
Alice sighed wearily. ‘I think you might do something better with the time,’ she 
said, ‘than waste it in asking riddles that have no answers.’ 
‘If you knew Time as well as I do,’ said the Hatter, ‘you wouldn’t talk about 
wasting it. It’s him.’ 
‘I don’t know what you mean,’ said Alice. 
‘Of course you don’t!’ the Hatter said, tossing his head contemptuously. ‘I dare 
say you never even spoke to Time!’ 
‘Perhaps not,’ Alice cautiously replied: ‘but I know I have to beat time when I 
learn music.’ 
‘Ah! That accounts for it,’ said the Hatter. ‘He won’t stand beating. Now, if you 
only kept on good terms with him, he’d do almost anything you liked with the 
clock. For instance, suppose it were nine o’clock in the morning, just time to begin 
lessons: you’d only have to whisper a hint to Time, and round goes the clock in a 
twinkling! Half-past one, time for dinner!’ (p. 71). 
 
Alice is aware of the rules, of the existence of imperatives in thought and behavior. She does not 
hesitate to mention them time and again. Nevertheless, there is no rigidity or rejection in her 
interaction. While in the first instance she preaches on the objective experience of time and 
characterizes its waste as unpleasant, she easily adjusts to the logic of the Hatter, and starts to speak of 
Time as a person that she must beat when she plays music. She is easily seduced to another logic and 
becomes equally consistent in this new form of logic. Moreover, she is not shy to admit her lack of 
knowledge. It is this bending trait toward different types of knowledge that matters in order to 
function within the rhizome, and thus in the end our engagement within politics of flight. 
 
Next to connection and heterogeneity, a rhizome is also characterized as multiplicity. It is not 
multiplicity but a form of unity as a closed whole, as an organism, that is secondary to rhizome. Such 
unity indicates a capturing of power within a multiplicity of forces. Multiplicity, however, does not 
have an object and a subject, not even as the repressor and the repressed. Multiplicity is not a minority 
as opposed to majority (as I will show in 3.4). It is measured by intensities as a field of yet non-
specified forces. Whenever these intensities are decreased or increased due to secondary divisions 
within the rhizome, the nature of a multiplicity starts to change.  
 
  
An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that 
necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections. There are no points or 
positions in a rhizome, such as those found in a structure, tree, or root. There are 
only lines (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 8). 
 
No knots yet, no nodes, no self-reflective individuals, let alone autonomous entities in this chaotic 
network. Let us return to the BwO as chaotic multiplicity and the human body as a whole or a unity. 
Although we pretend that the unity of our body is something essential and permanent, the procedure 
of our existence – the penetration of the sperm through the structure of the egg, the event of change 
and the shared fluid within the womb, as well as the multiple diseases due to bacteria and the process 
of digestion during our lives – already indicates otherwise. Our body is first a momentary assemblage, 
second a unity of particles. Dust to dust, ashes to ashes, multiplicities to multiplicities, as one might 
say. 29 
 
While the procedures of signification are permanently in force, a rhizome signifies itself in a 
paradoxical way – next to connection, heterogeneity, and multiplicity – through the principle of a-
signifying rupture. 30  The rhizome and its principle of a-signifying rupture refer to content and 
expression. A connection, an overpowering force, a fragmented line of flight can break through or be 
derived from the inside, from the middle. Deleuze and Guattari do not speak of isolated points of 
departure or arrival. They accentuate the process as a becoming, in terms of lines, due to the fact that 
the event of relating is prior to the categorizing of relata such as subject or object. According to these 
philosophers of difference, even entities are connected lines, knotted connections and not indivisible 
permanent atoms, no non-dividable entities, no in-dividuals. As I will show in 1.3, within the 
rhizomatic connectivity nodes occur, nodes in networks rather than prepositioned entities that start to 
connect with others motorized by transcendent principles. That is why Deleuze and Guattari prefer to 
speak about subjectification or agencement as a process.   
 
Nothing escapes this multiplification, this constant folding. No connection, even when it is qualified 
as a certain entity by a momentary signifying power, can evade other connections that undermine an 
exclusive and excluding finalized expression. In each connection another connection is expressed and 
repositioned and new connections are created. Transformation of piled-up segmentations starts with 
lines of flight. In addition to this, whenever transformations start to repeat themselves, they start to 
become common sense. In other words, whenever a line of flight slows down in its speed, bending 
back upon itself becoming meaningful in a unifying moment of multiplicity, Deleuze and Guattari 
speak of lines of segmentation. There is no prior ontology in which lines are qualified as right or 
wrong; primary and secondary. In segmentation lines that what ‘matters’ is defined in terms of 
                                                     
29 Unity and multiplicity do here in no sense refer to moral notions. There are multiple forms of unity and each refers to and 
creates another moral discourse. The three final chapters in this dissertation refer to three different types of unity and 
different types of moral discourses: totalitarianism, multiculturalism and coming community.   
30 In 2.3.1 I will elaborate on De Saussure’s linguistics and its relation to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of a-signifying 
rupture.  
  
articulated and meaningful force, i.e. of power. This is the basic line of politics in the strict sense of 
the word. Here a politics of flight finds its different impetuses.  
 
1.2.5 Mapping in the Middle 
Let us evaluate our findings through an example: an occurrence that as a line of flight inaugurated a 
massive revolt in our time. The act of Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian vendor who set himself on 
fire, on 4th of January 2011 started multiple revolts that eventually were claimed by existing political 
factions. However, the event itself is a contemporary articulation of rhizomatic emergence. It is easy 
to see Bouazizi and his act as a line of flight. The deterritorializing force of his suicidal act is more 
than obvious: disconnecting yet fully embedded. The unbalance of global economics, the repression 
of the poor and the arrogance of Tunisian leaders in their belief in their everlasting power, are clear 
signs of repressive power. The hardly coherent multiplicity of lines of flight, which is present in the 
daily life of the peoples of the Arabic world, was in need of a rupture. Bouazizi unintentionally 
became this unorganized and unplanned rupture. The act of the vendor testifies of an a-signifying 
rupture that breaks through ‘the order of things’. Its rhizomatic momentum dismantled the binary 
logic of the irrelevant poor and the hegemonic elites. Nevertheless, Bouazizi’s act of rupture 
simultaneously creates new segmentations. The vacuum drawn by the rupture is immediately filled by 
new forms of discourses and significations. Once the forces of revolt are connected to a political 
discourse the process is transformed into a revolution.31 A so-called irrelevant person turns into the 
hero of a new form of ideology. The unintended subversive impact of his act has become the engine 
of a new community with its intended revolutionary goals. Subversive ideas start to segment in new 
forms of power and new forms of repression. The differential relationality in-between the two types of 
lines (flight and segmentation) – in their simultaneous presence in each vectorial force, i.e. in each 
flow – shows that deterritorialization and reterritorialization, decoding and recoding are two sides of 
the same coin.  
 
In addition to this ‘simultaneous eventuality’, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) conclude with the last 
characteristic of a rhizome, which is important for the specific notion of approach that is applied in 
this research: the difference between cartography, as in the practice of mapping, and decalcomania,32 
as in transference and tracing of a pattern or a model. Rhizome is not bound to a transferable model. 
As a multiplicity, the knots that emerge within a rhizome are ‘approachable’ but not according to a 
method. The rhizome cannot be copied. It cannot even be traced back to a clear cut in which they 
came into being. There is no original happening. Thus, although from western perspective different 
events in the Middle East were homogenized by the term Arab Spring, the last six years have shown 
us a complexity that cannot be grasped by a singular idea, term or act. The expressive act of mapping 
                                                     
31  Oosterling (1989) states that revolution is a “totalitarian illusion in which the fragmented forms” of resistance are 
considered to belong to a whole. Revolt is on the other hand an undefined and unconstructed force that breaks through the 
organized state, as “intensities beyond the intensions of the subject” (pp. 134-135, Translation TR). 
32 Decalcomania is the process in which a design or image is transformed from a paper to a glass or other materials. In this 
sense decalcomania refers more explicitly to the transference of a model than copying. It also indicates differentiation of 
matter and nevertheless the hegemony of image.  
  
already changes the presupposed object into something else. Events do not have permanent structures 
of traits that can be comprehended and transposed as such to other situations. Processual knots are not 
tied indefinitely, but are constantly untied and retied, de- and recoded. They fold in and unfold, 
producing preliminary centers that factually are in-betweens, inter-actions. There is no essence. Thus, 
although Bouazizi was a singular individual with his connective story, he did carry the burden of a 
whole world in economic and political sense of the word. His story began long before his birth.  
 
Yet, the classical understanding of a book as a root-book is still captivated by the presumption of an 
origin and an essence. The tree-book is the practice of tracing, tracing a structure within an event, 
tracing of an already existing, yet covered origin. It tends to describe the existing reality and it is 
determined to reproduce this reality. It jumps to conclusions, presupposing the relata. Thus, it 
performs within the logic of relata as permanent, yet transferable forms rather than nodes within the 
dynamics of lines and relations. Holy books are often understood as texts that can be copied time and 
again, even in thought, neglecting their call for further education and alertness of mind. It was such a 
call that gave the young Pakistani Malala Yousafzai the courage to fight against rigid interpretation of 
her religion and the sacred book Koran.33 In that sense the Islamic fundamentalists as well as the anti-
Islam fundamentalists agree on the understanding of Islam as a single form of logic and an 
incompatible form of thought that could be produced endlessly over time and through people. And 
nevertheless, there are those Muslims, who apparently are not exciting enough for the main media, 
who oppose this rigid analysis of both parties, often with their lives. The streets of Libya, after the 
attacks in 2012 on the American ambassador, were not only occupied with hundreds of radicals, but 
also with masses who opposed the violence.  
The logic of the tree-book creates a traceable discourse, with deep-rooted values and final 
judgments. The rhizome on the other hand functions indifferently. It is “a map and not a tracing” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 12). A rhizomatic book does not intend to imitate the world. The world 
and the book do not blindly follow each other’s pattern, or assume the other as a model, but they 
rather affect one another simultaneously and mutually as a result of which thinking in not anticipating 
the outcome stays open to new unexpected connections. Rhizome is not a map of that which is already 
there, but a map of the possibilities of connections,34  redefining implicitly a territory. Ontology 
directly refers to creation, to inventing, to a micro-politics of writing. And that is precisely the role of 
thinking (as I will argue in 2.2). The rhizome makes its elements approachable from all sides and as 
such thematizes its potential relationality, always emerging from the middle, the inter, the in-between. 
Everything is ready for transformation. There are multiple entrances, no entrance is more important 
than the other. This is in contrast to a model based on centrality offering a main entrance, and hence a 
                                                     
33 “Are those equal, those who know and those who do not know? It is those who are endued with understanding that receive 
admonition”, (39:9) and “Those truly fear God, among His Servants, who have knowledge: for God is Exalted in Might, Oft-
Forgiving.” (35:28) 
34 In 1.4.2 I will elaborate on notions such as actuality, virtuality and reality. The rhizome is not a virtual or possible world 
next to the actual world, but what we call actual is merely a cut within the rhizome. In her Possible-worlds theory, Marie-
Laure Ryan (2005) elaborates on this tension within literary works. As Ryan concludes, while classical understanding of 
possible world intended to argue for a form of consistency within the fictional work, the postmodern literature rather wishes 
to dismantle a clear line between what is fictional and what is non-fictional or actual.  
  
strict methodology to find and explore this main entrance. The act of Bouazizi was not merely an 
event that is limited to the Arabic world. The act that drove this individual to his self-destructive 
gesture is connected to world-politics.  
 
As we will see in de second part of this study, given the reality of international politics in the 
twentieth century Deleuze and Guattari (1987) are convinced of the dangers of decalcomania, politics 
based on notions such as identity, citizenship and assimilation. But this warning is not an appeal to 
create new dichotomies.35 It is not the despotic world of models against the ‘flower’ world of the 
rhizome. Nevertheless, Deleuze and Guattari are fully aware of language giving little possibilities to 
escape the binary terminologies. Their practice of co-writing, however, longs for transformation of 
linguistic approaches. It calls for permanent shifts and approaches not in order to come closer to an 
essential truth, but in order to engage with the multiple, to perform a will to truthness by permanently 
shifting the parameters of thought – and as we will see in the third chapter the paradigms of politics – 
in order to affirm the process of the critical. There is not a world of mapping versus a world of tracing 
on a parallel level. “It is a question of method” they argue, “the tracing should always be put back on 
the map” (p. 13).36 The method is not a model to be followed; it is neither a bifurcating, well-rooted, 
blossoming tree nor a totally fragmented, dispersed rhizome on its own. Thought is an act of mapping, 
always maneuvering in-between. Thinking is an inter-act. It is an inter…mezzo. 
Art practices can explicate this ‘inter’ more explicitly. The intensity between Susan Orlean’s 
The Orchid Thief (1998); Charlie Kaufman and Donald Kaufman’s screenplay Adaptation (2002); and 
Spike Jonze’s film Adaptation (2002) bears witness to multiple, intertwined approaches. Orleans book 
is already interdisciplinary in itself, oscillating between journalism, literature and scientific research. 
Moreover, the book differentiates between her approaches and the passionate madness of John 
Laroche for orchids. Her approach is slow but persistent. Laroche’s passion on the other hand is 
sudden; it grows at an unbelievable speed and dies in an instant. Orlean’s sober approach and 
Laroche’s intense and furious mad approach transform through Charlie Kaufman’s panicky, uncertain 
and schizophrenic as well as manic approach. He is approaching his approach by dividing himself into 
two characters in the script: the twin brothers Charlie Kaufman, with his paralyzing accurate 
approach, and Donald Kaufman, with his aimless approach. Donald Kaufman is the first fictional 
                                                     
35 Within the modernistic terminology, it is easy to accuse Deleuze and Guattari of inconsistency, by stating that while they 
plead against opposition they somehow introduce a new terminology that equally creates new dichotomies, such as flight 
lines/segmentation lines and mapping/tracing. However, as Oosterling (1996) suggests Deleuze and Guattari do not simply 
plead against dichotomies. They merely show that dichotomies, which we introduce as convenient tools to structure our 
thoughts, do not have an ontological status, but merely function strategically within epistemology. And even within 
epistemology although dichotomies permanently appear they are nevertheless never permanent and static (pp. 600-602). 
36 This is in a sense a form of tracing that Derrida (1982) is pointing out. Tracing for Derrida appears on the map, it is 
without goal, an adventure with playful blind tactics, that opposes the conventional difference between theory and practice. 
It is not beyond reason, but beyond the opposition between reason and insanity (p. 7). “I have attempted to indicate a way 
out of the closure of this framework via the ‘trace’, which is no more an effect than it has a cause, but which in and of itself, 
outside its text, is not sufficient to operate the necessary transgression” (p. 12). However, Derrida is aware of the dangers of 
this tracing. Later in the text he states that: “trace is not a presence but the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself … 
It becomes a function in a structure of generalized reference. It is a trace, and a trace of the erasure of the trace. Thereby the 
text of metaphysics is comprehended” (p. 24). 
  
character to win an Oscar. Kaufmans’ script is layers of approach. It is not imitation or tracing, but 
how to enter the book comes along with the how of entering the film. The ‘initiating’ scenes 
thematize the entrance of the film into itself and its own process of entrance, but also how the film 
and the book disorganize one another as open organisms. The book enters the film and the film enters 
the book. However, through the fascinating screen there is a character that remains a ghost. Kaufman 
wonders how orchids approach. They migrate, attach, transform, reshape. They multiply, connect in 
form to all that surrounds them, wasps, men, trees, and monkeys. There is not an orchid approach, but 
orchidical approaches. 
 
1.3 (Dis)connecting the Dots  
 
1.3.1 An Unidentifiable Subject 
Knots, knots that are tied and untied permanently, how do they relate? How do we de- and reconnect 
the knots, the dots, in trying to map a specific territory? If methods are not absolute, how do we then 
orient our approach towards this field of connected dots? In other words, how does one as an 
individual engage within a politics of flight? Let us first address the question as to who is entering. 
Politics of flight is often defined by and debated through its specific subject: the refugee, sometimes 
less specifically approached as the migrant. Understanding this politics demands an approach on a 
specific modern philosophical notion that, after it was proposed by philosophers like Kant and Hegel, 
was adopted by human sciences like psychology, sociology, and political science: subject. What is a 
subject? Besides being crucial as a theme, a person or some body, even a thing within an event or 
discourse, the subject refers first and for all to power relations. First as something or someone exposed 
to a certain (repressive) power, and second as an actor or agency that internalizes and identifies with 
this power structure in order to become part of it. A subject undergoes, internalizes, individualizes 
and emancipates. It addresses and activates its passivity in order to become part of a whole. It is 
forced into membership or participation. The combination of the Dutch Social Support Act (Wet 
Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning) and economic crisis in The Netherlands accentuated the 
relationality between notions such as participation and self-sufficiency (zelfredzaamheid) on the one 
hand and on the other hand the governmental policy imposing the structure of such self-sufficiency. 
Not only newcomers, but also mentally and physically challenged, children and elderly are obliged to 
participate in certain patterns of citizenship (De Brabander, 2014). 
 
Yet, philosophically a subject is more than a docile individual or an individual forced to participate. A 
subject in modernistic philosophy – in the age of Enlightenment and Romantic era – is defined as a 
thinking, acting and feeling entity that internally remains the same. Epistemologically a subject has 
been characterized by the oppositional distinction between subject-object. 37  Metaphysical and 
                                                     
37 Often this refers to a Western, modernistic view after Kant’s distinction between subject and object. The Cartesian 
distinction between body and soul on the other hand still has metaphysical overtones. While Descartes does have the 
pretense that the object or body as a mechanism can be known to the subject, Kant limits the knowledge of subject by 
famously stating that the object in-itself remains unknown to the subject. Thus, the two philosophers differ in their approach 
 
  
ontological tendencies, however, also appear within the idea of subject due to its association with the 
notion identity. The etymology of identity refers to preservation of an essence, idem: the same. 
Identity is that which remains the same despite changes in course of life. Despite this tradition, subject 
and identity, given their historical uses, are not the same but rather opposites. Subject depends in its 
formation immediately on that which overarches or surrounds it, and as such differs from it. So, as I 
indicated above, following philosophers of difference, I rephrase subject as a process of 
subjectification – assujettissement – as has systematically been done by Foucault.  
 Subject is related to power, be it a more differentiated power. Foucault distinguishes three 
forms of power, each with a different approach to the notion subject and its operation. The first is 
called sovereign power in which subject is a juridical term, which appears within politics merely in its 
exclusion. The second form of power is the disciplinary power that forms and identifies subject due to 
its belonging to different types of segments within the society, such as a laborer in a factory or a 
student in the university. Foucault discusses the third form of power in his lectures on security. This 
form of power focuses on access, codes and passwords that determine the subject’s entrance into a 
society. I will elaborate more on the forms of power in the fourth- and fifth chapter.38 There is also a 
fourth form of power in which Foucault (1986b) thematizes the relation of the self to itself. In the final 
chapter I define this subjectification as an open rhizomatic agency that is in immediate contact with 
the forces that shape and de-shape its formation.  
This subject undergoes a permanent formation due to its unavoidable, yet indefinable, 
engagement within a discourse, shared with others. The subject is defined through its discursive 
relations with self-reflective practices, shaping his desires and taking care of the self. A subject is 
crucial only due to the discourse that defines it as such and not the other way around. Its relevance is 
a related relevancy. Identity on the other hand refers to that which lies within an entity, founded in a 
transcendent entity, either religious or philosophical. This unshakable foundation remains the same 
even if time and territory are changed.39 It is that which is kept outside the discourse and events that 
surround and embed this entity. Identity is in this sense a tree-book, with an internal truth or essence, 
or at best a fascicular-book that despite the multiplicity of truths remains ‘a self-reflecting whole’, an 
identifiable entity. While the subject refers to a rhizomatic becoming due to the changing discourse of 
subjectification, identity is the unchangeable ‘essence’: that which is as it once was and as it will be.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
to subject. While Descartes still believes in an essence that remains within reach for the cogito, an essence that even with a 
‘fundamental’ doubt remains intact, Kant’s view on the subject is more procedural, a transformative implication of changing 
knowledge due to the gained experiences.    
38 These types of power are explained by Michel Foucault mostly in his Discipline and Punish and in The History of 
Sexuality; volume one and two. In volume one The Will to Knowledge Foucault introduces the notion biopower, and later in 
his lectures, Security, Territory and Population, Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78, he elaborates on the theory of 
security.  The term security is also used by Deleuze in Negotiations, 1972-1990. In the course of this study I will return to 
these types of power. 
39 In the second part I refer to etymology and a function of this notion within policies instead of to the philosophical debates 
around it. The idea of identity remains archaic in policies while debates around it – in science, philosophy and arts – show 
the subjectifying mechanisms and external influences on the formation of identity.  
  
We can conclude from all this that the who in the question ‘who is entering a politics of flight?’ can be 
misleading once it refers to an individual that intentionally makes a decision to acknowledge 
him/herself as an identity within certain discursive practices. It is necessary to rephrase the question 
and ask who is the subject that is always already embedded in a politics of flight. Bouazizi was 
already positioned within this politics. But who becomes a participating member, i.e. an active subject 
– not a passive object – of politics of flight? Within contemporary politics it is assumed that this is 
only reserved to a refugee that is officially acknowledged as such. Even migrants or the individual 
who unfortunately is called an economic refugee cannot politically claim to belong to this discourse. 
This belonging is politically and juridically certified. They are persons who are:  
 
outside their country of origin and unable or unwilling to return there or to avail 
themselves of its protection, on account of a well-founded fear of persecution for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group, or political 
opinion. Stateless persons may also be refugees in this sense, where country of 
origin (citizenship) is understood as ‘country of former habitual residence.’ Those 
who possess more than one nationality will only be considered as refugees within 
the Convention if such other nationality or nationalities are ineffective (that is, do 
not provide protection) (Goodwin-Gill, 2013). 
 
The becoming of a refugee is immediately associated with a temporal and territorial dual setting: the 
starting point in the habitual residence or country of origin and the desirable ending point, namely the 
country of arrival or refugium, where the fear of the refugee is considered to be well-founded. The 
subject refugee refers in this binary setting to a multiple act. First, resistance, which is in some cases 
considered to be active, for example by choosing to be active in a certain political party; but more 
often than not is seen as passive, for example by being born into a certain ethnic, religious and hence 
politically and socially excluded group. Second, the refugee’s act is defined by the act of flight and 
banishment. While it seems that flight is an active act and banishment a passive one, both are in their 
intentionality passive. The fear that makes one flee and the power that banishes are both forced upon 
the subject. Fleeing is in this sense not an act, but a re-action. Third, refuge is the crucial act of the 
refugee and indicates hope of the possibility of entrance as well as fragile trust in the ‘chosen’ 
territory, the refugium. Within this discourse, to flee as a verb denotes more passivity than activity. 
The inclusion of the subject lies outside the act of refuge, the acknowledgment of the citizenship 
depends entirely on the political mood and legal system of the country of arrival. The refugee’s 
activity lies merely in his effort to gain the hope that this country will comply. In the contemporary 
reflections on refuge resistance, fear, hope and trust are thus modes wherein this subject experiences 
the act of flight, the core of which is the experience of escape.  
 
Refugee is the subject that is effectuated and forcefully defined, thus identified, by a state of affairs 
called exile. Both the country of origin and arrival refer to the experience of escape in terms of exile. 
In such a logic of exile a refugee is defined as a subject that is formed through a binary temporal and 
territorial intermezzo set in-between the country of origin and the country of arrival or refugium. Seen 
from the perspective of the country of origin refuge refers to multiple processes of resistance, flight, 
  
banishment and exclusion. As Ghorashi (2003) and Schinkel (2008) show the country of arrival with 
its logic of integration and assimilation creates equally new forms of exclusion. However, a politics of 
flight is not a synonym for politics of exile. While on a juridical, political and affective level exile 
seems to demand it all, it nevertheless remains a unilateral vector compared to the multiple entrances 
of politics of flight. Politics of exile is merely one side of the story. Nevertheless, it identifies an 
exclusive subject of flight. This one-sided ‘identification’ is due to the rigidity of the approach to the 
subject of this politics of exile. This subject appropriates 1) the experience of escape and 2) the act of 
flight within a restricted discourse. Politics of flight, however, is not a solitary or singular discourse 
but multiple-faceted, as we will see in 3.4. For now, we need to “do something” in order to change 
our “concept of what it means to be a subject” (Pisters, 2003, p. 31). 
 
1.3.2 The Subject Back on the Map 
It is crucial to notice that in this research I do not intend to exclude the process of identification or a 
sense of identity. I rather plead against identity as the only possible formation of subjectivity and 
hence the only foundation for belonging to a community. In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987) start with a political statement on the notion of identity via naming. A name is neither 
an identity nor a truth; it is merely a routine. Keeping one’s name just happens “out of habit, purely 
out of habit.” This habit, contradictory enough, is persistent not in order to maintain an identity, but to 
lose its relevancy. It is not the negation of a name that loosens the subject in her rigidity, but its casual 
repeatability, in order “to make ourselves unrecognizable.” It is not the negation of saying ‘I’, but 
rather a fading of the value of this saying act. Just think of how people introduce themselves at a 
party: they introduce themselves; names are exchanged and often forgotten immediately. The names 
are just habitual initiators to a conversation. Deleuze and Guattari thus do not strive for an antithesis 
to identity, nor a Cartesian paradoxical doubting in which the I remains intact instead of being 
questioned or becoming fluid. By surrendering to thought beyond the sheer pondering of a narcissistic 
mind, in their cooperative work they rather long for a “point where it is no longer of any importance 
whether one says I. We are no longer ourselves. Each will know his own. We have been aided, 
inspired, multiplied” (p. 3). 
 In writing books together, their act of writing is thus not a compromising act of thought, or a 
summoning of two distinguishable thoughts, from one point to the other. It is an event of in-between, 
instead of a multi-subjective act that is still in need of the relevancy of its subjects as fixed points of 
reference. Fixed subjects refer to identities, or identifiable subjects, while Deleuze and Guattari rather 
subjectify identity by defining it as a process or agencement. Inter-subjective therefore means a 
process of subjectification in which a subject is mapped out in a transformative field of formation and 
deformation. It does not gather distinguishable and traceable identities that are synthesized by 
compromise in thought. In terms of Foucault’s (1977, 2007) theses on power: while the subject that 
undergoes the sovereignty is placed on the peripheries, the subject of disciplinary discourse is 
pinpointed to a segment in the society – worker, teacher, prisoner – and the subject of security longs 
for the passwords in order to enter and participate fully in and under control; an agencement, 
however, remains untraceable, stays connected to all sides, neither in nor out. Agencement, which 
includes more possibilities than a subject of sovereignty, discipline, and security is not an I but a 
process of negotiation that structures the I. 
  
Negotiation is the manner in which – in conversation with Claire Parnet – Deleuze typifies his 
collaboration with Guattari (Deleuze & Parnet, 1991, p. 17). This process of negotiation politically 
puts the subject, as well as the identity of any I, back on the rhizomatic map. The simultaneous event 
of deformation and formation of identities/subjects becomes noticeable. What they oppose is not the 
formation of identity, but its universal assumption. Deleuze and Guattari argue against this generality-
particularity opposition or dialectics by thematizing singularities. Neither the general idea such as the 
repressed women nor a particular idea of a repressed woman in Pakistan could define the complexity 
of Malala. Each typification of her personality – woman, Middle East, girl, child – fails short in 
understanding her singular membership. Malala is a singular complex synergetic process, meaning 
she is connected to the world not in a predictable but in an outstanding manner. This manner is not 
permanent; it changes with each of her appearances. 
 The process of disintegration of an identity takes place permanently. Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987) clarify this through the threefold of coding, decoding and recoding, or, territorialization, 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Their thought is a territorial one: matters shift and 
reposition. Change is territorial, earthly. Within this territorial setting the subject is not a traceable 
body that endures through time, but a territorial mode, a momentary overpowering segmentation.  
 
It is a question of making a body without organs upon which intensities pass, self 
and other — not in the name of a higher level of generality or a broader extension, 
but by virtue of singularities that can no longer be said to be personal, and 
intensities that can no longer be said to be extensive. The field of immanence is 
not internal to the self, but neither does it come from an external self or a nonself 
(p. 156). 
 
Thus, what does the deterritorializing act indicate for a politics of flight? If life as a singular process is 
that which matters in the process of flight, how does this singularity affect and how is it affected by 
political processes that cannot but speak in terms of generalities and particularities? There is a 
difference in-between science of identity and politics of identity. Ghorashi (2003) argues: “While 
anti-essentialist tendencies within social sciences are celebrated, essentialist approaches toward 
culture, nation, and ethnicity are actually everyday practices.” (p. 210). A politics that reduces more 
than sixty million people to one term: tsunami of migrants? Although in rhizomatic thought the 
permanency and essentiality of the subject is problematized, the functionality of subjectification 
within a certain time and a given machinic process is acknowledged. Subject has a face, not as an 
eternal model or transcendental invisible power, but as a momentary shaped and deshaped event, 
defining modes of desire within a certain time and space. This is one way to read the notion interface. 
Within the multiplicity of body without organs subject’s face is not a particular body, but a territory, a 
map, that is penetrable from all sides, a territory that is deterritorialized and reterritorialized by forces 
through different processes of subjectification. It is not a particular biography – neither activism or 
  
symbolism, nor Nobel prizes – but the dynamics of a world that passes through Malala’s wounded 
face.40 
 
The face represents a far more intense, if slower, deterritorialization. We could say 
that it is an absolute deterritorialization ... Now the face has a correlate of great 
importance: the landscape, which is not just a milieu but a deterritorialized world 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 172). 
 
In order to emphasize the relevancy of this permanent territorial change and the related processes 
Deleuze and Guattari replace the notion of subject with the meta-term agencement in which relation 
appears on behalf of its own process and not as a sheer intentional act of a particular person. It is 
desire, as discussed before, that relates connective forces to an agencement (assemblage) or machinic 
procedure.41 That is how the dots are connected. Machines and assemblages accumulate affects that 
express themselves as attraction and repulsion. Entities move from one assemblage to the other as one 
machinic procedure is connected to other machinic procedures. A subject is a momentary 
segmentation within this process of agencement. It is a flickering dot. Nevertheless, even in this 
momentary, self-reflective state of ‘being’ a subject is many-faceted. This is sensible in the 
complexity of Tofik Dibi’s struggle against discrimination. This Dutch-Moroccan politician and 
writer experiences his life in-between multiple forms of discrimination based on his religion, ethnicity 
and homosexuality. Each time he pleads for one, he is forced to endure another type of discrimination. 
In an interview with Jeroen Pauw his dilemma is more than visible. Every time he tries to explain the 
complexity; Pauw forces him to pinpoint it to his ethnicity and religion. No one on that table 
understands the complexity of the multiple forms of exclusions in his life (Dibi, 2016).  
  
Let me situate the previous analyses on subject, power, desire and agencement within the horizon of 
our capitalist politico-economic regime. How do contradictory tendencies in capitalism – de/recoding, 
de/reterritorialization – determine our analysis on the subject of flight? Here the glocal trait of 
capitalistic modes of subjectivity comes to the fore. On the one hand, capitalistic dynamics triggers 
global economic flows, defining subjects such as migrants, guest laborers, political refugees, but also 
transnational CEO’s and tourists. Yet, as we have seen in the previous section, the juridical definition 
of a refugee does not contain any reference to this economic necessity of migration and world’s 
politics. On the other hand, capitalism, while expanding globally, still functions within a modern 
nationalist and regional discourse that contradicts cosmopolitical globalism/localism that Anthony 
Kwame Appiah (2006) hopes for. Individuals are defined as African migrant, Middle Eastern or Asian 
                                                     
40 István Szabó’s film (1981) inspired by Klaus Mann’s Mephisto with the same title sensitizes a man’s attempt to create 
permanent faces, the man’s face and a stage face. Despite the main character’s persistence and because of the turbulences of 
his time the two faces are affected into something indistinguishable from the original two faces. In addition, the world enters 
these faces. It is the terror of the totalitarian regime that finally makes the two faces collapse on one another. The final scene 
in the film of the desperate Hendrik Höfgen is the image of a man who has been disowned by his own face. There are no true 
faces. Nobody is just an actor. The world always draws and changes its marks on the face of men. The mask is the master. 
41 In Thousand Plateaus, they speak of assemblages and in Anti-Oedipus of machinic procedures. 
  
guest laborers, Syrian political refugees, Dutch expats and Chinese tourists. Although refugees arrive 
from all over the globe, the acknowledgement of refugees as subjects is reduced to the state of affairs 
in the country of origin and the country of refuge. For example, refugees from Eritrea in England, 
hoping for a migrant friendly atmosphere in England, need to justify their global act of migration by 
explaining the specific local political danger in Eritrea while the political setting of both countries is 
dependent upon global processes. Slavoj Žižek (2016), in trying to pinpoint ‘the political economy of 
refugees’, gives an indication as to where we should start in the case of an African country as Congo 
to solve the problem:  
 
Just remove the foreign high-tech companies from the equation and the whole 
narrative of ethnic warfare fueled by old passions falls apart. This is where we 
should begin if we really want to help stop the flow of refugees from African 
countries (p. 46). 
 
Moreover, the contradictory traits of the capitalist geopolitics is not only present in the traveling and 
migrating subject, but equally current in the residential state of being of the so-called local 
inhabitants. In the fourth chapter I will elaborate on the logic of the origin and essentiality of the 
politics of ‘we, the true inhabitants’. Though it is manifest on a local level, it particularity feeds global 
discourses too. So, the nationalistic tendencies in the West against Islam are not a local critique. 
Global disapproval of this religion feeds the local exclusion. The right-wing Dutch politician Geert 
Wilders’ expression ‘we do not want to become Saudi Arabia here’ situates local justification within a 
globalized perspective. The brutal slaughter of socialist youth in Norway in the summer of 2011 by 
Anders Behring Breivik who claims to have been inspired, among others, by Wilders is a clarifying 
example of the global effect of these forms of nationalism. Xenophobia is thus a glocal affect.42 
 
Without intentionally resisting this nationalistic discourse, in becoming a migrant one is determined 
by these glocal affects. As we will see in the fifth chapter, nationalistic discourse is equally present in 
the affective discourse of migrants, using notions such as nostalgia and homesickness as the result of 
rapidly changing territories. A sense of history, whether from the country of origin or from the 
refugium, is often idealized in order to regain a retro-sense of nationalism in cultivating a sense of 
loss. All these multiple subjects are mapped in an approach of a politics of flight that has to take into 
account a globalist localism – forms of nationalism that emerge around the globe43 – as well as a local 
globalism – for example the tourist industry that pumps people around the globe. So, although the 
migrant and the refugee are exemplary entities in the flows of migration, neither of them can fully 
appropriate the process as a subject. The experience of flight disseminates in a political field upon 
which multiple contradictory subjects – such as insider and outsider, migrant and inhabitant, 
allochthones and autochthones – are engaged in territorial discourses and paradoxical modes of 
thought, covering a spectrum from local globalism to global localism.  
                                                     
42 See for a daring illustration of how these ideas indoctrinate children to identify themselves with violence elsewhere: Dutch 
Children Apologize for Terrorism (El-Fassi, 2015).  
43 For an elusive elaboration on this issue see: Ceuppens & Geschiere, 2005.  
  
 
1.3.3 Inter-esse: Unappropriatable Experience and In-Between Action 
A subject results from experiences and actions. Yet, how do these two notions – experience and 
action – relate to the previous analyses of subject and subjectification of refugees? The ‘agent’ of the 
agencement within a politics of flight does not belong to a particular individual. It is a focused 
affection that multiple individuals experience. The notion of experience is related to action based 
upon repetitive perception. Active perception leads to knowledge and by active repetition this 
knowledge is finally embodied as skill; hence the adjective experienced contains both knowledge and 
skills of a subject.44 Although initially the subject seems to have control over what is happening, 
experience also implies compliance.45 Experience is not something orchestrated by an individual, it is 
rather the process of being affected by an event as well as a tryout to see what happens. This 
experimental practice of being affected asks for endurance. Some experiences even paralyze their 
subject. Nonetheless, an experience does never close a subject in upon itself. An experience unfolds 
the subject, opening it to all sides, altering its coordinates. In the strict sense experience articulates an 
inter. It is an event of in-between.  
 
The complexity of the relation between the subject and experience is visible in Loveleen Tandan and 
Danny Boyle’s blockbuster film Slumdog Millionaire (2008). The film starts by shocking the viewer 
with the image of a young man, almost a child, being tortured. This is Jamal, the almost weekend 
millionaire. He is born and raised in the slums and against all odds knows all the answers to the 
questions. A multiple-choice question is presented: “Jamal is a) a cheater, b) lucky, c) a genius or d) 
….” Thus, at first the final choice remains open for discussion. The host of the Indian version of 
Weekend Millionaire assumes, despite his own slum heritage, that the boy is a cheater and gets him 
arrested. The detective in charge confronts the boy, with almost no education, with the first defined 
three choices, without expecting the open fourth option. The answer is none of the above. Jamal is 
neither a mastermind that has gained all the knowledge, nor has he organized a deception. He is most 
definitely not lucky. He has experienced the answers. The answers often rather indicate 
incomprehension, hence the baffled face of the boy during the show. He knows the answers despite 
the incomprehension of the slaughter of his mother. The experience is political and collective, shared 
                                                     
44 Oosterling’s (2009a) understanding of the notion of skill is instructive here. Skill, gained by patience, self-discipline and 
self-critique, is a process in which the body itself rather than the mind becomes reflexive. Nevertheless, through Hannah 
Arendt and Richard Sennett, Oosterling argues that skill is not something owned by a particular subject, but gained and 
endured in a process, in-between men and media. Moreover, skill is not gained once and for all, but is a permanent process 
of adaptation (pp. 286-303).   
45 In some religious practices, it is exactly the compliance or submission that gives rise to the experience of the divine or the 
whole. This is not only experienced in Islam but also within the mysticism in Christianity and Judaism as well as in 
Buddhism and Hinduism. Submission indicates the disappearance of subject as the initiator, the humble attitude. Knitter 
(2010) even argues that it is this fundamental virtue of humility within religions that can create possibilities for interreligious 
dialogue. Instead of finding a true and unchanging self, religion could also create a possibility for a connected and 
transformable self (p. 261). Here, however, I aim at more than the religious aspect of submission. Subject is submitted to 
forces, as Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche have already shown. Submission within the concept of experience indicates thus that 
the subject is first affected in order to act, instead of being the one that initiates experience.   
  
by his slum companions Salim and Latika. The experiences in a sense disassociate the antagonist from 
its position. And as if filmmakers Tandan and Boyle are shocked by their own daring, they anxiously 
end the film by connecting the dots of the fourth option in a rigid manner, and losing the openness in-
between the dots – dots that belong to transitory networks. The movie ends with an extreme 
celebration of Jamal’s character. The experiences are retrospectively reduced to the honest character 
of the boy; the morally confused Salim dies in remorse while killing the actual bad guy and Latika 
gains beauty despite her scarred face. The collectiveness is lost, and the subjects are manifested in a 
happy ending; which was not the case for the real actors who had to go back to the slums. In the end, 
Jamal’s face does not map out the amalgamation of a collective experience, but the person Jamal has 
become the exclusive owner of his experience. The multiple-choice is completed and answered. The 
openness of the final option is closed metaphysically: d) it is written.46  
 
What has become problematic in a politics of flight is exactly this possibility of appropriation of an 
experience. The rhizomatic connectivity of experience is cut down in particular segments in order to 
project truthness on an individual. Walter Benjamin (1999) speaks of poverty of experience. 
“Experiences are lived similarities”, that cannot be measured by science, but must be endured in life. 
He deeply regrets that in modernity experiences are not lived and passed on from generation to 
generation. We live without a past, we think that we can experience without our body (p. 545 & 553). 
 
For never has experience been contradicted more thoroughly: strategic experience 
has been contravened by positional warfare; economic experience, by the inflation; 
physical experience, by hunger; moral experiences, by the ruling powers (p. 732). 
 
With this poverty of experience in mind, Agamben (1993a) starts his Infancy and History, on the 
Destruction of Experience with the following statement: 
 
The question of experience can be approached nowadays only with an 
acknowledgement that it is no longer accessible to us. For just as modern man has 
been deprived of his biography, his experience has likewise been expropriated (p. 
15). 
 
Experience is not owned, but can it still be approached in the middle of a politics of flight? How do 
we relate the action of refugee – refuge – to their expropriated experience? I think Arendt does offer 
some perspectives here by insisting that action appears in the middle, in-between men. Her analysis 
focuses on a political subject, that remains open or is shaped on the open field of politics, the public 
space. I will elaborate on this in the third chapter. The openness of the subject is due to the fact that 
men are conditioned by their plurality. It is difference that makes men equal. In Arendt’s approach 
                                                     
46 The political aspect of the film also becomes obscure in a scene with two Americans arguing against the lack of rights of 
children in India while not addressing the fact that international American companies gain their profit by child labor. This 
idea is underscored in the lives of the slum children who participated in the film. While the film’s profit grew sharply, after 
the shootings the children had to go back to the slums (Osterhout, 2010).  
  
(1958) to politics, an approach without ideology, equality does not emerge from sameness, but from 
distinction. The distinction disconnects and connects the dots, at the same time. She calls this middle 
inter-esse (being-in-between). Connection and disconnection become differential aspects of one and 
the same experience. They lose their assumed oppositional character. It is in this inter-esse as a 
relational distance, that action takes place.  
 
If men were not distinct, each human being distinguished from any other who is, 
was, or will ever be, they would need neither speech nor action to make 
themselves understood. Signs and sounds to communicate immediate, identical 
needs and wants would be enough (pp. 175-176). 
 
It is this complexity of equality in plurality that characterizes Arendt’s thought on the condition called 
human. The uniqueness of every life is thus emphasized in the interplay of action and speech. Action 
means in this distinctive creature not a realization of an essence, but rather initiation of something that 
has not been there before. Action means to begin or initiate. A human is free due to the fact that this 
being can create something new, being proactive by activating action. It is the principle that Arendt 
calls natality – the ability to be born (which I will elaborate on in 1.4.3). Humans can perform a 
miracle, meaning that they can initiate something that is as unexpected as it is unessential. 
Nevertheless, Arendt’s thought must not be typified as an appeal for a new form of isolated and 
fixated subjectivity. The initiation in action does not take place within a single individual, but always 
in the middle of plural individuals and within the plurality of an individual, in public space. In this 
interaction between men action is thus always accompanied by its twin: speech. Action and speech as 
procedural traits of men are relational. They appear in-between men. The equality of plurality is the 
event of speech and action as inter-esse.  
 
In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique 
personal identities and thus make their appearance in the human world, while their 
physical identities appear without any activity of their own in the unique shape of 
the body and sound of the voice (p.179). 
 
Speech is the disclosure47 of the initiating subject. However, despite Arendt’s distinction between 
physical identities and personal identity, I postulate with the intend to prove that Arendt’s subject is 
not an identity as I critically defined it, but a subject, a relational line within an assemblage of subjects 
and multiplicities of subjectification. Despite her focus on humans, I argue that her use of this term is 
not applied in order to generalize, but rather to multiply. Arendt shows how generalization is 
inevitable in even the simplest ways we approach and refer to each other. Whenever we want to 
                                                     
47 Dirk De Schutter (2005) justly argues that in this disclosure Arendt negates the fact that subject is not only active but also 
passive. It endures the identity that is given to him (pp. 40-41). I argue that if we expand Arendt’s thought, the who is not in 
opposition to the what (identity) of a subject, but is placed on another level. It is not something that simply activates the 
subject and decreases its passivity. Instead the disclosure brings alive a relationship. An emphasis on the relation instead of 
subject undermines the opposition between active and passive.  
  
describe who a person is, we start immediately to categorize its characteristics. This often happens in 
a comparative manner – such as high-educated refugees are more useful for our societies than so-
called low-skilled refugees – in which a person becomes an identifiable object due to its comparable 
characteristics with other objects. In this way, according to Arendt, we do not talk about who a person 
is, but rather what a person is or could do. Due to the urge to compare individuals, we lose sight of the 
very uniqueness, or rather singularity, of a person and force someone merely to be a particularity of a 
generality (pp. 181-188).48  
 As we will see, the notion of citizen indicates such a particularity within the generality called 
the nation. Arendt would rather argue that exactly that which makes an individual a person, namely a 
uniqueness articulated in its action and speech – meaning incomparable traits that appear in a political 
space – remains ineffable and indescribable, because actions bring out relations that just cannot be 
indicated. The whoness is not something that can be possessed or captured by a person to whom this 
whoness refers, Arendt states. “On the contrary, it is more than likely that the ‘who,’ which appears so 
clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the person himself” (pp. 179-180). The term 
hidden from the person himself is, however, misleading. It refers to an essence that is, in this case, not 
captured by the individual. In this study, I rather argue that there is nothing hidden, nor is something 
of a self better known to others than to ourselves. A self is not a being, it is a becoming, a process. A 
process is not knowable once and for all. It is rather approachable as everlasting changing 
performance. At present, Patrisse Cullors – a co-founder of the Black Lives Matter Movement – is one 
of the individuals that tirelessly shows how performance and politics are intertwined in one and the 
same movement. For Cullors performance politically enforces visibility and sensitization of 
transformative relationality of an individual life in a greater context of multiple exclusions. She resists 
the force of whatness of politics by showing the whoness of those who are excluded (Peled, 2016).  
 
Action and speech are the revelation as well as the initiation of a who that is performed49, always in 
the middle, always in-between, ignoring the whatness of the matter. That is why Arendt calls theatre 
the most political form of art. Characters are not owned by the actor but are explored in performance. 
The who is an event of speech and action. Arendtian ‘speech’ shares this unfolding trait with Deleuze 
and Guattari’s (1987) ‘expression’. The theatrical characters are not instrumental for protagonists, but 
processes that unfold. What appears, as something in speech and expression, is merely a flickering 
light, gone before it can bluff its way into existence. The relational taking-place of action and speech 
                                                     
48 Arendt’s distinction between what and who is inspired by Augustine’s Confessions. In his devotion and analysis Augustine 
gives rise to the idea of individuality, but through this individual experience of devotion the very I becomes an immense 
uncertainty. Arendt (1996) states: “For the more he withdrew into himself and gathered his self from the dispersion and 
distraction of the world, the more he ‘became a question to himself’ … What Augustine expects of God is an answer to the 
question ‘Who am I?’” (pp. 24-25). According to Augustine as humans we fail to understand who we are, only God is 
capable of such an understanding. Along with this Arendt (1958) states: “the conditions of human existence – life itself, 
natality and mortality, worldliness, plurality, and the earth – can never ‘explain’ what we are or answer the question of who 
we are for the simple reason that they never condition us absolutely” (p. 11). 
49 This refers to the verb acting within the act. However, performance and acting here do not refer to a fictional state of the 
subject. Following Arendt’s thought only in these momentary appearances the subject appears as really human. It is in this 
event of appearing and disappearing, that the flickering vulnerability of men, what makes them human, happens.  
  
now and here in-between people is the creation of a world of plurality of men, not the ego of Man, 
Arendt (1958) states. It is, however, not about a specific type of action or a productive act. The action 
proceeds for its own sake, it relates for the sake of the relationship, and not in order to comply with 
some people’s interest. The act, how objective it may seem to be, always reveals the who of its actors 
in this relationality. The intangible who acts and speaks by its in-betweenness, by its inter-est. Acting 
enacts and activates an entrance.  
 
These interests constitute … something which inter-est … Most action and speech 
is concerned with this in-between, which varies with each group of people, so that 
most words and deeds are about some worldly objective reality in addition to 
being a disclosure of the acting and speaking agent (p. 182). 
 
At the rear of the objective in-between lies something else, something that sheds another light upon 
the quality of inter, namely the subjective in-between. This second form of inter owes its existence to 
the relationship of acting with and speaking to one another. The subjective in-between has thus neither 
a graspable substance (formed matter), nor is it a designated empty space between objects and agents. 
It cannot be materialized, yet it creates a reality, a web of human relations. In this web, the who is not 
something that permanently is but something that vulnerably and momentarily appears in inter-action 
and inter-speech as an intersubjective reality.  
 
The chief characteristics of this specifically human life, whose appearance and 
disappearance constitute worldly events, is that it is itself always full of events 
which ultimately can be told as a story, establish a biography; it is of this life, bios 
as distinguished as mere zōē, that Aristotle said that it ‘somehow is a kind of 
praxis’ (p. 97). 
 
Action as a moment of praxis, in which a who appears beyond itself, is for Arendt a beginning, but 
never an absolute beginning. It is a beginning that always inserts itself into an already existing 
network of actions. The birth of these small events – natality – creates a unique life story. This story is 
not isolated; it concerns and affects the web beyond its own borders. The life that is produced in this 
web is unintentional and spontaneous. In an acting person – an agent who is neither the author nor the 
creator – a story begins. This beginning is relative, i.e. relational: always already in the middle of an 
existing narrative. It is a momentary assemblage of events within the infinite movement of the 
webbing of human stories. A life story, even with tree-minded or fascicular tendencies, is in this sense 
a node in the rhizomatic field of stories.50 Action and speech, just as the experience, although initiated 
                                                     
50 Paul Ricœur (1992), in his rejecting of one-sided identities, agrees with this who and storytelling of Arendt. Stories have 
the characteristics of movement and change; their structure has the ability to connect different points of life. In connecting, 
changing and transforming, stories take different shapes in life. In his work, Ricœur seem to oscillate in-between 
acknowledgement and critique of the Aristotelian structure of a story, with a clear beginning, middle and end. A story has 
multiple births and deaths, as Maan (1999) states in her critique on Ricœur by radicalizing a critical tendency that already 
exists in Ricœur’s work, for example in his analysis of Robert Musil’s Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, a novel without 
beginning, middle and end.  
  
and endured by the subject, create unexpected processes. One cannot own the unexpected. This is not 
necessarily because men do not choose to act, but rather because the ‘original’ impact of every act is 
impossible to trace and select in the tightly woven web of actions and speeches.  
 
It is within this Arendtian description of action that I expand Deleuze and Guattari’s agencement and 
reintroduce subjectivity without intentionality in order to criticize the conventional understanding of 
flight within a politics of flight. I first argue that action has rather been denied than acknowledged, 
due to the binary setting in which flight accordingly takes place. Refugees must identify themselves 
by the choice to leave the country of origin and to seek refuge in the country of arrival. There are 
general characteristics of the refugee, due to the well-known repression of the country of origin and 
the political and legal possibilities for admission of the country of arrival, which justify the whatness 
of a particular subject as being a refugee. The narrative has a beginning: political or economic turmoil 
in the country of origin. The refugee’s narrative also has a clearly targeted end: the stability and 
wealth of country of arrival. What is missing is a middle or mi-lieu in multiple senses of the word, the 
middle in which, as Benjamin (1999) suggests, the experience of flight is lived. There is inter in which 
in acting differentiated whos are performed.  
 Second, Arendt’s understanding of action expropriates action from a particular subject. 
Acting within a politics of flight – from resistance to flight and forcing an entrance to a western 
country – indicates a relational chain of acts rather than qualifying intentional behavior of a unified 
subject. Articulating an act as resistance is only possible within a political discourse, i.e. a coherent 
set of collective enunciations embodied in practices. Its multiple relations produce multiple forms of 
resistance. Banishment is only one of multiple outcomes of resistance. This multiplication is also 
implicated in the affective structure of refugees. Within a politics of flight fear, associated with the act 
of flight, is itself a multiple and shared affect. The multiplicity of this affect, as well as that of affects 
such as hope and trust, connect and disconnects subjects: the one who remains behind is in fear of 
exclusion and banishment, the one who leaves is in fear of rejection and a stateless life, and the one 
who is confronted with the migrant is in fear of intrusion and loss of its economic benefit. It is in 
terms of Sara Ahmed (2014) an affective politics of fear that creates opposing identities of us versus 
the intruder.  The relationality and multiplicity of action form a web in which subjectification of 
identities is intertwined with differentiation of subjects, multiplication of unappropriatable 
experiences and expropriation of the act of flight as owned by a particular agent. Refuge is an action 
experienced within a web of narratives, yet from the perspective of clear identities this web is torn 
apart in an event called forced migration or a tsunami of migrants.  
 
Let me clarify this web in reflecting upon the experience of homesickness. This form of distress is 
often used to describe one of the strong affects of the person who migrates, flees or is banned to 
another place. The affective and literary notion of abroad in Arabic, gharib51, refers to the term gharb, 
                                                     
51 The affectiveness is sensitized in the Arabic word ghorbah, meaning the loss of the familiar, land and language. This word 
– often used in songs in Arabic, Persian and Turkish – is also connected to the mother, the one that brings comfort and 
grounding. Her smell and her colors sensitize the home. Being-gharib is this unbearable burden of the foreigner that lives in 
 
  
which means the West as well as the place where the sun goes down. Thus, the subject, in spite of its 
hope for a better life, is travelling toward a place where the sun goes down, which explains its 
homesickness and the songs about it. What one migrant or refugee experiences is a particular 
manifestation of a collective affect. However, this affect had been transformed in the 20th century as a 
result of global movement and migration. This did not only change the world of the traveller, it also 
deterritorialized the world and home of the inhabitants of both the country of origin and the country of 
arrival. Within a geopolitical perspective – beyond nationalistic, chauvinistic discourse – 
homesickness has become a common state of mind, not at all limited to the experience of a specific 
subject, such as the refugee or the migrant. As Huijer (2016) shows, generations of European people 
remained behind after mass migration of Europeans to other places such as United States and 
Australia. These people felt a sense of loss, loss of a community while seeing villages becoming ghost 
towns. Yet again – from the perspective of modernity and its demand to be adventurous – they were 
often seen as stragglers, those who were too rigid to leave. They were often too poor to begin the 
journey. In their way, they longed and cared for a preservation of a culture. This nostalgic affect has 
turned into a glocal assemblage of both bodies and enunciations. According to Huijer this sense of 
loss and homesickness while staying behind eventually contributed to a negative sentiment toward 
migration as such, thus also rejection of refugees who in their eyes are the new adventurous fortune 
seekers who will once again turn their world upside down. This, however, does not mean that the 
experience of homesickness even for those who remained behind is a universal or uniform experience. 
In its contextual relationality, it can appear and is endured virtually by any subject that is articulated 
within a politics of flight, both in the country of origin and the country of arrival, yet each time in a 
different manner.  
 
There are those who yet have hard feelings about their experience of being left behind in a whole 
different way, as Huijer argues in connection to refugees. Atousa Bandeh Ghiasabadi’s 12 Days of 
Waiting (2008) shows the complexity of the subject of flight in connection to those who merely 
witnessed their love ones leave. It pictures an ordinary Iranian household of a middle-aged man and 
woman with Tony Blair on TV. Spring 2007, 15 English soldiers have been captured by the Iranian 
regime. It is almost Nowruz, Iranian New Year. The soldiers are captured 12 days ago and the couple 
is waiting for their daughter to call from England. Finally, the phone rings. The conversation between 
mother and daughter is psychologically contradictory. The dialogue seems to be casual and ordinary 
while the mother’s face is distressed. She is comforting her daughter while crying. It is now the 
father’s turn to comfort the child in distance. Things happen…. Life is this happening. … he 
melancholically laughs with the same lump in his throat. Things happen and the thing that has 
happened here is farness (doeri52). Farness happens, especially to sensitive people like them, the 
father tells the child. This farness is not an ordinary statement indicating the measurable distance. It 
rather specifies the affect in which the parents and the child as well as the English soldiers are 
subjected to a relational process of endurance. The farness of their daughter’s country of arrival has 
                                                                                                                                                                     
gharb, the west or the land where the sun goes down and the mother has been left behind. See for an analysis of this notion: 
Nekuee, 2004. 
52 This term is translated as homesickness in the subtitle, but indicates more.  
  
entered their home. Their daughter has British nationality. She has a passport. While the world of the 
parents seems to have become hollow in the images of dry land and rotten fruits, the daughter has 
residency. She is grounding while the parents are leafless. The couple has become the departed ones. 
While the daughter is settling down, they are banned. The fuzzy image of women sitting at the back of 
a riding truck is telling. They sit with their back to the road, moving backwards. The filmmaker, the 
other migrated daughter who resides in The Netherlands, speaks:  
 
Now my dear friends … So, my sister is not coming back anymore … And my 
parents will be alone … International crisis is over now… Nobody wants to attack 
Iran … For a short while … One Week? … One Day? … One hour? Who Knows? 
… We are waiting.53 
 
Waiting. Waiting for the unexpected, which is life, life that happens. What is this happening? In the 
first two sections the manner of approaching a politics of flight has been examined: approaching from 
within led us to consider the logic of roots as rhizome which gave us the key to how the disconnected 
dots or fragmented experiences can be connected again. Next to this question of ‘how to approach a 
politics of flight?’, in this section the question of reconnecting the dots in order to configure ‘who is 
the subject of politics of flight?’ has been explored. Still, another question emerges: ‘what is flight as 
an event, i.e. a political process?’  
Just as the how and the who, this what is not an exclusively identifiable phenomenon. Flight 
cannot be assigned to one fixed form of subject. Its analysis is not limited to one type of methodology. 
Flight is eventually an event. Even physically it situates its subjects in-between, but the eventual in-
between does not presuppose two already articulated relata. So, we have to approach this event too 
from within in a rhizomatic way in order to connect the dots. Flight, as an event, reaches beyond the 
actual migration from the country of origin to the country of arrival. (Dis)connecting the dots - 
subjects, actions and experiences – is an indication for an awareness that an approach of this politics 
must face the full potentiality of an event. Agamben articulates event as a potentiality of politics due 
to its unpredictability (see: 1.4.1). Deleuze takes a different turn and introduces the term virtuality to 
show that the actual occurrence triggers and is triggered by new assemblages (see: 1.4.2). Arendt 
introduces the term natality to emphasize the emergence of new biographies (see: 1.4.3).  
 
1.4 Event: Not Merely the Actual 
 
1.4.1 Another Potentiality beyond to Be or not to Be  
An illustration of the philosophical use of the notion of event might be enlightening for answering the 
question: ‘what is flight as an event?’. Michel Foucault (2005b) indicates that a revolution seen as an 
event is neither the effect of what came before it nor can it be judged by its aftermath. This analysis, 
                                                     
53 The final debate between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney on 23rd of October 2012 shows how this waiting will persist. 
During the presidential primary elections in 2016 it is not only Donald Trump but also Hillary Clinton that openly opposes 
Iranian government (Jacobs & Siddiqui, 2015). 
  
especially on the Iranian Revolution, brought him in great trouble. How could someone like Foucault 
imagine such an historical occasion not to be related to its past and future? There has been, however, a 
misconception in understanding Foucault’s elaboration on the matter.54 What he meant was not that a 
revolution is unrelated to its past and future, but rather that such an event in its immensity carries a 
potentiality that is neither merely an outcome of what has happened – it always enters something new 
– nor is this potentiality totally captured by the actuality after the revolution.  
 
Something being an event implies that there are multiple, emergent outcomes and any politics after 
the revolution is a possibility. An event encapsulates infinite possibilities. Although the event of flight 
is caused by actual political actions and although it seems to precede a form of life – such as 
imprisonment, banishment or residency in another country – it is never merely defined by this actual 
past and that possible future. In order to enhance Foucault’s argument Agamben’s view on 
potentiality is instructive. According to Agamben (1994) we live in an age that neither allows 
orientation back to a thing in the past, nor provides something accessible to refer to in the future.55 
 
Suspended in the void between old and new, past and future, man is projected into 
time as into something alien that incessantly eludes him and still drags him 
forward, but without allowing him to find his ground in it (p. 108). 
 
In order to think an event, one must start by elaborating on the notions of actual and potential. The 
distinction between actual and potential goes back to Aristotle’s Metaphysics and is preceded by yet 
another distinction, namely that between matter and form. While matter and form were at first 
                                                     
54 See: Afary & Anderson, 2005. 20 years after Foucault’s death and 25 years after the Iranian Revolution, Afary and 
Anderson make an extensive analysis of Foucault’s involvement in Iran. They had access to new available sources, such as 
the Iranian articles, and they have extensively interviewed more still living witnesses than before. Moreover, their book is 
the first integral translation of Foucault’s newspaper articles on the subject into English. In his review, however, Jonathan 
Rée (2005) describes this as a book without love for Foucault. Foucault’s experience of this revolution was much more 
complex, see for example his letter (Foucault, 2005b) to Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan from April 1979. Next to Rée’s 
objection, I even argue that Afary and Anderson’s thought does show little affinity with the Iranian Revolution due to the 
fact that their appreciation of the event is in full dependence of the state of affairs in the aftermath of the revolution. 
Ghorashi (2003) on the other hand shows the complexity of various affective relationalities toward this revolution and the 
multiplicity of its experience by different generations.  
55 Leland de la Durantaye (2009) connects this idea of loss of an actual past and actual future in Agamben’s The Man 
Without Content to Arendt’s idea of a loss of past or tradition in contemporary way of life. Agamben focuses on art and 
argues that there is a disconnection between the artist and its public space. However, as always is the case with Agamben, 
each loss or crisis is also a potential for another approach. It is for this reason that De la Durantaye calls potentiality the most 
crucial concept in Agamben’s work. The disconnection between the past and present means a loss of orientation. When there 
is no clear past, there is no linearity towards the future, and thus present is all that there is. This radical present – in which 
ideas, objects, or something such as essence is not transmittable from the past to the present or the future – becomes in its 
emptiness open and freed from the burden of the past. It does not focus on fixed matter, but on the act of creation (pp. 26-
55). 
  
simultaneous moments of a substance, in Metaphysics they become diachronic.56 In the Aristotelian 
thought, form is the final moment of substance; or rather its actualization as formed matter. Matter 
remains mere potentiality as long as substance is not realized in its form. Within this Aristotelian 
perspective, the concept of potentiality (dunamis) is the opposite of actuality (energeia – entelecheia). 
Potentiality means in the first instance force, including the power to become this or that. It indicates 
change, movement and process (kinêsis) (Cohen, 2009). 
 Aristotle emphasizes the meaning of potentiality in its relation to actuality. In the Aristotelian 
teleological logic potentiality is measured by the capacity to become complete. It marks the ability to 
become actual. The actual is what matters, because there the essence is realized. Actuality is equal to 
realization and thus reality. Potentiality gets its full meaning in its finalization as formed matter 
(Cohen, 2009). Take for example Auguste Rodin’s The Walking Man. Each part of the sculpture, each 
part of the incomplete yet fully articulated body answers to its form as a walking movement. Even 
more so, the process of walking hints a completion by the forceful stride into one direction. The non-
actual potentiality is understood as perishable and incomplete. Only that which has become actual 
realizes itself, and becomes eternal. For Aristotle eternal is that which no longer is in need of the 
perishable possibilities within the potential. This is perfection (Cohen, 2009). 
 
This teleological frame for a long time defined and evaluated something happening or occurring – an 
event – by its outcome. As such events, such as revolutions and flight, become means to an end, 
within a binary setting of a starting point and an end as an outcome; or in terms of Deleuze and 
Guattari: the seed as a potential tree. Actual is linked with being real, with existence, and in the end – 
due to its finality – to actual movement, with the movement as it should be, opposing the potential as 
well as the virtual. Actual indicates exactness, factuality, and truthness, and is in the end considered to 
be genuine and just. In the final stages of this line of reasoning, potentiality loses its association with 
the notion of force, once it is associated with notions such as passivity and latency. Yet, it is this first 
meaning of potentiality, i.e. force, that reverses the Aristotelian argumentation. An unconditional 
force in potentiality conditions the actual. In this sense, it makes the actual conditional, thus creating a 
relative reality. This is for Agamben potentiality: the ability itself, the capability in which the actual is 
merely a marginalized outcome rather than the only outcome, let alone the best outcome. Only from a 
teleological point of view and applying notions such as efficiency as part of a fourfold causation – 
causa materialis, formalis, efficiens and finalis – potential becomes inferior to actual. This thought is 
also thus criticized by Arendt – as we have seen earlier – once the potentiality of a who is exclusively 
reduced to a whatness. It is this teleological approach that is also problematized by Agamben (2000) 
in his Means without End.  
 
Let me return to the topic of this chapter – rhizomatic approach – and rephrase this in the perspective 
of Agamben’s expression means without end. An approach does not only negate a method of 
appropriation but does not function as an end either. ‘Means’ indicates middle, not as in the middle of 
                                                     
56 This is in contrast to what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) suggest, namely that form and matter are neither diachronic nor 
synchronic. In their simultaneous appearance, they are rather asynchronic. Form and matter are not historical but territorial; 
there is no beginning or ending. 
  
a road – in between a beginning and an end – but as a vectorial force without reference yet. It can 
connect to all sides to every thing. A means functions for the sake of this middle. Equipped with this 
idea of a middle as a means without end – crucial in lectures of Agamben, Deleuze and Guattari and 
implicitly thematized in Arendt’s political philosophy 57  – they approach events. Event, in their 
thinking, is a process in the middle. It is an articulation of in-betweeness, both spatial and temporal, 
yet not limited by respectively a lost motherland and an already known destiny, a past and a future. 
The middle carries the possibility of other options, i.e. new options. The new of this potentiality, in 
accordance with the event itself, cannot be appropriated, organized or speculated on. Deleuze and 
Guattari stress the emergent quality. Arendt emphasizes its spontaneity and natality.  
What does this impossibility to appropriate, organize and speculate on an event – in this case 
an event of flight – means for the experience of flight by individuals who are not yet subjectified by 
the layered and ambiguous discourse we have been reflecting upon? 
 
This does not mean that today there are no more experiences, but they are enacted 
outside the individual. And it is interesting that the individual merely observes 
them, with relief … the overwhelming majority of people have no wish to 
experience it, preferring instead that the camera should (Agamben, 1993a, p. 17). 
 
The medium camera is decisive in this quote. There is of course a distinction between the real 
experience of wars, famine, revolutions and flight, and the cinematographic experience. The 
cinematographic ‘registration’ of reporters gains knowledge. According to Agamben (1993a) the 
contemporary inability to gain or give meaning to experience is precisely caused by the modern 
alignment between knowledge and experience. Modernity as it is articulated in works of thinkers like 
Kant instrumentalize experience in the process of gaining knowledge. This is the founding process for 
the constitution of subjectivity. Yet, to increase knowledge is an endless process that according to 
Kant cannot be completed. The subject never becomes a whole. The instrumentalization of experience 
by the knowing subject deprives the experience from its singularity. It is reduced to a particularity 
within a series of similar particularities, the quantification of which leads to universalized 
propositions on general truths. The subject, being an epistemological construct within this process of 
knowing – labeled by Kant as ‘transcendental apperception’ – is thus never able to gain this essential 
truth factually. It undergoes the experience, but is never in full possession of ‘its’ experience (pp. 19-
27). 
 So, Agamben diagnoses a contradictory trait within this process. While experience is reduced 
to that which can be transformed into knowledge, the subject of modernity is split in two: between a 
subject that has knowledge but does not undergo the experience fully, and a subject that undergoes an 
experience but does not gain knowledge. Take Slumdog Millionaire: this is not only the bewilderment 
of Jamal, but moreover that of the detective. Jamal has undergone something, while the detective has 
only knowledge of it. The two characters are never at ease with each other. The experience of the 
                                                     
57 Although Arendt (1958) speaks about a means as an end the analysis is akin to that of Agamben.  
  
sublime is the exception to the rule: it is an exemplary articulation that initially ruptures the subject, 
ruptures the manner in which we understand of experience the world, according to De Mul (2004). 
 
This experience of the complete contingency of the world is pregnantly expressed 
in the negative pleasure that the sublime – the chaotic, completely purposeless 
character of nature – arouses in us. The sublime makes us realize that an answer to 
the question ‘Why and for what purpose is the world?’ cannot be given (p. 83). 
 
Returning to our approach of a politics of flight a question emerges: who is the subject that has the 
knowledge of flight and who is the subject that experiences the event of flight? Do I have knowledge 
of a politics of flight because of my experience of fleeing or because of my theoretical efforts to 
understand what has happened to me? Do policymakers and refugees differ in being respectively the 
subject that has the knowledge of and the subject that endures the event? The least we can say for the 
time being is that a politics of flight in its inclusion of multiple subjects undermines the duality of 
knowledge and experience, or more obviously between theory and practice, as we will see in the next 
chapters. Flight as a discourse implies both theory – i.e. in Deleuzian and Guattarian terms: an 
assemblage of enunciations – and practice – i.e. an assemblage of bodies. Due to the multiplicity and 
complexity of the subjects of a politics of flight on the one hand and the interconnectedness of the 
sublime experience as such on the other, the experience of flight and its escaping trait cannot be 
limited to the subject called refugee, nor could its approach be merely judged by policymakers.  
 The events in Paris on January and November 2015 and in Brussels on March 2016 show how 
the subject that watches and the subject that is being watched are intertwined in a global political 
network of violence, a violence that “cannot be dealt with in purely formalistic or moralistic models” 
(Pisters, 2003, p.80). Nobody is just a spectator. A politics of flight has immense unseen facets, some 
are our dreams, and some are our nightmares. Our political decisions do not only affect our taxes but 
also concern the state of affairs on Egyptian and Israeli border, prisons with no way out and no 
prospect of inclusion.58 Nevertheless, the inappropriateness of the experience of flight creates an 
unexpected potential of relationalities. The experience appears in a discursive field in which the 
experience itself becomes a force relating multiple subjects rather than distinguishing between 
experiencing subjects and informed subjects. The so-called experience of one subject is simply an 
occurrence in a rhizomatic affective field that connects all kinds of subjects.59 
                                                     
58 Even from the perspective of the binary logic of country of origin and country of arrival, refugees often find themselves 
stuck in the middle. One of the horrifying examples of our time is the torture, rape and murder of Sudanese and Eritrean 
refugees in the Sinai. They are not even political prisoners, but merely stateless, in no-man’s-land. And if they are able to 
reach Israel, they will be excluded and stigmatized as infiltrators. This is visualized in Israel’s construction of one of the 
biggest prisons in the world. This prison is not made for the so-called criminal, but for the so-called outsider. See on this 
issue: Van Nierop, 2012. 
59 Deleuze also often speaks of this unappropriated trait of experience. In the sixth chapter I will elaborate on the relation 
between the concept of experience and experiment, where Deleuze and Guattari play a crucial role. However, in Deleuze’s 
texts as well as in those with Guattari, the experience becomes subjectless, while I rather argue that although it is not owned 
by a particular subject, it is nevertheless endured by differentiated subjects. This is due to the cruciality of the notion of 
subject and subjectivity for a politics of flight.  
  
 
The unpredictability of the possibilities of various connections within a politics of flight forces us to 
approach potentiality in a different manner. What is the potentiality of the event of flight? Agamben 
reverses the aforementioned interpretation of Aristotle, which for that matter is still present in both 
the Hegelian notion of Spirit and the Marxian notion of Labor as universalizing forces that direct 
collective learning processes. While potentiality is here defined as that which is not-yet-actual, 
Agamben (1999a) creates a pseudo-Hegelian antithesis or speculative proposition: “All potentiality is 
impotentiality” (p. 182). He defines potentiality full range: also as a possibility not to be. Potentiality 
is “a hexis, a disposition or ‘a having’”, which indicates both the presence to be and the presence of 
not to be (p. 179). Through Aristotle’s aporia of seeing darkness – noticing that which cannot be seen 
– Agamben points to the experience of sensation. Sensation loses its teleological actuality as an 
instrument to see something, but is rather experienced as a potentiality, or as he calls it: “the 
possibility of privation” (p. 181). 
 
Potentiality … maintains itself in relation to its own privation, its own sterēsis, its 
own non-Being. This relation constitutes the essence of potentiality. To be 
potential means: to be one's own lack, to be in relation to one's own incapacity. 
Beings that exist in the mode of potentiality are capable of their own 
impotentiality; and only in this way do they become potential. They can be 
because they are in relation to their own non-Being. In potentiality, sensation is in 
relation to anesthesia, knowledge to ignorance, vision to darkness (p. 182). 
 
It is through this possibility of non-Being that Agamben defines freedom of men. Freedom, as we 
often see in contemporary times, indicates on the one hand the power to do something, for example 
Barack Obama’s expression Yes, we can, and on the other hand a form of refusal, for example the so-
called populist refusal voting mode60 in Europe and United States through which men do not choose 
for an ideology but rather negating the existing ones. Agamben reasons that freedom is neither the 
mere upholding of an act, nor the refusal of it: “To be free is, in the sense we have seen, to be capable 
of one's own impotentiality, to be in relation to one's own privation. This is why freedom is freedom 
for both good and evil” (p. 183). 61 
 The freedom to be capable of one’s own impotentiality is a kind of metastatic feedback loop: 
the concept bends back upon itself. It is the same as to see how we see. It problematizes our way of 
perceiving. In terms of the citation on camera as a mean of knowing: our impotentiality to see and 
                                                     
60 It is crucial to note that the populist refusal vote is not merely a racist or anti-migrant vote. In The Netherlands, they vary 
from PVV, to Socialist Party, Pirate Party, Animal Party. The notion populist must not result in pinpointing them to one 
form of ideology. 
61 In The Coming Community Agamben (1993b) clarifies this by reference to Glenn Gould, who is not defined by his ability 
to play the piano, nor his inability to play it. According to Agamben Gould is “the only one who cannot not-play” (p. 36). In 
the scene where Gould plays Bach’s Partita #2 in The Art of Piano this is more than obvious. Gould plays intensely, and 
suddenly stops playing, stand up and moves to the window, but in some sense the sound remains resonating in the air, and 
Gould remains playing the piano through his mouth by expressing the notes. When he returns to the piano, and start playing 
with his hands, there is no real gap between these moments (Glenn Gould plays Bach, n.d). 
  
know without our cameras and televisions. Yet, Agambens problematization does not lead to total 
inertia. This experience of potentiality does not necessarily lead to mere passive zapping form one 
channel to another. One can also choose not to not-act. This idea of potentiality thus alters the idea of 
actuality as well. In Agamben’s thought, and his reading of Aristotle, actuality is no longer the final 
realization of potentiality. It is the other way around; the impotentiality of potentiality survives the 
momentary actualization. It is always preserved in the actual (p. 183-184).  
 
In the principle of reason (‘There is a reason why there is something rather than 
nothing’), what is essential is neither that something is (being) nor that something 
is not (nothingness), but that something is rather than nothingness. For this reason 
it cannot be read simply as an opposition between two terms – is/is not. It also 
contains a third term: the rather (which is related to the Old English ‘rathe’ 
meaning quick or eager, and which in Latin is potius, from potis, that which is 
able), the power to not not-be (Agamben, 1993b, p. 104). 
 
Politics of flight is the exploration of this rather. It is this concept of impotentiality and freedom in 
the sense of to not not-be within a politics of flight that I will explore in the next chapters, reflecting 
upon the middle as mi-lieu of politics (chapter 2) and providing the conceptual tools (chapter 3) to 
analyze different political regimes that try to exclude, integrate or internalize the ambiguity of the 
other, the migrant, the refugee. What does it mean to-not-be, within the actualization of an identity, of 
an other, of a refugee, not as something or someone, but as an evental process that resist the 
homogeneity of citizenship’s actuality? 
 
1.4.2 Deleuzian Repetition beyond Identity: Virtual/Actual 
Potentiality is vitality, it is life itself. When we connect the idea of an event to ‘its’ potentiality, we 
surpass a reduction of this vitality of an event to actual analyzable historical facts. We take its 
liveliness to yet another level when it is connected with the idea of virtuality as understood by 
Deleuze. In his work and in his collaboration with Guattari, Deleuze too introduces apparently 
‘oppositional’ notions: flight lines versus segmentation lines, decalcomania versus mapping. In this 
sense Deleuze seems to retrieve the Hegelian duality and recaptures his dialectics. This is at odd with 
his and Guattari’s critical philosophy on Hegel. How do these twofold notions differ from Hegelian 
oppositions? In note 35 I argued that these are rhetorical gestures. The relation is not oppositional but 
supplementary. That also counts for virtuality and actuality. Nevertheless, Deleuze’s work must not 
be designated as anti-Hegelian. Such a conclusion would create a contradiction that Deleuze and 
Guattari reject. In their affirmative thinking, I would rather like to argue, they appreciate the 
multiplicity in thinking itself. Hegel’s merit is the introduction of movement, i.e. history in thought, 
and hence his introduction of dynamic difference. In his analysis thought thoroughly becomes a 
process.  
Deleuze and Guattari’s critique radicalizes this becoming in Hegel’s analysis. They push his 
thoughts beyond its teleological and oppositional traits that reduce differences to oppositions and lift 
negation via sublation to ever more self-conscious identities, that in a geopolitical sense eventually 
legitimize western supremacy over other cultures; especially African culture and philosophy. Their 
  
rhizomatic anti-methodology is drenched of Nietzschean terminology: forces that do not oppose, but 
enforce upon and annihilate one another. Just like Agamben’s treatment of ‘means’, their 
‘methodology’ is a dialectics without beginnings and ends, as Deleuze’s describes in Difference and 
Repetition. In this book Deleuze (1997) connects two notions: difference and repetition. It is this 
Deleuzian understanding of difference that I intend to explore in my analyses of politics of flight. 
Within this politics the idea of sameness has dominated for a long time. Deleuze’s exploration of 
difference problematizes the idea of sameness. Except, what does repeat itself, since difference is 
beyond sameness?   
In traditional approaches these two notions – difference and repetition – are either seen as 
opposites or as two secondary traits of an overarching notion: The Same. What remains The Same is 
The Identity of The One. As we will see in the fourth chapter, it is this idea that leads to a politics of 
exile. Deleuze’s critique is that difference in this approach is not absolute. The idea of Sameness 
always represent itself in difference, hence makes difference secondary to The One that always keeps 
the same Identity. According to such analysis repetition does not impose change or real movement, 
but is always the repetition of the same. In contrast to this, Deleuze opens another entrance by stating 
that the ideas of difference and repetition are neither oppositional nor secondary to the idea of The 
Same that has haunted philosophy since Plato.  
 
1) Difference, from Deleuze’s perspective, is not an aspect of The Same in its repetitiveness, but 
underlies as well as undermines the idea of The Same. Deleuze demonstrates difference in itself, by 
distinguishing conceptual difference form the concept of difference. Conceptual difference regulates 
the process of thinking, in which concepts are categorized according to a logical matrix. Only in the 
second instance this order allows for differences and subcategories, such as homesickness and 
dislocation. For example, the general category of ‘home’ enables me to make a distinction between 
my home and your home, my land and your land, my people and your people. This in the final 
instance oppositional distinction depends on the identity of the category and thus the concept ‘home’ 
is represented in the distinction (which I will elaborate on in 5.4). Exactly this secondary status of 
difference in the conventional interpretation of thinking is criticized by Deleuze. His critique targets 
the four principals of logical thinking in which representation predominates: 
 
There are four principal aspects to ‘reason’ in so far as it is the medium of 
representation: identity, in the form of undetermined concept; analogy, in the 
relation between ultimate determinable concepts; opposition, in the relation 
between determination within concepts; resemblance, in the determined object of 
the concept itself (p. 29. Underlining TR). 
 
Identity, analogy, opposition and resemblance are the four legs upon which logical reason62 founds 
the concept of The Same as primary. What differs not only then becomes secondary, but also inferior 
                                                     
62 It is important to make a distinction between reason in a broader sense of the word, and logical reason in the strict sense 
of the word. Reasoning, in its strict logical sense, gives rise to the idea of The Same, yet in a broader sense creates a certain 
consistency that is open to difference that is not secondary to the idea of The Same. It is this latter form of consistency that 
 
  
or even worse, evil or monstrous. In 4.3 and 4.4 this moral implication of the difference as secondary 
will be elaborated on, while in 6.3 I focus on the implication of difference as the affirmative ground 
zero of thought and ethics, which refers to the concept of difference. According to Deleuze thought is 
an experiment with the concept of difference not depending on The Same but as difference in itself. 
Thus, in contrast to the idea of The Same that generates the duality between particularities and 
generalities, the concept of difference according to him connects two other notions in a supplementary 
way: singularities and universality. The ‘thing’ that repeats endlessly is the universality of 
singularities. There are endless homes, yet a home does neither represent The Home, nor is an 
inadequate instance of the idea of The Home, as in homesickness. A home is not this particular home 
that must complete the Ideal sense of hominess.  
 
2) Repetition, the second notion that Deleuze thematizes and transforms, is often seen as a secondary 
manifestation of The Same, a recurrence in which each element represents its predecessors. There is 
an alleged origin that reproduces the repetitive elements. The first form of repetition is habit – habit 
of reading, writing, walking, going to war, identifying. Sometimes something becomes a habit out of 
an original act that precedes the repetition: like handshaking with your right hand, always brushing 
your teeth the same way or addressing the other with her proper name. Habit or the act of repeating 
something in the now-moment resembles something other than itself, whether from its past or its 
anticipated future. Habit by definition indicates repetition of things that resemble one another. Habit 
synthesizes the past and the future in its present action. The idea of homesickness thus synthesizes an 
Ideal Home in the past, with the hope of finding or the despair of never finding the Same Home in the 
future (as I will argue in 5.4). 
 The second form of resemblance assumed in repetition is recognition. The expectation of 
resemblance guarantees the shortcoming of the repeated element. And the shortcoming that finds its 
foundation in the difference, how minimalistic it may be, is always immanent within the repetition. 
Recognition appears in remembering, the image of a thing or an experience that resembles something 
that has passed and is reproduced in the memory. Deleuze calls habit and memory naked repetitions. 
The dominance of The Origin – such as The Home – that is repeated, gives the naked repetition on the 
one hand a static trait, meaning what repeats itself always resembles the same thing; as well as a 
negative trait, meaning despite repetitions’ effort to resemble the origin, it always fails to do so.  
 Deleuze’s critique targets the illusions from which this idea of failure springs. Difference is 
not a defect of repetition. “We can never say that two things are the same because of the difference 
implied in any repetition” (Williams, 2003, p. 33). Deleuze (1997) introduces another form of 
repetition, a covered repetition, which does not symmetrically repeat The Same, but rather repeats 
asymmetrical and incomparable singularities. And again, he refers to Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s eternal 
return is not the repetition of one life over and over again, but repetition of life – which differs every 
time – endlessly (as we will see in 6.5). The difference is not secondary, it is the dynamic force behind 
repetition. In the same vein, there is no such thing as Writing, but endless individual writings, each 
with its own intensive variety. The spiritual rather than materialistic repetition is the everlasting 
                                                                                                                                                                     
has been explored by Deleuze and Guattari in their analysis of milieu in What is Philosophy? and A Thousand Plateaus. This 
will be addressed in the next chapter.  
  
presence of individual synthesis and not an endless recurrence of the same element. This synthesis is 
characterized by Deleuze as passive, which does not indicate non-productivity, but rather pre-
personality. “Repetition is a condition of action before it is a concept of reflection” (p. 90). It does not 
emerge from the cogito (logos), as Descartes suggests. The synthesis is not initiated by a person, but 
by that which is endured by an individual. The synthesis is thus not something that can be planned, it 
rather disorganizes its predecessors. In other words, literally in line with Nietzsche, Deleuze states 
that the only thing that repeats itself is difference in itself. “Repetition is, for itself, difference in 
itself” (p. 94). The only thing that always happens is difference, or what is called pure becoming.  
 
For eternal return, affirmed in all its power, allows no installation of a foundation-
ground. On the contrary, it swallows up or destroys every ground which would 
function as an instance responsible for the difference between the original and the 
derived, between things and simulacra. It makes us party to a universal 
ungrounding (p. 67). 
 
The repetition, the repetition for itself, is thus not a horizontal recurrence of the same concept, but 
“repetition is difference without a concept” (p. 23). Deleuze synthesizes the titles of the first two 
chapters by stating in a quasi-Hegelian manner: “If difference is the in-itself, then repetition in the 
eternal return is the for-itself of difference” (p. 125). In naked repetition – habit and recognition – the 
repeated becomes a metaphor for that which is repeated, as if it could repeat something naked without 
any supplementary elements. In covered repetition every part carries a mask that cannot resemble the 
other due to the immanent difference. Nonetheless, again these two forms must not be seen as 
opposites. Covered repetition is the heart that endlessly beats through the assumed resemblance of 
naked repetition. As we will see in the fifth chapter it is this masked repetition that undermines the 
memories of subjects of multicultural society. Their habits and memories refer to some shared identity 
in the past that can be repeated, naked as it were, in the present. The difference results in affaects 
ranging from disappointment and reactive resentment to nostalgia (see: 5.4). The recent Brexit bears 
witness to this retro-imperialist nostalgia. In the sixth chapter in trying to sketch an affirmative 
approach to this supplementary difference the repetition of memory answers to this active affectivity 
of difference. Then remembering indicates a repetition of memories as new creative syntheses and not 
as a phantom of an imagined past. Arendt’s notion of natality offers productive connections.    
 
Yet, before exploring this notion and finalizing this chapter, it is instructive for an understanding of 
Deleuze’s revision of the notions of difference and repetition, to explore his notion of the individual 
against the background of the already introduced notions of subject, person and identity. As James 
Williams (2003) points out, individual does not indicate a person as a conscious human being who 
resembles an identity and acts in analogy to, yet negating other human being’s identity. Individual 
cannot be exhaustively subsumed as a member under a species or as an object under a category or 
concept. As indicated before, according to Deleuze individual is not a fixed moment in time and 
space, but rather a process, a synthesis of infinite connections. While a person intends to manifest its 
identity and a subject in a Kantian sense is the essence of self-consciousness, an individual is eventive 
in experimenting. An individual rather permanently disorganizes itself, not as a self-conscious person 
  
or a normalized subject, but as a process that thinks on its own accord, the latter term suggesting 
resonance with other individuals. There is more to an individual than a person can express or a subject 
can reflect upon. This difference between an individual as a node in a network with endless virtual 
connections and a person as a self-conscience body results precisely from a crucial distinction 
between the actual and the virtual.  
 
The virtual and the actual form the doublet that creates reality. Thus, reality for Deleuze (1997) is not 
a state of affairs as an objectifiable configuration of facts and acts, but rather vital difference that 
gives rise to the virtual as well as the actual. “The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. 
The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual” (p. 208). When he states that ideas are real he refers 
to this twofold aspect of reality in which ideas as virtual forces are dramatized in actual concepts. 
There is an equality of appreciation between the two in reality in which “the virtual is the condition 
for change and evolution in the actual” and “the actual is the condition for determinacy in the virtual” 
(Williams, 2003, p. 52). 
 Ideas are virtual in being affects or intensities. The virtual must not be confused with an 
abstract idea, or still Platonic based fiction. It is rather sensed and experienced as that which cannot be 
represented. Its reality is anchored in this difference. As an affect, an idea is more than a logical and 
analytical entity. Although affect refers to an experience of a body, nevertheless it is “all the while 
trans-historical, trans-temporal, trans-spatial and autonomous” (Coleman, 2005, p. 11). Affect is the 
experience of what I have explored before as a body without organs. This experience involves all 
senses, also the mind that Nietzsche labeled as our biggest sense organ. The title of the 52nd 
International Art Exhibition of La Biennale di Venezia in 2007 Think with the Senses - Feel with the 
Mind. Art in the Present Tense refers to such an idea of affect. Deleuze (1997) thus argues that 
unrealistic abstraction belongs to the realm of the actual, the realm in which connections are cut off or 
reduced to oppositional positions in order to create comprehension of an object. What we consider to 
be an isolated actual object is rather the thing that has been distanced from ‘its’ virtual ground from 
which it is born.  
Virtual is not synonymous to possible. Possibilities, think for example of science fiction 
movies, are still enthralled by re-presentation. Something is possible, i.e. imaginable in the sense that 
it aims to become actual. Possibility remains in the realm of the actual but then as a fictive trait. As a 
fictive projection, it strengthens the communis of identification. Virtual on the other hand dispenses 
with ideas of representation and original, which gives rise to the very opposition of fictive/non-fictive. 
 
Thus, with actualisation, a new type of specific and partitive distinction takes the 
place of the fluent ideal distinctions. We call the determination of the virtual 
content of an Idea differentiation; we call the actualisation of that virtuality into 
species and distinguished parts differenciation. It is always in relation to a 
differentiated problem or to the differentiated conditions of a problem that a 
differenciation of species and parts is carried out, as though it corresponded to the 
cases of solution of the problem (pp. 206-207). 
 
  
The differentiation in the virtual thus appears as a problematization, while actualization differenciates 
– as we will see in the fifth chapter – for the sake of solutions. The homo sapiens that stretches itself, 
standing on his feet to see and orient better, solves the problem of being spotted before he spots the 
enemy. Species, organs and laws of nature and men are solutions to specific problems. The problem 
as such – problematization – remains on the level of the virtual, in a state in which it makes a 
connection to all that is at hand, and not solely to what is needed for a specific solution. Completeness 
is another aspect of the virtual. Deleuze (1997) nuances matters by stating that completeness does not 
mean that the virtual is a totalistic whole. Being whole is articulated in the realm of the actual: the 
organism or organization as a whole of elements. The actualization as a whole means differenciation, 
integration, and solution (p. 211). The quality of the actual object is bound to space and time, a 
movement gradually from A to B, for example an integration policy that through an assimilating 
process intends to gradually normalize the other toward a citizenship with recognizable and 
controllable habitual performance. The affects within the virtual other have the creative potential to 
differentiate endlessly. The virtual is aimless, which does not mean that it does not move, it moves 
without aim, connecting forces that strive to enhance themselves. The example of the difference 
between brainwaves in analytical thought and creative thought is in that sense illustrative. During 
analytical thinking the brainwaves appear as short lines between A and B. The movement is fast but 
does not leave the left side of the brain. The creative thinking, which starts on the right side of the 
brain, on the other hand, shows multiple long stretching lines that penetrate the entire brain. The 
movement is slower and the directions of the vectors are unpredictable (Dart, 2013). The creative 
brain is rhizomatic (Pisters, 2003, p. 7). It is also fascinating to know that creativity is enhanced in the 
frontal lobe of the brain by interference with the inhibitory mechanism. 
 
How does the virtual connect to time? The virtual is the past but not a particular past. It is a past as an 
endless multiplicity of that which has been. This past is not defined by chronological order and not 
even a multiple chronology. Bouazizi is not a product of a specific Tunisian history, or Arab history, 
but an amalgamation of a world history of colonialism and capitalism. It is non-chronological, not 
because it rejects chronology, but because the chronological line that we are presented with is merely 
one mode of what is real: namely the actual history books. The virtual is capacity, not as something 
that can be identified and imagined. The completeness of the capacity means that it is real beyond that 
which could be actually imagined in our minds and dreams. Bouazizi’s deed physically did happen 
then and there, but in a virtual sense resonated in political thinking everywhere. This idea of capacity 
brings about the connection between Deleuze and Agamben. In this respect, there seems to be no 
difference between the two words potentiality and virtuality for Deleuze (1997). Both virtual and 
potential are characterized as complete determination (pp. 175, 209). The affinity with Agamben’s 
thought becomes even more obvious when Deleuze shows how the non-being of the virtual does not 
function as a negative. 
 
There is a non-being, yet there is neither negative nor negation. There is a non-
being, which is by no means the being of the negative, but rather the being of the 
problematic … Critiques of the negative are never decisive as long as they invoke 
  
the rights of a first concept (the One, order, being); they are no more so as long as 
they are content to translate opposition into limitation (pp. 202-203, italics TR). 
 
The non-being of the virtual and the potential for Deleuze and Agamben is thus not a negation; it is 
not a determination of the The Same, rather a determination of endless repetition of difference within 
the reality of the virtual. The non-being is eventive. What lies, relatively before and after an event are 
actualized states of affairs, whereas the virtual event is a convergence of forces that cannot be 
captured in spatio-temporal concepts and thought such as country of origin and country of arrival, or 
Arab Spring. Bouazizi’s life is a much bigger story than words that intend to comprehend it. There is 
in Deleuze’s sense of the word neither something that happens before or after an event, nor is the 
event a mere reaction to the state of affairs. There is neither essence nor finality in an event. Event is 
what lies, has lain and will lie underneath any actual state of affairs. It is in Agambian sense the 
impotentiality that is never lost in the moment of actualization. What we call actual is rather a 
particular outcome of the event. “The event is not what occurs (an accident), it is rather inside what 
occurs, the purely expressed” (Deleuze, 1990, p 149). A home is not an entity, a whole – a building, a 
nation, designated emotions – it is a complete reality that surpasses our ideas of what is comfortable 
and what is not. 
 
This is what we call ‘home’. Every household is an aurally marked territory. 
Homes are created by sound walls: a radio that is playing, singing, and speaking 
voices; the sound of the washing machine; and other sounds (Pisters, 2003, pp. 
189-190). 
 
1.4.3 Permanency of Birth 
How do pure expressions of an event in Deleuze’s thought and aimless experience of an event in 
Agamben’s reflections relate to the analysis of political act and speech in Arendt’s lectures? The 
connection is the unpredictability of that which is about to emerge. Arendt calls this emergence: 
natality. Birth, creativity and event are political forces in this Arendtian notion. Dirk De Schutter’s 
(2005) analysis of Arendt’s notion of revolution is instructive here. The Dutch word om-wenteling – 
re-volution – D. De Schutter states, exactly expresses Arendt’s vision of revolution, first by referring 
to rotation, meaning repetition of the same cycle; second, by referring to blasting (Dutch: toer) of an 
engine; and third to a radical change in the order of things. The three meanings of omwenteling are in 
accordance with the three conditions that for Arendt characterize a human action (p. 14). This is: the 
repetition of the birth of new organism in labor, the repetitive work for the fabrication of new objects 
in work, and the repetition of difference in a new action. When Arendt speaks of natality, she is 
beyond labor and work, referring to the emergence of endless difference in the realm of action and 
speaking in public space. This political natality is thus distinct from the ‘ontic’ birth of a living 
organism and the production of cultural objects in the realm of work. Confronted with the totalitarian 
tendencies in her time, Arendt argues that the emphasis on birth of the body in the cycle of life has 
decreased our capacity to be born in the realm of politics. While the body refers to that which 
conditions us, effectively limiting us, politics is the realm of freedom. In Arendt’s work life seems to 
refer to merely a conditioned life, leaving freedom of political natality in the abyss of a lost world of 
  
human interaction. Nevertheless, as Anne O’Byrne (2010) argues in her Natality and Finitude the 
three forms of newness in labor, work and action, are not hierarchically divided in Arendt’s work. 
Their interaction with one another is far more complex than is often assumed. Even the notion of body 
is not unambiguous in her work. In chapter three I critically examine Arendt’s understanding of body 
and life.  
 How does this natality relate to the notion of death? In her Love and Saint Augustine, Arendt 
(1996) opposes to the emphasis on death in the history of philosophy – iconized by her teacher Martin 
Heidegger – by the idea of beginning, the idea of natality. “Since man can know, be conscious of, and 
remember his ‘beginning’ or his origin, he is able to act as a beginner and enact the story of mankind” 
(p. 55). While Augustine defines man as something between the not-yet, which indicates the birth, and 
the no-more, which denotes death, Arendt accentuates the first by stating: 
 
The negation of life through the ‘not-yet’ has a positive meaning: it has to do with 
what followed upon the ‘not-yet’ … Therefore, the ‘not-yet’ of life is not nothing, 
but the very source that determines life in the positiveness of its being. Life must 
refer back to its own ‘not-yet,’ because life in the world will end (p. 71). 
 
Arendt’s natality indicates that birth is not a simple beginning process of life that results finally in 
death. Natality is the capacity to appear endlessly in the realm of politics, creating new forms of 
relations that cannot be predicted beforehand. Natality with its infinite potential is the engine of 
immortality. In The Human Condition (1958) she continues to emphasize the fact that it is the 
immensity of our human actions – actions that makes us appear in the world of human relations – that 
give us a name that could endure time. Thus, political natality does not result in death, but in 
immortality or as O’Byrne (2010) states political immortality (p. 81). 
 O’Byrne too shows that the two notions – birth and death – must not be understood as 
opposites. They are not polar concepts, due to a fundamental asymmetry between the two. In words of 
Heidegger, death is that what belongs to us the most. There is an intense form of loneliness that 
appears in the possibility of death. Even if others are present in the very moment of our dying, death 
is what happens to us alone. Birth on the other hand is never ours alone. Our birth needs the 
cooperation of at least two other individuals. Birth is thus by definition relational. It is within this 
relationality, with birth’s reference to another time than that of death, that the symmetry between 
death and birth is disrupted (pp. 7-9). 
 
If death delivers us from the world, whether into paradise or hell, oblivion or 
having-been, birth introduces us to a world that is not of our making and to a past 
that we have the impossible task of making our own (p. 6). 
 
Instead of defining natality as the first part of a polar set, O’Byrne defines it in accordance with David 
Wood as a liminal concept. 
 
Because they are neither inside nor outside (or both inside and outside), neither 
here nor beyond (or both here and beyond), neither within the philosophical 
  
practice in question nor wholly outside it (or both within and outside), we have to 
set each liminal concept in a more complex set of relations (p. 10). 
 
In line with this we could state that the asymmetry between death of the body, which as will be argued 
in Chapter 4 becomes the decisive factor of totalitarianism, and the natality within political plurality, 
are central here. While the totalitarian death reduces the body to merely its whatness, it is the whoness 
of the singular individual that is at stake in the political natality. The question is: who draws the 
consequences of the Deleuzian virtual, Agambian potentiality and Arendtian natality? It is this idea of 
birth as a productive mechanism that becomes more and more explicit in Arendt’s (1958) work, 
especially in The Human Condition. There is no finality in natality.  
 
Greatness … the specific meaning of each deed, can lie only in the performance 
itself and neither in its motivation nor its achievement (p. 206). 
 
The current geopolitical situation asks for a new ethics for a community to come that acknowledges 
the differential connectivity of individuals that have to participate in a political community beyond the 
utilitarian normative thinking of policymakers. How do we ‘approach’ a refugee: as an identity or as 
an individual in Deleuzian sense? Following Arendt’s line of thought, we could state that it is 
impossible to outline the web of stories around who a refugee is. This is merely approachable through 
the initiation of action, and not due to goals or motivations of a particular person. Action is a 
performance affecting the actor as well as the other, as we have seen in Bouazizi’s case. 
 Through these characteristics, Arendt discusses how frustrating action and narrative can be. 
Her analysis is still instructive for an understanding of our age of transparent communication on the 
World Wide Web. The web of narratives is unlimited because of the unpredictability, irreversibility 
of its actions and the anonymity of its actor. These three traits are the engine of political birth. Action, 
even reaction, initiates something by altering a course in the network of human relations. The who is 
not traceable. The outcome of any alteration, however, is unpredictable. It gives rise to multiple 
processes and each branching or bifurcation in this rhizomatic field leads to endless other outcomes. 
The endlessness of branching roots in what affects and is affected by uncountable, anonymous actors. 
Once a connection is made – and virtual others are given as a result of this one connection – it is not 
possible to move backwards and reverse an act in time and space due to the multiplicity of branches 
that have been created. Each act is irreversible (pp. 190-192, 223). Bouazizi’s act cannot not have 
happened.  
 
Must we then oppose Arendt’s thought to that of Deleuze and Guattari, who speak of reversibility of 
connections in the process of mapping? Deleuze and Guattari agree that a current connection can 
transform, multiply and even vanish. Only the act of tracing an origin removes the alternative 
connections. Selective tracing carries the consequence that some connections seem to be irreversible. 
Approaching the matter of refugees therefore means mapping its virtual existence, not tracing its 
actual situation, or pretending their indwelling in Turkey and Libya can hold the flows of migration. 
Arendt’s idea of irreversibility of an action indicates that an action, the moment that it appears in the 
public realm, is detached from its actor, whether this refers to the refugee or the policymaker. The 
  
death of an actor is thus asymmetrical to the death of an act. What Arendt means, is not that an act can 
never change its course. She only emphasizes that an actor is incapable of intentionally reversing its 
act. In sync with Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis, Arendtian action is not an object that is owned by 
an actor. It is a process that operates on actual differenciated and virtual differentiated fields. It 
virtually has the potentiality to move anywhere. What makes an action change course is not the actor 
but another act, or in Deleuze’s Nietzschean perspective: another force. The clash of forces creates 
other entrances that enable actors to take different directions. Arendt speaks of deeds that can be 
interrupted in their everlasting effects, in their everlasting consequences and in the case of 
totalitarianism in its course of destruction. However, what interrupts the course of action, discourse 
and political violence, is not the consequence of that which is already present. The interruption 
appears as a miracle. Arendt (1958) states: 
 
The new always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and 
their probability, which for all practical, everyday purposes amounts to certainty; 
the new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle (p. 178). 
 
Are miracles possible in a politics of flight? Miracle does not mean that it is an intervention of gods. 
An intervention is never an introduction or creation of something new. It is rather a manifestation of 
what once was, but has been forgotten. It refers to an already existing essence. When Arendt speaks of 
a miracle, it is in the true sense of the word, namely that which comes to existence without a prior 
plan or logical causality. She calls this miraculous eventfulness in the discourse of men natality. 
Natality means that whatever is, whatever force imposes itself as the final direction, has the potential 
to cease to exist. 
  
The life span of man running toward death would inevitably carry everything 
human to ruin and destruction if it were not for the faculty of interrupting it and 
beginning something new, a faculty which is inherent in action like an ever-
present reminder that men, though they must die, are not born in order to die but in 
order to begin” (p. 246). 
 
With Deleuze and Guattari I see natality as the deterritorializing effect of the abstract machine, as the 
engine that keeps assemblages in motion. Nevertheless, in this deterritorialization, natality is never 
merely critical; it never tends towards death, but is rather the affirmation of the new. Flight does not 
utter itself as a negative yet critical experience and event, but occurs due to a yearning that is 
immanent in life: the will to change, the desire to start something miraculously new. The question is: 
 
What kind of thinking and expression does this affirmative 
critical attitude within politics of flight petition for? 
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Chapter 2: Mapping a Milieu Called Politics of Flight  
 
This is impossible, that no one would come to this 
door. Is the noise of the world so cacophonous 
that mine cannot be heard? I ask only for one 
person! One person coming to my door will be 
enough  
(Valentino Achak Deng in Eggers, 2008, p. 162). 
 
2.1 Difference = Relational  
 
Rhizome; open bodies; body without organs; earth expressing itself in assemblages of bodies and 
enunciations; subjects disconnecting themselves from fixated identities in their process of 
subjectification; actions that surpass the intentionality of their subjects; actions and events that, due to 
their unpredictable potentiality, virtuality and natality, problematize the actual solutions to problems 
of our time; these are all notions – outlined in the previous chapter – that characterize an introductory 
approach toward a politics of flight. All these phenomena, however, do not provide us with a straight 
answer. They are in the first instance meant to criticize and diagnose every answer that pretends to be 
permanent and definitive. Within the contemporary state of affairs – the crises of refugees and 
political urgency to find an answer to these crises – this type of approach incites a distanced attitude 
toward the political needs of our times. Is it wise to problematize the rules of the current state of 
affairs with these yet imprecise notions while our political reality urges us to act in order to overcome 
the impasse of war and death around the globe? Although this impreciseness by some is typified as an 
unrealistic and vague attitude concerning the reality of the day, I will time and again argue that it is 
exactly this intended clarity of rules of engagement of contemporary politics that creates the crises 
that we face today. In order to engage within another politics of flight we need to face the need to 
oversimplify our global involvement within current macro-politics. We have to sketch the milieu in 
which a new politics of flight can be expressed. This mi-lieu, this space of in-betweenness takes flight 
as a primary force of our human condition. Not as a negative disposition to escape reality, but as an 
affirmative condition that cultivates a sensibility for transformation, for – in the words of Deleuze and 
Guattari – becoming.   
 Yet, we first need to address a misconception that has dominated the discourse within 
philosophy toward this impreciseness that occurred in the late 20th century polemic against 
postmodernism. Thinkers of difference, such as Agamben, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari 
have often enough been accused of haziness and a cloudy approach toward reality. It is argued that 
these so-called postmodernists tempt us to lean back and do nothing, stupefied by the fragmentation 
  
that we face. In their so-called anything-goes attitude they appeal to ‘nothing’ and as such are the 
latest heirs of Nietzschean nihilism. From a binary perspective, these thinkers – due to their severe 
critique towards overarching universalistic moralistic tendencies – are blamed for being relativists 
without a cause.  
 
In this study, I sketch a different approach (chapter 6) toward politics of flight by examining the 
tension between universalism (chapter 4) and narrow relativism (chapter 5). Furthermore, also due to 
the fact that the abovementioned thinkers of difference inspire this study, it is instructive to elaborate 
on the disqualification of postmodernism as a narrow form of relativism. Thinkers of difference are 
also characterized as deconstructivists, meaning that they are accused of not taking a self-evident 
given into account but merely believe in socially constructed facts. Social constructivism and 
deconstructivism, as stated before from an oppositional perspective, bear witness to a cynical form of 
relativism, so the argument goes, to an anything goes mentality. In this section against this 
presumption I will argue that radical critique of universalism does not need to result in a disconnected 
and indifferent form of relativism. Nonetheless, this chapter will not only deal with the tension 
between universalism and a narrow form of relativism. In the second part of this chapter (2.2) I will 
elaborate on the tension between comprehension and incomprehension by evaluating the presupposed 
opposition between the two notions. The notions of communication and miscommunication will also 
be treated in order to sketch the image of comprehension, communicability and thought within politics 
of flight that I intend to amplify in this study. I will explore how Arendt pleads for incomprehension 
as an immanent trait of comprehension. This is in line with Agamben’s thoughts on knowability and 
communicability. This section will end with an exploration of Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of an 
image of thought. This is the stepping-stone for the construction of a new image of thought that is 
needed to explicate a politics of flight. In a way thinking is made porous in order to open up to a 
world and a territory of thought, life and expression. In section 2.3 I will set out the territories in 
which thinking on politics of flight takes shape. Returning to topics of Chapter 1 I will further explore 
the articulation of a body without organs through this image of thought by elaborating on the idea of 
assemblages of bodies and of enunciations as well as relation and difference between content and 
expression. All this enables me to outline in section 2.4 the idea of politics of flight as a layered 
milieu, answering the question as to what kind of milieu politics of flight is and which image of and 
on thought does occur within such milieu. The layers of this milieu will then be explored.  
 
Let us start with an exploration of the attitude of my companions in thought toward universalism. 
First, so-called postmodernists attack the supposed objectivity of truth in relation to so-called evident 
facts. Truth presupposes an epistemological and, given the Nietzschean inspiration, a moral certainty. 
The confusion between facts – ontology – and truths – epistemology – matters here. Truth is not a 
representation of an objective reality – a pretense to truthness as I have analyzed in the first chapter – 
but a construction of a given that is shaped by the discursive grid in which it renders meaning. Not 
only language but also physical ‘objects’ are screened by this discursive grid. As Ten Bos (2015) 
argues, we live in a discursive intensity in-between intersubjects and interobjects. Both subject and 
object gather meaning in relating, in which the opposition in-between subject and object disappears.  
  
For example, I have back problems. None of the above-mentioned philosophers denies the plain fact 
that I have a head, a neck, arms, and muscles; or the fact that I feel pain. These are facts, or as 
Deleuze would put it, actual facts. Nevertheless, the truth about my back problems depends on the 
construction of a discourse in a society that has taught me to sit for long hours behind my computer 
and yoke my muscles until they ache. The fact of my back problems is in this sense constructed 
within a specific practice and discourse in which object and subject are interwoven. No one denies 
that objects, things and people do actually exist. However, these matters of facts exist in a world 
where all that exists is related to one another and everything becomes meaningful within a specific 
context. This meaning is established in differing, as I have shown through the analysis of Derrida’s 
concept différance (in section 1.2.4).  
Critics of postmodernism, like Jürgen Habermas (1985), time and again refer to the French 
thinkers of difference as ‘neostructuralists’. This emphasis on différance also results from a 
structuralist inspiration. In structuralism, the primary constituent of meaning is difference. Moreover, 
meaning is not constituted by a transcendent principle; as language is analyzed from an immanent 
point of view (De Saussure), so are cultures (Lévi-Strauss), texts (Barthes, Kristeva) and 
philosophical and political discourses (Foucault). Yet, different from postmodern thinking, these 
thinkers pose that the foundation of meaning is not relativistic in the narrow sense of indifference and 
non-connectivity, but relational. We always gather meaning within a fundamentally relational reality. 
In making statements and in judging we construct truth games, as Foucault (1989, p. 70) has shown in 
his later works in connection to the idea of parrhesia. Truth games are a pragmatic ‘sub-category’ of 
discourse. Hence truth concerns different patterns of relationality. This unavoidable ontological 
relationality underpins narrow interpretation of epistemological relativism, which therefore should be 
redefined as epistemological relationalism. Admitting that people elsewhere think and act radically 
different than we do and that we cannot compare let alone judge their ‘truths’, does not imply an idea 
of anything goes or non-relationality. It asks from us another idea of cosmopolitanism. Appiah (2006) 
suggests a “conceptual change” (p. 143). 
  Nevertheless, the idea of the other as being radically disconnected from us, the West, 
determines the discourse of politics toward refugees or people with different beliefs. Inspired by my 
companions in thought, I would rather explore thinking as differing in relating, on whatever level. In 
short, politically it is of paramount importance to make a distinction between two approaches: 
thinking in difference and relativism in a narrow sense of the word. An indifferent relativistic attitude 
is as sterile as a totalitarian state of mind. So-called postmodernists as Deleuze, Guattari, Foucault, 
Derrida and Appiah for that matter never qualified themselves as such. They do not only criticize 
totalitarian tendencies of identification, but also narrow relativist claims of absolute disconnection, let 
alone the political indifference that results from this. They all accept the fact that, in spite of the 
differences there is always a claim on truth, be it provisional and contextual. This truth is a fixation 
within a truth game or discourse. Despite their monotheistic affinities and historical relations, in the 
dominant political discourse of today Judeo-Christians and Muslims are by both sides locked into two 
types of discourses that are permanently at odd with one another. Both fail to justify their positioning 
toward the other due to their belief of disconnection. Thinking in difference demands a permanent 
engagement with the other, because the other is not an external given that abruptly enters your world. 
From an immanent point of view both are related and embedded in a complex tensional field. The 
  
other is within us, as Julia Kristeva (1991) stated. Thinking in difference is not indifferent and does 
not exclude action. It even demands action and engagement from within this complex setting, in 
which the actor is always at stake. Precisely this problematized subjectivity creates agency or 
agencement as Deleuze and Guattari argue that is embedded in a complex global process of 
subjectification. The Syrian and Sudanese problem is also a problem of the West. The Palestinian and 
Somali problem is also a problem of the West. 
In criticizing universalism thinkers of difference also argue that their repositioning of the truth 
claim is always provisional, never definitive or conclusive. In this complex configuration of differing 
– of deconstructive différance (Derrida), genealogical hermeneutics (Foucault), transcendental 
empiricism (Deleuze) or rhizomatic mapping (Deleuze & Guattari) through conceptual change 
(Appiah) – disconnection and connection do not oppose each other, they supplement one another. 
Inspired by Heideggers’s Mitsein, Jean-Luc Nancy and Laurens ten Kate (2011) propose the notion of 
‘cum’ as a sense of being-in-common, which brings together, yet separates us. They suggest that “we 
are in charge of the avec or the inter in, for and by which we exist in a strict, literal and radical sense: 
that is, to which we are exposed (p. 43). The word that explicitly addresses this supplementary tension 
is partage: sharing in differing.  
 
Thinking in difference explores this ambiguous exposition. The relational approach of Foucault, 
Agamben, Derrida, Deleuze & Guattari, Appiah and Nancy is in sync with Arendt’s idea of plurality. 
How do we situate Arendt’s position in this polemic between universalism and non-connective 
relativism, whether epistemologically or normatively? Although inspiring, Arendt’s use of multiple 
discursive tools and styles of writing is yet often experienced as confusing. Marieke Borren (2009) 
justly states that the diversity in Arendt’s work and her lack of justification of a methodology brings 
about a difficult task in defining her approach.  
 
Arendt’s method is not external to the topics she investigates, unlike more 
conventional research paradigms, which put the scholar in the position of an 
observer over and against the topic under investigation (p. 16). 
 
As the so-called postmodernists Arendt accepts the immanency of the systems and structures she 
investigates. Therefore, Borren states that Arendt is a situated thinker. From the perspective of 
relationality, thinkers of difference are akin with the manner in which Borren describes Arendt as a 
thinker who is positioned in the mi-lieu of her investigation. Arendt’s experiences with a specific type 
of politics of flight during her lifetime have determined her approach toward the totalitarian state of 
mind. She has dedicated her intellectual life to an exposition of a public life that is eradicated by 
totalitarianism.   
Arendt’s work has been defined through various disciplines and methodologies, a fact that 
Borren also acknowledges. Nevertheless, she characterizes Arendt as a hermeneutic phenomenologist 
and explicitly rejects Arendt to be defined as a postmodernist. Given my redefinition of 
postmodernism and given the fact that Borren’s argument implicitly bears witness to some common 
prejudices towards postmodernism – i.e. its plea for narrow form of relativism – I reject Borren’s 
explicit opposition to postmodernistic tendencies within Arendt’s thought. Given the primacy of 
  
plurality and difference, Arendt does not favor an epistemology that is disconnected from this 
ontological relationality. Arendt also emphasizes relationally embedded meaning. Borren 
acknowledges this approach in her analysis of Arendt’s notion of narrativity: “Though based on 
knowledge of the facts, storytelling does not reveal the truth, but the meaning of what it relates” 
(p.37). Yet, this ‘relational’ approach differs from a narrow sense of relativism; by giving in to a 
broader understanding of relativism as a demand to implement contextuality in the manner of 
thinking. In the act of relating the trap of dogmatism is avoided. Neither skepticism nor nihilism is the 
issue here. In Kant’s philosophy, which is appreciated by Arendt (1982), both reductions – dogmatism 
(Wolff) and skepticism (Hume) – are blamed for rendering a truth that is mutually exclusive, unable to 
think the bonds that are inherent to the difference between them (pp. 32-34). Judith Butler (2009) too 
acknowledges and appreciates this Arendtian Kantianism: “how this apparent epistemological 
thinking actually implicitly commits us to a social ontology.” Skeptic attitude in thinking – whether 
on an epistemological or ethical level – is in this sense not a unitary attitude. In relation to relativism 
it can give rise to an anything goes non-connective mentality, or as a critical approach it can give in 
to relativism in a broader sense, i.e. implementing difference and relationality in its contextual manner 
of thinking. In line with Butler, we could thus say that both forms of attitude have a social ontological 
impact; they both have a political impact in the discourse of difference, as we will see in this chapter.  
As with Nancy and Ten Kate (2011), we could state that a contextual and critical approach 
keeps a distance but does not detach. It permanently searches for the right balance between 
propinquity and critical distance. Borren (2009) shows that Arendt’s ontological claim in thinking – 
which implies in terms of Deleuze and Guattari a political claim – is respectfulness. 
 
Arendt rejects subjectivity as much as objectivity in favor of an intersubjective 
perspective. The Arendtian scholar is not a third-person disengaged observer, but 
neither, for that matter, is she a first-person participant or actor (p. 41). 
 
Arendt situates difference beyond the subject-object dichotomy. In being reflective she is 
simultaneously subject – first-person - and object – second or third-person; in any sense, the other 
person that gives rise to an intersubjective relationality. She stresses the – in Aristotelian sense of the 
word – virtue of articulating a relational epistemology that still claims a truth as a connector in a given 
context. This approach is what Deleuze (1997) in his pragmatic thinking labels as transcendental 
empiricism: reflective thinking without the pretense of not being contextualized. Transcendental 
empiricism is a method of empirical research wherein “‘nothing can be said in advance, one cannot 
prejudge the outcome of research.’ As with pragmatics, one must experiment” (Bell, 2006, 412; 
Deleuze; 1997, p. 143).  
Deleuzean pragmatism distances itself from an idea of the reality, in order to face a reality 
with all its complexities. The impreciseness of the terms introduced in the first chapter – such as 
rhizome, subjectivity, action, experience and event – are not meant to create an inactive vacuum, but 
rather to create active agency – an agencement – that openly engages within an ungraspable state of 
affairs. In a dialectical sense, the universalistic agents (chapter 4) – due to their distanced, totalistic, 
excluding view - and the non-connective agents (chapter 5) – due to their fragmented and segmented 
view – fail to engage with the tension between differences and connection beyond opposition and 
  
negation. The relational agents (chapter 6) – due to their supplementary type of engagement – are 
prepared to put themselves and their view on the line, as René ten Bos (2011) repeatedly argues. As 
we will see in the next sections, Arendt’s and Agamben’s sensitized susceptibility propagates an 
attitude toward thinking and knowing that surpasses both the absolute certainty of the universalist and 
the absolute uncertainty of the non-connective relativist. While universalists are certain of 
comprehending reality by their believe in the Truth and these relativists are certain of 
incomprehension by their believe in a disconnected diversity, relational agents problematize the 
opposition between comprehension and incomprehension by stressing their supplementary 
contextuality.  
 
2.2 Thought as Practice 
 
2.2.1 Incomprehension: Immanency of Supplementarity 
What does thinking imply in the context of politics of flight? Arendt (1965) suggests that the sin of 
Eichmann and men like him was not stupidity but thoughtlessness. It was within this thoughtlessness 
that the evil became a banal figure. 
 
That such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak more havoc 
than all the evil instincts taken together which, perhaps, are inherent in man – that 
was, in fact, the lesson one could learn in Jerusalem. But it was a lesson, neither an 
explanation of the phenomenon nor a theory about it (p. 288, italic TR). 
 
No explanation, no theory, a lesson learned to track vice and virtue. If thoughtlessness is the banality 
of evil, how does thought contribute to a lesson that does neither explain nor theorizes – in other 
words does not comfort us with clear answers? And how does thinking about thought – the core 
business of philosophers – relate to this lesson on thoughtlessness?  
Arendt’s reflections – which are contextualized by experiences of resistance, banishment, 
flight and refuge – offer multiple tools to reflect on the experiences of refugees. Her critique explores 
the mind-set that we need to reflect upon through and within the state of affairs of refugees today. Her 
analysis of the reality of human rights in The Origins of Totalitarianism and her reflections on the 
concept of evil in Eichmann in Jerusalem, A Report on the Banality of Evil provide us with juridico-
political tools to visualize both the radicality and the banality of evil. While thoughtlessness, as we 
could see in Eichmann’s trial in which he pleads for his innocence by his obligation to obey authority, 
shows itself in a disengaged attitude; Arendt pleads for an intersubjective attitude that demands an 
engagement with those whose fates are decided by our actions.   
 
In her analysis of the Eichmann trial Arendt shows that this intersubjective perspective aims at a 
lesson that does not explain; a lesson that is experienced but needs no theoretical justification because 
in its evilness it triggers an evident experience of how ruthless defining an order as a truth and 
obeying it can be. In order to understand such a claim, one must read Arendt’s notes on 
comprehension within the extreme political setting of the Second World War. What does an 
  
understanding of politics mean in this context? The Origins of Totalitarianism is Arendt’s (1968) 
extensive effort to comprehend the relation between the three political concepts: antisemitism, 
imperialism and totalitarianism. Arendt starts with problematizing the definition of the three terms: 
 
Antisemitism (not merely the hatred of Jews), imperialism (not merely conquest), 
totalitarianism (not merely dictatorship) – one after the other, one more brutally 
than the other, have demonstrated that human dignity needs a new guarantee 
which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose 
validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must 
remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial 
entities (p. ix, italic TR). 
 
In order to resist the impasse between totalitarian universalism and indifferent disengagement, she 
pleads for a comprehension that in a supplementary manner extends itself to the whole of humanity 
and yet limits its power to a territory. What does this overall extension with limited power mean and 
can this approach be compared with Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism? 
The birth of new politics must implement a complexity of involvement with the whole of 
humanity while remaining limited in order to avoid becoming totalitarian. The lesson is 
comprehension, yet not of an ideology of truthness. As a need instead of an explanation, it does not 
oppose incomprehension. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari: in order to engage with the rhizomatic 
field of thought within politics of flight, political action – which in Arendt’s analyses is always an 
inter-action – must not solely involve clarity of policies (as we will see in 3.4) but also an engagement 
with its a-signifying trait: the uneasiness of not grasping the whole, a line of flight. Incomprehension 
in Arendt’s analyses is a process of thought that never finalizes itself in a dogmatic comprehended fait 
accompli. She pleads for a comprehension in incomprehensible times in order to initiate further action 
in resisting a brute actuality. This comprehension is relational, i.e. a literally ‘inter-ested’ action 
instead of distanced thoughtful analysis.   
 
Comprehension does not mean denying the outrageous, deducing the 
unprecedented from precedents, or explaining phenomena by such analogies and 
generalities that the impact of reality and the shock of experience are no longer 
felt. It means, rather, examining and bearing consciously the burden which our 
century has placed on us – neither denying its existence nor submitting meekly to 
its weight. Comprehension, in short, means the unpremeditated, attentive facing up 
to, and resisting of, reality – whatever it may be (p. viii).1 
 
Comprehension is an affective practice in which the participants are sensitized by incomprehension of 
the horror. The photo of the washed-up corpse of the three-year-old Alan Kurdi in the arms of a 
                                                     
1 In her article ‘Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding)’ Arendt (1994) makes similar remarks: 
“Many people say that one cannot fight totalitarianism without understanding it. Fortunately, this is not true; if it were, our 
case would be hopeless” (p. 307).  
  
rescuer on the beach of Bodrum taken by press-photographer Nilüfer Demir in September 2015 is an 
example of such sensitization.2 Such an image affects us and is affected by our affective reactions. 
Through this sensitization comprehension as a revolting eventive process demands a transformation of 
the actual. In the case of the boy’s death this meant an enormous disgust with policies toward refugees 
within European media and public discussions. The public seemed perplexed and speechless on how a 
European civilization could let such a thing to happen. As Ten Bos (2011) argues, the image of this 
child creates a sense catastrophe (p. 47). The image of the boy creates a catastrophe in defining 
oneself, or one’s society. As Ahmed (2014) shows the disgust felt here is not for the sake of the other, 
not for the sake of Alan, but for the sake of losing one’s idea of national identity as a tolerant and 
open society that respect human rights. Thus, we tend to forget, forget the dead flesh (Pisters, 2003), 
that reminds us that the idea of a we as tolerant people is as dead as the child.  
It is such forgetfulness or the will to pass by this tragedy by returning to old manners of 
thinking that Arendt refuses to understand. Along with Arendt, we state: I prefer not to comprehend – 
in a conventional sense – in order to comprehend the urgency that change is needed. Being 
speechless, one is urged to speak and this very speaking is an act. Incomprehension within 
comprehending – supplementary not oppositional – does not release us from the responsibility to 
judge. Judgment is unavoidable and as such a historical necessity. Nevertheless, judgment in its 
decisiveness must always realize its own paradoxical temporality: neither a reflection on the true 
meaning of the (f)actual, nor simply a communication of the evident. Our comprehension of Alan 
Kurdi unfortunately limits itself to the latter. Yet, “understanding precedes and succeeds knowledge” 
(Arendt, 1994, p. 311). Comprehension is a process that cannot be fully reduced to vita contemplativa 
(Arendt, 1958, p. 17). We have to understand the injustice. Arendt rather pleads for a comprehension 
that leads to action. Comprehension is part of life – a living process – as vita activa. Yet politics is not 
an actualization of understanding. Despite the miscomprehension or rather incomprehension of the 
horror, the relational agent understands the need, or even better the urgency of resisting. The 
relational agent does not force a discourse onto the other, but respects the difference by 
acknowledging the responsibility to act as a virtue, not a law. Going beyond Truth, as a living process 
political thought needs to create permanent lines of flight. It demands to sense Alan Kurdi-es every 
day everywhere. Or in Kantian terms: transforming the exemplary – the singular situated – via a 
reflective judgment into a regulative aesthetic idea that guides our thoughts and acts. It is within this 
“aesthetic experience,” as de Mul (2004) argues, that “opens up an original experience of the world 
that breaks through the ontological primacy of theoretical reason” (p. 92). 
 
Why this reference to Kant? Arendt’s (1982) reflection on judgment is based on the works of 
Immanuel Kant. Her analysis on political judgment does not refer to Kant’s ethical notion of 
judgment – Critique of Practical Reason – but to his aesthetical notion of judgment - Critique of 
Judgment. Within this work, ideas such as sociability and communicability become the sine qua non 
of judgment. Arendt states that – while Kant’s first and second Critique refer to any intelligent species 
– the Critique of Judgment is oriented specifically toward men and their relationships. “He spelled out 
                                                     
2 See also on this issue Rahimy & Molendijk, 2016. 
  
man’s basic ‘sociability’ and enumerated as element of it communicability” (p. 19). Sociability 
indicates that men create a community through communicability. It is here that she refers to the 
ancient understanding of sensus communis. Sensus communis does not indicate an opinion that is 
shared by majority, which was implemented in Kant’s thinking, but as Arendt understands it, it refers 
to an unavoidable inter-speaking relationship that creates a world through communities.  
Within this connection that imagination – “the ability to make present what is absent” 
(Arendt, 1982, p. 65) – re-presentation comes to the fore. In Arendt’s reading of Kant re-presentation 
is more than just a copy or tracing of the original. Re-presentation is the appearance of something that 
is not present. It maps out potential roads or in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms: lines of flight. In the 
imagination within the sensus communis something emerges that neither belongs to the reality of the 
objects, nor to the isolated interiority of the subject. Imagination is not bound to the realm of the 
actual. Yet, “by placing the particular in the context of the whole and thereby giving it meaning, 
imagination makes it possible to understand the world” (De Mul, 2004, p. 82). What is re-presented is 
the virtual Gordian knot of stories as the outcome or expression of inter-subjective relations. Re-
presentation is thus not less real than the presence of an object, but its reality has a different quality. 
Arendt (1958) even argues that this inter-subjective world is as real, or even more real, than the world 
of objects. When men become men distancing themselves from oppositional setting of objects and 
subjects as well as isolated subjective interests, the world becomes the realm in which men become 
fully engaged due to a disinterested attitude. Disinterestedness within Arendtian thinking does not 
mean indifferent, but indicates that one connects oneself to what is present. One widens her mind in 
Selbstdenken. According to Dirk De Schutter (2007) this disinterestedness must not be confused with 
neutrality manifesting a righteous personality or self. It is rather literary selflessness, the act of 
selflessness in connection (p. 31). The selfless disinterested individual always stays connected to 
others, i.e. interested. Selbstdenken then relates to Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism that connects 
the uplifting movement of reflection to that of a contextualized practice, as we will see later.  
Arendt (1978b) speaks of a plurality that is present as inter hominess esse (p. 74). As 
incomprehension supplements comprehension, disinterested has a supplementary appearance as inter-
esse. The realm of inter-esse is a dynamic and unpredictable world that is in need of another form of 
judgment, another form of thought, another comprehension than what has been argued in Kant’s 
Critique of Practical Reason. Agents are sensitized by an ambiguous tension between 
uninterestedness as non-connectivity and a kind of reflective disinterestedness. Precisely the latter is 
of relevance for politics of flight. Which choice do we make? Will we approach the other within this 
politics with an idea that their interest is at odd with our interest and hence strengthen 
uninterestedness; or do we – in Jodi Dean’s (2012) sense of ‘we’ – implement a connective inter-esse 
through a reflective disinterested attitude, meaning the ability to look beyond our momentary interest? 
How do we then judge such inter-est?  
 In accordance with Kant, Arendt (1982) distinguishes between the determinant judgment, the 
judgment that categorizes and fixes particularities according to generalities of understanding, and 
reflective judgment, in which particularities do not represent a general law but “‘perceives’ some 
‘universal’ in the particular” (p. 83). In line with Veronica Vasterling (2003), I rather qualify these 
exemplary particularities as singularities. In between these singularities difference and relationality 
take place. This form of judgment is thus not deductive like a determinant judgment, but rather 
  
seductive: it communicates in order to convince. Yet, seduction is not enough. Hitler also seduced the 
masses. What remains essential to reflective judgment, according to Arendt (1982), is plurality. 
Judgment can only be established in communication with those who think in difference. This plurality 
– or in Deleuze’s thought: pragmatic attitude towards difference – that is often exposed, is still as an 
affect neglected in politics of flight.  
 
The image of Alan Kurdi touches us due to its disturbing aesthetic qualities. It is within this 
susceptible sensibility that political judgment – but also moral judgment – must never become 
general, not even relatively general. According to Vasterling (2003), Arendt precisely on this point 
distances herself from the Kantian categorical imperative. It is the singularity of the aesthetic 
judgment that seduces and convinces. So, Arendt (1978b) is pleading for a reflective judgment that is 
in permanent disapproval of its own eternal pretention, yet inviting its practitioners to take a 
pragmatic, contextualized stand. Again, here relativism in a narrow sense is transformed into 
relationism, avoiding the trap of indifference. This even counts for self-reflection. ‘Private’ thinking 
appears as a “soundless dialogue of the I with itself”, as an “actualization of the original duality or the 
split between me and myself which is inherent in all consciousness” (pp. 74-75). Therefore Butler 
(2009) states that in Arendt’s thought plurality remains in both public and private sphere a plural 
voice and a differentiated voice of a relational agent that cannot be neglected in both moral and 
political judgment.  
 
You are never alone within your silence. There is a solidarity of the silence (Ten 
Bos, 2011, p. 65. Translation TR).  
 
For action to stay creative – natality – this judgment permanently remains in the pain of labor, giving 
birth to new forms of expression. Judgment indicates uneasy repetition, the repetition of difference as 
such, not of difference as a copy if the same. “To be confronted by reality does not automatically 
produce an understanding of reality or make one feel at home in it” (Arendt, 1978a, p. 167). The core 
of this judgment is the ability to communicate, i.e. communicability: permanent dialogue and 
disagreement in order to act. Even the moral and political subject must differ in itself to maintain its 
thinking capacity. As an agent, it is in permanent dialogue with itself and others. Eichmann lacked the 
ability for such a dialogue and according to Vasterling (2003) he was incapable of being a public 
political subject – with its political judgment – as well as a moral private subject – with its moral 
judgment. Vasterling states that it is not surprising that Arendt not only spoke of thoughtlessness in 
Eichmann’s case, but also of lack of imagination. It is this ‘transcendental’ – in both Arendtian and 
Deleuzean sense – imagination that we need in a politics of flight in order to engage through different 
types of approach, enhancing reflective disinterestedness. While political judgment has to take into 
consideration the perspective of others, moral judgment requires independency from these judgments 
and perspectives. As a process of constructing instead of finding truth – beyond the pejorative narrow 
relativism – thinking remains effective in both moral and political forms of judgment.  
Comprehension is always already embedded in an affective context. Knowledge has a body, a 
body of knowledge. Comprehension is tensional. Jean-François Lyotard, a keen reader of Kant’s third 
Critique, speaks of sensibility: a reflective judgment that does not totalize causes pain. This pain is in 
  
need of a specific expression. According to Lyotard art makes this pain sensible and communicable 
(Molendijk, 2003, pp. 81-112). Can we relate the above-mentioned imagination to Lyotard’s notion of 
sensibility that is cultivated by a reflective judgment and see art practices as a sensibilizing 
convincing practices, as Lyotard proposes? Turbulent, a work of the artist Shirin Neshat (1998, 2005, 
pp. 96-105), is in this sense exemplary. Two screens face one another. First a man sings, beautifully 
and eloquently about his unfortunate heart. In the background, we see a crowded house with an 
audience in admiration of his voice. When he stops singing, on the second screen a woman with an 
ambiguous face starts to sing. Yet she has not one voice, but multiple voices that cover any 
individuality in her voice. There is no audience, no one to hear, except the man on the first screen who 
is perplexed by the expressiveness of her non-language. The woman does not speak, but screams 
multi-vocally. The voice does not break your heart; it rather breaks your comprehension. As we will 
see, it is exactly this multivocality that is lost in totalitarianism (chapter 4), segmented in 
multiculturalism (chapter 5) and re-valued in coming community (chapter 6). 
 
2.2.2 Communicability: A Thing Called Thought 
Arendt appreciates both the vulnerability of thinking and its potentiality to resist. Yet what within this 
incomprehensive comprehension is still a point of reference? “What is the thing of thinking”, 
Agamben (1999a, p. 29) asks. For him thought has no specific territory, like in theory versus praxis. 
Thought is always practical, in the sense that it performs itself in its eventuality. It is this idea of 
thinking that I intend to develop in connection to politics of flight. Thinking is a process, an 
(Ent)wicklungsfähigkeit, an ability to develop, or, as Deleuze and Guattari would put it: a process of 
(un)folding. It is the creative folding and unfolding of lines of thought on plateaus. This (un)folding 
act of thought is performed by what Agamben, in line with Arendt and hence Kant, calls 
communicability: the potential to communicate. Communicability is not merely language, but rather 
the experience of language as such: the ability to communicate. Thinking is the experience of 
linguality in which the very thing of thought is this linguality, the sayable in which the unsayable is 
immanent, which is in line with Agamben’s idea of (im)potentiality (as we have seen in 1.4.1). Yet, 
language, Agamben states, is not restricted to men. Every creature has a voice, a language. 
Nonetheless, he argues that men are the only creatures who are not born into a language. Men have to 
infiltrate language; they are in an unavoidable process of adopting and adapting, i.e. of learning.  
 
The thing itself is not a thing; it is the very sayability, the very openness at issue in 
language, which, in language, we always presuppose and forget (p. 35). 
 
Agamben projects this potentiality within an act of knowing as a skill (ability): “that by which the 
object is known, its own knowability and truth.” Knowability thus does not refer to an external origin 
or external element: language is “the very medium of its knowability.” This is the very thing that 
comprehension cannot grasp, precisely because it unfolds within this comprehension. So there seems 
to be an aporetical tension within language: “sayability itself remains unsaid in what is said … that 
knowability itself is lost in what is known and in that about which something is known.” Still, in a 
sense this aporia only bothers us, silences us at the moment that language is used to define and 
express something that does not belong to it. The aporia is not unproductive; rather the endurance of 
  
the unsayable within the sayable renders the possibility of “the coming to speech of speech” (pp. 32-
34). 
 
This unsayable was sensible on February 2016 in the eastern state of Saxony, Germany, when a mob 
of anti-refugee protesters attacked a bus full of refugees with the slogan “We are the people, go 
home!” (Oltermann, 2016a). And exactly in this slogan a deep-rooted European image of thought on 
life was sensed. The other lacks being a people, and although the refugees did perhaps not understand 
the words as such, the affect was felt. Their panicking faces visualize the rejection of their humanity 
by not belonging to a people or a community. Go home, in this sense does not indicate going back to a 
community, but the wish to separate the non-people from the people. This dehumanization in a 
political sense is extensively analyzed by Agamben (1999b) in his reflections on the concentration 
camp and the so-called ‘Muselmann’ to which I will return in the fifth chapter. Typifying refugees as 
vermin days later (Oltermann, 2016b) shows how the idea of non-people is derived from the idea of 
refugee being a non-human. Yet, as we will see in chapter four, it is a definition of a people that 
creates a non-people and vice versa. This opposition creates the reality in Saxony in which some lives 
have the benefit of being a people and some lives have not. What remains unsaid is life itself as 
connective vector, as an impotentiality within fierce potentiality of speech. Is it possible to boldly 
imagine an idea of a people and expression that surpasses the binary setting of us the expressive 
people versus them the non-expressive non-people?  
 
The productivity of experiencing such subversive immanency – the impotentiality within potentiality 
and the unsayable within the sayable – is also present in Agamben’s analysis of thinking. Within this 
configuration thought is an event. The experiential quality of thinking is the experience of an event. 
The act of philosophy is the event of thought, in which the practice of thinking – thinking as such – 
becomes an experimental experience with affective relations rather than a distant reflection on 
foundations. The subject or discipline does not control and manage this act; the subject is 
simultaneously formed, deformed and reformed in this experiment as a performance, i.e. the 
expression of forming. The thoughtful subject unfolding its pure potentiality becomes porous. This 
experience of thought as an experience of multiple entrances in thought and language is at stake in 
politics of flight. It is its territory, its mi-lieu. For this reason, it is argued in the first chapter that 
approaching this politics starts from the middle and not from outside: in the mob and the bus in 
Saxony or in the imagination and communication of a different reality. In the latter flight means 
focusing on crack in the foundation of the subject, on an immanent rupture, which, as a form of 
comprehension without understanding, demands an experimental attitude towards the paradigmatic 
embedding of thinking. Politics of flight takes this rupture as a point of reference in order to imagine a 
new focus that creates new consistency. The affirmative aspect of imagining this politics does not 
imply closing this rupture but rather connecting life to its form, or as Agamben (2000) puts it: to a 
form-of-life. A life, as we will see in the final chapter, in which the way of life is not detached from its 
vital forces. Arendt’s title The Life of the Mind, does sensitize this ‘empowerment’ in a different way. 
The vital (im)potentiality of thought – natality of vita activa or performance of form-of-life – is what 
Agamben appreciates as the philosophical act: a self-affection that Lyotard calls a tautagoric quality 
of thinking, in which difference, differing, and what Lyotard calls the ‘différend’ or dissensus, insists: 
  
“thinking informs itself on its own state. This is not a discursive, but a sensual informing on and about 
the différend in-between capabilities.” (Molendijk, 2003, p. 93, Translation TR).  
 
To think does not mean merely to be affected by this or that thing … but rather at 
once to be affected by one’s own receptiveness and experience in each and every 
thing that is thought a pure power of thinking (Agamben, 2000, p. 9). 
 
The way which we approach politics of flight determines the manner in which we are receptive and 
experience the ambiguities in such politics. This is why in the previous chapter I pleaded for another 
understanding of a subject of flight. If subject – as a process of potentiality – is porous and 
transformable, then the subject of this type of politics must be thought beyond the juridical definition 
of such subjects. The subject of a politics of flight – being both the anti-refugee protesters as the 
refugees – is twofold: it is the one that talks and acts as well as the one that is under discussion. This 
double bind needs disclosure in order not to implode. The relational agent as a subject needs both 
focus and agency. In Agamben’s words this politics needs an affective thinking which is not 
exclusive. It is, in its rhizomatic connectiveness, all-inclusive, yet, as Arendt (1968) argued, not 
generalizing. In its performative self-reflectivity it affects and is affected. Thought is immediately 
political in this performance. When Agamben speaks of language and thought he refers to a sense of 
commonality. Thought is no longer defined as an instrument of non-contradictory understanding 
(Hegel), alienating ideology (Marx), or transparent communicative action (Habermas), nor as the 
outcome of an argumentative line of thought. Thought is potentiality that becomes real through an 
active actualization. Thought, as potentiality containing its own impotentiality, resists the boundaries 
of its past – the identities that are already constituted – literally opening the space of its origins for 
new connections to emerge. Only in this sense thought is ‘original’. 
 
Only a thought that does not conceal its own unsaid – but constantly takes it up 
and elaborates it – may eventually lay claim to originality (Agamben, 2009, p. 8). 
 
This is repetition of difference in itself, as an ontological given, not an epistemological construct.  
 
2.2.3 The Sense of Thinking  
How are we able to think? What kind of thinking can we imagine? Thinking of difference is not 
focused on something to hold on to, forever, always, and everywhere. Something, some thing unfolds 
within the porosity of thinking. This seems quite idealistic but as we have seen Deleuze (1997) does 
not speak of transcendentalism versus empiricism, but synergizes them in his thought as 
transcendental empiricism. Time and again this notion appears in his texts. Transcendental 
empiricism does neither indicate that the idea can be grasped and sensed exclusively in a material 
sense, nor that the idea could become something understandable in the course of transcendental 
apperception, as Kant claimed. An idea is something that being explored and explained problematizes. 
Problematization means that an idea is neither fixated in an object, nor appropriated by a subject. This 
unavoidability of problematization informs a politics of flight. As an experiment, an idea has no 
intention: it is an intensity that sensitizes both subject and object. Yet when we speak of sensitization 
  
we also speak of the violence – and not the harmonious benevolence – of this intensity beyond good 
and evil, beyond any fixed opposition. This rupture manifests itself once we try to reach out to the 
limits of thinking, breaking through the chronology of memories, and imagining not fixated images of 
the other – merely another corpse on the shore – but difference in itself, Deleuze argues. Alan Kurdi is 
not like any child, yet his death ruptures our illusion of legitimacy of children’s right for any child. 
 So how do we imagine thought? Stupidity and madness – or the perplexity of the public in 
case of Alan Kurdi – are not errors that enter the mind from outside, as if a pathological deficiency 
enters our perfectly organized thought, as a dogmatic image of thought suggests. The dogmatic image 
still holds on to the idea that objects and subjects remain the same as immovable phenomena. Thus, 
what is thought remains in the realm of sameness of the object and the subject, and finally in the 
harmony that is represented by this immovability. That explains Eichmann’s lack of imagination. 
According to Paul Patton (2000) Deleuze:  
 
argues that it is not the reassuring familiarity of the known which should provide 
us with the paradigm of thinking, but those hesitant gestures which accompany our 
encounters with the unknown (p. 19).  
 
A politics of flight is the ex-position, ex-ploration and ex-planation of this hesitancy. The stupidity 
that appears in thought reflects this blind spot.  
  
Cowardice, cruelty, baseness and stupidity are not simply corporeal capacities or 
traits of character or society; they are structures of thought as such (Deleuze, 1997, 
p. 151).  
 
Stupidity appears when the virtual state of the problem is reduced to actual solution(s), when the 
potentiality of flight is marginalized by policies (as we will see in third chapter) that do not 
acknowledge this tension. Such oversimplification is noticeable in the reduction of the problem of 
exclusion of some European youth to radical ideas of movements such as Al Qaida or Islamic State. 
The inhabitants of cities and villages in Syria and Iraq sense the consequences of such 
oversimplification. 
Deleuze resists this type of reduction in order to break through the dogmatic image of 
thought. Another image implies other acts. Imagine the way power was visualized before Foucault 
(1977) developed his idea of discipline, proclaiming that visualizing power is no longer in need of a 
pyramid that suggests repressive control from above. Visualizing power is more adequately served by 
the visual of a panoptic gaze that is situated within networks on the nods of crossing lines. This study 
too does not limit itself to given images, but proposes multiple images for reflections upon flight. This 
demands a process of learning, and any teacher knows that there is nothing manageable or predictable 
in the act of learning. Learning means the acquiring of skills that adapts to the specificity of the 
medium involved. This process runs its own course and can neither be anticipated from actual 
knowledge, nor even by current uses of a medium. 
 
  
Learning is the appropriate name for the subjective acts carried out when one is 
confronted with the objectivity of a problem (Idea), whereas knowledge designates 
only the generality of concepts or the calm possession of a rule enabling solutions 
(Deleuze, 1997, p. 164). 
 
Learning is knowledge in process. Nowadays we know that learning does not stop when we leave 
school. Lifelong learning is mandatory. This asks for a specific skill of questioning, encircling the 
problem, more than merely getting to know the right answer.  
Is philosophy also about learning? Philosophy is about the ability to question, even more so 
about the radical act of questioning the question, exposing the roots in a rhizomatic approach of its 
‘object’. Deleuze and Guattari’s What is philosophy? has an instructive opening. After many years of 
negotiations, the multiple Deleuze and Guattari (1994) wonder about the ontological status of 
philosophy. This wondering as an initiating act is connected to their old age, and in some sense to the 
ending of a process. This end, however, is rather initiating than finalizing. Even in their so-called last 
cooperative work they are still ‘processing’ and inventing concepts. ‘What is it I have been doing all 
my life?’, they ask (p. 95). The translators Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell characterize their 
book as a manifesto instead of a textbook. I prefer to call it an introduction. This does not refer to the 
beginning, but to a permanent initiating tendency in the practice of philosophy: introduction as 
natality of approach. It refers to a beginning that will never end, even after they died. Paradoxically 
their thinking has become a living category after their deaths. They are friends of wisdom, 
philosophers, not as mortal men, but as living potentialities.  
The sensitization for a politics of flight is related to this natality of philosophical introduction. 
What is sensitized is a process of learning. What does sensitizing more in detail mean? In line with 
Agamben’s question “What is the thing of thought?” we can ask “what is the thing of sense?” within a 
politics of flight. Sensitization asks for engaging with a world on an exemplary basis, transversing its 
assemblages of bodies and assemblages of enunciation. The questioning act is, however, not for the 
sake of disorganization, but for the sake of creating new entrances in thought. The political image of 
Alan Kurdi, his lifeless body, is not merely an exemplary visual image in a media discourse, but also 
an affect that cuts deep in our flesh. This is the reason why I prefer to use the term sensitization 
instead of visualization. Sensitization refers to a complex expression that reaches beyond the clarity of 
an image or an evident, comforting feeling. Sensitization hits the body with its senses, decentering the 
subject; as well as the implemented hierarchy, in-between emotions as Ahmed (2014) argues. It is 
time to think beyond psychological, biological and cultural identifications of emotions and in line 
with Ahmed think of the complexity of the politics of emotions. The questions “What is the thing of 
thought?” and “What is the thing of sense?” problematize the clarity of an assignable thing in both 
thinking and sensing. Avant-garde art practices question both body and mind systematically and 
permanently. This is one of the reasons why a politics of flight has at least a philosophical as well as 
an artistic component (see: 3.2). Sensitization in thought within politics of flight shows how 
intertwining life and thought are. It shows how content and expression amalgamate.  
 
  
2.3 Intertwining Content and Expression  
 
2.3.1 Double Capture of Assemblages 
What does all this entail on a philosophical plane, once we situate this practice within an Agambian, 
Deleuzo-Guattarian milieu? Do refugees voice their state of being and their state of mind? Language 
is the first thing that comes to mind. Yet, language is precisely one of the most problematic issues 
within the debates on whether they should integrate or assimilate. On a practical level the tension 
between the mother tongue and the foreign tongue can lead to misunderstandings. Yet, on a deeper 
level sheer communicability is at stake in every interaction. What kind of other expressive means can 
migrants rely on to adequately express their pain and joy, their fears and hopes? What is the relation 
between content – the assemblages of bodies – and expression – the assemblages of enunciations – 
within a politics of flight? How can we revalue the stuttering and silence, other than as a lack of 
language proficiency? I will firstly use the tools that Deleuze and Guattari (1987) developed in order 
to more adequately approach this problematical state of mind and being in terms of content and 
expression and then apply an Agambian reflection on the constitutive role of silence. 
 
Where do we find politics of flight? Whom do we meet? Is it there, over there, in the refugee camps in 
Kenya, Sudan, Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey, Greece? Does it happen on the borders of Europe, on the 
walls that must be passed in Morocco or Eastern Europe? Is it sensed in the cold of the winter, in the 
snow-banned refugee camps, or is it somewhere in my warm living room? Is the expression of politics 
of flight in the body of the Eritrean refugees who are tortured, enslaved and prisoned on the borders of 
Sudan, Egypt and Israel; or is it placed within the rhetoric of politicians?  
The milieu of a politics of flight is a complex rhizomatic network of assemblages of bodies 
and assemblages of enunciation. How do these two types of assemblages relate to one another? If we 
scrutinize the events in Saxony, we must not only analyze the connection between two types of 
expression but also two assemblages of bodies. The relation between these assemblages refers to one 
of the most complex problems within Deleuze and Guattari’s thought: the difference and connection 
between content and expression. The intricate relation between content and expression and their 
distinct nature play key roles in the mapping of the notion of flight and its political implications. 
 
 
 
Substance 
 Content Expression 
Form 
 
Reterritorialization  
Assemblages of bodies  
Deterritorialization 
Reterritorialization  
Assemblages of enunciations 
Deterritorialization 
 
Matter 
  
How does a life express itself? And what does it mean that a life is never fully captured by its 
expression? In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari (1987) explore these questions.3 They refer 
                                                     
3 Here I foremost explore Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) elaborations in the third, fourth and fifth plateau of A Thousand 
Plateaus, pp. 39-148.  
  
to Arthur Conan Doyle’s character Professor Challenger,4 who defines the earth as a body without 
organs with “free intensities or nomadic singularities” (p. 40). The concept of the nomadic body is 
critical and overlaps with the political body of the refugee and the migrant. Nonetheless what do they 
try to say when they characterize the earth in terms of intensities and singularities? Everything flows 
without being fixated. There are no goals, no targets, no intentions. Intensity is solely force and force 
is in the first instance unformed and without substance. It is sheer matter that needs to be ‘in-
formed’.5 Substance is not the same as matter. The earth is initially unformed matter. As a body 
without organs it is matter, but not substance. Substance already inheres form. The ‘In-forme’ occurs 
simultaneous with the capturing act of the formation of matter that always produces a rest that resists 
total formation, yet this surplus motorizes further formation. Formation of unformed matter is what 
Deleuze and Guattari call stratification. The earth as the total of life forces is, as Deleuze and Guattari 
call it, a plane of consistency. As such it is the arena that on the one hand gives rise to unformed 
intensities that destratify and on the other hand simultaneously triggers the processes of coding and 
territorialization. Yet, as we have seen in the analysis of the case of Mohamed Bouazizi in section 
1.2.5, these processes of deterritorialization and territorialization are always simultaneous. In line with 
Nietzsche’s understanding, Deleuze and Guattari state that force is always multiple: pull, push, 
pressure. Force is immanently multiple, given these inherent tensions. They call this dynamics 
machinic as opposed to mechanical. The latter already presuppose an organic logic and structural 
form. Mechanical thus rests, in words of Schinkel (2008), upon on an idea of an atomistic whole in 
which every part functions in accordance to the consistency of this atomistic whole, or super-
organism (p. 73). Machinic on the other hand is pure force, unformed but nevertheless directional and 
effective in creating stratification. Initially the earth itself in the first instance does not make a 
distinction between the two types of assemblages: content and expression.  
 
The plane of consistency knows nothing of differences in level, orders of 
magnitude, or distances. It knows nothing of the difference between the artificial 
and the natural. It knows nothing of the distinction between contents and 
expressions … these things exist only by means of and in relation to the strata 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 69-70). 
 
An assemblage is the result of this relating. It cuts into the unformed matter, packing and wrapping, 
i.e. folding forces into strata, becoming literally com-pact.  
 
The materials furnished by the substratum constitute an exterior milieu for the 
elements and compounds of the stratum under consideration, but they are not 
exterior to the stratum. The elements and compounds constitute an interior of the 
                                                     
4 While Sherlock Holmes is the wise and analytic character of Arthur Conan Doyle’s novels, Professor Challenger is the 
passionate and violent character within his work. See the novels: The Lost World, The Poison Belt, and The Land of Mist.  
5 In reference to Bataille’s ‘informe’, Oosterling (2000b) shows how in information society the forming and in-forming of 
individuals as informational subjects – homo informans – is enveloped in a supplementary field of forces. The process of in-
formation also produces the ‘informe’ as chaos. They are equiprimordial (pp. 44-45).  
  
stratum, just as the materials constitute an exterior of the stratum; both belong to 
the stratum, the latter because they are materials that have been furnished to the 
stratum and selected for it, the former because they are formed from the materials. 
Once again, this exterior and interior are relative; they exist only through their 
exchanges and therefore only by virtue of the stratum responsible for the relation 
between them (p. 49). 
 
Implicitly Deleuze and Guattari develop a geophilosophy of an earth that from the start is in 
permanent state of creation and destruction. Imagine a planet, a lonely planet full of seismic activity 
and flowing with lava, orbiting around a star; the infant earth that was bombarded by meteorites 
bringing little water cells. Imagine then another planet crashing into this ball of fire, billions of years 
ago. The collision deterritorialized its nature and the dust of this collision gave birth to its own little 
satellite, the moon. The companion that remained with earth is in the end also the thing that gave earth 
the ability to create life. As a parastrata it forced the earth to move slower and slower, to become 
seasonal and to cool down. The earth that moved around its own axis in 5 hours, now completes its 
circle in 24 hours, and is getting slower and slower due to the gravity of the moon. It was also the 
moon that by its effect on the oceans, causing the ebb and flow of tides, brought movement to the 
earth. This movement as epistrata gave birth to organisms, with multiple contents and expressions. 
These were our ancestors, the bacteria that still occupy and penetrate our bodies. The moon is also the 
thing that kept life from perishing. By capturing the meteorites beforehand, the forces that shaped the 
uneven surface of the moon, are those forces that could not reach the mother earth. But the moon has 
yet to finish its signature on us. The child of collision is still moving further and further from us, 
almost four centimeters a year, and after a billion years its distancing departure would make earth an 
inhabitable planet. That which gave birth to life, sustained life, would eventually also take life (BBC, 
2012). 
The earth remains immanent to all different strata. There are connective interstrata and 
metastrata (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 40). Meta – inter alia meaning beyond – indicates that the 
unformed earth – life – as a field of forces is present within as well as beyond the stratum. As such the 
earth challenges the coding act of the layers from within. Life overflows every codification. Inside 
out, outside in. Resistance is always intensified from within, immanently. The multiplicity of earth 
and machinic intensities are never exhausted in assemblages. Assemblages are multiple and 
differentiated as well, open to all sides due to earth’s rhizomatic dynamics. I thus ask the reader to 
imagine something that is already there, the earth itself with all its dimension of reality. Yet, we have 
to imagine the implication of such an ontology within our epistemological and ethical structure of 
thinking, in order to understand that politics of flight confront us with much more than bureaucratic 
rules and juridical rights.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge that the dynamics of earth always has a double articulation: 1) 
molecular and nomadic 2) molar and sedentary. Systematically the ‘first’ machinic act is where 
chaotic matter, molecular singularities, is formed as substance within the two machinic layers. Matter 
becomes formed matter: substance. The second articulation reacts to the unformed forcing of the 
machinic by formalizing it, by reducing function to form and reducing matter to substances (formed 
  
matter). Deleuze and Guattari call these conjunctions molar entities. Form thus “indicates the way in 
which different intensities are related in an idea as they are expressed in actual individuals – the chaos 
of the virtual becomes determined in this way” (Williams, 2003, p. 21). In this sense, the molecular 
and nomadic have an affinity with virtual differentiation; while the molar and sedentary have more 
affinity with the actual differenciation (see: 1.4.2). In case of the events in Saxony, differentiated 
bodies are sectioned as severe differenciated identifiable phenomena: the people and the non-people. 
By broadening the subject of politics of flight a breaking point is introduced in this differenciating 
politics of Us versus Them.   
 Molecular and molar articulations refer to form and to matter; they both have a twofold 
setting. Nevertheless, the structure that contains this twofold setting is not the final articulation. The 
differentiation/differenciation is never absolute or simply oppositional. The non-people is always 
immanent within the people. And this is where, in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) exploration, 
Professor Challenger meets the Danish linguist Louis Hjelmslev. Despite the fact that Hjelmslev is 
speaking of linguistic processes criticizing De Saussure’s too simple a distinction between matter and 
form, Deleuze and Guattari give him more credit by increasing their understanding of his work. They 
rather see him as a Spinozist geologist (Pisters, 2003, p. 9). In the assemblage of the professor and the 
linguist, the first articulation, in which the unformed matter of the body without organs becomes 
formed matter (substance), is called content and involves the assemblage of bodies. The second 
articulation, in which affects are formalized and bring about their own substance, is called expression 
and involves the assemblage of enunciations. Content and expression both contain their own specific 
substance, their own specific relation of matter and form (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). In the case of 
Foucault’s (1977) disciplinary panopticon: this connects the docile bodies that are incarcerated with 
the discursive practices of the prison, justice, and human sciences. In case of Saxony: both the 
revolting and attacked bodies are encapsulated in a geopolitical discourse, in which human right and 
national policies no longer match.    
Things are, however, never easy with Deleuze and Guattari (1987). There are different forms 
of multiplicities. There is something called an intermediate state (epistrata) through which content 
and expression are distinct and related at the same time, as well as a differentiation immanent to the 
two types of assemblages. And they “apply the term ‘parastrata’ … in which the central belt 
fragments into sides and ‘besides,’ and the irreducible forms and milieus associated with them.” Yet, 
a “stratum exists only in its epistrata and parastrata, so that in the final analysis these must be 
considered strata in their own right” (p. 52). Returning to our example, neither the assemblages of 
bodies of anti-refugee protesters can be reduced to their expression ‘we are the people’; nor the bodies 
of the refugees can be reduced to their outcry of fear of rejection and their appeal to human rights. 
Yet, the two types of assemblages – bodies and enunciation – do affect one another. The rejection 
within the slogan “We are the people!” does not only silence the refugees’ expression, but the 
judgment “Go home!” refers to and rejects their bodily presence. The pain within the bodies of 
Eritrean refugees is the embodiment of a world-politics that in its expressions permanently neglects 
the existence of these refugees.  
Everything is in its own right per definition relational. Their pain is immanently connected to 
our comfort. In line with their relational geophilosophy, Deleuze & Guattari, (1987) argue, that each 
  
assemblage – whether it happens in the setting of content (bodies) or in the setting of expression 
(enunciations) – multiplies itself in two different types of articulation (pp. 40-45). 
 
Content and expression are two variables of a function of stratification. They … 
intermingle, and within the same stratum multiply and divide ad infinitum. Since 
every articulation is double, there is not an articulation of content and an 
articulation of expression – the articulation of content is double in its own right 
and constitutes a relative expression within content; the articulation of expression 
is also double and constitutes a relative content within expression. For this reason, 
there exist intermediate states between content and expression, expression and 
content: the levels, equilibriums, and exchanges through which a stratified system 
passes (p. 44). 
 
It is not likely that one could point out these articulations in their pure appearance – in contrast to 
what Descartes suggests is the case with mind and matter – due to the fact that every articulation is 
another double bind of content and expression, into infinity. Thus, although we are witnessing the 
consequences of worldwide discursive policy on refugees (expression) by observing their washed-up 
corpses or their physical isolation in refugee camps (content), the immensity of the affects of these 
discursively expressed bodies is still beyond our imagination.  
 
The double bind of content and expression is always at hand. Let me once more simplify this with an 
example: learning language. An infant’s contact with language articulates itself not only as expression 
but also as content. The expression articulates itself in brainwaves and the neurophysiological 
development of the brain. A lack of lingual interaction will thus not only lead to a lack of lingual 
abilities in the further development of a child, but as such even affects the body and its development 
on a physiological level, which is distinct from its lingual articulation but nevertheless relative in this 
distinction (Tallal, 2013). Patricia Kuhl (2010) for example, argues how babies, as world-citizens, are 
capable to distinct sounds in different languages, while after six to eight months, due to physiological 
transformation of auditory brainwaves, they become cultural bound listeners. Discursive expression – 
whether it concerns refugees or language development of an infant into a cultural subject – is thus not 
only a matter of expression but also a matter of content, as Foucault (1977) shows by pointing out 
how docile bodies follow the disciplining discourse in prison in order to develop subjectivity (as is 
discussed in 1.2.1). In this doubling act – assemblage of bodies and assemblages of enunciations – it 
is impossible to categorize expressions as a system wherein one could easily hop from one to the 
other, from expression to content and vice versa. Think of the W.E. Hill’s image called my wife and 
my mother-in-law,6 Wittgenstein’s (1953, part II, §xi) use of the image that either could be seen as a 
duck or as a rabbit or Dali’s painting Espana. ‘One’ image contains two forms and matters, but the 
mind is incapable of capturing both at the same time, and yet they are in a sense indistinguishable. 
There is no common final point of formation of the matter. Form and matter occur simultaneously as 
                                                     
6 This image was published in an American humor magazine in 1915, but in 1888 in Germany there was already a postcard 
in circulation with the same optic idea (Wikipedia, 2014). 
  
substance, which means they change and transform simultaneously. There is no degree or perfection, 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) state: degrees merely are “in terms of differential relations and 
coefficients … it is a question of speed, and speed is differential … What qualifies a 
deterritorialization is not its speed (some are very slow) but its nature” (pp. 48, 56).  
 
If content and expression are systematically distinct and nevertheless related in their distinction, what 
is it that holds the two together? What comes ‘beforehand’ in which the distinction is not yet there? 
The abstract machine is this ‘pre’position. The distinction between content and expression is the 
distinction between two aspects of stratification: one (expression) that creates regimes of signs or 
assemblages of enunciation; and the other (content) gives rise to the regimes of bodies or assemblages 
of bodies. The abstract machine on the other hand is unformed diagrammatic force that functionalizes 
matter. It is for Deleuze and Guattari (1987) not something or someone, not an entity, but a force in 
the Nietzschean sense of the word. Although the abstract machine contains both expression and 
content, they do nevertheless not define it exhaustively. “The abstract machine is pure Matter-
Function – a diagram independent of the forms and substances, expressions and contents it will 
distribute” (p. 141). Matter is not captured by physiology, which already refers to the substance of 
content. Function must not be equalized with semiotics of expression. The abstract machine is a 
diagram, which, according to Deleuze and Guattari, differs from a general perception of the concept 
of diagram that in the end is reduced to semiotic substances and forms such as index, icons, symbols, 
axioms, transcendental ideas, or the regime of bodies as matter and form of content. For Deleuze and 
Guattari a diagram indicates intensity that is not reality itself or a semiotic force, but that which 
generates reality. It is the paradoxical unformed constructing force of “real that is yet to come.” It is 
“virtual yet real” (p. 142, 95). Through our comfort is the idea of tortured bodies a virtual reality; 
thus, in order to incomprehensively comprehend this reality, we need as Ten Bos (2011) suggests, 
radically put ourselves at risk. Risking not only physically, but more so expressively.  
 
Let us return for a moment to our example of Saxony. It would be oversimplifying to categorize 
people as those who exclude (the anti-refugees) and those who are excluded (the refugees). As Noam 
Chomsky states in the documentary Requiem for the American Dream (Hutchison, Nyks & Scott, 
2015) the hostility between populations and the manner in which groups in their fear of exclusion and 
deception exclude other groups, lies in line with the neoliberal policy that through the twentieth 
century has promoted individualism and consumerism by demolishing a sense of solidarity and 
connectedness. Demonizing one group for the sake of other neglects the virtual political reality of the 
day. The answer is perhaps not another type of opposition, but lies in the imagination of something 
that is yet not present. As Chomsky states in this documentary: 
 
I don’t think we’re smart enough to design, in any details what a perfectly just and 
free society would be like. I think we can give some guidelines and, more 
significant, we can ask how we can progress in that direction.  
 
This explains why the abstract machine is the dark side of the assemblage, just as the dark side of the 
moon where meteorites crash. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) speak of machinic assemblages to expose 
  
the complex relation between the assemblage and the abstract machine. The body of the assemblage 
rises in the process of formation out of the unformed plane of consistency, the plane that also 
guarantees its permanent deterritorialization. Nevertheless, the assemblage rises as a two-headed 
creature. One head is sensualized by the formed matter, i.e. substance of its content and the other by 
substance of its expression. This double articulation never ceases in its relation to the plane of 
consistency or the abstract machine. 
 
We may draw some general conclusions on the nature of Assemblages from this. 
On a first, horizontal, axis, an assemblage comprises two segments, one of content, 
the other of expression. On the one hand it is a machinic assemblage of bodies, of 
actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies reacting to one another; on the 
other hand it is a collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and statements, of 
incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies. Then on a vertical axis, the 
assemblage has both territorial sides, or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, 
and cutting edges of deterritorialization, which carry it away (p. 88). 
 
These analyses clarify that content and expression are defined and function differently than the 
classical dichotomies such as body and mind, matter and language, object and subject. Content is not 
an object or matter, but as an outcome of the abstract machine it pre-figures dichotomous notions. The 
form of content as “technical social machine” initiates a formation of power as a regime of bodies. 
The rallying of refugees in refugee camps at the moment is an example of such regime of bodies. The 
same trait also applies for expression. It is not grammar or language as such, but the whole “semiotic 
collective machine that pre-exists them and constitutes regimes of signs” (p. 63). The slogan ‘we are 
the people, go home’ is not accidental, but an outcome ratified by a regime of signs and regimes of 
emotions within a differenciating politics of Us versus Them (Ahmed, 2014) that according to 
Chomsky moves a population to look at a so-called hostile migrant or people of color instead of the 
policy itself.   
 
Nonetheless, as is argued in the previous chapter and the chapters to come, in this study politics of 
flight is not merely typified by one form of regime of signs, but by multiple and often conflicting 
regimes of signs. There are even expressions in this politics that are not yet enclosed within a specific 
regime. This is the reason that this rhizomatic politics was characterized as an a-signifying rupture (in 
1.2.4). In order to understand not only the context of this a-signifying rupture, it is vital to dwell upon 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistic structuralism. De Saussure’s understanding of language initiates 
thinking in difference, which has been articulated by Derrida, Foucault, Agamben, Deleuze and 
Guattari. De Saussure’s analysis criticizes two traditions. First, he rejects atomism in language 
(Russell), where words as isolated entities contain meaning; second, he discards historicism in 
language (Hegel), where words gain their meaning by referring to their historical context and use. 
There is, according to De Saussure, no origin to which language refers. Language is an autonomous 
system, and independent of a world outside itself. Furthermore, he states that language is not about 
words but about signs. Signs, which are embedded in social and political structures, can be words, but 
also images, and gestures (as we will see in 2.3.5). Signs are not atomic, but they are relational 
  
entities. According to him semiology is thus a discipline that studies language as an immanent system 
of interrelated signs. This system does not refer to a world, does not include an intentional subject or 
is rooted in a historical process outside itself, but gains consistency of form within itself. Tonal matter 
(spoken: sound) and graphic matter (written: a stroke) are captured in a mental form (concept) as a 
result of which a sign is born. An internal consistency matches an external consistency wherein signs 
refer to other signs – the sign of people referring to other signs such as rights, citizenship, belonging 
and nation-state – and gain meaning through this state of relationality on a grammatical, syntactical 
and semantic level. De Saussure explains the sign, referring to different aspects through which this 
system of signs could be analyzed.7 
 
1) First, synchronic instead of diachronic analysis. De Saussure’s analysis of language accentuates 
the synchronic aspect of language. In terms of the case of Saxony:  the idea of people refers to how 
we in the present circumstances of the European Union and its borders speak about people. De 
Saussure does not negate the value of diachronic analysis. In the case of Saxony, the idea of people 
does also refer to a historical development of the notion. Nonetheless, he emphasizes that diachronic 
is rather a sequence of synchronic analyses.  
 
2) He also speaks of streams of sounds and streams of thought. Language is neither merely sound, nor 
merely thoughts, but the assemblages of the two. It is through this amalgamation that sounds and 
thoughts become signs that gain meaning. Language is thus not an indifferent transmitter of 
information, as we have seen in Agamben’s idea of sayability, but an inscrutable process that 
constructs and forms combinations of sounds and thoughts.8  
 
3) De Saussure distinguishes between langue (system) and parole (speech). There is not such a thing 
as the Language. Language is always a contextual interplay between a langue and parole, or as Kuhl 
(2010) suggests we are cultural bound listeners. 
 
4) De Saussure then concentrates his inquiries on the structure of the langue as a system, and the 
manner in which signs refer to other signs. The fourth distinction is that between signifiant (Sa, 
signifier: the image or sound of sign, its sensory trait) and signifié (Sé, signified, its concept). While 
the difference between these two in parole remains unnoticed, within langue, De Saussure states, they 
could be studied separately. De Saussure discerns within the sign systematically four traits: 
a. arbitrary: although within a given context words we use, like ‘chair’ refer directly to a 
concept, in a strict sense there is no necessary bond between Sé and Sa. Phonetically each 
language has a different word for a people, but still when we think of a concept people – a 
collection of human bodies often gathered on or in relation to a territory – the specifics are all 
relational. Moreover, there is no universal bond between the word ‘people’ and the ideas that 
discursively form the collection of bodies as content.  
                                                     
7 In my reference to De Saussure I have made use of the analysis of Hénault (2010) and Oosterling (n.d).  
8 See also: Tallal, 2013 & Kuhl, 2010. 
  
b. negation: a sign derives its meaning by differing from other signs through negation. Negation 
is an aspect of difference. The sign ‘car’ relates to the sign wheels, windows, but nevertheless 
negates them by being something else, namely a car. In the case of our example, the idea of 
the people is exclusive: in negating others as not belonging to the people the contours of a 
people are negatively drawn. It is this negative positioning that will be discussed in chapter 
four.  
c. relation: given all this, signs are primarily known through relational qualities. In relating they 
get meaning. This means that the idea of a non-people is immanently related to the idea of the 
people. 
d. difference: each sign gains meaning by phonetically, lexically and semantically differing 
oneself from another sign. A ‘b’ is not a ‘p’ although both are labials, the first voiced and the 
second unvoiced. Their specific meaning or value can only be expressed by this difference. In 
this very strict sense the people differs only from refugees because the first are formally 
voiced and the latter are unvoiced.  
 
5) It is this understanding that leads De Saussure to make the final and fifth distinction between 
difference (langue) and oppositional (parole). De Saussure thus believes that the system of language is 
differential and not necessarily oppositional. Negation does not always mean oppositional setting. A 
car is not - negates - a bicycle, but is not opposed to it. They can even be made into an assemblage to 
provide multi-functionality. The concept migrant differs from the concept refugee, yet they are in no 
sense oppositional. They simply relationally differ and the difference constitutes their meaning. In 
context of Foucault’s understanding of discourse and epistemic structures, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
understanding of signs, but also Derrida’s understanding of différance, De Saussure’s influence is 
more than obvious. In criticizing metaphysics and transcendentalism these philosophers of difference 
provide an analysis from an immanent point of view. That is why they were initially labeled as post- 
or neo-structuralists. Just as Deleuze and Guattari, De Saussure resists the idea that language solely 
exits in order to communicate something outside a language: a real thing out there. This ‘matter’ first 
has to be (in)formed. The four previous traits create tools to problematize the notion of the Other 
within politics of flight. In an Agambian perspective it is the immanency of langue within parole – the 
unsayable within the sayable – that feeds difference.  
 
Yet, becoming a refugee supersedes linguistic reality. In his emphasis on language as a linguist and 
his fear of reduction of language to an outside world, De Saussure ignores the ontological aspect fully. 
In other words, De Saussure’s analysis does provide us with tools to understand the complexity of 
language but does not provide us with tools to approach the sensation of a body, the body of a refugee 
or the body of an individual whose skin color differs from others. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) on the 
other hand neither negate the tangible world, nor state that expression is without ontology. The 
ontology of expression and content as performance is not reductive, but relational, be it in a 
supplementary sense. The body of the so-called other can never be captured in a discourse yet its 
onto-physiological reality always permanently affects and is affected by a discourse. A statement on 
being the people eventually led anti-refugee protesters to burn the refugees’ housing places in Saxony 
(Oltermann, 2016b). Both expression and content have their self-regulating form and matter.  
  
Louis Hjelmslev, also a structuralist was inspired by De Saussure, yet criticized him, precisely on this 
reductive relation between matter and form and the supposed explanatory power for the exclusive 
difference between signifier and signified. It is Hjelmslev who overrules this pairing in the sign by 
reflecting on the relationality between content and expression. 
 
A form of content is not a signified, any more than a form of expression is a 
signifier. This is true for all the strata, including those on which language plays a 
role (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 66). 
 
Deleuze and Guattari add both content and expression to their four-folded presentation – form of 
content, form of expression, matter of content and matter of expression – in order to show the subtle 
nuances of how forces converge and disseminate on different layers. Once there is no longer a 
transcendent meaning that overcodes all relations, more adequate discursive tools are needed to map 
the specific assemblages. Yet what remains decisive in all of these assemblages – agencements or 
subjectifications – is the permanent presence of deterritorializing effects of the rhizomatic earth: the 
openness of forms and matters to other strata in which they appear differently. Although any 
substance of content and substance of expression betray the unformed tendency of the body without 
organs, nonetheless these substances also remain vulnerable to the forces of the unformed earth. The 
substance of content becomes disengaged due to the force of the body without organs. Despite its 
semiotic urge expression gives rise to enunciations that escape the current regimes of signs. As 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) state, expression is not only the voice of regimes of signs but also of a-
semantic cries that escape signification (p. 7). Thus, the slogan of Saxony is not the only voice in 
Germany. There are those voices that resist the hegemony of Us versus Them. On 20st of March 2016 
in Berlin another slogan catches the eye: “My right is your right”. It is in this slogan that another idea 
of a people is differentiated within the exclusive idea of the people: The other is explicitly included 
(My Right is Your Right, 2016). Other slogans transversalize these two: “Wir schaffen es”. Yet, 
behind this macropolitical discourse lurks an economic imperative of declining workforce that need to 
be compensated. All these assemblages of enunciations oppose, even contradict each other, while in 
between their strata the bodies of both the protesters and the refugees unwillingly intertwine within 
one and the same political discourse.   
Different substances in content and expression create different assemblages. In connection to 
politics of flight not one, but several forms of assemblages are at work within this politics. First, they 
all have different form and matter in their content as well as their expression. Second, each time due 
to this differentiation content and expression relate differently to one another. In section 2.4 I will 
therefore demonstrate that the milieu of flight is always already a multiple milieu: it contains multiple 
assemblages that create their own form and matter within a certain milieu. However, first a closer 
look on the notion of expression is needed. Which ideas on enunciation constitute a politics of flight? 
I referred to art practices, but the most important and problematic expression is what underpins and 
differentiates communication: language.  
 
  
2.3.2 A Foreign Tongue: Voicing the Silence  
Does intermingling of bodies and expression within politics of flight indicate that there is equality 
within this politics? It depends how we define equality. As we will see in the last three chapters 
different ideas on equality creates different forms of relationality within this politics. There is an 
equality of existence within politics of flight. Both the screams of tortured bodies of Eritrean refugees 
as well as slogans of anti-refugees belong to it; yet there is an inequality in the manner of existence; in 
the manner in which our sense hear, taste, see or touch. There is an inequality in the manner in which 
our language and signs approach the other. Hegel’s Aufhebung only resisted the contradictory 
paradigms that concerned the male western individual. It left women and people of color for the 
unknown abyss of prejudices. What are the expressions that let us surpass such ignorance? 
 
Agamben’s reflections on language problematize language as the only form or even the dominant 
form of expression. As we have seen in our current visual culture images perhaps have nowadays a 
more expressive impact. How does Agamben approach language, i.e. how do we speak of “the thing 
of language”? In Infancy and History (1993a) this thing does not refer to an essence, but to a process, 
an experiment. In a politics of flight the milieu is always multilingual. When language is incapable of 
expressing affective intensities, hesitation, stuttering and even silence become indications for another 
communication. What does hesitation indicate? What does silencing of refugees mean in case of the 
events in Saxony? Are lack and loss inherent in language – or expression for that matter – of politics 
of flight or are these only seen that way as the result of a specific idea on expression? And when 
speech is silver and silence is golden, is silence still a lack of expression?  
In Agamben’s Language and Death: The Place of Negativity language is ‘essentially’ related 
to death. Agamben (1991) predominantly refers to Hegelian analysis and Heideggerian elaboration on 
the matter, as well as to the history of Christianity, linguistic thought and Western poetry.9 The 
discussions are focused on the ‘place of negativity’ and on the question: “What if humankind were 
neither speaking nor mortal, yet continued to die and to speak?” (p. xii). In line with Arendt (1958), 
Agamben thus problematizes the relation of death and language as essential to the human nature. 
They both criticize Heidegger’s thought in which death and its experience in silence become the 
authentic experience of humanity. Agamben (1991) intends to liberate ethics from this negativity. 
This time his efforts are to liberate ethics “from the informulability (or sigetics) to which Western 
metaphysics has condemned it” (p. xiii). What does this sigetics as the art of silence entail? 
Agamben states that the taking-place of language in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and the 
disclosure of Da of Dasein in Heidegger’s Being and Time appear only as a negative. Dasein, is 
nothing in particular. Although it is ontically rooted, it operates on ontological level. It is the 
ontological experience of death. This death is the impossibility of the possibility to be, to be a being. 
Nevertheless, one could wonder why death is so typically human. Animals die too and plants and 
objects perish as well. Heidegger (1996) argues that all other beings, such as animals and plants, do 
not die but merely cease to exist. The thing that supposedly distinguishes men from other beings is 
                                                     
9 Agamben (1991) does not negate these thoughts, which can only lead to new forms of negativity, but rather examines them 
in order to let them operate differently (p. 53). 
  
their silent presupposition of this impossibility to be and the valuation of life through this knowledge. 
We know with certainty that one day we will stop existing. The experience of dying is an experience 
exclusive to men, and within this experience men experience their Dasein. Death does neither 
complete Dasein, does not make it graspable, nor does it refer to the loss of something or someone. It 
instead exposes more openly the non-existence of Dasein while being alive. Dasein is being alive and 
death is the pure experience of what it means to be alive. Heidegger states: 
 
Death, in the widest sense, is a phenomenon of life. Life must be understood as a 
kind of Being to which there belongs a Being-in-the-world. Only if this kind of 
Being is oriented in a privative way to Dasein, can we fix its character 
ontologically. Even Dasein may be considered purely as life. When the question is 
formulated from the viewpoint of biology and physiology, Dasein moves into that 
domain of Being which we know as the world of animals and plants (p. 290).  
 
For Heidegger argues that there is no choice; Dasein’s life cannot ever escape death.  
 
Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein. Thus death reveals 
itself as that possibility which is one’s ownmost, which is non-relational, and 
which is not to be outstripped (unüberholbare) (pp. 294).  
 
It is then not surprising that Agamben (1991) states: “Negativity reaches Dasein from its very Da” (p. 
5). What is the expression of this negativity? What is the language in which Dasein ‘utters’ the 
impossibility of this possibility of being, the paradox of impossible possibility? This language is 
sigetics, the speech of silence, the art of speaking through silence. It is the inability of language to 
grasp the pure sense, pure understanding of Dasein, or, as Hegel puts it, a sense-certainty.10 Agamben 
cites the young Hegel’s poem that was dedicated to Hölderin. In this poem, through praising Ceres, 
the Roman goddess of fertility, Hegel problematizes the act of speaking itself. The goddess that lives 
in a silence of wisdom or wisdom as silence, can only be experienced in the “poverty of words”, 
empty, merely “in the echo of foreign tongues would it find its roots” (p. 9). Deleuze and Guattari 
(1986) also refer to the sobriety of words, especially when referring to the concept of minority 
language. Nevertheless, this sobriety refers to the possibility of speech and language rather than the 
impossibility of it. In the sixth chapter I will discuss how this second form of poverty is different from 
the Hegelian one. It is not stinginess that defines this poverty, but rather redundancy (Ten Bos, 2011, 
pp. 73-74) 
 
However, for the time being, let us scrutinize this Hegelian concept: ‘poverty of words’ that combines 
three notions: silence, emptiness and foreign tongue. What does this imply for the discourse on 
refugees? How do refugees experience their Da in the threat of death or exclusion, silenced by both 
threatening and yelling masses? Are the refugees an exposition of Dasein and is their numbed 
                                                     
10 Hegel (1977) also states that: “this very certainty proves itself to be the most abstract and poorest truth” (p. 58). 
  
expression a form of sensitization of a sobriety in language, due to their foreign tongue? In order to 
elaborate the possible answers to these questions we must examine the Agambian notion of silence a 
bit further.11 Is the notion ‘empty silence’ a pleonasm, a redundancy? Silence, as a lack of voice, 
resides not outside the language as its opposition, but in the heart of it, as its supplement. Yet, is it 
justified to see a lack of voice as an expressive mode or do we interpret the terrified faces of refugees 
during attacks on them as an inability to express or as a form of informulability within a foreign 
tongue?  
Agamben (1991) suggests that language must liberate itself not only from the Heideggerian 
logic, but also from its grammar, that defines human voice in negation. What matters is a voice. But 
where do we localize a voice of men?  
 
The utterance and the instance of discourse are only identifiable as such through 
the voice that speaks them, and only by attributing a voice to them can something 
like a taking place of discourse be demonstrated … he who utters, the speaker, is 
above all a voice. The problem of deixis is the problem of the voice and its relation 
to language (p. 32). 
 
Voice is embedded in an affective field – somewhere in-between body and language (Ten Bos, 2011, 
p. 182 – 190) – with a spectrum stretching from mere sounds to articulate and communicative 
meaning. Voice carries the intensity of the intention to gain meaning before this meaning is 
segmented or determined. The human voice differentiates itself in this manner from the animal phoné 
or mere sound. The physicality of the voice, as waves of air, seems to indicate pure being, the voice of 
Hegelian Geist in itself, not yet understanding himself. The human voice, however, in the tradition of 
thought on language, singles out itself from mere sound, or pure voice, due to its immediate 
connection to a discourse as systematic coherence of meaning. Children mimic words as sounds, and 
it is only in the continuing experience of their psychological development that they are conditioned to 
put words into a grammar, or as Kuhl (2010) suggests, become culturally bound listeners. Human 
Voice is never pure, and despite its physicality it seems always detached from the living phenomenon 
that utters it.12 This is due to the fact that the human Voice, no matter how pure it intends to be – a 
                                                     
11  Agamben refers to Hegel’s Phenomenology and his elaboration on deixis such as ‘this’, ‘now’ and ‘here’. The adverb 
‘here’ neither refers solely to a physical reality, nor to a present time, it is multiple. ‘Here’ also refers to all uses of the 
adverb ‘here’. “‘Here,’ which is a Here of other Heres, or is in its own self a ‘simple togetherness of many Heres’; i.e. it is a 
universal” (Hegel, 1977, p. 66 & Agamben, 1991, p. 13). Adverbs such as ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘that’ and ‘this’, but also pronouns 
such as ‘I’ and ‘you’ never refer solely to the reality outside a language, just as the slogan ‘go home’ does not refer to a 
specific physical place or pronouns such as Us and Them are never captured by specific assemblages of bodies. In other 
words, these adverbs and pronouns never capture completely what they intend to mean. Language guards its own ineffable 
state and the impossibility to express. Hence Hegel concludes the immanent negativity of language, according to Agamben. 
The act of refuge functions as a deixis: the word or sentences never grasp this slippery event as a ‘now’ that defines the 
process in which the subject is entangled. Again, this is not an oppositional, but a supplementary configuration. 
12 Faraneh Vargha-Khadem suggests that the ability to speak a language is traceable in our DNA. She did this by examining 
the DNA of a family, whose members despite their healthy ears speak as deaf people do. She found out that a part of their 
chromosome 7 was partially broken (BBC, 2009). 
  
purity in which, as Schinkel (2008) argues, a(n) language/expression overcodes itself as the 
language/expression (p. 404) – is always destined to oscillate between the mere sound or phoné and 
the determining discourse that bestows it with meaning. When listening to an unknown language that 
we cannot understand we still are aware that these sounds are meaningful. It is potentially language, 
i.e. communicability. Language is the negation of phoné or voice as mere sound. In terms of De 
Saussure, the father of structuralism: phoné is comparable with the signifier, Voice is the articulated 
sign.  
Agamben (1991) states that the human Voice is always considered to be the death of phoné in order to 
initiate the taking-place-of-language. The stagnation into a meaning extinguishes the process of 
voice. So, the expression of refugees – or in Hegelian sense: the foreign tongue – does not lack a 
voice, or even a human voice, but it lacks a coherent meaningful positioning in a regime of signs, or 
in Agamben’s words: in a Voice. 
 
The voice, the animal phoné, is indeed presupposed by the shifters, but as that 
which must necessarily be removed in order for meaningful discourse to take place 
… But inasmuch as the Voice (which we now capitalize to distinguish it from the 
voice as mere sound) enjoys the status of a no-longer (voice) and of a not-yet 
(meaning), it necessarily constitutes a negative dimension. It is ground, but in the 
sense that it goes to the ground13 and disappears in order for being and language to 
take place (p. 35). 
 
The characteristics of no-longer and not-yet, in Agamben’s reflections, do not only indicate a relation 
to the being that utters the Voice in this in-betweenness, but also to the temporality of the taking place 
of language. This temporality, however, must not be understood as a beginning with an end, but as the 
in-between moments. Thus, the expression of refugees or of anti-racism in Berlin and other cities of 
Europe are not absent, but appear as intermezzi within the dominant discourse, voices appearing 
within Voice.  
Another aspect of this temporality is indicated by the relevance of memory, which always 
oscillates between the Voice and voice. In Voice memory is reduced to ‘true’ facts with a certain 
logical linearity – a history – in which memory loses its concrete multiplicity. As we will see in the 
fourth chapter, it is exactly this reduction of multiplicity to ‘true’ facts that is at issue in 
communication with refugees in a totalitarian setting. Through memory the Voice is always 
embedded in a discourse, whether its meaning is already there or yet-to-be. It is the invisible ground 
that defines our manner of speaking. In words of Foucault the discourse that defines us, yet remains 
unseen.  
Human Voice is a metaphysical thought on language – its ‘true’ facts intend to distance 
themselves (meta: above, beyond) from the virtual reality of a rhizomatic multiplicity by creating an 
                                                     
13  This ground has some affinity with the concept of earth in the sense that it creates the formation, but remains 
deterritorializing. The voice that goes into the ground thus does not disappear but remains affective in its hidden state. There 
is also a reference to Hegels ‘zu Grunde gehen’ as a ‘Denkbestimmung’ at the end of the first part – Logic of Being - of his 
Logic of Science.   
  
immovable fundament: a ground. Furthermore, in this metaphysical ground the relevance of memory 
is always confined by gramma: the written word that it is part of, or yet-to-be part of. Thus Agamben 
(1991) states: 
 
Metaphysics is always grammatology and this is fundamentology in the sense that 
the gramma (or the Voice) functions as the negative ontological foundation (p. 
39).  
 
Death and language are in this way intertwined in the experience of Dasein. Dasein can never capture 
its Da, its being and its death. Language – as gramma – carries the same burden. It never can contain 
the voice, due to the death of this voice in Voice of men – just as the staged images in the media can 
never capture the horrors that are expressed by subjects of politics of flight. Language can never 
capture its taking place, “discourse cannot speak its taking place” (Agamben, 1991, p. 62). We are 
always already within language when we try to speak about language. The Da of the Dasein and 
language are in the final instance speechless, silent, without words.  
The tradition of Christianity and mystic thought has captured this silence as the utterance of 
God. Isolation, sobriety and stillness of silence indicate a dedication to God that does not represent 
itself in language, which is already articulated in Hegel’s poem in adoration of Ceres. Nevertheless, 
according to this Hegelian logic the word is not something of men, but a truth to which men need to 
come. The word is already there, humans do not invent the word, but merely reinvent it in their desire 
for knowledge. Even poetry dedicates itself to this negativity. Agamben (1991) uses the example of 
Provençal poetry, in which the love for language is the love for its taking-place, when language is 
nothing but itself, when it is about no-thing. Here poetry connects itself to the non-place of Dasein 
and silence (pp. 57 & 63-74). 
 
What does this excursion on silence clarify as to the situation of refugees? It is within this form of 
appreciation of silence that thoughts on language in philosophy and literature separate themselves 
from the rhetoric of politics. In politics, as we will see in 3.3 and 3.4, the abstract other of philosophy 
departs from the political other called migrants and refugees. In politics speech is imperative, it is 
performative (Schinkel, 2008). Not only in Arendtian sense of the word, but also as the demand of 
adequacy in interviews with refugees. Philosophy appreciates a silence that does not necessarily 
explain the experience of these political figures. The Voice in politics demands clarity, as we will see 
in the fourth and fifth chapter. The voice of refugees is expressed in chaos, but how does this chaos 
relate to this philosophical articulation of Voice as a double negativity. On the one hand, Voice 
negates the voice or the phoné in order for language to take place and become a Voice. On the other 
hand, as we have seen in 2.2.2, the same Voice – once more: the fact of taking place of language – is 
uncontainable within language itself and affects only in silence. The sayable is always impregnated by 
the unsayable. Language can never speak of its own taking place.  
 
If this Voice is the mystical foundation for our entire culture (its logic as well as 
its ethics, its theology as well as its politics, its wisdom as well as its madness) 
then the mystical is not something that can provide the foundation for another 
  
thought … Only a liquidation of the mystical can open up the field to a thought (or 
language) that thinks (speaks) beyond the Voice and its sigetics; that dwells, that 
is, not on an unspeakable foundation, but in the infancy (in-fari) of man 
(Agamben, 1991, p. 91). 
 
This concept of infancy is what radicalizes Agamben’s understanding of language and its ethical 
implications. It is within the concept of infancy that the experience of political life of refugees affects 
philosophy: by changing the parameters of philosophical thought on language. This is not about the 
pidgin, the particular use and accent of the foreign language by migrants and refugees. Infancy does 
not indicate the infant’s ability to learn language, but our entire experience of language. While Voice 
means to distance itself from the original voice of men, Agamben argues that this voice was never 
there to begin with. While apes gibber, chickens cluck, foxes bark and seagulls scream, men don’t 
have a voice. Nothing is lost, because there was nothing to lose in the first place. It is always in 
suspension, we are in search of a voice. Ethics, for Agamben, is the manner in which we deal with 
this suspension. Human thought dwells in this suspension of something that has never been there 
before. In this sense, the foreign tongue is neither an experience of silence in the previous sense, nor 
an experience of a loss of a language, but a confrontation with this underlying intensity of finding a 
voice. The foreign tongue does not refer to an expression of a people with a different ethnicity but is 
the experience of this everlasting suspense in thought. 
 
We can repeat that which has been said. But that which has been thought can 
never be said again. You can take your leave forever of the word once it has been 
thought.  
We walk through the woods: suddenly we hear the flapping of wings or the 
wind in the grass. A pheasant lifts off then disappears instantly among the trees, a 
porcupine buries in the thick underbrush, the dry leaves crackle as a snake slithers 
away. Not the encounter, but this flight of invisible animals is thought. Not, it was 
not our voice. We came as close as possible to language, we almost brushed 
against it, held it in suspense: but we never reached our encounter and now we 
turn back, untroubled, toward home. 
So, language is our voice, our language. As you now speak, that is ethics 
(Agamben, 1991, p. 108). 
 
It is this fragility of thought and the non-lacking characteristic of language that set apart Agamben’s 
reflections from that of the dominant genre in the history of Western philosophy, which has been 
trapped in binary oppositions, not only that of body and mind, but also that of worldliness (indicating 
reality of objects) and language (indicating the only true form of human expression). Due to the fact 
that language cannot completely grasp reality, it has been seen as a negation, as a process of lack that 
finds its true meaning in silence. Language is expected to comprehend reality and due to its inability 
to live up to this expectation it has been detached from reality.  
 
  
In order to position the foreign tongue, as a process that connects the idea of language in philosophy 
to the practice of expression in politics of flight, Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction of content and 
expression is instructive. The two articulations are not oppositional, but distinctive, related and 
supplementary. It is in this simultaneity of distinction and approach that the idea of language as an 
appreciation of silence is challenged. The problem does not necessarily lie in the appreciation, but in 
the definition of silence as a negative. We can leave the idea of negativity and emptiness behind once 
we redefine silence as a cacophonic state in which multiplicity instead of emptiness emerges. In 
words of Heidegger, let us truly speak of silence. Silence becomes a positive expression in-between 
all other forms of expression, instead of the true form of expression. Only through this multiplicity of 
the foreign tongue the focus of philosophy becomes that of political practice, challenging the mode of 
appreciation in both regimes. Dealing with politics of flight indicates an engagement with the tension 
between Voice and voices. Such engagement does not need to reflect upon voices as absence or lack, 
but must sensitize these as rupturing points that challenge the coherency and dominancy of regimes of 
signs. The second part of this study in the first instance deals with this coherency and dominancy. It 
will be argued that totalitarianism (chapter 4) and multiculturalism (chapter 5) – although both in their 
own accord – in their search of a true Voice approach the multiplicity of expression as form of lack or 
absence of this truthness. It is in the final chapter – where the multiplicity of life and expression 
explicitly relate to one another due to another approach toward assemblages of bodies and 
assemblages of enunciation – that this idea of lack is surpassed. However, in order to do so, we need 
to redefine and thus re-approach the idea of silence. What is the event of silence, its potentiality? 
 
2.3.3 A Cacophony in Silence: The Sound of Silence14  
Let us once more ask the question: is the notion ‘empty silence’ a pleonasm? Is the emptiness of 
silence a given? Ten Bos (2011) states that silence falls, it leaks, it is emptiness (p. 61-62). Yet, what 
does this emptiness mean? Inspired by Agamben’s reflections on the difference between Voice and 
voice as well as Deleuze and Guattari’s elaborations on content and expression, I will now argue that 
the relation between content and expression does not appear in a form of lack towards one another. 
Can we expect language, i.e. expression to capture the full complexity of its content? Let me give an 
example from the art world that has been experimenting with these complex relations. Art & 
Language is a cooperative practice of conceptual artists that was founded in 1969. Joseph Kosuth is 
one of its collaborators. Kosuth’s art installation One and Three Chairs (1965) is the first proclaimed 
conceptual art installation: a chair is placed against the wall of the museum, next to a photograph of 
this same chair and a dictionary gloss on ‘chair’. The chair is shown as object, image and text. In this 
installation language is exposed as being both content and expression. Only by defining the word 
‘chair’ or showing the image of a chair as a replacement of the ‘real’ chair, both words and image 
start to evoke a lack. Kosuth, however, shows how they are not each other’s replacement, but that 
they differ as well as relate to one another. As I showed in 2.3.1 in commenting on De Saussure’s 
analysis of the sign, negation is just an aspect of difference; not the fundamental aspect of difference.  
                                                     
14 See also Rahimy, 2009 & 2010. 
  
Content and expression are no substitutes for each other. Content and expression are related, but not 
according to a logical and linear causality: content does not cause expression as – in architecture and 
design – form follows function. There are multiple relations within a differing whole, especially when 
the ‘means’ of expression is language. Hegel intended to fill the gap between content (an sich) and 
expression (für sich) in a final ‘Aufhebung’ (sublation: an und für sich) within an absolute Idea. 
Deleuze and Guattari also attempt to think beyond the gap, but without the hierarchy or quasi-
theological and teleological presuppositions of the Hegelian dialectics. For Agamben as well as for 
Deleuze and Guattari it is not the relationality within Hegelian thought that is problematic, but rather 
the finality: the inevitability of his logic towards one final direction, solution and hence appreciation 
of one type of existence or culture.  
So, what is silence? A lack of sound or a leak of sounds? A meaningful expression beyond 
language? Does the imperative “be silent!” means don’t speak or rather more affirmatively 
“listen!”?15  According to Ten Bos (2011) silence is also associated with “motionlessness, fraud, 
absence, vulnerability, loneliness and withdrawal” (p. 37, Translation TR). Silence is even assumed to 
come after cacophony. In our analysis of silence we need, in line with Ten Bos, to problematize such 
assumptions. Silence does not lack sounds. It is rather noisy. In his art installation 4’33 (1952) John 
Cage forced his audience to experience both silence and a cacophony. Sitting, first in public space, 
behind a grand piano, suggesting he is going to play for four minutes and 33 seconds, he just ‘waits’ 
four minutes and 33 seconds to end the performance. In public space, we hear the urban soundscape, 
while not hearing the music. In the concert hall, the orchestra is listening while the audience is 
trapped in its own unintended performance of cacophony. What Cage sensitizes is that silence is not 
an empty moment in thinking, listening or looking. It is a fulfilled, tangible sounding beyond human 
agency. “What Cage calls silence constitutes the totality of sounds that are not intended by the human 
subject” (De Mul, 1999, p. 226). Silence is chaos as sheer noise. Is it expression without substance or 
does it transform any form that connects on its surface into matter? Cage magnificently shows that 
silence is not a moment in speech, as if Voicelessness is its ‘true’ essence. The essential soundlessness 
of silence is as big a myth as the idea that refugees lack the ability to express their experiences. They 
do express some ‘thing’; just as the first scream of a newly born child manifesting its existence: “I am 
here” (Ten Bos, 2011, p. 173). Only within the context of a dominant discourse or regime of signs 
their expressions are typified as lack and banned. 
Let us revers this logic: coherent speech as a supplement of silence. This occurs the very 
moment expression informs words, sounds and images with so-called adequate meaning. No matter 
how directly one speaks, no matter how transparent words pretend to communicate, this can only take 
place against the background of the omnipresent, cacophonic chaos of silence. The screams are 
epistratic phenomena, connecting assemblages of bodies to assemblages of enunciation, a kind of 
breath that neither belongs to the body nor to the regime of signs but rather operates as a connective 
force. It is plus-de-corps (Ten Bos, 2011, p. 189); the expression of relational difference.  
                                                     
15  Heidegger (1996) does speak of the triangle: speech, listening and silence. Listening is affirmative but not as an 
agreement. It creates room for multiplicity of experience. However, there remains something as ‘true’ understanding in 
Heidegger’s analysis that in the end reduces the unpredictability in listening (pp. 203-210).  
  
Not words give rise to permanent thinking. Silence does. Silence is the interstratum constituting a 
difference upon which thoughts manifest themselves momentary. This could be the form of silence 
Derrida (1982) refers to in connection to ‘différance’ when he states:  
 
The pyramidal silence of the graphic difference between the e and the a … that 
functions within only a so-called phonetic writing – quite opportunely conveys or 
reminds us that, contrary to a very widespread prejudice, there is no phonetic 
writing. There is no purely and rigorously phonetic writing. So-called phonetic 
writing, by all rights and in principle, and not only due to an empirical or technical 
insufficiency, can function only by admitting into its system nonphonetic ‘signs’ 
(punctuation, spacing, etc.). And an examination of the structure and necessity of 
these nonphonetic signs quickly reveals that they can barely tolerate the concept of 
the sign itself (p. 4-5).  
 
The nonphonetic is not only affected by, but also constitutes the signification. The ‘pyramidal silence’ 
concerns the A of différance that cannot be heard in a comparison with the more regular ‘difference’. 
The différance cannot be Voiced, it can only come to the fore in written language, and finally in 
discourse. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari silence is the body without organs that penetrates the 
expressive clarity, i.e. finality and truthness in expression. Silence is not mystical. Mysticism, which 
upholds the negative idea of silence, refers to the truthful thing that cannot be grasped, hence negative 
theology as the discourse of mystics. Silence is not negative, but dynamic and supplementary. It is a 
becoming, a becoming-music, in which, as Pisters (2003) says, not the utility or correctness of 
expression is at stake, but rather the event of expression. As cacophony, it refers to permanent change, 
permanent transformation of expression. Silence is a line of flight. Silence does therefore not negate 
expression, but resists the permanency of a consistent and logical gramma. As we will see in the 
fourth chapter the clarity of communication that is intended through such laws in language is neither 
just nor preferable. They do not produce comprehension, they install exclusion; makes us violently 
deaf for the sounds of tortured refugees and severely blind for their frozen bodies in the refugee 
camps.  
 
The cacophony of silence is not in opposition to expression or even language. It is another act within 
expression itself. Not an act of an agent, but an act of speaking itself; the act of inter-speaking that 
connects subjects in multiple ways. Instead it is the rigidity in some practices of language that creates 
a setting in which both silence and cacophony are opposed to language. Robert Ashley’s musical 
experiment in Automatic Writing (1979) is a profound example of the immanency of this cacophony 
within language and expression as such. The composer Robert Ashley assumingly ‘suffers’ from the 
disease Gilles de la Tourette. He makes sounds without intending it: he speaks other (heteros) words 
(phasia) than intended. This type of expression, let us call it heterophasia, is often, from the 
perspective of dominant understanding of language, pathologically characterized as aphasia. Aphasia 
is a mental condition, which refers to either partial or total loss of the ability to communicate verbally 
or using written words. It shows itself as a difficulty with speaking, reading, writing, recognizing the 
names of objects, or understanding what other people have said. In case of Ashley, it triggers 
  
involuntary sounds, in which the cacophony penetrates expression, in which the subject literally 
undergoes the expression. Yet, these involuntarily sounds are more common than one might think. 
Different types of slip-ups, saying something while intending to say something else, often accompany 
the experience of learning another language.  
Ashley’s artwork She was a Visitor (1967) installs such an experience. It expresses a reversed 
intensity of the Automatic Writings. The fragment starts with the sentence ‘she was a visitor’, at first 
there is silence and only the sentence is audible, but gradually a chaos of sounds is introduced, while 
the sentence ‘she was a visitor’ is repeated over and over again. Nevertheless, while the sentence is 
assumingly unchanged, the intensity of the listener’s comprehension of the sentence changes due to 
the cacophony that surrounds it. What does he mean ‘she was’ instead of ‘she is’? What happened to 
her? The cacophony demands its place in the process of comprehension. The visitor is not present. 
There is no image. She is solely defined by an everlasting tension of words, stuck between multiple 
affects: embedded in the unintended singular silence, she was and thus cannot be present, while at the 
same time being totally present in an act of listening of the audience. In words of Deleuze (1997), 
such an artwork sensitizes us for the tension between naked and covered repetition (as I argued in 
1.4.2). Although it seems that every word repeats itself in exactly the same way – naked repetition – 
the intensity that each repeated sentence creates, sensitizes us for covered repetition. What is repeated, 
is difference itself. It is within this sense, that the listener becomes ‘passive’, meaning that the action 
of listening and being affected by it, surpasses her intentionality. More exactly formulated, in such a 
pre-personal endurance of difference, or in words of Derrida (1982) différance, the opposition 
between passivity and activity “remains undecided … différance is neither simply active nor simply 
passive, announcing or rather recalling something like a middle voice” (p. 9). This is the in-
betweenness of Agamben’s supplementary relation of voice and Voice. The listener rhizomatically – 
subconsciously Freud would say, ideologically Marx would add – connects to all that presents itself in 
the expression. Listening is hence not the opposite of speaking; it is only due to listening that speech 
becomes more than a mere noise. Where content is cacophonic, expression becomes multiple. Where 
silence is not viciously hushed as a negating form as soundlessness, the listener becomes perceptible 
to multiple sounds of silence, to the noises that remains unheard; to the screams that tell us “we are 
here” even when “we are over there”. Thus, “our task … is to learn how to hear what is impossible” 
(Ahmed, 2014, p. 35); to hear the cacophony of this silence.  
 
2.3.4 Heterophasia and Heterotopia: Voicing and Situating the Other   
Aphasia does not only affect the sensations of the listeners, it also makes them sensible for 
disorganized syntaxes. From the perspective of the speaker the dictionary defines aphasia as a 
“disability to understand or express speech, caused by brain damage”. It is compared with aphonia: 
“loss of ability to speak”; and connected to agnosia: the “inability to interpret sensations and hence to 
recognize things, typically as a result of brain damage.” Oliver Sacks (2010) brilliantly writes about 
these phenomena in his description of the curious case of Lilian Kallir. Mrs. Kallir is a master pianist 
who could write but not read. She can see details as no other, she is masterly sharp in this sense, but 
she cannot distinguish a picture on a wall from the wall that it is pinned on. The wall and the picture 
are all the same to her, while she piercingly observes minimalistic details (pp. 12-31). Clear 
comprehension is at stake here. 
  
There are different aspects of aphasia. The first concerns the connection between word and image. For 
example, one sees an apple and calls it a chair. The second concerns the connection between different 
words from the same family: one wants to say arm but says leg. Aphasia is also connected with not 
being able to discern words that almost have the same pronunciation, such as huur and hoer. In Dutch, 
the confusion between huur (rent) and hoer (whore) has become a national joke among migrants. 
Aphasia can be the result of wrong articulation: saying the word true as a reference to a proposition 
on reality, instead of through as a reference to the crossing of space, as a result a wrong pronunciation 
of t and th. Aphasia can also have effects on the manner in which one constructs sentences, the order 
of words, as in, “yesterday wrote text William”, instead of “the text William wrote yesterday”.  
 
In The Order of Things Foucault (2005a) refers to yet another form of aphasia in order to introduce his 
specific approach of discourse. In his Preface Foucault points to Borges’ phrasing of a lemma in a 
‘certain Chinese encyclopedia’. The definition entails different types of animals that in an occidental 
perspective have nothing in common: 
 
(a) belonging to the emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, 
(f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, 
(j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) 
having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies (p. 
xvi).16 
 
Thought is pushed by expression into the abyss of speechlessness. Foucault argues that what disturbs 
us in this alphabetical series is not the semantics of words. It is within language that the order of 
things becomes spatial, literally spread out on a plane of language connecting one thing to the other. 
The disturbance emerges due to the fact that despite our comprehension of all the words and each 
category, the order of things makes no sense to us. It is the syntaxes of concepts as well as the order 
of the images that is not familiar to us. Only in the incomparability of discourses such an aphasic 
amazement arises. On the one hand we try to comprehend, on the other we are confronted with the 
unfamiliar, with the Other (heteros). Does the other find its specific place (topos) in language? 
Scientific ex-planations are countered in the above-mentioned artworks and art practices. They unveil 
their contingency, as does the table of Borges. Foucault frequently refers to the imagination of art in 
order to ex-plain the concepts he introduces. The crucial image in The Order of things is Diego 
Velásquez’ Las Meninas or The Maids of Honor. For Foucault, this image ‘shows’ the transformation 
of the position of the subject in modern discourse. The main subject of the painting are not the court 
ladies, not even the king and queen that are mirrored in the back-wall mirror, but Velásquez himself 
                                                     
16 This quote originates from Jorge Luis Borges (1993), The Analytical Language of John Wilkens. In this article, Borges 
criticizes Wilkens’ attempt, or any other attempt to order and organize universal (linguistic) categories. Borges typifies them 
as acts of childish Gods. Each order remains ambiguous compared to others no matter how thoroughly it has been 
manufactured. The example of the Chinese encyclopedia is introduced in order to point out this ambiguity. It is this 
contextual coherence that Foucault elaborates in The Order of Things as the epistemic discourse that changes over time.   
  
who steps back from the painting he is painting on the painting. In this meta-move, in this 
feedbackloop, the artist as an autonomous subject enters the stage of history.  
In the ‘Preface’ Foucault (2005a) also refers to a surrealist painting that was inspired by a 
commentary of Comte de Lautréamont on which completely incomparable things are assembled in 
one image: 
 
The table where, for an instant, perhaps forever, the umbrella encounters the 
sewing-machine; and also a table, a tabula, that enables thought to operate upon 
the entities of our world, to put them in order, to divide them into classes, to group 
them according to names that designate their similarities and their differences – 
the table upon which, since the beginning of time, language has intersected space 
(p. xix). 
 
The move Foucault makes from art via language to discourse analysis is instructive. These three 
expressive modes supplement each other, though they take place on different planes or strata. Utopias 
are the planes of languages upon which we are comfortable, where harmonized categories and orders 
calm us because they make sense. It is within heterotopias that fear of language emerges in the 
disturbing appearances of heteroclites, where words refer to unknown tongues and where grammar is 
disturbed by irregularities. It is within this experience of a heterotopia that Foucault refers to aphasia, 
as ‘patients’ who do not lack the ability to order things, but rather lack the ability to hold on to a 
certain order of things.17 One moment they categorize objects in a certain order, another moment they 
are flabbergasted by that very same order.  
If we go along with Foucault’s analysis, within heterotopias concepts such as atopia and 
aphasia do not respectively indicate a lack of place (a-topia) and a lack of words (a-phasia), but rather 
a lack of rationality or consistency: a permanent order. Countering the differentiation of orders within 
space and language utopias are the continuations of invisible homogeneous orders. However, 
heterotopias inspire counter cultures and subcultures that resist the dominant order. In self-reflective 
heterotopias, the process of taking-place-of-order or, as Foucault concludes, the operation of episteme 
as such becomes visible. Gramma loses its certainty; the silence is voiced once its ‘grounding’ is 
stripped bare (pp. xix-xxiii). The order, as Ten Bos (2011) suggests, appears as nothing more than 
ripple (p. 38). 
Is it not due to a dominant idea of ‘adequacy’ that we call these phenomena disorders? Does 
the language of migrants, Mrs. Kallir and Ashley really pathologically and psychologically fail? Did 
not Foucault also argument in his work on discipline that the normal is a function of the disciplined 
abnormal? Does ‘thinking’ have bodily aspects in affecting and being affected? If so, where does the 
problem of their inabilities derive from? At the end of the story of Mrs. Kallir it seems that her 
                                                     
17 See in this case the short film Expressive Aphasia - Sarah Scott - Teenage Stroke Survivor. (2010, February 28). It is the 
story of Sarah. She had a stroke when she was 18 and due to this she has developed a form of aphasia. When she is asked to 
tell her story, she mostly hails words and not so much sentences. Words such as school, English, book, arm, and leg. When 
the interviewer asks her what she wants to do now, she says one word: connect. She likes to connect. It is the connection that 
is lost and at the same time challenges her creativity.  
  
disorientations have paralyzed her completely. Even at home for a moment she cannot recall where 
she is. But then suddenly her body remembers the piano. This memory is not directed by a written 
score, but by her physical awareness. She has a body of knowledge. She does not raise a Voice, but 
enacts the comforting skill of her fingers that structure her world. She starts to play, not by following 
the visual order of the notes on the score, but following the intensity of her hands. Sacks (2010) 
describe it as follows: 
 
Lilian stared upward, singing the melody softly to herself. She played with 
consummate artistry, with all the power and feeling she had shown before, as 
Haydn’s music swelled into a furious turbulence, a musical altercation. Then, as 
the quartet drew to its final, resolving chords, she said, simply, “All is forgiven” 
(p. 30). 
 
Sacks’ analyses are fascinating due to his ability to explain the consistency of multiplicities instead of 
giving a reductive analysis with a final judgment of disorder. Sack’s approach thus moves beyond the 
pathological interpretation of Mrs. Kallir’s state of mind by not reducing her virtuality or potentiality 
to the actual ‘normal’ or molar abilities. How do we then surpass, in line with Sacks, a pathological 
characterization of refugee’s voices? How can we, within a milieu of flight, sharpen our ears to sense 
the molecular reality of their voices? When we transpose this specific pathology structurally to the 
context of migrants and refugees, they too seem to ‘suffer’ from involuntary sounds. In the 
cacophonic milieu of flight and its multilingual condition, migrants and refugees even seem to ‘suffer’ 
from different types of aphasia, which I label as glocal aphasia: experiencing a lack of coherent 
speech in order to express what they have and still experience on both sides of a vector, called flight: 
the state of exclusion in both the country of origin and the refugium. The ‘incapability’ to construct 
and pronounce words as they are ought to be pronounced, is a commonality in the global condition of 
statelessness and second-class citizenship. The concept of glocal aphasia refers to the problematic 
short circuiting of discourses of different orders of things within a multiplicity of heterotopias. In 
chapter 6, beyond the totalitarian (chaper 4) and multicultural setting (chapter 5), I will elaborate upon 
an intercultural setting 18  that decenters the conception of language as the exclusive form of 
expression. Even stronger: There is no ‘adequate’ and ‘exclusive’ form to express the fear of 
exclusion.  
 
These sensitizing experiments bend Voice back upon itself as in a feedback loop. Thinking is 
experimenting with its own limits by engaging flight lines of incomprehension within its act of 
                                                     
18 Heinz Kimmerle refers to the distinction between multiculturalism and interculturalism. “multicultural issues deal with 
problems which arise when people of different cultures live together in the same geographical area or on the territory of the 
same state, and intercultural issues deal with problems which arise when people of different cultures, living in different 
geographical areas, communicate with each other regularly” (Kimmerle & Oosterling, 2000, p. 12). However, when I speak 
of multiculturalism I refer to a relation that is based on identity (chapter 5), and interculturalism when it does not relate to 
identity but to inter-est (chapter 6). Thus, interculturalism is also effective within one geographical setting, or rather as 
Oosterling puts it: interculturalism is a glocal process. Oosterling states in ‘A Culture of the ‘Inter’ that the “core activity of 
interculturality appears to be cultivating the inter” (p. 62). This is Sarah’s urge to connect.  
  
comprehension. Avant-garde art bends its form back upon itself by sensitizing its audiences for the 
flight lines within their preconditioned senses. On the level of our senses: thinking thinks its own 
dispositive, ears hear their own paradigms of listening, eyes see their own paradigms of seeing. In the 
same way sensing the limits of Voicing enables us to hear the cacophony of silence. These self-
reflective experiences help us to distance ourselves from the arrogance – patronizing and 
pathologizing tendencies – of ‘correct’ ways of expression. That is why Deleuze and Guattari (1994) 
at the end of What is Philosophy? raise the question as to the productive crossbreeding of philosophy 
and art. Their respective idea of image of thought intertwines artistic sensations – percepts and affects 
– with philosophical concepts. On such interstratum silence as a virtual field of (im)potentiality 
unfolds. In Arendtian (1958) terms, sensitized expression gives birth to new attitudes within politics. 
Once we connect this natality to the expression of a foreign tongue, without giving in into the 
negativity of the notion a-phasia (no-words). That is why, in line with Foucault’s heterotopias, I 
would rather prefer to speak of heterophasia – a phasia with molecular temperament. Refugees, 
migrants, Mrs. Kallir or Ashley do not lack expression, they experience multiplicity of expression, yet 
are forced by the dominant regime of words to homogenize this multiplicity. It is not the lack, but the 
affirmation of this multiplicity that – in contrast to the order of language – makes their lives as 
fascinating as it is unbearable.  
 Heterophasia is thus another state of mind, referring to another image of thought, rather than 
a wrong state of mind. This image of thought in Agamben’s vocabulary can be labeled as coming-to-
expression. This is not merely a characteristic of some people, but rather a hiccup in the process of 
expression that is of relevance to all heterotopic subjects. What I call heterophasia is the ability to 
experience the cacophonic background of silence, releasing language from its totalistic illusion that 
demands clarity and adequacy. This is however not a postmodern plea for confusion for the sake of 
confusion, but rather a proposal to approach a space in which noise is not excluded from life for the 
sake of Voice. Noise does not silence political action, but voices the multiplicity of mesopolitical 
practice. It happens in front of you, next door where the illegal sexworker screams silently in order 
not to be deported, in a classroom where students do not speak in order to camouflage their accents, in 
the dirty halls of shabby bars and in your clean houses where spouses do not know how to talk in 
difference. It happens within you, through you via others.  
 
Sometimes I disagreed with my own ideas when I heard them from other mouths; 
sometimes I heard things from others and then realized that I thought the same 
way without even knowing it (Ghorashi 2003, p. 49). 
 
2.3.5 From Language via Image to Bodies: Faces and Gestures19 
How to express oneself? Noise does not only resonate in sounds that we cannot decipher as words and 
sentences, but also in a multiplicity of meanings and in a fusion of affects that are accompanying 
language. Qualifying refugees as ‘economic’ refugees produces other affects and triggers other 
meanings resulting in another politics of flight. Even the same word, say ‘refugee’, triggers different 
                                                     
19 See also Rahimy, 2012b. 
  
affects for anti-refugee or pro-refugee protesters. Individuals use words like love and affection 
differently in connection to their parents, partners, friends or children. Even within a single statement 
different sensations are virtually present, as we have seen in Ashley’s performance. Within the 
interaction of power – pouvoir not puissance/force – and knowledge, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 
introduce a third element: temperament. Language in its temperament loses its universality and 
differentiates itself into different styles of enunciation. These are not personal utterances, but an 
assemblage of enunciation that have multiplied layers within itself. According to Deleuze and 
Guattari in using language non-linguistic forms of expression connect, such as images, faces and 
gestures. Yet, the relationality between language and other forms of expression does not indicate a 
simple analogy, they are supplementary to one another and not a replacement for one another (pp. 92-
99, 109). “Words do not replace missing objects. They occupy no empty or hollow spaces” (Foucault, 
1983, p. 39). Neither do words replace missing expressions. In case of music Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987) state: 
 
Once again, the objection will be raised that music is not a language, that the 
components of sound are not pertinent features of language, that there is no 
correspondence between the two. We are not suggesting any correspondence. We 
keep asking that the issue be left open, that any presupposed distinction be rejected 
(p. 96).  
 
Expression is always multiple. Visual artists such as René Magritte have methodically worked with 
this idea of multiple forms of expression, which has been acknowledged by Foucault in This Is Not a 
Pipe (1983). Foucault shows that through Magritte’s work we can experience the “absence of space, 
an effacement of the ‘common place’ between the signs of writing and the lines of the image” (pp. 28-
29). Foucault (1994) argues how language determines meaning and at the same time gives rise to a 
twofold suspicion of its own nature. First, that language does not mean what it says – this is not a pipe 
– and second, that language refers to its incapability to be the only form of expression. Thus 
expression “exceeds its merely verbal form in some way, and there are indeed other things in the 
world which speak and which are not language” (p. 270). Magritte’s The Interpretation of Dreams is 
another fine example: four images (a horse, a clock, a jug and a suitcase) are each matched with a 
(mis)matching word (the door, the wind, the bird and the valise), apart from one, the image of a 
suitcase and the word the valise. Yet the image of a horse is not in opposition to the word the door, 
they just differ. What is questioned are two regimes of expression: one elaborated on by Guy Debord 
(2001) in The Society of the Spectacle: images refer to each other, producing a visual discourse in its 
own; and the other – language – discussed by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) in which “all signs are 
signs of signs” (p. 112). Both are self-referential processes of signification that give rise to what 
Deleuze and Guattari call a regime, in this case a regime of signs and a regime of images. Heterotopia 
– with its heteroclitic expression – thus harbors a multiplicity of regimes, whether of images or signs. 
Heteroclite indicates the impossibility “to find a place of residence … to define a common locus 
beneath” this multiplicity of expression (Foucault, 2005a, p. xix).  
 
  
The acknowledgement of this heteroclitic state – or as stated before: the cacophony within silence – is 
not merely an aesthetic matter. Deleuze and Guattari’s preference for the term regimes of signs, 
Arendts introduction of speech into political action, and the unavoidable connection between 
community and communicability in Agamben’s work, bear witness of the fact that for all these 
thinkers expression – and its multiplicity – is a political matter. The intensive dynamics of 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization creates different regimes with the prospect of new 
expressions. Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis gets even more complicated, once they present a regime 
of signs as a face.  
A face is not a personal trait, but the appearance of these multiple forms of assemblages. In a 
face the quadrant of content and expression, their form and matter, amalgamates. Face refers to both 
the assemblage of bodies and assemblage of enunciations. Face intertwines “the organic stratum, the 
stratum of signification, and the stratum of subjectification” (Lorraine, 2011, p. 36). The concrete face 
is a molar segment, expressing a Voice. It configures social, political, economic and anthropological 
ideas and images that are dominant in society. What appeared in Saxony is a molecular face – the face 
of refugees – a face that reacts to a Voice – a molar face. The refugee’ face is not only a (con)fusion 
of these ideas in society, or type of strata, but also expresses rupture with and resistance to these 
strata.  
Each type of politics within a politics of flight creates a different face and emerges from different 
types of faciality as a process. We are familiar with the binary sets of totalitarianism – such as citizen 
and non-citizen – and multiculturalism – such as belonging and non-belonging. The signifier shows 
itself in its faciality. The signifier – as a molar force – is visible. Sometimes it shows its true face, 
ruthless and without mercy. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue that although the system of signs is 
deceptive in its nature, it is never secretive. It visualizes the structures of segmentation in networks of 
signs. Within these networks some faces appear and some faces remain in the background due to their 
inability to connect. “The machine rejects faces that do not conform, or seem suspicious” (p. 177). 
These faces revolt against the order of signification. It is not without reason that Alan Kurdi’s face is 
buried in the sand. How can one imagine the face of a dead child?  The public was unable to imagine 
Alan Kurdi, so some media even dared to demonize his father by wondering how he could endanger 
his child on such a journey. 
Signification is the process of unification and contribution of consistencies, in which the 
order-words and order-images as molar assemblages of enunciations effectuate the assemblages of 
bodies. Signification, whether in images or words, is the process in which the subject is formed, 
whether it considers an individual – the citizen, the non-citizen – or a collective – the people, the non-
people or the nation-state. Subject is a face too, but not all faces are subjects as a consistent type of 
agency.  
 
Although from the perspective of order-words and order-images the abnormal or the refugee 
becomes faceless, losing its singularity, because their ‘faces’ answer to another idea of faciality. Their 
faces refer to other assemblages of enunciations and bodies. To call these undefined images invisible 
in contrast to the visibility of the signifier would in a sense be missing the point, namely their 
molecular virtual reality. In order to give this faceless group a face art enters the stage with its affects 
and percepts. Does art not enforce images, sounds, and words upon us that affect the audience’s both 
  
visually and physically, rupturing the binary sets of the dominant form of faciality? It is the 
sensitization in art, which ruptures the evident visibility of the signifier. That is, as Deleuze puts it, the 
very resistance of art: its creative act in connecting affects and percepts, creating new sensations and 
multiple expressions (Deleuze, 1987; Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). Patton (2000) states that “art in its 
pure form exists in a state of permanent exile, a nomadic state which resists the territorialization of 
particular styles, genres or modes of capture” (p. 73). It is due to this creative resistance that I refer to 
art in the previous chapters and the coming chapters. This enables me to connect to an expression that 
sensitizes for another faciality in surpassing the given state of affairs.  
 
Still, Deleuze (1987) warns us, not every work of art is in a state of resistance. Not every image 
resists. There are those that confirm the clichés. As Susan Sontag (2003) argues, in their cliché state 
images could even become unrealistic and surreal. Such are the images of “battles and massacres” 
that have become “routine ingredient of the ceaseless flow of domestic, small-screen entertainment” 
(p. 21). When Jean Baudrillard (1995) boldly states that the Gulf War did not take place he refers to 
the staged images that gave an illusion of comprehending a horror that was beyond our 
comprehension. These staged images refer to a regime of images, in which images in turn refer to 
other images, as Guy Debord (2001) argued. Images reproduce one another according to the logic of 
their regime. Although this visual regime operates in a different way than the lingual regimes, they 
bear witness to the same rigidity. In the world of the spectacle words or stories dramatize an image 
(Sontag, 2003, p. 32). The maker cannot save the image from its destiny: It has to become a spectacle. 
Images cannot be owned by those who make them. They exponentially connect to other images. They 
pop up and settle in communities in which meanings and signs are enforced upon them. Even in the 
case of Alan Kurdi we were not able to protect this extreme image from being framed according to a 
regime of signs. The intentions of photographers, as Sontag (2003) suggests, do not define or protect 
an artwork. An image “will have its own career, blown by the whims and loyalties of the diverse 
communities that have use for it” (p. 39). It is this unpredictability that results from the multiple 
approaches toward the image. While some images manifest arborescent or fascicular ideas, others 
become rhizomatic. Sontag senses this arborescent trait when she emphasizes that although the United 
States is eager to show the suffering that has taken place elsewhere, finds it difficult to have a national 
museum20 exposing its own history of slavery.  
 
The Holocaust Memorial Museum and the future Armenian Genocide Museum 
and Memorial are about what didn't happen in America, so the memory-work 
doesn't risk arousing an embittered domestic population against authority. To have 
a museum chronicling the great crime that was African slavery in the United States 
of America would be to acknowledge that the evil was here. Americans prefer to 
picture the evil that was there, and from which the United States – a unique nation, 
one without any certifiably wicked leaders throughout its entire history – is 
exempt (p. 88). 
                                                     
20 This text is written before the year 2016, the year that the Smithsonian National Museum of African American History & 
Culture was opened by Barack Obama.   
  
 
Still, there are images that deterritorialize and reterritorialize other images by imagining something 
else than the ordinary ways of imagination, or conventional ways of faciality: They deterritorialize the 
idea of an I of an individual by disturbing its subjectification in identifying with others. The face of 
Frederick Treves in The Elephant Man (Lynch, 1980) is such a deformation. Treves hears of the 
existence of a man with horrifying features. He is eager to see the man. It is almost happening, he is 
near the elephant man’s cage. The man stands with his back to the camera, and slowly turns around. 
And just before the viewer can see the elephant man, the camera turns. We see Treves’ astonished, 
ashamed and shattered face. “There is shame as well as shock in looking at the close-up of a real 
horror” (Sontag, 2003, p. 42). Why is Treves ashamed? Is he ashamed because of his desire to see; a 
voyeuristic desire that feeds back upon itself? And identifying with Treves the viewer who needed the 
spectacle, is horrified too. By turning the camera away Lynch forces the viewer to face its own 
faciality, its own scopophilia (Schaulust), as Freud qualified it. The face of Treves, in Bataille’s sense 
transgresses and transfigures the faces of the viewer.21  What Lynch shows is that it is not the 
disfigured face of John Merrick that challenges us. It is not the formless and faceless, but a face like 
ours, with its enforced consciousness, its related passion, and its unavoidable pain, that challenges us 
to break through our given regime of images. The resistance of an image is another image.  
 
Images on the one hand refer to reality, not necessarily as a faithful copy, but as to 
what they suffice to stand for. And then there is also the interplay of operations 
between the visible and invisible, sayable and unsayable, an alteration of 
resemblance and dissemblance which is the way by which art constructs images 
that have affective and interrupting power (Pisters, 2016, p. 146). 
 
With Agamben (2000) I would affirm that a face can on the one hand manifest the sign or the image, 
but at the same time this very face can rupture the evident transparency of a regime of expression, 
breaking it into pieces. A face always hides another face; it bides its time. Take Richard Avedon’s 
image of Samuel Beckett (1979). The lines in his face are so deep, that a whole world seems almost to 
spit out of his wrinkles. His face is not a face of a man, it is a faciality of a life. With hands in the 
pocket, the eyes stare, as if they expect the spectator to say something. Come on, be brave, name I. It 
is Samuel Beckett, the great writer, to whom you wish to say something smart. And while you search 
for words to answer the image, the eyes and the smirk on his mouth ridicule your childish attempts. 
This double image challenges the idea of signification. Beckett’s face is not the negation of the 
appearance of a face – we do not have to see Alan Kurdi’s face in order to comprehend the 
incomprehensibility of his death – but instead it counteracts the identifying comprehension of a face. 
In agreement with Agamben, we could state: don’t be your I, don’t be your face, instead become your 
faces.  
 
                                                     
21 Sontag (2003) shows that Bataille’s fascination for horrifying images is neither for the sake of spectacle, nor aesthetic. 
“Bataille is not saying that he takes pleasure at the sight of this excruciation. But he is saying that he can imagine extreme 
suffering as something more than just suffering, as a kind of transfiguration” (pp. 98-99). 
  
How can this be related to a politics of flight? The face is an expressive force, with molar power and 
molecular temperaments. So is the body, once it is signified in an assemblage of enunciations. Body 
being the content discourse is the expression. Yet again, this is not a causal, but a supplementary 
relation. Agamben (2000) exposes the expressive force of the body as a political affect. He transposes 
face to gesture, though not as a mean to express something behind it. As Ten Bos (2011) states: 
“Gesture is never a project” (p. 100). “Gesture has no purpose and it is in this sense the opposite of 
labor” (p. 123, Translation TR). However, this non-purpose does not indicate that gesture is simply a 
useless act. Gesture has a potentiality, according to Ten Bos, that surpasses the simplicity of the 
contradiction in-between usefulness and uselessness. Gesture, as Agamben (2000) argues, expresses 
itself in “the sphere of gestures or pure means”, which is “the sphere of those means that emancipate 
themselves from their relation to an end while still remaining means”. Means of what, if there is 
neither substance nor goal? This sphere, Agamben concludes, is eventually “the proper sphere of 
politics” (p. x). Nowadays this can be understood as the slogan Marshall McLuhan formulated in 
1964: “The medium is the message”. Gesture amalgamates content and expression. It becomes an 
adequate term for reflecting upon a politics of flight not only due to its introduction of means without 
end, but also due to its contemporary reference to a loss of gesture in western society. It starts 
referring to itself, once it is no longer evident, like the pipe in Magritte’s painting. It becomes a mean 
bent back upon itself. Agamben states that thinking about gestures appears the very moment it loses 
its commonality.  
 
An age that has lost its gestures is, for this reason, obsessed by them. For human 
beings who have lost every sense of naturalness, each single gesture becomes a 
destiny ... a gesture in which power and act, naturalness and manner, contingency 
and necessity become indiscernible (p. 53). 
 
The image of Alan Kurdi shocks us due to its confrontational statement: “how could a continent so 
obsessed with human rights let me die on its shores.” In losing its grip, gesture sensitizes thinking, 
initiating deterritorialized thinking. This loss thus does not refer to a loss of specific political gestures, 
but to the capability of gesturing in general. This is due to the complexity of expressions in our time. 
It is the complexity of the manners of gesturality that again distinguishes forms of politics within 
politics of flight. The stability in expression is at stake, not in the least because of the interbreeding of 
cultures in a globalized world. The images are no longer fixed, language is lacking coherency, and the 
body becomes hesitant in its gestures.  
 
The gesture is, in this sense, communication of communicability ... being-in-
language of human beings as pure mediality ... gesture is essentially always a 
gesture of not being able to figure something out in language; it is always a gag in 
the proper meaning of the term, indicating first of all something that could be put 
in your mouth to hinder speech, as well as in the sense of the actor’s improvisation 
meant to compensate a loss of memory or an inability to speak (p. 59). 
 
  
Thus, gesture loops back upon itself, becoming a self-reflective process of thinking; process of 
expressing, or as Agamben states, a dynamic polarization and a virtual movement. Gesture needs to 
free itself from its image, its being, in order to give in to its becoming. It needs another affirmative 
approach, not one, as Foucault (1983) argues, that gives in to resemblance – all our homogeneous 
statements pleading for human rights lacked the ability to break through regimes of faciality. In 
Foucault’s words, we need a naked affirmation, which refers to a formation of a gesture itself (p. 34).  
 
Ten Bos (2011) argues that gestures become sincere only when they are aimless, when they are not 
presenting a loveless inflexibility, but relate in a disinterested manner. Trusting, Ten Bos says, while 
accepting all the consequences; an aesthetical ethical thinking. Where do we find such a gesture? Is it 
Merkel’s gesture repeatedly saying “Wir schaffen es”? Am I a cynic for permanently fearing that she 
will stop saying or meaning those words? Or is a gesture for me to stop eating meat in order to not 
give in to environmental effects of the western consumerism creating disasters elsewhere, where lands 
dry and humans flee due to hunger that I caused?  Would it help? I don’t know. A gesture urges us to 
act instead of being a promise of an idea. In this becoming, according to Agamben and Ten Bos, 
gesture in its aesthetic act resists fixation on ourselves on an ethical and political level.  
 
The gesture is the exhibition of a mediality: it is the process of making a means 
visible as such. It allows the emergence of the being-in-a-medium of human 
beings and thus it opens the ethical dimension for them (Agamben, 2000, p. 58). 
 
Nevertheless, in the end gesturality in Agamben’s thought is not limited to politics alone, but it is as 
always also a philosophical issue. By introducing the gag of language and image into the process of 
philosophical writing Agamben shifts gesturality to the center of philosophy. 
 
And every great philosophical text is the gag exhibiting language itself, being-in-
language itself as a gigantic loss of memory, as an incurable speech defect (p. 60). 
 
Is this a heterophasia, that releases language from is representational function, bending it back upon 
itself, exposing the presuppositions of this medium as Foucault did in The Order of Things? Gesture is 
communicability that differs from clear communication or transparent flows of information via 
language. Agamben speaks of being-in-language. This ‘being’ however does not refer to words, but 
rather to something immanent to the transparency and clarity of words. Within the acknowledgement 
of the multiplicity of expression and the heteroclitic trait of heterotopia, the term being-in-language 
still puts an emphasis on language, instead of expression as such. In a politics of flight, it is the 
reduction of expression to merely actualized fixed expressions that undermines speech or utterance in 
general. That is why I would rather speak of being-in-expression; hetero-expressive. 
In line with the argumentation in the previous chapter being-in-expression means the loss of 
self-evident gestures, not a lack of gestures. The multiplicity in heteroexpressive and heterotopia 
reappears in faces and gestures. Extending the Foucaultian idea of heterotopia this entails the 
disclosure of multiple approaches within politics of flight. Thinking about and thinking within a 
politics of flight asks for a diversified milieu in which assemblages of bodies and assemblages of 
  
enunciations intertwine and affect one another. Multiplicity cannot be addressed adequately within 
one milieu. Its expression asks for a multiplicity of milieus within a milieu, due to the feedback loops 
and double binds that are hidden in every communication. Given the intertwining of content and 
expression thinking about the assemblages occurs in different milieu, each with its own regime of 
signs, regime of images, regime of faciality, regime of gestures.  
 
2.4 Approaching Heterotopic Milieus 
 
2.4.1 Transitory Spaces: Politics and Art 
Flight as the starting notion is by now connected to countless other notions. Thinking the coherence 
of all these notions asks for a specific concept: family resemblances, as Ludwig Wittgenstein points 
out in his Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein (1953) speaks of language-games that connect 
words and concepts to one another. There is no essential characteristic that unites and causes such 
connections, whether in language or other forms of expression. The notion game is the key in 
comprehending Wittgenstein’s point. Games are coherent and consistent because of the rules, but 
there is not one essence that defines all rules. We cannot grasp a single essence, we can only see their 
connectivity. “Don't’ think but look!” Wittgenstein advises (§66). The common, or the family-
resemblance, is hardly a concept. It has no definition, due to the fact that there are no clear boundaries 
to what is part of the game and what is not. Once there is overlap, there is a connection. It is thus not a 
particular territory, but an area with open boundaries that comes to the fore in examples. These 
examples do not explain the area, do not define its traits, but instead invite us to see “what is 
common” (§72), to see a set of connected notions. It is showable, approachable, but what is 
connected and the way it is connected is not unambiguous. The term ‘family’ as used by Wittgenstein 
thus does not point out a transparent familiarity. Yet, Wittgenstein also knows that families are also 
known for their secrets, misunderstandings and complexities.  
 
While Wittgenstein speaks of family resemblances, Deleuze and Guattari (1994)22 speak of families 
of milieus. In What is Philosophy? they distinguish philosophical, scientific and artistic milieus (as 
will be discussed in 3.2), but not a specific political milieu (see: 3.4). In line with this distinction this 
investigation does not intend to clarify one specific definition of the notion of flight. It rather aims to 
show on an exemplary basis multiple types of relations within this notion that is embedded in a 
network – its familiarity – with other themes. Rather than looking for one clear and universally 
determined description or image, diffuse limits are approached that make this notion consistent. In 
exposing an immense range of enunciations and imaginations, i.e. after evaluating the thing of 
thought, the multiple relations between content and expression, and the thing of expression, the 
emphasis is now on the crucial question: 
 
                                                     
22 Bruce MacClure (2001) argues against the presumption that Deleuze and Guattari have a problematic relationship or 
sometimes even a nonexistent relationship with Wittgenstein. Nonetheless, according to him, they first and for all 
problematize the ideas of followers of Wittgenstein, rather than Wittgenstein himself (pp. 84-106). 
  
What is a milieu of flight? 
 
It is clear by now that a politics of flight is a complex, layered milieu, in which the idea of flight 
operates on different scales and in different manners. As a discourse, it shelters notions such as 
refuge, migration, otherness, inhabitants, context, culture, identity, race, history, territory, country of 
origin, country of arrival, nation-state, refugee camps, and in its expressive mode notions as 
mediality, language, image, gesture and imagination. As Agamben suggests each approach toward 
these notions and their connections creates a different form of ethics, presupposing different types of 
moral values and pragmatic norms (as we will see in 3.4). The ethics of anti-refugee protesters does 
not only differ from that of refugees, but also from those Germans who argue for human rights in their 
pro-refugee demonstrations. All ties with ethical, political, social and economic issues exposes 
specific configurations. We hop from one milieu to the other. Each configuration creates a type of 
community. The way men segment themselves into groups (exclusive or inclusive) is however a 
problem in itself, yet at the same time the engine that motorizes politics. Becoming sensitive for the 
complex interactions between these (political) milieus starts with a reflection on the way in which 
different objects of thought relate to one another, yet distinguish themselves from one another – 
‘partage’, Jean-Luc Nancy and Ten Kate (2011) say – as well as how they are affected by the 
intensities within and between milieus.  
 
Moments of intensification are determined by the singularities or limit points of 
the line of variation in the relation between two elements; specific intensities 
increase or decrease as what actualizes draws closer or moves further away from 
the limit points where something different will happen (Lorraine, 2011, p. 37). 
 
This rather abstract circumscription accentuates the emergent quality within every relation that occurs 
at its limits. How do the intensities of a multiplicity of ideas express themselves at the limits of 
milieus, where assemblages start to overlap and connect, and discourses are mixed up? How do they, 
in expressing themselves, relate to a political content of milieu of flight? As we have seen in the first 
chapter, in the act of flight every expression is political – micro, meso, macro – producing the subject 
refugee and focusing the desire survival. This ‘bare’ subject wants to stay alive whatever it takes. 
What does it take? Because different subjects cannot be isolated and opposed as passive versus active 
subjects (as we have seen in 1.3) as in a regular political action, the act of flight is an intense act of 
connection to all directions. Its intensity gives rise to multiple ways of connection, despite the fact 
that some connections still retain the illusion of disconnection, as we will see in the fourth and fifth 
chapter. The crucial task for thinking the full range of agency in a politics of flight is to differentiate 
the ways in which flight reterritorializes and deterritorializes the territory of belonging for all the 
subjects it concerns.  
On a macropolitical level flight is explained in terms of the dominant yet ambivalent 
discourse. Mesopolitically groups, opposing each other, embrace aspects of this ambivalence, as a 
result of which the refugee is stuck in between interest that are not (yet) his own. Micropolitically the 
mode of expression is determined by a basic desire: staying alive. Life is the crucial notion: Life as 
formed matter, i.e. as substance refers to humans as a specific type of living beings. Aristotle qualifies 
  
man as a zoon politikon, a political animal. Politics, as was already argued by him, denotes the ways 
lives connect to one another, once they start operating in public space, affirming existing 
communities, yet creating ever-newer communities. The event of articulation and the event of 
connection are simultaneous events in politics. Each articulation gives rise to a different type of 
community. Politics is not a secondary process; it is a primary process of articulation. Life is basically 
expressed as a body without organs. Life as a connective force is always affective, no matter how 
articulated its contents and expression are defined, respectively as human beings (closed organisms) 
and human language (contained expression). Life, in this broader sense of the word as a yet unformed 
process – matter – is the integrative connector, the engine of content and expression. As an 
affirmative force life urges politics to create new contents and expressions, and eventually new forms 
of life, i.e. ethics.  
Do politics and ethics coincide? Yes, but politics is never defined by one coherent form of 
ethics – as Foucault’s analysis of discipline and resistance has shown – but by the handling of 
multiple and complex ethical dilemmas: Are economic refugees political refugees or economic 
migrants? For who is owning two passports an option? Politics tries to cohere a diversity of ethical 
articulations. Yet, the substance of the connections of life as zoē and the substance of the connections 
of life as bios are different in nature: life as matter – zoē – is informed as content and as expression, 
assembling via biopolitics bodies and discourses. Yet, life-processes and politico-processes 
intermingle. In contemporary politics, the complexity of life is highly reduced. Our modern societies 
life sciences – with their strong molar temperaments – aim at managing life in every aspect. We want 
to manage unpredictability in risk society. We do not know who refugees are, so we close the borders 
for all of them. More than curing ‘diseases’ or decreasing criminal behavior we want to domesticate 
all potentiality. Avoiding risks urges politicians to argue that closing the borders was argued to be in 
the interest of refugees and yet it led to a lack of food and heat in refugee camps in Greece and 
improvisational settlements on the borders of Balkan countries. Politicians also want to avoid the 
tragedy of drowning. Yet, the reason why they risk their lives in order to survive, the complex 
circumstances that urges them to plea for their lives are never heard, because that would reveal the 
involvement of the West.  
Foucault’s description of biopolitics and Arendt’s texts on modern totalitarian regimes 
analyze the political processes that effect and instrumentalize life. The conceptual complexity of a 
politics of flight needs a milieu of thought that can handle this complexity, including both refugees 
and the groups that want to exclude or include them. Given the unavoidable connection between life 
and (bio)politics every individual is in some way linked to this milieu and as such part of a process of 
subjectification. There is a tension between the undefined movement of life – with its intense 
molecular temperament – and the way life is appropriated by molar macropolitics. Each notion within 
a politics of flight is contaminated by this tension: each specific way of territorialization within 
personal or collective lives is deterritorialized by life forces.  
 
Can we address and articulate these life forces in a different way than via molar biopolitics? Art has 
the creative ability to express and confront us with these processes of life. Politico-art – whether 
working with objects, images, sounds or people – sensitizes us for both content and expression. It 
does not create to territorialize but to deterritorialize the universal ‘illusions’ in territorial objects and 
  
thought, as we have seen in Robert Ashley’s performances (in 2.4.4). Of course, art segments and 
fixates too, but mostly in order to create flight lines. Art teaches us to look at states of affairs 
differently. But art as an act of composition always intervenes within a certain milieu of thought. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) situate this milieu on a plane of composition (as I will elaborate on in 
3.2.3). On this plane, the flight lines are immanent to the processes of segmentation, as a result of 
which everything can change. Art mobilizes life forces to express becoming. Oliver Messiaen’s 
Quartet for the End of Time articulates a vectorial force. Within the borders of prison, and with the 
use of broken and defective instruments he created a sound that broke through the walls that 
incarcerates his body (Beckand, 2011). A scene in Darabont’s The Shawshank Redemption (1994) is 
moved by the same affect (Pisters, 2003, p. 201). The prisoner Andy Dufresne locks himself inside 
the warden’s office just to play Mozart’s opera The Marriage of Figaro for the entire prison 
population. Touched by this, Ellis Boyd ‘Red’ Redding, his co-prisoner, states:  
 
I have no idea to this day what those two Italian ladies were singing about. Truth 
is, I don't wanna know. Some things are best left unsaid. I'd like to think they were 
singing about something so beautiful it can't be expressed in words, and it makes 
your heart ache because of it. I tell you those voices soared, higher and farther than 
anybody in a grey place dares to dream. It was like some beautiful bird flapped 
into our drab little cage and made these walls dissolve away, and for the briefest of 
moments, every last man in Shawshank felt free (Darabont, 1994). 
 
It does not matter that the lives of the two prisoners and the two Italian ladies differed so much or that 
their words were incomprehensible to one another. For a brief moment, their lives intertwined in a 
sound that escaped the limits of their territories, even the ones formed by their identities. Art is this 
transitory intervention that connects the content and expression of a so-called subject to 
incomprehensible force of life. Its expressions micropolitically undermine segmentary certainties in 
disclosing lines of flight. In ex-posing life art creates or unlocks transitory spaces hidden in politics, 
science and philosophy. Art creates events that virtually connect different types of milieus to one 
another.  
 
2.4.2 Mapping Foggy Planes 
A milieu is not a place. It is a dynamic space. A mi-lieu23 is a connective process, articulating forms 
and matter as substance in order to give political consistency to contents and expressions. It springs 
from the chaotic surface upon which it operates. As a differing process, it maps territories in thought 
that allow life forces as affects to permanently penetrate this space. In short, a politics of flight is in 
need of a milieu of thought as an amalgamation of entrances to multiple milieus. Every milieu has, in 
the words of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), a rhizomatic texture:  
 
                                                     
23 See also Rahimy, 2015. 
  
The rhizome is reducible neither to the One nor the multiple. It is not the One that 
becomes Two or even directly three, four, five, etc. It is not a multiple derived 
from the One, or to which One is added (n + 1). It is composed not of units but of 
dimensions, or rather directions in motion. It has neither beginning nor end, but 
always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills (p. 21). 
  
A rhizomatic milieu simply indicates that philosophical concepts, artistic sensations, scientific 
functions on different scales – micro, meso and macro – are transversed by politics. They are 
connected in multiple ways, by a multiplicity of possible micro-worlds and possible macro-worlds. In 
order to avoid the trap of fragmentation and disconnection we need to answer the question raised in 
the beginning of this chapter in 2.1: What is that ‘something’ that connects in difference? Concepts do 
not float groundless in the air. Inspired by Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari speak of a plane of 
immanence, also known as One-All, an “Omnitudo” or planomenon, plane of consistency, which as a 
sieve contains the concepts. The plane of immanence must not be understood as a super-concept 
defining the little concepts within it. It is a binding sieve, a porous container that filters concepts out 
of chaos. It is a segment that moves within the chaos as a plane of infinite movements or a fluid milieu 
of elastic concepts (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, pp. 35-36). A sticky space in the middle of the chaos. 
Other notions, such as rhizome and plateau, show the same in-the-middle characteristics: “A plateau 
is always in the middle, not at the beginning or the end. A rhizome is made of plateaus” (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 21). Plateau is a mi-lieu, literally a middle-place. Rhizome expands not from the 
borders but out of the middle. 
Rhizome forms the in-betweenness of a plateau as its matter. Concepts do not connect 
deductively from the beginning as particular categories that follow a general rule. Nor are they 
connected inductively in the end like a wrap up. They connect rhizomatically out of the middle in all 
directions, changing while being articulated, becoming. Arendt’s conception of politics and of public 
space phrases this middle as a principally provisional being interested. Agamben’s title Means without 
End affirms this notion of milieu as well. Whomever applies the concept milieu is concerned with a 
constitutive in-between. From this radiant in-between perspective, there are no borders in the 
conventional sense of the word. Borders indicate well-defined ends and beginnings. Whenever 
borders come in sight in this milieu it is as a vague or foggy supplement.  
When Deleuze and Guattari speak about the process of writing A Thousand Plateaus they 
mention plateaus that can be entered, experienced and perceived from all sides, given de diversity of 
strata. Like Wittgenstein’s approach they are pragmatic, not in the sense of ‘anything goes’ or a 
utilitarian application of thinking to serve macropolitical purposes, but rather as a process that is 
pragmatically involved in the same constructions and variations that it is ‘describing’. In that sense, a 
milieu always has a political focus. According to Deleuze and Guattari, ontology is always already a 
political ontology. Their pragmatism does not favor indecisiveness, but is rather an internal act of 
decision, an act that does not disconnect its theoretical thought from practical processes. Pragmatic 
politics does not imply the implementation of an ideology from an outside or a meta-state, but a 
bricolage that operates from within. Its description is primarily relational and self-reflective, meaning 
  
inter-ested in the complexity of the context, and not disconnective relativistic, indicating an 
uninterested whatever.24 As Deleuze stated: “I have always felt that I am an empiricist, that is, a 
pluralist” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1991, p. vii).25 Finally, this in-betweenness as well as the reality of the 
‘chaosmos’ 26  of a plateau does not imply that a plane is without consistency. As Deleuze and 
Guattari’s idea of plane of consistency and plane of immanency suggest the plane gains an immanent 
consistency due to the machinic forces that, by folding and unfold in their interaction with other 
forces, form its matter in assemblages (of bodies and of enunciation). To return to the image of 
mountains, it is the force of the earth, creating and evading resistance, that makes her mountains rise 
and valleys deepen in the middle of her territory.  
 
Concepts are concrete assemblages, like the configurations of a machine, but the 
plane is the abstract machine of which these assemblages are the working parts. 
Concepts are events, but the plane is the horizon of events, the reservoir or reserve 
of purely conceptual events (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 36). 
 
Everything can happen every moment potentially. What is the horizon of philosophy then? Where 
does philosophy as one form of expression find its limits? What is its consistency and how do 
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) call this specific milieu? “Philosophy is at once concept creation and 
instituting of the plane. The concept is the beginning of philosophy, but the plane is its instituting” (p. 
41). Though in A Thousand Plateaus they seem to indicate that plane of immanence and plane of 
consistency refer to different disciplines and practices, in their last collaborative work What is 
Philosophy? they use both these notions exclusively to indicate the plane of philosophy. Nevertheless, 
they state that a plane of immanence is “not the relative horizon that functions as a limit, which 
changes with an observer and encloses observable states of affairs, but the absolute horizon, 
independent of any observer, which makes the event as concept independent of a visible state of 
affairs in which it is brought about” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 36). This immanent trait belongs to 
every plane. Although a plane of immanence is singular, there is nonetheless more than one plane or 
more than one kind of plane of immanence. Like concepts, planes also differ in time and change 
modes over time. A plane of immanence is rather intuitive. The chaos yet does not indicate 
randomness as Manuel DeLanda (2007) and Brain Massumi (1992) argue. It is plurality of 
consistency. Massumi states that it operates as “the potential for generating from the same equation a 
variety of diagrams” (p. 22). The potentiality of variation already emerges when Deleuze and Guattari 
(1994) argue that the plane of immanence is a two-headed creature:    
 
                                                     
24 In the sixth chapter I will discuss the concept of whatever in Agamben’s work. For him whatever means exactly the 
opposite of the conventional understanding of the term in the American talk shows.  
25 John Rajchman (2011) even suggests that it was due to Deleuze’s empiricist attitude, as well as his love for logical 
thought, that he found a way out of the abyss between the Anglo-Saxon tradition of analytic thought and the continental 
phenomenological discourse.  
26 They lend this term from James Joyce.  
  
The plane of immanence has two facets as Thought and as Nature, as Nous and as 
Physis. That is why there are always many infinite movements caught within each 
other, each folded in the others, so that the return of one instantaneously 
relaunches another in such a way that the plane of immanence is ceaselessly being 
woven, like a gigantic shuttle. To turn toward does not imply merely to turn away 
but to confront, to lose one's way, to move aside (p. 38). 
 
Thinking and being cannot be separated. A plane is a dynamic space of matter that rhizomatically 
informs bodies and enunciations. Ethical thought, methodical reflections and fixated opinions arise on 
this plane. Yet in our ethical reflections in connection to politics of flight it is essential to criticize the 
manner in which political ideologies and policies fixate life and thought. This is why in The Order of 
Things Foucault (2005a) says that it is almost impossible to think beyond a method or ethical 
discourse. One is never randomly fooling around in the abyss of non-ethical thought. Even in the 
rupture between two discourses one still hops from one form of logic to the other. Politics of flight is 
a milieu on which multiple planes with different ethics and morals simultaneously emerge. What are 
these different types of dynamics within politics of flight? The shift between these are, however, not 
diachronic but synchronic. Differentiation of these planes is not an easy task, due to the fact that we 
are always within a plane, in a middle of a milieu, which we intend to decipher. A plane of 
immanence is always presupposed, pre-philosophical, though not pre-existing to philosophy. An idea 
as a force, is the coming to existence in and of philosophy, and the plane, on which it emerges, 
consists of an instituting slice of chaos that brings about the birth of new ideas. Deleuze and Guattari 
(1994) state: 
 
We will say that THE plane of immanence is, at the same time, that which must be 
thought and that which cannot be thought (p. 59). 
 
It is precisely this necessity as well as impossibility of identifying the plane of immanence that has 
focused my research on the notion of flight and its milieu. The milieu of flight has been identified by 
contradictory ethical claims and political dilemmas. In a sense, it can be argued that one is 
permanently struggling with its inconsistencies and non-consistencies, as a result of which the 
political milieu differentiates itself from the philosophical milieu. While conventional philosophy 
needs to overcome the inconsistencies that appear on its plane, politics is aware that it is precisely 
those inconsistencies, dilemmas and aporia that give rise to its movements. It is the struggle between 
opposites and the implied contradictions – between democracy and autocracy, monarch and republic, 
left and right, conservative and progressive, upper class and lower class, oppressed and oppressor, 
factory owners and the workers, employers’ rights and the employees’ rights, nationalism and 
internationalism, the inhabitants and intruders – that brings about the antagonistic and agonistic 
process that is often called politics. Yet, politics is not solely an antagonistic field. Antagonism as the 
key trait of politics – which motorizes critique, opposition, and resistance – is a cloud that 
camouflages the affirmation of a multiplicity of ethical discourses. In the second part, it will become 
clear that each type of politics – totalitarianism (chapter 4), multiculturalism (chapter 5) and coming 
community (chapter 6) – deals with this antagonism from different angles.  
  
 
Along this line, no matter how great the urge is to clarify a discourse on a plane, Deleuze and Guattari 
(1994) argue that layers of illusions and fogs as ‘thought’s mirages’ (p. 49) are always surrounding 
planes: transcendence, universality, eternity and description. Let us recall the idea of transcendental 
empiricism. The two notions thus need one another, because empiricism alone lacks the ability to 
create a feedback loop toward its own movement. Isolating transcendence one immediately tends to 
create hierarchies within the immanent. A connection between the two – empiricism and 
transcendence – creates a pragmatic approach, which is driven by a critical attitude towards such a 
predisposition. Ideologies, whether religious or not, often anchor themselves in an outside 
transcendent field, triggering its oppositions 27  while pragmatism permanently calculates its own 
change due to immanent transformations. The illusion of transcendence relates to the second illusion: 
the illusions that universals can explain global processes. For example, universalistic thought reaches 
out to find resemblance and similarities in human behavior in order to install a discourse on the nature 
of men, making their actions calculable. Is warfare an immanent characteristic of men, and hence 
refuge and death its logical outcome?  
Such ideological questions and argumentations have often stimulated to draw general 
conclusions on what human and what non-human is, as we will see in the fourth chapter. However, 
even functions based upon primitive human emotions, such as anger and fear, are not universal.28 
Moralistic assumptions such as inhuman acts and behavior often refer to what so-called humans 
rather than non-humans do. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) suggest that universals do not explain but 
time and again need justification and explanation themselves. The illusion of universals let us 
sequentially “fall into a triple illusion – one of contemplation or reflection29 or communication” (p. 
49). As mentioned in the first chapter, these illusions have the tendency to refer to a transcending 
truth or essence beyond their own practice. Opinions result from a certain consistency on a specific 
plane and, within a milieu of thought, they are mistakenly assumed to become representative of some 
kind of truth that occurs on all planes in all times. Instead of universal identification we better talk 
about multiversal unfolding.  
The idea of universal gives rise to the next illusion: eternity, in which the creative act of ideas 
is sacrificed for the sake of universalization. While universality is a territorial homogenizing act, 
eternity homogenizes through time, searching and accentuating the similarities and relating this to an 
original event or being. The last illusion is that of description in which propositions overdetermine the 
                                                     
27 In her critique on monotheism Rita Gross (1991) argues that monotheistic attitude does not limit itself to the monotheistic 
religions but springs out of the idea of a universal truth. According to her this universal tendency of truth always leads to 
xenophobic and ethnocentric tendencies, by which each anomaly appears as demonic. Yet, her critique, unfortunately, 
focuses merely on monotheistic religions, rather than monotheistic attitudes in general.  
28  The behavior of chimpanzees for instance is often used to explain the essential violent nature of men. De Waal (1995) 
argues that the discovery of Bonobo chimpanzees, due to their bisexual, female dominance and their substitution of violence 
with sexual intercourse, disrupts the idea of human beings as inherently violent and male-dominated evolved chimpanzees. 
29 The idea of reflection here refers to a process in which a subject by contemplation could find his true essence – an 
everlasting identity – and thus can communicate this identity in a clear way. Some interpretations in psychology are still in 
the ban of such illusion. In this study, however the term reflection is seen as a process in which the identity of the subject is 
rather lost than found due to its permanent changing relationality.  
  
concept, as a result of which “propositions are confused with concepts”, demanding a reference for 
the concept on the scientific plane of reference (p. 50). Description transcends the dynamics of 
concepts within their milieu, universalizing and eternalizing them. What defines these notions as 
illusionary is their urge of fixation within an unfixable process. As fixated points notions assume a 
beginning, an end, or an essence that without change occurs in time and space.  
 
That so many fogs arise is explained in two ways. Firstly, because thought cannot 
stop itself from interpreting immanence as immanent to something, the great 
Object of contemplation, the Subject of reflection, or the Other subject of 
communication: then transcendence is inevitably reintroduced. And if this cannot 
be avoided it is because it seems that each plane of immanence can only claim to 
be unique, to be the plane, by reconstituting the chaos it had to ward off: the 
choice is between transcendence and chaos (p. 51). 
 
The appearance of these illusions as well as the process of territorialization remains unavoidable due 
to the fear for chaos. Despite its critique on some forms of territorial thinking, my analysis will 
unavoidably fix new territories, unwillingly suggesting moral judgments with universal tendencies. 
Even Deleuze and Guattari do not attempt to negate transcendental, universal, eternal and descriptive 
forces. They will rather argue that despite the illusion that these are external forces they will time and 
again show that these tendencies emerge immanently. Deleuze and Guattari’s intention, as well as 
mine, is to map out the processes in which these illusions immanently appear and through which 
processes re/deform. They just oppose the idea that only through these similarities connections 
become possible and sensible. Difference, as we also have seen in Arendt’s thought, is connection 
through plurality. Where do consistencies function effectively and where do they block life processes? 
In which cases are antagonisms productive and in which cases are they destructive? 
 
It is the diversity of these questions that bring about the complexity of mapping out a politics of flight. 
Milieu of flight is not a one-dimensional space but rather consists of multiple milieus engaged in an 
amalgamating process. It is within this complexity that every description appears as too simplistic. 
While descriptions follow a line of thought in order to remain consistent in their logical elaborations, 
and while cartographers map out only one form of political milieu, the politics of flight instead gives 
rise to multiple mappings and multiple lines of thought. This could be characterized by the 
Foucaultian concept heterotopias. Heterotopias are real places outside the main order or space. 
Nevertheless, this outside is relative. Heterotopias are thus opposed to absolute utopias as mirrors that 
give an image of a perfect space but without reality. Foucault defines them as virtual as opposed to 
the reality of heterotopias. This virtual however differs from the virtual in Deleuze’s work.   
In his article Of Other Spaces Foucault (1967) testifies that even the understanding of history 
relates itself to space instead of time. History is mapping out time according to spatial coordinates, 
while the whole range of history is an amalgamation of multiple spaces. According to Foucault 
heterotopias follow six principles.  
1. The first is that heterotopias appear in every culture: “there is probably not a single culture in 
the world that fails to constitute heterotopias” (Foucault, 1967). No matter how homogenous 
  
a culture appears it to be, it always creates outside spaces that are paradoxically immanent to 
it. Whenever a practice does not follow the norm, a space is created to include such an action 
or subject by exclusion. In this sense, radical anti-Muslims and Islamic State are trapped in 
the illusion of homogeneity of more than one billion people. Some spaces – such as boarding 
schools and psychiatric clinics in Foucault’s analysis or refugee camps in the analysis of 
Agamben – differentiate themselves from the ‘ordinary’ course of life.  
2. The second principle of heterotopias is the transformation of their function through time. 
Foucault gives cemeteries as an example. The space of the dead in modern times functions 
differently and more individualistically than in pre-modern times. The cry of Khizr Khan – 
whose son Humayun Khan, a US soldier, had died in Baghdad for the sake of America – 
toward Donald Trump to visit the cemeteries is yet another example of changing discourses in 
which cemeteries become the objects that determine whether or not the so-called other 
belongs to a nation-state. In part II I will emphasize the synchronic transformation of 
territories by accentuating the different manners in which flight is approached by different 
types of politics: totalitarianism, multiculturalism and coming community.    
3. The multiplicity of spaces and functions gives rise to a third principle: Heterotopia is capable 
of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves 
incomparable. In the above-mentioned politics, these are thus – despite their coexistence and 
relationality – not simply interchangeable and comparable to one another.  
4. The fourth principle “Heterotopias are most often linked to slices in time – which is to say 
that they open onto what might be termed, for the sake of symmetry, heterochronies” 
(Foucault, 1967). The description of European history and territories varies whether you are 
minority or not. Even through generations there are different lines of experiencing events and 
different logics of gestural developments.  
5. The incompatibility and the connections between these descriptions give rise to the complex 
fifth principle in which Foucault states that heterotopias are closed as well as penetrable. The 
example of doors is in Foucault’s analysis extremely clarifying. A door gives entrances and at 
the same time it closes a space from outside. The same goes for borders. This is also the case 
with the diversity of types of communities within politics of flight. On the one hand, they 
exclude one another due to their incompatible characters, on the other hand they break 
through – or in words of Deleuze and Guattari deterritorialize – one another.  
6. The final principle of heterotopias is that they do not define the real space as such, but always 
challenge the dominant understanding of a milieu. Heterotopias in terms of Deleuze and 
Guattari have a molecular and nomadic quality. These are real and virtual outside spaces, 
where what remains hidden or unpracticed within a ‘normal’ space can be manifested. 
Colonies were such spaces, according to Foucault. While Europe claimed brotherhood and 
equality to all, colonies were the spaces where men oppressed and enslaved the other. It is 
still an awkward idea that The Netherlands before 1945 were the biggest Muslim nation in the 
world, although this was never experience as such by inhabitants of the part of The 
Netherlands that was situated in Western Europe. And while the contemporary ‘Western’ 
countries speak of worker’s rights and equality, the idea of economic refugees not being 
political refugees opposes such claims.  
  
 
Heterotopias operate on a plane of inconsistencies. As such they are not moralistically right per se. 
They could be forms of resistance as well as spaces where the unwanted are gathered and excluded. It 
is the complexity of this multiplicity of space, history and morality that makes the mapping of a 
politics of flight complex and necessary. A politics of flight includes a fusion of heterochronicle 
heterotopias. Not only because different ethnical groups are involved. That is too simplistic a 
conclusion. The history of migration in the west is equally heterochronic and heterotopic to that of 
different ethnicities.  
 
Hence, the necessity of multiple approaches in order to comprehend what occurs and happens in a 
politics of flight. As a layered milieu politics of flight then will be approached by applying different 
disciplines such as philosophy, semiotics, artistic, juridical and social sciences, anthropology, but on 
different scales – micro-, meso- and macropilitical – where different contents (assemblages of bodies) 
and expressions (assemblages of enunciation) are produced. Consisting of different planes, plateaus or 
strata, all intertwined and due to its interdisciplinary, interdiscursive, intermedial and inter-strata 
characteristics, a politics of flight is necessarily interpolitical in a global setting. It is through the 
multiplicity of the milieus that different perspectives within a notion of flight arise. Yet, to analyze the 
complex milieu of the trilogy totalitarianism, multiculturalism and coming community I need to 
define and refine the discursive tools through which I intend to map out their milieus of flight. The 
next chapter – after the analysis of the manner of approach in the first chapter and the manner of 
comprehending a milieu in this chapter – will expound the next programmatic question: 
 
What are the discursive tools that we need to differentiate layers 
in politics of flight? 
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Chapter 3: Discursive Tools and the World of Politics 
 
 
Philosophers … must no longer accept concepts as 
a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first 
make and create them, present them and make 
them convincing. Hitherto one has generally 
trusted one's concepts as if they were a wonderful 
dowry from some sort of wonderland: but they 
are, after all, the inheritance from our most 
remote, most foolish as well as most intelligent 
ancestors  
(Nietzsche, 1967, pp. 220-221, Fragment 409). 
 
3.1 From Cologne to Lesbos  
 
Language as a challenge does not only concern the refugee, but all other speakers. What is at stake is 
expression as such. I experienced this during a workshop that I had organized for the event Zicht op 
Rotterdam in September 2014 with the title City and her Expressions. During this workshop, I 
showed parts of the film Nahid=Venus (Parisa Yousef Doust, 2008). This semi-documentary is about 
Parisa’s aunt Nahid. In Persian language Nahid means Venus. Due to her political activities, the 
Iranian government imprisoned Nahid. After several years she was released from prison, but the 
Nahid that was known to her family, had perished. At the moment, she resides in a psychiatric clinic 
in Germany. She is locked in in an everlasting numbing shock, she cannot communicate and her face 
is absently present. She has become a pure gaze, fixed eyes looking at the camera. In one of the final 
shots Yousef Doust fixes this gaze for a couple of minutes. While showing this scene, I noticed that 
the participants of the workshop after less than a minute became uneasy. They started to look away 
and move on their chairs. When I asked them to reflect on the scene they immediately distanced 
themselves and started to talk about global politics. When I asked them why they felt uneasy, they 
were quiet for a moment. Finally, one of the participants typified her experience as choking. Others 
confirmed this. One of the participants said: “I couldn’t think coherently.” 
 
How can we relate and analyze this inability to think coherently? In the previous chapter I 
characterized politics of flight as a plane of consistency and a plane of immanence. I also argued that 
different regimes of signs, images, gestures and faciality are at work within this politics. In this final 
chapter of the programmatic part one – after pleading for different approaches towards the 
  
multiplicity of agent and towards the event of flight (chapter 1), and after arguing for different 
streams of thought in the heterophasic and heterotopic milieu of flight (chapter 2) – it is time to forge 
some discursive tools in order to analyze the multiplicity of this milieu. In this chapter I will argue 
that it is not a lack of expression that characterizes the image and gesture of Nahid in Yousef Doust’s 
film. It is rather the paradigmatic structure within policies approaching others that fuel the disquieting 
experience of “I couldn’t think coherently”. 
 
Discursive tools are never all-inclusive. In executing this investigation, I have to make a decision in 
order to cut through the rhizomatic chaos of politics of flight. This decision is twofold: 1) in order to 
meet the multiplicity of politics of flight, I have chosen to include a set of approaches instead of a 
singular approach; 2) the chosen sets of approaches must be made immediately relevant for the 
current state of affairs within politics of flight. Therefor in 3.2 by connecting philosophy, science and 
art, I can use the correlated discursive tools – concepts, functions and affects/percept (sensations) – to 
criticize the homogenizing tendencies within political discourse on refuge and migration. Yet the 
question remains what kind of thing these discursive tools critically dissect. In 3.3 I will therefor 
introduce a fourth domain: politics. It will be argued that an idea of ‘the Other’ within politics 
operates differently than the idea of other that is developed within the previous mentioned disciplines. 
This chapter will, however, not only treat the intra-consistency of the notions within its own domain, 
but will also focus on their inter-consistency. I will in conclusion typify these cross-breedings with a 
hyphen: politico-philosophy. Finally, in 3.4 I will specify through this hyphen the discursive tools I 
need to differentiate and analyze the three political configurations which will be explored in the 
second part of this study and in which a politics of flight is both historically and systematically 
expressed. As a start, however, let us focus on a contemporary event.  
 
Every day news-items pass, every day the complexity of refuge and the crisis of refugees seem to 
become more uncontrollable than the day before. The events in Aleppo during the Syrian Civil War 
bring about a complexity of a world politics – a complexity of assemblages of bodies and assemblages 
of enunciations – and yet all parties often oversimplify its complexity. On the one hand, Russia – in 
their regional interest by supporting Assad’s regime – bombs the area and weakens the opposing 
parties arguing that they assist a regime that has been disadvantaged by western imperialism; on the 
other hand, the west closes its borders out of fear of terrorism, blaming Assad for the disorder in his 
country while not acknowledging that Islamic State has been created by the ex-military of Saddam 
Hussein due to previous interventions of the west (Melissen, p. 2015). While the west on the one hand 
blames the Greeks for a lack of policy toward refugees and makes anti-humanitarian deals with the 
Turks – for the so-called safety of refugees – in order to stop the refugees to cross the Mediterranean 
Sea, the Turks are bombing the most potential ally against the IS: the Kurds. In-between both parties 
human rights are violated for the sake of the established deal. Aleppo is a political heterotopic 
territory and its people have become the victims of a geopolitics in which parties look the other way 
or blame the other party for their involvement. The burning of car tires by the inhabitants – to create a 
fog that impedes the visual ability of the bombers – sensitizes how badly they want to escape an 
unwanted visibility of the signifiers. While all these parties cynically wage war, time and again the 
  
victims are being criminalized in their intention to flee. The events such as on New Years Eve 
2015/2016 in Cologne cause such criminalizing tendencies to escalate.  
 
What happened in Cologne? How did this single event lead to a new vocabulary or rather strengthen 
an old vocabulary on the nature of the Other and finally made Europeans close an unethical unlawful 
treaty with Turkey and imprison refugees in the camps in Greece? During the celebration of New Year 
men – with middle-eastern features – boldly sexually harassed some women. Due to a lack of 
overview, the police failed to control and arrest the harassers. In the following days, more and more 
women came forward and people complained about the lack of action of authorities. From the start – 
due to their features – the harassers were claimed to be refugees from Syria. However, after a while it 
became clear that these men were mostly migrants with North African background. Yet the idea of 
refugees being essentially dangerous remained intact. The body of a refugee was identified as a rapist, 
which strengthen the idea of the Other as terrorist and hazardous for western moral, values and norms. 
In the days after in different states of Europe demonstrations were held for rights of women. The 
attack of a Syrian refugee, whose asylum was rejected, in Reutlingen in July 2016, murdering a 
pregnant woman, fully confirmed the collective fear. The image of a policeman, half standing on his 
bleeding body, justifies a truthness within this fear.  
Yet, most participants of demonstrations after the incidents on New Year claimed that their 
involvement had nothing to do with racism or ethnocentrism. They solely opposed all people who did 
not respect these rights. Yet, there were no arguments why these participants waited for such an event 
to put one of the most pressing issues of Europe on the agenda, namely sexism and sexual harassment 
being the most criminal activity. Even more so through these demonstrations parties such as Pegida 
(Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) accused the authorities and the media of 
concealing the criminal tendencies in refugee camps. This concealment referred merely to crimes 
committed by refugees, but did not criticize the unlawful circumstances in refugee camps created by 
European governments within and beyond the borders of Europe, for example the flagrant violation of 
international rights of children. The media and politicians – with future ratings and elections in mind 
– took over the popularized jargon. Instead of nuancing the claims they rather confirmed the fear by 
going along with the binary setting of victimized western women and rapist middle-eastern men in 
general. In an interview with minister Jet Bussemaker on 21st January 2016 on News-Time in The 
Netherlands this discourse was more than obvious. While her tablemates Hasna el Maroudi and Laila 
al Zwaini tried to nuance their violent sexual experience beyond the ideas of culture, ethnicity and 
religion – both expressing their fear of awakening ethnocentric sentiments – the minister did not 
hesitate to repeatedly speak merely of hostility within Arabic culture against women; leaving out the 
systematic abuse of women in The Netherlands by men with diverse backgrounds. Even the journalist 
pretending to understand the others’ fear of replacing one type of exclusion with another, finally 
plainly asked the minister which measures she intended to take as to the integration of refugees. And 
as Schinkel (2008) and Ahmed (2014) argue, through this jargon of integration by defining a criminal 
act – abuse of women – as an essential characteristic of the culture of the other, a culture of us purifies 
itself from such an act.   
 
  
The singular event on this New Year Eve and the experience of these women on micro-level led to 
new policies in connection to refugee camps and the strategy of integration. Refugees were 
bombarded by lectures and seminars explaining how one has to behave in a European setting, arguing 
that western values differ from the values of their country of origin. Flyers were passed in refugee 
camps with a set of ‘rules of engagement’ toward women. While explicitly associating their religion 
and culture as hostile, refugees were explicitly asked to distance themselves from the events in 
Cologne while in the whole history of Europe no white man is systematically asked to distance 
himself from an abusive act toward a woman by another white man; nor as Schinkel (2008) argues is 
his sense of integration is at issue. In return, the policies that were installed on macro-level translated 
themselves on institutional levels. Even during the events – such as Carnival in the south of The 
Netherlands, which is not visited by refugees or men with Middle Eastern background, yet sexual 
intimidations happen every year – by the associate organization flyers were past in refugee camps 
with a set of rules of engagement toward women. In return, due to this macro-political attitude on 
micro-level European citizens – even with progressive background – started to fear the inhabitants of 
refugee camps. This policy trickled down from a macro-level to mesopolitical, institutional levels. 
New demonstrations and civil disobediences aroused. Refugee camps were attacked and mayors who 
tried to nuance the story were threatened.  Although they condemned the civil disobedience they 
sympathized with the underlying fear of these citizens, acknowledging the fear of parents thinking 
that their daughters were not save near refugees. In this overall sense of fear, the next step to stop the 
flows of refugees was easily made. Some European countries started to suggest closing the European 
borders. The ethnocentricity of the fear, however, didn’t become part of the mainstream discussions. 
Instead, the main argument against closing borders was rather purely out of economic interests. 
 
The event in Cologne is merely one example of how discourses determine a politics of flight. Personal 
experiences uncontrollably trigger moral claims, initiating repressive policies. In the previous chapter, 
it has been argued that the heterotopic milieu of a politics of flight articulates itself as a complex 
Gordian knot of multiple contents and expressions. I have stated that in order to understand this 
milieu one needs to include incomprehension within the process of comprehension. These heuristic 
suggestions problematize the classical idea of investigation. Each research needs a clear set of notions 
and sharply defined discursive tools that enable scientists and commentators to diagnose events in an 
adequate way, creating the frames through which a phenomenon is diagnosed. The phenomenon in 
this research is a milieu called politics of flight. With what kind of tools do we investigate a milieu 
that due to its complexity, defies any singular logic of framing? Due to its integral character and 
rather fuzzy agency it can be approached from many sides, being analyzed by different disciplines on 
different planes of thought. What does this imply for philosophy, science and art?  
 
3.2 Expressive Tissue of Correspondences  
 
3.2.1 Concept: Philosophical Creation   
According to Deleuze and Guattari (1994) the practice of philosophy contains an act, which is 
immediately revealed in the introduction of What is Philosophy? That is adequately titled The 
  
Question Then…. Inspired by Nietzsche’s vitalism, Deleuze and Guattari define philosophy as an act 
of creation. Philosophy aims at the creation of new concepts to meet a problem, and not the imitative 
conservation of old ones to repeat the problem. If philosophy is a practice of problematizing, then 
exile is the politico-ontological status of philosophy: in creating differences it distances itself from the 
ruling discourse. It marginalizes itself. This idea of exile does not explain refugee camps on the same 
discursive level, but it works as a liminal force (as we have seen in 1.4.3) in the middle of a dominant 
discourse. As Cornelis Verhoeven (1967) suggests, the ordinary way of thinking and judging – in this 
case the demonization of the other due to events in Cologne – is questioned.  
 
So, philosophy is not only a reactive act of de(con)struction, but also an affirmative act of creation. 
 
The philosopher is the concept’s best friend; he is potentiality of the concept. That 
is, philosophy is not a simple art of forming, inventing, or fabricating concepts, 
because concepts are not necessarily forms, discoveries, or products. More 
rigorously, philosophy is the discipline that involves creating concepts (Deleuze & 
Guattari, p. 1994, p. 5). 
 
Philosophy creates specific objects of thought: concepts. Creating is miraculous due to its capability 
to imagine or shape through, despite and beyond the actual (as I have argued in 2.2.1). Philosophy is 
not a mere critique, but its critical drift involves an affirmative act, creation, implying a crossbreeding 
of multiple acts within philosophy. Its affirmative approach is not a simple thoughtless yes to 
everything or anything, like the ‘ia, ia’ of the donkey in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 
Affirmative thought is not the opposite of critical. It refuses to just criticize thought, persisting in a 
negative mode, as Oosterling shows with the concept of the hypercritical and his plea to think beyond 
cynicism. 1 Deleuze (1997) boldly states: “the negative is the objective field of the false problem, the 
fetish in person” (p. 208). What does this affirmative thinking indicate? 
 
1) First, this does not mean that the critical act is a secondary act. Affirmative thought is neither a yes 
nor a no, as is the case with the oppositional tendency of either-or. Thus, while the incident in 
Cologne led to an idea that you either plea for the rights of women or the rights of freedom of religion 
or culture, a critical affirmative thought needs to question the underlying prejudice – for example the 
misleading preposition that misogyny is something that happens elsewhere – that produces the idea 
that these two rights are essentially opposed to one another (Crenshaw, 1991). The critical and the 
                                                     
1  In Door schijn bewogen (1996) Oosterling argues that two new forms of critical surpass the traditional Kantian 
philosophical attitude. First, hypercritical – meaning more critical than critical – leads to an aporetical tension that in its 
reactive expression leads to cynicism. The affirmation of this aporia is becoming active and creative once it acknowledges 
that the aporetic is an expression of an affirmative in-between: inter-esse. Second, hypocritical – meaning less critical than 
critical – could also be affirmed. In its non-critical use, it leads to a specific form of life: a radical mediocre existence 
(Oosterling 2000b). In the ‘self-reflective’ affirmation – ‘reflaction’ – of the aporia, in acknowledging that we are both part 
of the problem and part of the solution it reaches beyond cynicism and becomes inter-esse (Oosterling, 2014, 296-297).  
  
creative act of thought are simultaneous in the event of thought. Philosophy thus rather absorbs than 
eliminates critique.  
 
2) Second, this twofold act of (de/re)territorialisation or (de/re)coding is not a simple negation of old 
elements in thought. In order to move beyond a global hostile tendency toward women we need to dig 
deep in our bygone memory. Reconstruction and recomposition actualize the historical factuality of a 
concept. Deleuze’s terminology and methodology – genealogy – however differs from that of Derrida 
– deconstruction. They approach time and space in a different way. In his breath-taking text ‘I’m 
Going to Have to Wander All Alone’, Derrida (2001b) addresses his admiration for Deleuze and their 
difference (pp. 192-195). Derrida’s deconstruction, in fragmenting the idea, refers to the actual, yet 
remains attached to the ruptured idea. Deleuze and Guattari’s (de/re)territorialisation refers to space, 
but eventually to relations. It approaches a field or rather a milieu of thought in which history as a 
non-chronological past intertwines with virtual and actual reality of today (as I have shown in 14.2). 
Our knowledge of flight does not simply progress or deteriorate in time. We do not get more 
sympathetic or more hostile, wiser or dumber on the matter. The events of the Second Word War did 
affect the approach toward refugees, yet histories and their lesson are often forgotten in time. 
Nonetheless, present generations in European cities are much more acquainted with diversity than 
their parents and grandparents. Their approach is not better or worse than their grandfathers who were 
born in or just after the war. Their approach is merely different and contains its own lessons. Their 
terminology does not simply eliminate old territories, but overcodes those due to other, not yet 
actualized, i.e. virtual territorial relations. In A Thousand Plateaus (1987) Deleuze and Guattari 
redefine territory from spatial into relational terms: a territory is “the critical distance between two 
beings of the same species”. Relationality defines the body and as such the I: “Mark your distance. 
What is mine is first of all my distance; I possess only distances” (p. 319). Philosophy unfolds 
through this fortunate yo-yo effect, losing and gaining space.  
 
3) Third, creation and knowledge are not opposites as beginning and end of an act, but they are 
intertwined in the same philosophical gesture. Concept is not the end of a long development, it 
happens in-between; its creation is an event, its quality evental. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) even 
suggest that a concept is self-positing (p. 11). It forces itself upon thinking, emerging as an 
assemblage, situating the subject from within flows of desire – affective, sensational – in relation to 
new planes. By implication the thinker does neither own nor controls the process of thought. 
Nevertheless, through its historical development in retrospect philosophy has had a specific image of 
controlling and directing this chaotic process. When once upon a time Kant decided to appreciate the 
idea of autonomy as a critical attitude toward authorities and governments, he could not foresee that 
this idea of autonomy would become a tool for governments to impose an ideal autonomous citizen – 
a working and taxpaying consumer eventually – on others. The poverty in south of Rotterdam – one 
out of four children, mostly with migrant background, lives in poverty – and the lack of official 
services due to the idea that self-sufficiency (De Brabander, 2014) is a virtue, shows how after 
centuries Kantian autonomy as a so-called political inclusive concept has become an excluding 
imperative.  
 
  
Deleuze and Guattari define concept in this way – as self-positing – in order to disclose a mi-lieu for 
philosophical thinking. In What is Philosophy? they explore the epistemological status of philosophy, 
science and art without valuing one practice over the other. Like Arendt and Agamben, they argue 
that philosophy is not thinking as the production of knowledge of an essence through theoreia, i.e. 
contemplation (Plato). Nor is philosophy a form of reflection (Descartes) defining the basics and 
fundaments of life and thought. Finally – as we have seen with the idea of communicability in 
Arendt’s and Agamben’s thinking (see previous sections: 2.2.1 & 2.2.2) – philosophy is not 
communication (Habermas) – communication being defined as articulation of a well articulated and 
procedurally rationalized opinion especially for the sake of a consensus. It is not even an act of 
clarification of statements (the early Wittgenstein). Philosophy is first and for all the problematization 
of the obviousness of clear arguments and the creation of concepts. The wondering and 
problematization within philosophy is thus not for the sake of the spectacle, but rather in order to 
break through the spectacle, even in its own realm of thinking. 2 While on the one hand the secretary 
of state Bussemaker acknowledges that in some European countries domestic violence remains a 
problem without defining it as a European problem, on the other hand she does not hesitate to define 
the problem of some Middle Eastern men as a problem of a whole Arab communities: externalizing 
and universalizing singular events according to the spectacle of the media and populist parties. It is a 
homogenization of singular events that lead to universal bifurcations: the spectacle of we against the 
other. As we will see, policies are defined within these homogenizations. 
 
Every creation is singular, and the concept as a specifically philosophical creation 
is always a singularity. The first principle of philosophy is that Universals explain 
nothing but must themselves be explained (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 7). 
 
Despite their differences Deleuze and Guattari as well as Arendt and Agamben reject the idea of 
contemplation, reflection, communication and clarification as a universal trait of thinking that can be 
applied transhistorically to all men. For them generalization is a result of a radiant affect of a specific 
assemblage of bodies and enunciations. A non-contemplative, non-reflective, non-communicative and 
non-clarifying philosophy is, however, not silent. It has its own vocabulary and syntax. It has its own 
philosophical taste and as such is communicable. In her elaboration of Kant’s aesthetic judgment, 
Arendt (1982) argues that taste is not a personal and unrelated affect. Taste appears only through 
communicability of a community. Taste is what is shared.  
Finally, Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue that although philosophy is not obsessed by 
effective functionality and production, it is nevertheless not a useless act. They even ironically state: 
“to say that the greatness of philosophy lies precisely in its not having any use is a frivolous answer 
that not even young people find amusing any more” (p. 9). The function of philosophy is its capability 
                                                     
2 This is one the reasons why Richard de Brabander (2008) in his introduction to philosophy for ethics for social workers 
states that philosophy does not wonder or is not surprised by unordinary events, but by daily life. Philosophy is amazed by 
what we call normal, as Foucault criticized in his oeuvre. In line with Cornelis Verhoeven, De Brabander, however, also 
suggests that the astonishment within philosophy is not a road to truth, philosophy rather urges us to sustain the 
astonishment. Wonder for the sake of the permanency of wondering (pp. 11 & 30-31). 
  
to create concepts and disclose new consistencies. That is the image of thought that Deleuze and 
Guattari propose (as I have shown in 2.2.3).  
 
Yet, the way Deleuze speaks of concepts in Difference and Repetition differs from his approach to 
concepts in his texts with Guattari. In What is Philosophy? philosophy is the skill of creating 
concepts. In Difference and Repetition this presupposes the deconstruction of the Hegelian concept – 
das Begriff – that has been analyzed from its own immanent logic. For Hegel, a concept is the 
realization of a not yet in its vastness comprehended reality. Except, given Arendt and Agamben’s 
shift from communication to communicability, what is now at stake is the precise status of the 
concept beyond the interpretation of the notion of concept by German idealism. Let me start by 
distinguishing concept, as indicated by Deleuze and Guattari, from the German word Begriff and the 
Dutch word begrip.  
Begriff is often translated as notion, idea and even as concept. Both Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept and the Hegelian term Begriff indicate more than a linguistic notion. Beyond the limits of 
language these ‘notions’ function within the complexity of different types of expression. Yet the 
concept as understood by Deleuze and Guattari is not one and the same as the Hegelian Begriff. 3   
 
1) First, Begriff refers to the verb griff meaning to handle, to hold, to grip. It refers to manipulation. It 
gets hold of something, grasping its meaning, no matter how momentary this holding may be. In 
Hegelian dialectics Begriff is the sublation of being (Sein) and essence (Wesen), of something not yet 
understood and the objectification of it that arise from an immanent urge to understand itself. It is the 
full comprehension and as a result full realization of being, joining substance (Spinoza) and subject 
(Kant). As such Begriff indicates an understanding that pre-exists subjects and subjectivity. The 
subject’s act of comprehending is secondary to the existence of understanding of the Begriff by the 
Absolute Spirit (Geist) that realizes itself through the World Spirit (Weltgeist) in the course of human 
history. In this sense flight is in contrast with the idea of Begriff. Due to its nature as an event, as I 
have argued at the end of chapter one, flight escapes any form of grip.  
2) Second, a concept – in this case flight – does not pre-exist its subject but rather emerges 
simultaneously with its subject. Thus, although – as we have seen through the developments of 
policies due to the events in Cologne – different parties define the process of flight in order to create 
coherent understanding of the experience of refuge by pinpointing refugees to clear character traits, 
the idea of flight contains more dimensions according to Deleuze and Guattari’s concept. Concept is 
an evental experience that envelops the subject, not something or an idea that the subject can hold on 
to or that others can use to objectify the process the refugee has been caught in. It is that which 
engages the subject as an experience; that which manifests and embraces its subject instead of being 
                                                     
3 In ‘Round-table Discussion on Problems of Translating Hegel’ John Findlay argues that the Hegelian term Begriff is not 
the same as the English term concept, but rather the English term notion. He then argues that the term concept means 
something well-defined, while the term notion indicates more than definition or comprehension (O' Malley et al, 1973, pp. 
253-267). As is shown shortly the term concept in Deleuze and Guattari’s work does not indicate a well-defined idea, but a 
process. However, I do use notion as a broader term in this research, but not as a substitution for or a translation of Begriff. 
  
captured by it. A concept is the articulation of a problem – a breaking point within the ordinary way 
of life – without the comfort of a simple solution to a yet not fully understood being. 
3) Finally, Begriff in association with understanding has moralistic overtones. It refers to sympathy, 
hence the affective characteristic of understanding. Tout comprendre c’est tout pardonner.4  For 
Hegel, the realization of a concept – in the formal-ontological sequence of the dialectics – implies 
simultaneously proper moral behavior that is guaranteed by the internalization of the institutional law 
as a moral law. Begriff demands such realization. As such a morality is involved, meaning that there is 
goodness in understanding the truth as is in realizing the Beautiful. This Begriff appears in slogans of 
movements such as Pegida; or politicians that understand the fear of the public for young single 
refugees as a form of truthness. Then, it also misleads those who plea for the rights of the refugees 
while trying to understand their fears and sorrows, neglecting the fact that for us – the citizens of 
European countries – there is no possibility of understanding the horrors of Aleppo. Even the 
inhabitants of this city in ruin are perplexed by incomprehension. In Arendt’s words, it is this 
incomprehension of the ugliness of state of affairs that must leads us toward comprehending the 
necessity of change, necessity of creating new concepts.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) understanding of concept triggers multiple affects and implies 
becoming part of an assemblage, connected transversally to all directions, lines crisscross and connect 
from and to all directions to one another. Transversal qualify connections that are not bound to the 
vertical order. The connections are all over the place, as a result of which the implications of an event 
– such as Aleppo or Cologne – cannot be reduced to one universal morally underpinned discourse. 
They emphasize the con in con-cept: grasping together, not synthesizing but assembling in a folded 
complexity. Concept is an act of composition, combination, and consistency, and as such always 
needs more companions in thought. Concept is conceived, which means that it affects the body and 
reinforces engagement. However, this does not necessarily indicate a better understanding of the 
matter, let alone becoming a better person. A concept does not only have a becoming but also a 
history. A concept is new, but not an orphan. A concept moves and mobilizes. In relating to other 
concepts, its history is disseminated. Its movement implies a past, present and future, however, not 
per se in a linear order. It is a circular connectivity – through feedback loops, i.e. self-recurrent and 
self-reflective – that creates a milieu. This explains why the conceptual phenomenon flight creates a 
milieu of thought, which enables us to formulate a politics of flight. This milieu does not only connect 
ideas, notions and concepts, but, due to its heterotopic traits, also intertwines different histories with 
one another. Cologne is not a singular event; Aleppo is not an isolated city. In a concept geopolitical 
histories amalgamate. It connects itself not only with the refugee camps in Kenya, with the horrors 
that are endured by Eritrean refugees, but also with the wall in-between Mexico and United States. 
 
The concept is not paradigmatic but syntagmatic; not projective but connective; 
not hierarchical but linking; not referential but consistent (p. 91). 
                                                     
4  English translation: to understand all, is to forgive all. It is exactly this sense of comprehension that Arendt (1994) rejects 
the most: “Yet forgiving has so little to do with understanding that is neither its condition nor its consequence” (p. 308). 
  
 
A concept serves as a shell in which different components are assembled forming consistency, i.e. an 
internal intensity that “renders components inseparable within itself” (p. 19). So, despite the relational 
setting of the composing act of a philosophical concept, it nevertheless has a strong immanent 
endoconsistency. 
The events of Cologne thus show how micropolitical experiences on an affect level connect 
with macropolitical thinking on a conceptual level through a type of consistency within an idea of the 
Other. Yet, even in this setting a concept is not a puzzle that can be cut up into pieces and glued back 
again to its original composition. Being immanently evental, it cannot be analyzed and synthesized in 
a dualistic, Cartesian way. It is not the sum of its components that defines a concept. Its components 
are also affective, due to the interdisciplinary composing power of the concept. The unilateral 
explanation of the events in Cologne slowly created a hostile attitude towards refugees – more than 
half of progressive citizens of Germany have become hostile toward refugees. It strengthens a gated 
Europe (Huijer, 2015) and unlawful state refugee camps, actively forgetting the fragility of new 
refugees on shore. The composing intensity prevents concepts from being simply used as a means to 
an end – like an instrumental tool – to describe something else or to comfort a subject in 
comprehending. 
 
The effects of a concept and its affective components are not predictable because of its virtuality, 
meaning “real without being actual, ideal without being abstract” (p. 22). Kant’s concept autonomy is, 
as we have seen, an ideal; yet as an ideal it affects daily lives of men and women in modern society. A 
concept is not an actual object for the taking. Due to its aporetical quality its application immediately 
deterritorialize the epistemological territory whereupon it emerges and operates, enabling lines of 
flight. Autonomy as a concept is not only a tool for a policymaker but as a process it can also create 
resistance toward such policy itself. In other words, concept’s ‘object’ is ‘approachable’, but not 
methodologically conclusively identifiable, as has been argued in the first chapter. If we still want to 
‘define’ it, this is the way Deleuze & Guattari propose to do it:  
 
The concept speaks the event, not the essence or the thing – pure Event, a 
hecceity, an entity: the event of the Other or of the face … The concept is defined 
by the inseparability of a finite number of heterogeneous components traversed by 
a point of absolute survey at infinite speed (p. 21). 
 
What do heterogeneity, hecceity, and infinite speed mean in this context? Are these the rough material 
of tools that allow us to analyze a politics of flight? Part II explicates how heterogeneous this politics 
is. On top of that each layer of a political milieu – totalitarianism, multiculturalism or coming 
community – contains a thisness that engenders its own unique unfolding. Imagine the concept of 
body, and the history of this concept. Body is not one concept but consists of multiple concepts. The 
ancient Greeks applied the concept ‘body’ in different ways than Christian, Islamic, Buddhist 
Cartesian thinkers or modern scientists. The body that appears in the movement Black Lives Matter 
differs from those bodies of resistance before them. Identified bodies differ from the body without 
organs as circumscribed by Deleuze & Guattari (as I have shown in 1.2.2). The body of the homo 
  
sacer (chapter 4) that Agamben introduces, is not the same as the body of multicultural segment 
(chapter 5) or that of whatever being in coming community (chapter 6). So, the concept ‘body’ affects 
our philosophical thought on different planes in different ways and in different directions. None of 
those meanings are conclusive. As for the infinite speed, each concept relates immediately tot all 
directions, but in different speeds and intensities due to its different composition. Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1994) concept is on the one hand immanently absolute by not tolerating any other regime 
than its own act of intensity, by its own speed. A politics of flight intertwines different contents, 
different types of assemblages of bodies. Yet, on the other hand it is also relative due to its 
exoconsistency, the consistency of the concept in relation to other concepts. In relating to other 
concepts, it is a historical notion (p. 18). 
 
The concept is a whole because it totalizes its components, but it is a fragmentary 
whole. Only on this condition can it escape the mental chaos constantly 
threatening it, stalking it, trying to reabsorb it (p. 16). 
 
This fragmenting trait is crucial. De Brabander (2003) clearly notes:  
 
The meaning of a fragment is not multiple due to the fact that it assembles various 
meanings or due to the fact that it gains various meanings in a given context, 
rather [it is multiple TR] because it refuses any kind of unity (p. 112, Translation 
TR).  
 
Every concept as a fragmentary, porous whole presupposes a problem that can no longer be defined in 
conventional terms. As Appiah (2006) states, engaging with multiplicity is challenging conceptuality. 
Philosophical concepts share the confusion of heteronyms. Descartes, Marx and Irigaray all spoke of 
bodies, yet al three meant something else with it. Reduction of the one into the other misses the point 
of their differences. Heteronyms sound the same, but they disclose multiple streams of thought. This 
heteronymic trait has also crucial consequences in the elaboration of the notion of flight. 
Understanding the notion of flight asks for an analysis of the geohistorical complexity in which this 
notion is embedded. “Philosophy is a geophilosophy in precisely the same way that history is a 
geohistory” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 95). The multiplicity of geohistorical and geophilosophical 
components of the notion flight is the theme of the second part of this book.  
 
Yet, if concepts are the ‘objects’ of a philosophical plane of thought, then who are its ‘subjects’? In 
order to distance themselves from the binary logics of object versus subject, Deleuze and Guattari 
prefer to speak of personae instead of a subject or an identity. Ten Bos (2011) refers to the Latin 
meaning of the term persona: “there where noise goes through” (p.197, Translation TR). It does not 
refer to fixation but to a process: going through. The names on the philosophical plane of immanence 
– Arendt, Agamben, Deleuze and Guattari – do not refer to actual persons. They are already 
  
enveloped in the folds of concepts. These names are not even the remains of something coherent: they 
do not refer to identities, but to engines of thought. As such these are conceptual personae.5 
 
The conceptual persona is not the philosopher's representative but, rather, the 
reverse: the philosopher is only the envelope of his principal conceptual persona 
and of all the other personae who are the intercessors [intercesseurs], the real 
subjects of his philosophy. Conceptual personae are the philosopher's 
‘heteronyms,’ and the philosopher's name is the simple pseudonym of his personae 
(p. 64). 
 
Foucault’s analysis in ‘What is an Author?’ explains this in yet another way. Foucault (1986a) does 
not wonder who an author is, or what defines the unity of a work. He challenges both the unity of an 
author as a subject and the unity of a work as an object. Killing the author or declaring its death is not 
an answer either. Although executed by Roland Barthes in 1968 in ‘the death of the author’ in order to 
make the subject and its psychology less relevant for its work, Barthes also asks for the work no 
longer to be identified as a unity. The works is a node in an intertextual network. It is related to all 
these texts that virtually motorize it. The author and work do not relate in a simple binary opposition 
of subject and object, but both rather function within what Foucault calls a discursive practice. As 
such an author’s name functions as a conceptual persona. The name organizes a discourse, and even if 
there are contradictions in an oeuvre, the name unites them as a discourse on contradictions (pp. 101-
120). An author is thus according to Foucault “a particular source of expression” (p. 111). As 
philosophers, we are not interested in what Spinoza ate, loved and ached about. The name Spinoza 
relates not only to his Tractatus and his Ethica, but also to all his unfinished works and all the 
comments on his work that came long after his death. A name refers to a composition, Foucault states: 
 
The author’s name serves to characterize a certain mode of being of discourse: the 
fact that discourse has an author’s name … does not pass from the interior of a 
discourse to the real and exterior individual who produced it; instead, the name 
seems always to be present, marking off the edge of the text (p. 107). 
 
Summarizing, the discipline of philosophy has an ‘object’: concept. These concepts as objects of 
thought in philosophy unfold themselves immanently in their endoconsistency. Concepts relate to one 
another on a plane of immanence or plane of consistency. Planes of immanence are interleaves upon 
which concepts are linked, a linkage consisting of mobile bridges that transvers to all sides. The 
elements within these concepts are components. The philosophical plane that connects these concepts 
is the plane of immanence, and the philosophical figure that creates a certain composition of concepts 
                                                     
5 The term persona etymologically means ‘mask’ or playing a role or character. On governmental websites, we read about: 
person x. Although the person is here non-existent, he or she is nonetheless not meant as fictive figure. It refers to a general 
idea of a certain type of people; like Cindy is 25 years old, is married and has one child. Cindy is here a statistical figure. As 
we will see shortly, in a philosophical sense ‘conceptual persona’ does not refer to a statistical phenomenon, but functions as 
a composing engine.  
  
and thought is called conceptual persona. The philosopher is the enunciator, the voice, which is 
always multiple as we have seen in the second chapter. Nahid in Yousef Doust’s documentary is not 
voiceless, it is the cacophony of her expression that makes us speechless. The task of philosophy thus 
lies within such assemblages of enunciation – the necessity of expression of multiple exiles in thought 
– that is accentuated in the idea of communicability in Agamben and Arendt’s lectures. These 
conceptual personae – as Artaud puts it (see my reference in: 1.2.2) – defy judgments by dancing 
wrong side out. Or as Deleuze and Guattari (1994) state: “conceptual personae are also the true agents 
of enunciation. ‘Who is 'I'?’ It is always a third person” (p. 65). Let us philosophers create concepts 
that enunciate the pain of misogyny as well as that of ethnocentricity, let us create gestural concepts 
that engages with the gaze of Nahid.   
 
3.2.2 Function: Scientific Revolution  
Next to philosophy, it is both to science and art as separate disciplines that politics refers to establish 
its coherence. Policies use science in order to legitimize their course of actions. It uses art in order to 
trigger a desirable affect for support and mental images to comprehend and totalize these as in a 
Gesamtkunstwerk. In the course of history, not only philosophy, but also science and art have shown 
a critical approach toward the spectacle of policies. In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari 
point out that creativity does not only belong to concept in philosophy, but also to other objects of 
thought: function in scientific practices and affect/percept or sensation in artistic practices. Science 
works in different directions and creates a different object of thought: functions. These are 
differentiated on the plane of reference that holds on to the scientific function. Science works with 
formulae that ‘represent’ real processes. In art on the plane of composition, another object of thought 
is triggered: sensation. Philosophy, science and art are the three disciplines that Deleuze and Guattari 
differentiate but also connect – a connection that they typify as “a rich tissue of correspondences” (p. 
199). 
 
Function is a composition of functives. The difference between function and concept is that while 
concept goes along with the speed, the function in science slows down the process, in order to 
actualize a perspective on state of affairs. It slows down in order to enable observation. The 
observation is not something that is manageable by the scientist, but the other way around. The 
scientist becomes the observing eye, in function of the observed thing. Scientific function refers to 
things as state of affairs. As such, the scientific function differs from the philosophical concept, but 
also from artistic expression. While art’s sensation and philosophy’s concept are aimless in their self-
reflectiveness, the state of affairs within the scientific research is characterized by intense focus on the 
observing object or phenomenon.  
A concept, as we have seen, is the experience of an event. Function is the manifestation as 
well as the observation of a particular state of affairs. According to Deleuze and Guattari, while a 
concept is in consistent composition with other concepts, a scientific functive is referential. Roland 
Barthes’ (1982) discussion of the difference between syntagmatic and paradigmatic is helpful here. 
The syntagmatic refers to a horizontal process of coherently connecting words in a grammatically 
well-formed manner and their respective meaning as in spoken language. That is why Deleuze and 
Guattari refer to the concept as “not paradigmatic but syntagmatic, not projective but connective; not 
  
hierarchical but linking; not referential but consistent (p. 91). The body without organs is in this sense 
an ideal concept, it connects, links and is consistently present. Body without organs is not observable, 
it cannot be referred to, and it has no hierarchical order.   
Paradigmatic refers to the vertical distribution of word categories, which Barthes associates 
with the language as a system. The paradigmatic axis organizes and distributes the syntagma that form 
a “text without an end” (p. 123). The paradigmatic is bound to a system of organizations and 
distribution (pp. 117-142). In order to observe a state of affairs science needs to cut in a systematic 
and precise way in order to focus. Scientists are often honest about their focus. In anthropology, for 
example, the limits of a research and its conclusions are often systematically noted via choices for a 
certain method, people, time and space. Furthermore, while syntagmatic thinking relates to the 
difference between the meanings of the words, the paradigmatic thinking focuses on the categorized 
meaning of a word itself. Scientists thus often systematically comment on the manner in which they 
define and use words. The horizontal connectivity, checked by a focus on immanent consistency are 
characteristic for syntagmatic thinking. Yet, science and philosophy are not unrelated. Scientists often 
evaluate philosophical concepts within the state of affairs, and philosophers via their syntagmatic 
thinking can rupture the system in using the paradigm as a syntagma on a metalevel. Thus, while 
scientists evaluate the notion of flight within the state of affairs, by evaluating its movements, its 
psychological, social and economical impact; within philosophy the notion can function as a concept 
that ruptures through given definitions and interpretations of the term flight. It is in this distinction 
from scientific thinking that is articulated vertically – paradigmatic – that Deleuze and Guattari (1994) 
argue for another topology in philosophy: the components of concepts bead together neither vertically 
nor horizontally but in a transversal manner. These connections are not bound to the vertical order of 
the paradigm. In contrast to science in philosophy there are no exclusive connections, no pyramidical 
hierarchy but scaled networks, according to them.  
 Is Deleuze and Guattari’s description of science not one-sided? Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) 
distinction between normal science and revolutionary science in his The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions gives us a different view. While normal sciences – in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms – stay 
with the slowness and follow the paradigm, revolutionary sciences stage things that speed up. Kuhn 
describes its functioning as a form of disorientation and crisis, in which the world as we knew it is 
turned upside-down, i.e. revolutionized. The crisis is not something planned by the scientist, but the 
scientist is blown away by it, sucked into an experimental practice: We could even state that some 
scientific discoveries – such as Galileo looking at the planets realizing that the earth is not the center 
of the universe – did not only changes the world of science, but the whole spectrum of thinking itself, 
thus also philosophy. Following this speed, it becomes rather an act of faith than of reason. Kuhn thus 
states: 
 
A decision between alternate ways of practicing science is called for, and in the 
circumstances that decision must be based less on past achievement than on future 
promise. The man who embraces a new paradigm at an early stage must often do 
so in defiance of the evidence provided by problem-solving. He must, that is, have 
faith that the new paradigm will succeed with the many large problems that 
  
confront it, knowing only that the older paradigm has failed with a few. A decision 
of that kind can only be made on faith (pp. 157-158). 
 
As Albert Einstein pointed out: "We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used 
when we created them." A leap of faith is an act of speeding up. In these revolutionary moments 
multiple approaches arise, paradoxical, even aporetic. Yet, after a while some approaches start to 
cohere, the gaze repositioned and gradually a new paradigm is fixed that from then on regulates the 
scientific practice. A new era of normal sciences emerges again, until the next paradigm shift. Kuhn 
shows that every scientific inquiry is regulated even in its experimentation, but that there are times in 
which the experiment as an accelerating line of flight becomes the core business of sciences. These 
lines of thought rupture the common understanding of state of affairs. The gaze changes, the world 
changes. This rupture brings other questions, and produces other images, and thus another image of 
thinking. Referring to the rabbit/duck double image, Kuhn summarizes this as follows: “what were 
ducks in the scientist’s world before the revolution are rabbits afterwards” (p. 111). 
  
Does all this suggest that the idea of transversality is also applicable in the case of science? The 
Kuhnian revolutions in sciences at least suggest this. Did hegemonic functions or a transversal 
process of connecting and emerging lead Fleming to the discovery of penicillin? There was no 
structure, no planning, but an event that made Fleming into the discoverer of the pharmaceutical drug 
(see: 1.1). Transversal alertness, which by all means sensitizes the rhizomatic trait of thought, thus 
cannot be excluded from scientific thought. It is this awareness of transversality that creates other 
types of persona in science. Deleuze and Guattari typify these personae in science not as conceptual 
personae but as partial observers. In order to approach a milieu of flight to formulate its politics – in 
this case a philosophical approach – one needs not only to criticize the ordinary manner in which 
science has analyzed the process and the subject of flight, but affirmatively arm oneself with ideas of 
those revolutionary observers that break through the hegemony of references.  
Putting this to a test in the Dutch setting there are sociologists and anthropologists within 
humanities that – as Ghorashi (2014) puts it – sensitize the deep-rooted tendency of pillarization and 
polarization within communities and criticize “the culturalization component of categorical thinking” 
(p. 107). Schinkel (2008) criticizes the manner in which sociologists have implemented policymakers’ 
ideas in their analysis and research without a critical evaluation of these ideas. He invites sociology to 
rather punch holes within the consistency of such an epistemology (p. 10), in order to create room to 
truly investigate the complexity and contingency of thought on society (p. 157). In line with Schinkel, 
Zihni Özdil (2015) explains how racism never left the plane of reference by going back to the roots of 
the so-called neutral distinction between allochthonous and autochthonous. As we will see in this 
study, through their transversal approach these revolutionary observers create different types of 
objects in thought – different functive compositions within functions – in order to implement different 
planes of reference. Femke Kaulingfreks’ (2015) analysis of civil disobedience of youth in different 
European cities such as The Hague, Paris and London bears witness to the fact that and how from the 
perspective of another plane of reference the fears that are nested through events such as Cologne are 
not something that appear outside our European civilization, these are its products.  
 
  
3.2.3 Sensations: Artistic Composition 
The transversal movements within the rhizome are never over there but always immanently 
everywhere connected to everything here and now. It is the stage on which we act. Our present 
globalized networked transactions and interactions can be approached with this concept of 
transversality that problematizes the hierarchical composition of the modern world. This approach has 
an aesthetic dimension. In relation to art, Deleuze already thematizes this in his Proust and Signs 
(Deleuze 2008) that was published in 1964, four years before he writes his thesis on difference and 
repetition and long before his collaboration with Guattari. In this book Deleuze speaks of a 
transversal dimension in connection to literature.   
 
It is transversality that permits us, in the train, not to unify the viewpoints of a 
landscape, but to bring them into communication according to the landscape’s own 
dimension, in its own dimension, whereas they remain noncommunicating 
according to their own dimension … it is always within this dimension of 
transversality, in which unity and totality are established for themselves, without 
unifying or totalizing objects or subjects (pp. 108-109). 
 
As a cinematographic image the landscape is complete, yet not total (1.4.2). We know – or believe – 
that there is more beyond the horizon. In its own dimension it communicates completeness, except 
without dismissing other forms of completeness or excluding other forms of communication. Deleuze 
chooses his words carefully: the transversality permits us; it is what is endured by us and not triggered 
by us. Nonetheless, our engagement is not inactive or passive. It is, as Derrida points out, a ‘non-
passive endurance’ (as I have discussed in 1.2.4).  It is agency, yet not as a subject that objectifies. 
Is it possible within politics of flight to sensitize the public – readers of books, perceivers of 
media images, adversaries in the debate – for this transversal alertness?  If so, then via sensation, via 
its affects and percepts, sensation being the object of thought of art. Sensing in art, but also within 
milieu of flight, is more than just imagining. It reaches beyond Kant’s transcendental imagination. 
The body is present. What is visualized has a haptic quality: touching with your eyes as it were, or as 
we have seen before in the title of International Art Exhibition of La Biennale di Venezia in 2007: 
Think with the Senses - Feel with the Mind. Art in the Present Tense. According to Deleuze and 
Guattari, art produces these sensations. A sensation enables us to ‘sense’ the meaning of the work in a 
physical sense, feeling pain and joy, while sensing. It is in this sensing that the double perspective of 
(de)territorialization becomes a trait of a politics of flight: Focusing on a virtual now-here in the 
limboesque actuality of the nowhere of refugee camps or asylum centers in Greece, Turkey, Kenya, 
Pakistan, Sudan and North African countries. The binary setting of the country of origin and country 
of arrival perishes, for these transversalized territories are not structured according to binary 
oppositions.  
Though the gaze of Nahid in Yousef Doust’s film does not show us the tortures, the 
exclusion, the terror and the exile, we sense the pain. We sense her inability, her distance as well as 
her propinquity. She touches you through her eyes beyond the screen. Sensitization maps, 
visualization traces. It is through the visibility of a trace in a regime of visualization – ‘what do you 
  
see?’ – that the loss of coherency in thought becomes rather a choking silence instead of eventive 
cacophonic silence. It is not an entertaining film. It is, as Pisters (2003) calls it, a political film:  
  
The aim of the modern political film is to give a fabulation space for the people 
who are missing but nevertheless are connected to a collective situation and in this 
way to aid in their becoming (p. 94). 
 
In line with the idea of transversality of art, in Nahid’s case I see what I do not see. Sensitization of 
the milieu of flight permits us to create another image in thought, just by mapping differently. 
Sensitization thus does not merely indicate the ability to see, but engages all the senses in a medial 
way as a non-passive endurance. Engagement unfolds out of the center of a milieu and connects with 
results of an inquiry from the peripheries. Nahid is the gaze of our peripheries. Engaging with her 
demands multiplicity of approaches. It is uttered through multiplicity of expressions: It is not her 
ethnical background that matters, but her performance beyond existing orders of expressions, beyond 
dominant regimes of signs, images, gestures and facialities. She is a face, but she is not just one face: 
She is an assemblage of bodies bringing prisons elsewhere right to the heart of the European 
madhouses. Sensitization is also related to the explanation of imagination in the most literal sense: 
mapping on a plane of consistency, where sensation and thought, art and philosophy intertwine. 
Thought is neither beyond nor in opposition to sensation. It is immanent to it. Sensitization as an 
intermedial experiment in avant-garde art practices turn the audience into reflective bodies (Molendijk 
& Oosterling, 2001, p. 11). Imagining does not mean that what is sensed is a fiction. Nahid’s body as 
well as our chocking is real, yet their impact is different. What is sensed is a potentiality that is always 
present in that which is considered to be factual. Or as Arendt (1982 & 1978b) suggests in line with 
Kant, it is the imagining faculty that enables men to affectively relate via communicability and enter 
another community.  
 
Artistic sensation is thus, next to philosophical concept and scientific function, the third form of 
object of thought introduced by Deleuze and Guattari (1994) in What is Philosophy? For them affect 
is the haptic experience of bodies, not particular bodies, but the experience of the body as a body 
without organs, a not yet organized body or a body that escapes organization, such as Nahid’s body. 
The body of the audience is a disintegrating body too, in that it is no longer capable to grasp what it 
encounters in an art practice, be it in a museum or in a public space. It is within the realm of art that 
affect does not become a momentary emotion attached to an individual, a feeling that can be 
appropriated. Affect becomes independent over time, transcending the space in which it is triggered. 
Affects are always accompanied by percepts. Not as a passive but as an active force, connecting to 
and assembling other percepts beyond the merely personal perception or feeling. There is no here and 
there, we are choked in our sensing of Nahid’s gestural gaze that shows us that the world itself has 
become a madhouse of wars, terrors and exclusions. Sensation transforms the form of life of the 
artistic figure – the persona of art – on a plane of composition. In her film Yousef Doust even engages 
this idea of artistic personae. The film is a feedback loop, the artist and art have become inseparable in 
this plane of composition called Nahid=Venus. Just as Venus surrounded by fogs, the images of the 
  
artist herself are hazy and transformative. She shows how the image of her aunt Nahid has more effect 
on herself than on her aunt. Nahid as well as Yousef Doust herself are the sensation of a collective. 
 
Affects are precisely these nonhuman becomings of man, just as percepts – 
including the town – are nonhuman landscapes of nature (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1994, p. 169). 
 
Sensitization or transversal alertness results from feeling, seeing and thinking, from sensation and 
concepts, from art and philosophy. The dynamics of art becomes a political force in thinking once it 
starts to disconnect from and reconnect to organisms. This is not only acknowledged by Deleuze and 
Guattari, but also by Arendt and Agamben. The latter also thematizes art as a force that constitutes the 
political. As we have seen in 2.3.2, it is through poetry that Agamben defines a human voice. Arendt 
(1958) calls music and poetry the most human forms of arts in their intangibility and finds theatre the 
political art par excellence due to its reference to political community (pp. 169 & 188). Art does not 
only create images of thought, but also deconstructs fixed images of thought in sciences, politics and 
even philosophy. Barthes (1982) states that when a paradigm is projected in syntagmatic thinking – as 
in a meta-position – creativity is at hand. Something new emerges: In not yet being an object it is 
beyond the comprehension of the subject. Barthes calls this creativity aesthetic. Aesthetics forces 
itself in-between the lines. It commits adultery in transgressing the limit between paradigmatic and 
syntagmatic processes (p. 140). As we will see later on in this chapter the image of Nahid appears in-
between, its sensation self-posit itself in-between paradigms and concepts.   
 
For Deleuze and Guattari art first and for all composes. What does it compose? Like science and 
philosophy, art is also a domain with its history, its segmentations and fixations. It is often bound to 
styles, genres and regimes of expression. Yet, as notions shift when science revolutionizes, art in 
deconstructing its own history unfolds transversal dimensions, creating new affects and percepts, i.e. 
sensations. It is in this state, that art becomes mad and unbearable, just like the voices in Shirin 
Neshat’s Turbulent (see my analysis in 2.2.1) and in the manner in which Nahid incohesively 
connects words to images. The compositions in both artworks are almost deafening. Within this 
sobriety6  art moves beyond the stage of beauty and touches upon the sublime in rupturing the 
philosophical, scientific but also political images of thought. In this new vocabulary that feeds an 
approach – in line with Deleuze and Guattari (1994) – we have differenciated: 
 
1. different planes of thought: plane of consistency (philosophy), plane of reference (science), 
and plane of composition (art); 
2. different objects of thought: concepts (philosophy), functions (science), and affect/percept 
(art); 
3. different personae: conceptual personae (philosophy), partial/revolutionary observers 
(science), and artistic figures (art). 
                                                     
6 Deleuze and Guattari speak of sobriety in connection to Kafka. I will discuss the final chapter. 
  
 
The transversal movement on and in-between all planes unfolds the rhizomatic field of thought. 
Drawing Agamben’s evaluation of the thing of thought (see my evaluation in 2.2.2) means that these 
kinds of actual differenciations never exhaustively explain the underlying field of virtual connection 
within politics of flight. They are merely introductory discursive tools to approach a milieu of flight. 
In approaching the tools have to be refined permanently. 
 
Let me ‘illustrate’ this with an artistic project: Ingmar Bergman’s (1966) film Persona. In the story of 
Elisabeth Vogler different objects, personae and planes of thought meet and intertwine. Planes of 
thought – within and without – permanently challenge one another, personae that contradict one 
another in conversation and finally objects of thought that put one another in perspective. Yet, it was 
exactly through this film that I was inspired by another type of persona: the image of a monk burning 
himself on television. The image of this persona – which remains a side-figure and is in a sense 
sensitized in the cacophonic silence of Elisabeth – sensitizes another figure that is in contrast to the 
previous analyses of Foucault. While philosophical, scientific and artistic personae are not defined by 
what they eat, drink, nor whether they breathe, the monk presents a figure for whom life itself – the 
burning body and the end of breathing – is at stake. In this sense, Yousef Doust herself is more than 
an artistic figure, she has experienced the politics of flight from the other side of European borders. 
There is a type of personae within politics of flight for whom eating, drinking and breathing matters. 
Let us breath once more through another type of persona.  
 
3.3 The Hyphen: Politico-Philosophy 
 
3.3.1 The Other as a Potential World  
We are talking politics. I agree with philosophers such as Agamben, Deleuze and Guattari who argue 
that philosophy is essentially political. Agamben’s philosophy is an attempt to articulate new notions 
in order to engage in new forms of political actions. Deleuze and Guattari’s subterritorial thinking – 
the rhizome – is more than anything a philosophical effort to deconstruct the political rigidity of our 
time. Arendt (1994) on the other hand states that there is some kind of enmity between the acting 
individual in politics and the thinking individual in philosophy (pp. 2-3). Due to her disappointment in 
philosophy and philosophers, Arendt typified herself as a political thinker instead of a philosopher. 
Yet, she is more defined by philosophical tradition than she presumes. Her political elimination of 
body finds its roots in philosophical thinking since Plato. Inspired by these divergent attitudes I have 
to rephrase the necessary link between politics and philosophy, going beyond the opposition of matter 
and form to the supplementary relation between life and expression. In explaining the threefold life-
expression-politics, I came to realize that philosophy is a politics as well. That is why I will propose 
in this paragraph to put a hyphen in between political and philosophy: politico-philosophy.  
 How do philosophy and politics connect and differ? Transversal thinking in art, science and 
philosophy makes us realize that there must be a transversal dimension in politics too, and by 
implication in a politics of flight. First, politics needs to be scaled and differenciated as well. Lefort’s 
distinction between la politique and le politique, Foucault’s shift towards micropolitics, and the 
  
emergence of virtuality in the digital world that is as real as the actual world – which asks for an 
unprecedented articulation of mediapolitics – are examples of such scaling. All of these 
differenciating maneuvers refer to complexity of different layers within politics that can no longer be 
grasped by two-dimensional, not even three-dimensional graphics. This new topology asks for a 
multidimensional idea of political connectivity that is expressed in the qualification ‘transversal’.   
 
I argue that politics of flight does not have a transversal dimension. It is this dimension per se. In 
order to understand this properly we have to make a distinction between politics and policies, yet 
without disconnecting them. Policies that are implemented to meet political goals vainly reduce 
geopolitical transversality to paradoxical formats. Very concretely this means that formally the 
existing borders of the European Union cannot be crossed, yet factually are transgressed, even 
shattered in every dimension and direction by the Western government in their deal with Turkey to 
protect the borders. This paradox clarifies the inconsistencies within the policies. Nevertheless, the 
approaches to disclose such dimension, as we will see in the fourth and fifth chapter, do not always 
lead to map the transversal landscape of flight in a new categorical sense. It can even enforce binary 
categorization more, as is the case in respectively a totalitarian and a multicultural setting. In the sixth 
chapter transversality finally becomes the raison d’état and the d’être of politics. Transversal does 
neither unify nor totalize subjects, but situates and connects them in a layered landscape, i.e. a milieu. 
A transversal approach connects different scales, loops back unto different strata while preserving 
differences and respecting singularity. The transversal dimension does no longer permit us to speak of 
those refugees, as I have argued in the first chapter, but acknowledges ‘us’ as participants within a 
politics of flight. Even in compassionate dealings with refugees by communities that resist 
governmental policies to no longer house them – bed and bread policies – refugees are singled out and 
as such disconnected from the regime of expression. Their bodies do not connect to the content and 
expression of these communities.  
Speech, action, natality, a life, bodies, body without organs, form of life, and form-of-life, all 
these notions are created by the philosophers that inspire this research to explain the problematized 
globe we are living on. As a world, the globe functions as a complex set of milieus, so intertwined 
that only a mad (wo)man could see some coherence in it. And if she is able to communicate this 
coherence, are concepts, the object of thought in philosophy, neutral in their explanation? Do they 
merely explain or do they also create worlds on their own?  
 
In a conventional sense, it is the task of philosophy to establish truth. She applies concepts as 
analytical tools to disclose ‘Truth’, lost or still hidden in reality. Every truthness that comes out of this 
discovery is ‘born’ simultaneously with the creation of the concept. Deleuze and Guattari reverse this 
relation: An ontology is instantaneously produced with the concept. Yet, this concept does not come 
out of the blue. It is a concentrated force as a vital reaction to a problematic situation. Life forces 
concepts to appear. Since, as I have in the previous chapters argued, force articulates itself 
immediately as a power relation, this ontology is equiprimordial an articulation of the political. This is 
where thinking and imagination cross breed. Ontology is always already political. The creation of a 
concept is the creation of a milieu that takes a problematized situation into account. That is why it is 
not sheer fiction. This problematization is a micropolitical move on the part of the body within a 
  
forceful macropolitical reality. A concept has an internal and an external relationality. On an internal 
level, it contains several components. Due to its gravity, it attaches its components to one another 
according to a certain density and intensity strengthening its consistency. In A Thousand Plateaus 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) speak of strata or layers of strata, which form a plateau. However, strata 
do not only form, i.e. define a territory. They also break and deterritorialize its milieu, as I have 
shown in the second chapter. There are distinct types of strata, each functioning differently: 
Metastrata, peristrata, but also inter-strata, attached to different strata, affecting the in-between of 
strata (pp. 111-115). Concepts can relate to one another on different strata: a group of concepts is 
interlinked with one another on a discursive plane of already intertwined discourses. Different milieus 
relate to one another as well, as families of planes. Thus, despite their internal consistency planes are 
porous and as such penetrated and affected by other planes.  
 
The question then arises: what kind of a stratum is a politics of flight? Is it a form of metastratum, 
peristratum, or an interstratum? Or does it, instead of referring to one (type of) stratum, or one 
particular milieu, refer to a family of planes; planes of immanence that are related in their modes of 
enunciation and bodily assemblages (see: 2.4.1)? It is clear by now that a politics of flight is an 
interdisciplinary and multi-expressive milieu that creates bridges and lines – segmenting and fleeing 
lines – between different planes, different streams of thought, assemblages of enunciations and of 
bodies. Politics of flight is not a plane, but covers a family of planes. Different planes have different 
objects of thought. We already dealt with philosophy, art, science. As we have seen the notion flight 
can operate as a philosophical concept, but in other domains it becomes a scientific function or an 
artistic affect/percept. In order to sensitize this multiplicity, let us experiment with the notion other. 
How does this notion, which relates to notions such as migrant, refugee and minority, operate on 
different planes of thought? What does exile in a multiversal perspective mean, and how does the 
notion other conceptualize, functionalize, sensitize a milieu of flight? And how does it eventually 
politicize a milieu of flight? Let us focus on its conceptualization. Deleuze & Guattari (1994) state: 
 
The concept is obviously knowledge – but knowledge of itself, and what it knows 
is the pure event, which must not be confused with the state of affairs in which it is 
embodied (p. 33). 
 
A concept must indeed neither be confused with the state of affairs – science – nor the milieu in 
which it is defined in terms of the discourse of this milieu. Each milieu creates its own illusion of 
comprehension, universality, eternity, transcendence in describing the singularity of notions such as 
otherness, strangers and aliens. The problem that the concept other unravels, might be unproblematic 
or meaningless within another discourse and milieu. Thus, I do agree with Deleuze and Guattari that 
the “problem would change if it were another plane of immanence” (p. 74). For example, while flight 
motivated by economic considerations is problematic for Western societies, within international 
corporations and companies the flexibility of economic migration is appreciated and stimulated. In the 
case of Germany, on a macropolitical level allowing refugees to settle is motivated by the decreasing 
availability of work force in the future, now the population is getting older and the birth rate 
  
decreases. Different political discourses and policies create a diffuse debate that cannot be unraveled 
by operating on just one plane of immanence.  
 
Creating a concept is a cutting/piercing act within the chaos, recomposing components on another 
plane. In a sense, it is the heterophasic process that has been described in the previous chapter: 
discontinuous elements are brought together and only in the formation of an other discourse gains 
consistency and become rational. The concept of human in the human sciences has, according to 
Foucault (2005a), been such a concept. This does not imply that there were no humans before. What is 
new is the manner in which this particular species is analyzed and conceptualized in modern times by 
itself out of itself as a result of which man now becomes an empirical-transcendental double figure. In 
other words, the concept is new due to its modified, self-reflective quality and the construction of its 
components, but it has also been ‘invented’ to solve a problem: how to imagine and think about man 
in a secular world? As we will see in the fourth chapter, Arendt argues that the notion human in 
human rights not necessarily concerns humans but citizens.  
Although, a concept is not defined through exterior elements but by its own unfolding of its 
internal intensities and movements of its components, it is nevertheless related to the chaos and to 
other objects of thought. Concept as a whole is always a fragmentary whole, due to the fact that it is 
not universal, eternal or transcendental. The concept other is no exception. This means that this 
concept is always approachable from all sides due to the rhizomatic field in which it operates. It is a 
whole not in its all-encompassing immensity but by its self-positing radiant trait. It is not totalitarian 
in grasping all there is, but radiant in sensitizing everything that marginally connects to the mi-lieu 
from which it unfolds itself. This radiancy, however, differs in each object of thought. The radiancy of 
the concept other is not the same as the radiancy of functions and sensations of the notion other. They 
create different realities and different truths. Yet, neither does it imply that a notion has only one type 
of radiancy. As we will see in the final three chapters, notions – such as flight and other – can have 
different types of radiancy,7 due to the milieu in which they are articulated.   
Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue that a problem engines the heartbeat of the concept (pp. 
15-16). They clarify their analysis with an example that is, most fortunately, one of the crucial themes 
in this thesis: the notions self, I and other (other person). Defining oneself and the other is the crux of 
the identity problem that dominates the discourse on migration and refuge. Cologne and the aftermath 
fear for young single male refugees are thus merely just one example of a bigger issue. How do the 
self and the other relate? Deleuze and Guattari state that it is not easy to determine which one of the 
two, self and other, is a concept and which one is a component of a concept. Which one is a whole, 
which one a part. Which one is implying which one? Is the self so plural that it contains within itself 
the other persons, the others of the self? In other words, is the self a fragmentary whole, a concept, 
containing within itself the multiple others as components?8 
                                                     
7 Radiancy is a notion used in astronomy. It is an optical illusion that results from a perspectival observation of meteorites 
that seems to move towards us, expanding from one point, while in fact their movement follows parallel tracks. 
8 This is also a crucial issue in Ricœur’s analysis in the eighties on narrative identities. The self and the other are always 
intertwined in a life story. They are permanently part of one another.  
  
This is what Bulgarian born, French philosopher Julia Kristeva’s (1991) point out in Strangers to 
Ourselves. In this work, she states that the juridical system creates the stranger. This system is based 
on the idea of sameness, meaning people who are born in a certain country or who are kinsman. It is 
this idea of sameness that produces the stranger as stranger. Not because the stranger is strange, but 
because it does not fit into this idea of sameness. She concludes that foreignness is a political and 
legal construction, i.e. a discursive construct.  
 
Here one comes up against a paradox. If political regulations or legislations 
generally speaking define the manner in which we posit, modify, and eventually 
improve the status of foreigners, they also make up a vicious circle, for it is 
precisely with respect to laws that foreigners exist (p. 96). 
 
Then again, Kristeva’s point could also indicate the opposite. It could imply that the other is the 
abstract non-identifiable body that brings about a diversity of subjects, as in difference containing or 
creating multiple selves. So, which one is the concept and which one is the component? On this issue 
Derrida (1982) circumscribes the self as the same that is rooted in this supplementary tension: 
 
The same, precisely, is différance (with an a) as the displaced and equivocal 
passage of one different thing to another, from one term of an opposition to the 
other. Thus one could reconsider all the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is 
constructed and on which our discourse lives, not in order to see opposition erase 
itself but to see what indicates that each of the terms must appear as the différance 
of the other (p. 17). 
 
Akin to this idea Deleuze and Guattari (1994) do not even make an effort to answer the question 
whether the self or the other comes first. Both supplement each other. They argue that the question 
itself is misleading. It contains the assumption that there are only two options.  
 
1. The abstract object other is a component of a subject self. The concept is the subject self. 
2. The subject self is a component of the abstract object other. The concept is abstract object 
other.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari envision – at least – a third option. Within a field of experience the other is not a 
subtraction but it merely is, it is a Dasein, a “there is”, a presence. It is a presence without the need to 
appropriate or get appropriated. Other is there in its singularity without becoming an object: an other 
person or a subject I. It is not via a dialectical opposition that the other is positioned and known. 
Nahid is not simply our other, a refugee is not simply a known other, or the opposite of us. They are 
  
the omens of an other world, a world beyond our conception of good and evil; right or wrong, sane or 
insane. It is rather an impotential9  world. 
 
The Other Person is always perceived as an other, but in its concept it is the 
condition of all perception, for others as for ourselves. It is the condition for our 
passing from one world to another (p. 18). 
 
An impotential world is virtual (as I have shown in 1.4) in so far as different compositions emerge, 
different worlds with multiple compositions of I and the other person. Inspired by Agamben’s (1999a) 
impotentiality, we could state that it is not rigidly segmented by the actualization of one form of life. 
The other is not an actualized object or a subject. It is not even the phenomenon that needs to become 
actualized. It is not a sympathized with or excluded refugee, migrant, patient x or John/Jane Doe. 
These are merely faces that pop up or are imagined to emerge in this world; they belong to the 
concept without defining its whole. It is not Nahid that creates a choking affect, it is the 
segmentations in our minds that cannot define the impotentiality of her expression and hence result in 
a choking affect. 
 
Next to being an impotential world, the idea other has, according to Deleuze & Guattari (1994), two 
more components: “existing face” and “real language or speech” (p. 17). Does an existing face refer to 
the content of life and real language or speech to expression? Or is a face a middle line – an interface 
– between the content and expression, between bodies and expression? Are life, expression and 
politics the components of this impotential world? As argued before in the second chapter, a face is a 
surface that relates content and expression as an interstratum. A face is a map. It can on the one hand 
refer to copied substances of assemblages of bodies and of enunciations. Jack Shaheen (2001) shows 
how in Hollywood cinema the image of Arab men is endlessly repeated as hostile, aggressive and 
misogynistic. The comments of Minister Bussemaker, discussed earlier in this chapter, in connection 
to the events in Cologne are merely a confirmation of a long-lasting stigmatic image of these men. 
Inspired by Foucault, we could state that regimes of expressions force themselves upon a face, 
enforcing a specific assemblage of bodies. Yet a face, on the other hand, does not only appear as a 
construction of a regime. In its liveliness, it is also an unpredictable singular substance – as is the case 
with Nahid – that is difficult to relate to whether content or expression. According to Agamben (2000) 
the face is exposure rather than the thing that it exposes. It is a “threshold of de-propriation and de-
identification” (pp. 100). Face therefore is conceptual, affective, functional, yet also a living matter on 
another level. The face is territorializing as well as deterritorializing. Totalitarian face (chapter 4) thus 
inherently differs from that of multicultural faces (chapter 5) and the faces that appear in a coming 
community (chapter 6). Similar to this Agamben states that all living beings appear – they are all 
existing faces – but only human beings intend to appropriate their appearance via expression. Or more 
                                                     
9 Deleuze and Guattari speak of a possible world. However due to my distinction between possible and impotential in 1.4.2, 
possible being a not yet actualized phenomenon and potential being rather virtual and eventive rather than a secondary 
phenomenon to the actual, I have chosen to speak of an impotential world. In order to avoid confusion, due to various uses 
of virtual world, I have also decided to not use this term.  
  
adequately formulated, a regime of expression “transforms nature into face” (p. 91). Nevertheless, 
despite this intention, the face is an outside, something that happens to us, and not an absolute place 
of identification.  
What connects the women in Cologne who are brutally violated and refugees who are 
wrongfully stereotyped is the violence of an enforced stigmatized face. These are the exclusions that 
regimes of faciality create. Both assemblages of bodies become the other as an object – women as 
objects of lust and refugees as objects from barbaric cultures – and not an other as potential world, in 
the regimes of expression. Yet the impotential world is never lost, a face always remains relational, 
never relative or universal. This is what Hasna el Maroudi and Laila al Zwaini were trying to plea for, 
a point that was missed by the interviewer and the Minister (see: 3.1). The face as impotential world 
in Agamben’s sense of the word defies the homogeneity represented by policies and media. The faces 
of refugees in Saxony – discussed in the second chapter – thus contradict the slogans that force them 
to be an isolated face.   
 
Be only your face. Go to the threshold. Do not remain the subject of your 
properties or faculties, do not stay beneath them: rather, go with them, in them, 
beyond them (p. 100). 
 
All the same, I argue that due to the complexity of the face, and as argued in the second chapter, due 
to the multiplicity of faces of an individual the analysis of the oppositional relation between the self 
and the other remains problematic. Despite the unfortunate existence of the problem, the binary 
setting affects the ontological state of human interaction. One only needs to look at the expressions on 
the faces of El Maroudi and Al Zwaini to know how the media forces a regime of signs. Even if the 
problem between I and the other is inherent to the impotential world, within this world the opposition 
carries on with its exclusive tendencies. And even if we go along with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) 
evaluation, still we need time to comprehend the unfortunate or illusive opposition between the I and 
the other. The ideas that gave rise to the ontological state of exclusion cannot be turned ‘upside down’ 
overnight. Can thought, language, image and even more so, policies motivated and engineered by 
politics grasp such a radical metamorphosis?  
 
Of course, new concepts must relate to our problems, to our history, and, above 
all, to our becomings. But what does it mean for a concept to be of our time, or of 
any time? (p. 27). 
 
As I have shown in 1.4.2, Deleuze and Guattari suggest, we are creatures of habit. We are called by 
our names and we – except the queens and kings – function as an I in sentences. Is it possible for an 
existing concept – for example the concept of other – to decode and recode its components, in this 
case the subject I and the object/subject stranger? Can a concept potentially destroy itself and undo its 
effect, in order to become a sheer impotentiality? It must become this impotentiality in order to break 
through the rigidity of regimes of faciality in our time.  
This ‘discursive transition’ does not only involve the concept but also the connectivity of a 
concept with functions that revolutionize science and with sensations that artistically resist rigid 
  
notions on state of affairs. The notion of other, just as the notion of flight, does not merely belong to 
the philosophical plane of consistency. Yousef Doust’s and Ingmar Bergman’s images affectuate a 
sense of other as an impotential world, as an unpredictable other. Within the plane of composition 
artists resist the objectification of the other. The image of Ai Weiwei’s gesture – lying in the same 
way as Alan Kurdi on the beach – shows that even dead bodies are not immovable objects, but alive 
in their potentiality to connect in a world of exile. And as we have seen in 3.2.2, there are those 
scientists that do not merely observe, but criticize our manner of observation and revolutionize the 
frames of observation toward others. El Maroudi and Al Zwaini are pleading for another political, 
sociological and cultural frame, in which they can express their experiences of sexual harassment 
without the demonization of their cultures – brothers, fathers and husbands – or any other ethnicity. 
Just as Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw (1991) long before them, they once more ask us to shift the 
parameters of observation and oppositional critique whereby we surpass the opposition between the 
rights of women and the rights of refugees; an opposition that in its effect smothers them to speak of 
their experiences of violence.  
 
In outlining the discursive tools thus far, however, there is a missing link. Nahid is not merely an 
image of resistance in art, not just an inspiration for philosophers to problematize; nor only a 
phenomenon for scientist to observe in multiple ways. Something happened to her, she was 
imprisoned and tortured. A happening that, just as the events in Cologne and the burning body of the 
monk in Bergman’s Persona, emerges on another plane, with a different stream of thought and its 
own specific object of thought. Thus, the question is: what is the thing and plane of thought that 
philosophers problematize with their concepts, scientists observe and revolutionize with their 
functions, and artistic figures resist with their deterritorializing sensations, i.e. affects and percepts? 
Our conceptual personae, revolutionary observers and artistic figures are inviting us – in Artaud’s 
words – to dance wrong side out. Our critical problematizers, revolutionaries and protesters of these 
three disciplines are facing something, they are facing the other side of the spectrum. Let us thus enter 
another world, another plane of thought: politics with its own object of thought and its own kind of 
personae.  
 
3.3.2 Politico-Philosophy: Active Reflection10  
Flight has been typified as an event. This event relates to multiple subjects, regimes of subjectification 
and faciality. Flight operates as a multiple force creating different inter-strata (see: 2.3.1) – multiple 
forces connecting assemblages of bodies and assemblages of expression. Due to its eventive character 
and global setting in which it takes place flight thus does not limit itself merely to one type of subject 
– whether or not according to the legal definition (as I have argued in 1.3). It is due to this connection 
between assemblages of bodies and assemblages of enunciation that flight as an event is characterized 
as political, creating a political milieu called: politics of flight. Against the aforementioned distinction 
between philosophy, science and art, we have to return to the question: What is Politics? 
 
                                                     
10 See also Rahimy, 2012b. 
  
Politics is by no means an apodictic science. It proceeds by experimentation, 
groping in the dark, injection, withdrawal, advances, retreats. The factors of 
decision and prediction are limited. It is an absurdity to postulate a world 
supergovernment that makes the final decisions (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 
461). 
 
In line with Deleuze and Guattari, with global temperament of politics of flight I do not refer to a 
global supergovernment. There is not one idea of the political or one type of global political force at 
hand. Politics of flight is not one but multiple milieus in which different ideas create different 
communities. As I will argue in this chapter, in connection to flight, there are at least three types of 
politics. Just as flight politics contains inter-strata creating a milieu that we call community in which: 
 
1. Bodies are assembled in certain ways;  
2. Expressions are enunciated according to certain ideas; 
3. Assemblages of bodies and assemblages of enunciation relate to one another according to an 
idea of what it means to create a community. 
 
Politics of flight operates as multiple force, giving rise to inter-strata in which the event of flight and 
the event of politics intertwine and affect one another in multiple ways. The conjunction of indicates 
that flight has a political aspect as well as is affected by political ideas. When we speak of a politics of 
flight, the preposition of does not create a process that starts with politics and ends with flight. Flight 
is both object as well as the subject of politics: both genetivus objectivus and genetivus subjectivus. 
Eventually flight transforms politics and politics transforms flight.  
 
In order to articulate a strong connection between politics and life, we need to connect Deleuze and 
Guattari’s assemblages of bodies and assemblages of expression to 1) Arendt’s distinction of labor, 
work and action and 2) Agamben’s distinction between life (zoē), form of life (bios) and form-of-life. 
Both Arendt and Agamben see a problematic connection between life and bios within contemporary 
politics. However, their critique leads them in opposite directions. For Arendt (1958) labor is the 
bodily effort to ensure one’s physical survival, but also the survival of a species in the cyclical, 
periodic change of birth and death. Labor literally refers to life. It refers to primary needs such as 
eating, drinking, protecting, sheltering, reproduction. While labor is the necessity that is consumed 
immediately, work on the other hand is the linear time of production of objects that often last longer 
than one’s physical life, like artworks that survive their artists, technology surviving their inventors, 
facilitating generations to come. The endurance of human life as culture depends on work’s 
productivity. 
 
Unlike the productivity of work, which adds new objects to the human artifice, the 
productivity of the labor power produces objects only incidentally and is primarily 
concerned with the means of its own reproduction; since its power is not exhausted 
when its own reproduction has been secured, it can be used for the reproduction of 
more than one life process, but it never ‘produces’ anything but life (p. 88). 
  
 
According to Arendt, the craftsmanship of the worker – especially due to its predictability and 
linearity of production – is a non-political way of life, but the process of production is certainly not an 
anti-political event. However, according to her, the same argument does not apply to labor. Labor is 
neither an event in the human world nor an interaction between people. The demands stimulated by 
natural labor undermine human plurality by reducing everyone to the same eating and drinking being, 
to an organism. In this homogenizing movement – due to its implementation of mindless 
consumerism within political domain of difference – the individuality and uniqueness of a human 
being is lost. Exactly in this loss of equality in difference lies the anti-political characteristic of labor. 
The only equality in labor is that each person is destined to die, while the equality within the third 
human condition, political action, is achieved through natality. Politics is for Arendt a milieu wherein 
each individual is free to be born again, free to become someone else (pp. 212-215). In the necessity 
of life, one loses his political freedom, an experience that only can happen in the independency of 
everything that is necessary. Yet, Arendt also opines that a human life is bound to the certainty of 
necessities (labor), the creation of objects to endure beyond the physical life (work), as well as to the 
domain of freedom (action). Eliminating one aspect of our human condition means the elimination of 
the other two. 
 
This is Arendt’s ‘explanation’ of life. Labor is conditioned by life; its plane is life as a finite process. 
The domain of necessities contains more than the need to eat and to drink. Arendt believes that our 
most private form of experience is physical pain. This also belongs to the domain of labor. In labor 
the pain is purely private. The physicality of pain has no reality in public space. While public space is 
characterized by the ability to act and speak, pain is portrayed by being the least communicable 
experience. The intensity of this experience deprives us from the reality of it. According to Arendt, it 
is the most subjective experience, an experience in which one’s sense of I, as a construction in 
language in connection to others, no longer can be recognized as a pure body. Pain is a sense of 
subjectivity, but in confusion. This subjectivity refers merely to a body without any form of clear 
expression.11  It is a subject without public performance, Arendt states: 
 
Not only is it perhaps the only experience which we are unable to transform into a 
shape fit for public appearance, it actually deprives us of our feeling for reality to 
such an extent that we can forget it more quickly and easily than anything else. 
There seems to be no bridge from the most radical subjectivity, in which I am no 
longer ‘recognizable,’ to the outer world of life. Pain, in other words, truly a 
borderline experience between life as ‘being among men’ (inter homines esse) and 
                                                     
11 It seems that Arendt recognizes something in pain that breaks even through subjectivity as a unity. In recent researches, it 
is shown that pain, which is typified as a subjective experience, is in reality far more singular in itself. A person does not 
always feel the same pain. Pain is not only unshareable with others, but also with oneself. The experience of pain, its 
intensity – or in Deleuze and Guattari’s words its speed – differs in a particular body as well, depending on singular 
connections in the brain that differs in time and circumstances. In other words, there is no simple analogy between pain-
experiences (BBC Horizon, 2010). 
  
death, is so subjective and removed from the world of things and men that it 
cannot assume an appearance at all (p. 51). 
 
This understanding of private is extremely alien to our understanding of it nowadays. Nahid’s body 
and pain as well as the bodies and the terror of the women in Cologne are not private matters. Nahid’s 
pain did not emerge due to her private life but due to her political life. According to Ahmed (2014), 
the inexpressibility of pain does not indicate that pain is a-political. Exactly in such contexts as Nahid, 
Ahmed speaks of the violence of negation, the reduction of a body such as Nahid to a not. She states, 
“our question is not so much what is pain, but what does pain do” (p. 27). Ahmed even argues against 
the assumption that pain is private and non-relational by expressing that: 
 
the impossibility of feeling the pain of others does not mean that the pain is simply 
theirs, or that their pain has nothing to do with me … an ethics of responding to 
pain involves being open to being affected by that which one cannot know or feel 
(p. 30). 
 
It is this idea of pain that I will elaborate on in the fourth chapter in connection to torture. Yet, 
Ahmed’s view on the subject also problematizes another problem in Arendt’s thought: the distinction 
between private and public. Arendt’s inspiration for distinguishing private and public this way is not 
derived from contemporary times, but from the ancient Greeks. Next to life as the plane of labor and 
worldliness as the plane of work, public is the political space of action. The public is the political 
space and this political space is the only milieu in which action can take place. The term public refers 
for Arendt to two states of affairs, which are related but not identical.  
1) The term refers to the act of making something appear in public by means of which a reality is 
constituted. Each time we ‘publicize’ a private matter, we create a reality that, despite its intensity 
within the personal life, never before has been presented as reality, Arendt states. In order for 
something to become real it must necessarily appear in public, meaning it has to connect itself beyond 
the boundaries of one’s body to others. This realization will always come at the expense of the 
intensity of the private life.  
2) The term public refers to the public space that men share with each other and is distinguished from 
their personal realm. Arendt calls this political space: the world. Within this world it is shown how the 
human narratives of whos function as a process of political actors (see my elaboration in 1.3.3). 
Humans in political space are not closed organisms in need of individual survival, but intensities in-
between political processes. Yet this world must not be confused with earth in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
sense of the word. It is the relational field, the space in-between, that differentiates and connects 
humans: inter homines esse. 
 
While public space is defined as the carrier of freedom of political action and speech, the private 
domain is characterized by the necessities of life. Men need both, a plane on which the rules are clear 
– not drinking indicates the end of life – and an open plane in which actions could potentially be 
anything.  
 
  
A life spent in public, in the presence of others, becomes, as we would say, 
shallow. While it retains its visibility, it loses the quality of rising into sight from 
some darker ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth in a 
very real, non-subjective sense. The only efficient way to guarantee the darkness 
of what needs to be hidden against the light of publicity is private property, a 
privately owned place to hide in (p. 71). 
 
The world is the true realm of freedom, but not a world where anything goes. Freedom means the 
ability to give birth to new forms of politics, the ability to force changes through the natality of 
actions. Yet, each acting agent on this plane of freedom must be aware of the consequences and the 
chain of reactions that are out of one’s reach, but are nevertheless their responsibility. Freedom in 
public space means responsibility of open action, burdened with the lack of knowledge of what it 
could bring about. Freedom of action appears through a triple frustration: the unpredictability of the 
outcome, the irreversibility of the process and the anonymity of the actor (see: 1.4.3). 
 
All this is reason enough to turn away with despair from the realm of human 
affairs and to hold in contempt the human capacity for freedom, which, by 
producing the web of human relationships, seems to entangle its producer to such 
an extent that he appears much more the victim and the sufferer than the author 
and doer of what he has done. Nowhere, in other words, neither in labor, subject to 
the necessity of life, nor in fabrication, dependent upon given material, does man 
appear to be less free than in those capacities whose very essence is freedom and 
in that realm which owes its existence to nobody and nothing but man (pp. 233-
234). 
 
It is within this unpredictability and irreversibility that action is distinguished from work. The 
efficiency and instrumental character of work, along with the necessity of labor, are fatal elements for 
a political action. Politics is not only defined by freedom, but also difference and unpredictability. 
These characteristics are lost in the realm of work, in which production of objects can be planned and 
regulated. Politics is a field that needs an openness, in order to avoid totalitarian exclusivity, 
according to Arendt.  
 
However, in the decades that have passed since the publication of The Human Condition, having lived 
through environmental crises, mass murders and economic wars, and an increase of immense numbers 
of refugees and stateless people, it has become impossible to distinguish these three planes. The world 
of objects is not as predictable as Arendt suggests. Production and life are intertwined in global 
political economy; and cannot be distinguished as easily as Arendt proposes. Yet, Arendt herself 
admits that it is politics “in the narrower sense of the word” (p. 47) that she advocates. It is politics as 
she wishes it to be. The question is however: Why does she define not only politics but also life in 
such a strict way. Arendt’s fear of a political body is the same fear that Foucault has for biopolitics. 
The body, whether included or excluded, has always been the main target of totalitarian regimes. The 
unwillingness to include the body in politics in The Human Condition finds its starting point in her 
  
elaborations in The Origins of Totalitarianism in which the body – zoē – has become the main object 
of politics of exclusion.12 It is within a totalitarian milieu that men become merely living beings 
without potentiality, merely bodies that are forced to just breathe without thought, refraining from 
political action.13 Then again, deeds such as systematic torture and massacre on a macropolitical level 
– as Arendt (1970) states in On Violence – are political strategies par excellence, although they 
indicate the end and decrease of politics in Foucaultian and Arendtian sense. 
  
Neither violence nor power is a natural phenomenon, that is, a manifestation of the 
life process; they belong to the political realm of human affairs whose essentially 
human quality is guaranteed by man’s faculty of action, the ability to begin 
something new (p. 82). 
 
Arendt does introduce an aspect of life that previously has been unprecedented: birth. While 
totalitarianism has death as the true engine of speech and action, Arendt defines politics as birth: It is 
a process of natality. Although actions are irreversible they also have the ability to cut through 
processes in order to change their course by giving birth to other forms of interaction. When Arendt 
excludes life from politics, she means life without a form. When she excludes the body, she means to 
exclude a body that is identifiable and without potentiality, a body that is constructed in totalitarian 
politics or in a biogenetic lab.  
 
Despite the implication of this excluded body within politics, life can no longer solely emerge in the 
safe haven of Arendtian private space; nor is the inclusion of life within political thinking merely 
destructive, as we will see in the sixth chapter. Life endures and is under siege on all planes of the 
global space. Lack of food in parts of the world versus the limitless consumption plus obesity in 
another part politicizes labor as the satisfaction of basic needs as well. Life, thus even in its basic act 
of breathing – as refugees make tangible – is not merely a natural factor of labor. An idea of politics 
thus cannot merely limit itself to assemblages of expression – as action for Arendt is always 
accompanied with speech – without affecting assemblages of bodies and their resistance toward 
political discourse. Dirk De Schutter (2005) even states that politics always rest on an ontological 
principle. He criticizes Arendt by stating that by neglecting questions such as political implications of 
sexual differences, and the mere reduction of these types of questions to the condition labor, she has 
never wondered how life (zoē) is implemented in politics (bios) (p. 125). Dirk De Schutter (2007) thus 
argues that political responsibility – which Arendt pleads for – must not only respond to the 
irresponsibility of humans toward each other, but also to contemporary political issues such as 
poverty and environmental disasters caused by access of production (pp. 31-33).  
Next to these aspects, and neglecting the feminine body as political issue, Arendt, despite her 
nuanced thinking, fails to understand the complexity as well as the urgency of political movements of 
people of color, especially Black power movement. As Kathryn T. Gines (2014) shows Arendt’s 
                                                     
12 In the fourth chapter I will discuss Agamben’s view on the connection between Foucault’s biopolitics and Arendt’s 
totalitarianism. 
13 See also her article, ‘We Refugees’ in Arendt, 1978a, p. 65. 
  
political vocabulary is useful on the one hand to analyze the totalitarian state not only during the first 
half of twentieth century but also in the ages to come. Yet, Gines also justly argues that in her 
concrete elaboration of the history of colonialism and the history of racism in the United States – for 
example in The Origins of Totalitarianism, On Revolution and in her article ‘Reflection on Little 
Rock’ – Arendt does not critically implement her European, white and intellectual perspective on the 
matter.  Resistance against racism as well the political argumentations within such resistance are 
dismissed as private matters and in some cases even self-centered. Arendt’s political analysis thus 
shows a fundamental error due to the fact that the political ontology of bodies as well as intersectional 
manners in which these bodies are excluded from political power, as Crenshaw (1991) shows, do not 
play a role in the course of totalitarianism as well as the steps to distance from such politics. In this 
sense in line with Gines (2014) we can state that Arendt’s view on politics is both insightful as well as 
problematic (91). The ontological reality of politics – in which body is actually and virtually 
implemented in political thought – makes us responsible for the manner in which life is always 
affected by our actions and prejudices, whether we want it or not. Every action we take – eating, 
traveling, digitally connecting, or even disposing our garbage – as well our state of sexuality and skin 
color affects the world on economic, social, cultural and not the least environmental level. Life 
matters, bodies matter, they matter in a political sense. 
 
How do life (zoē) and form of life (bios) relate? Agamben’s (2000) distinction in Means without End 
between life, form of life and form-of-life is helpful in order to understand politically the non-rigid 
body in-between life. The first concept life, for which Agamben also refers to the Greek term zoē, 
concerns the general biological fact of life that is shared by humans, animals and gods. This life is not 
procedural but particular; the life of Aristotle, the life of my cat Lola or the body of Zeus. The second 
concept form of life or bios denotes the form that humans share, for example in a particular group. 14  
Form of life thus does not refer to life styles, in which individuals create their eccentric lives. It rather 
refers to political forces that connect each individual life to a collective; hence eliminating the 
opposition between collective and individual as well as the public and the private. Within politics the 
private and personal is always collective. The personal experiences of women in Cologne refer to a 
global image of women. Furthermore, the public and the collective always affect the private and 
individual life in politics. Collective ideas on refugees lead to the inclusion or exclusion of a refugee 
as an individual. While the first concept refers to what Arendt indicates as labor, the second refers to 
the production of work that connects us to other human beings and also partially to the political and 
social life. Agamben (1998) argues that the problem does not only appear in the manner in which we 
comprehend life and its form, but the problem also lies in the rupture between life and its form. 
Because of this rupture some lives within contemporary forms of life – bios or politics – are merely 
reduced to nothing else than surviving as a necessary condition. Agamben calls this life – which is 
                                                     
14 It must be noticed that although Agamben seems to mix the concepts of life and zoē, and form of life and bios, in the first 
chapter of Means without End he explicitly indicates that the terms zoē en bios do not refer to our concepts of life as we 
know it or forms of life for that matter. The concepts in this paragraph originate from Agamben’s work The Homo Sacer, 
Sovereign Power and Bare Life; Remnants of Auschwitz, The Witness and the Archive; and finally, The State of Exception. In 
the fourth chapter I will examine these subjects more thoroughly.  
  
banned from the realm of politics – a bare life or homo sacer. Modernity, Agamben testifies, has 
created states of exceptions in which naked lives are excluded from politics and banned to 
extermination camps (see: 4.4 & 4.5). Refugees are the exemplary cases within such politics.  
 
Given the by now unstoppable decline of the nation-state and the general corrosion 
of traditional political-juridical categories, the refugee is perhaps the only 
thinkable figure for the people of our time and the only category in which one may 
see today … the forms and limits of a coming political community (Agamben, 
2000, p. 16). 
 
Within the political analysis of Agamben the concept of life is in immediate relation to the subject of 
flight that cannot be reduced to what juridically is defined as a refugee. It is a figure that refers to all 
bodies that populate a milieu of flight or a realm of politics. Agamben’s (2000) resistance to such 
politics is however not a farewell to life, or an immigration of life into a private realm, but rather a 
fundamentally different accentuation of life within politics. He searches for an idea of community in 
which neither politics nor life suffer from their rupture. Thus, while zoē or life represent itself as the 
biological ticking of the naked life, and form of life as a process disconnected from life, Agamben 
introduces a third option: form-of-life. It is through the hyphens of this third notion that life escapes 
the boundaries of politics that block its potentiality by reducing living beings to mere survival. Life 
does not have isolated moments. Individuation of subject, which insists as a transcendent identity, is 
merely a haecceity of singularity, now-moment of this-ness or that-ness that remain immanent to the 
process of a life. Form-of-life, in which life does not become impotent but answers to its non-
essentialism, is the only political life for the sake of happiness. This happiness, which I will elaborate 
on in the final chapter, is not something that can be manufactured by the subject, but only experienced 
in its elusiveness of the hyphens in-between life and its form. 
 
A life that cannot be separated from its form is a life for which what is at stake in 
its way of living is living itself … processes of living are never simply facts but 
always and above all possibilities of life, always and above all power15  … That is 
why human beings … are the only beings for whom happiness is always at stake in 
their living, the only beings whose life is irremediably and painfully assigned to 
happiness. But this immediately constitutes the form-of-life as political life (p. 4). 
 
Politics enters the stage when an epistemology of an idea on community forces itself upon an 
ontology; in other words, when an assemblage of expression forces itself upon an assemblage of 
                                                     
15 Power is a complex notion in works of Agamben, Foucault, Arendt, Deleuze and Guattari. For them power contains a 
productive energy. Power thus has different shapes and ethical implications. Nevertheless, in Arendt’s view, for example in 
her On Violence, power – which springs from an interaction between political individuals – differs from the sheer forceful 
violence. In this sense, power always has a positive connotation, as I will elaborate on in the final chapter. In this 
investigation, however, power (Macht/pouvoir) as a concept is been used in a broader Nietzschean sense of the word, always 
unfolding from within its inner core: Force (Kraft/puissance).   
  
bodies. That is why Foucault’s thesis on discipline and Deleuze and Guattari’s affirmative approach 
of vital forces diversified the definition of politics, creating the plane of micropolitics.  
 
This study is not limited to an exploration of politics in the strict sense. Politics is not exhaustively 
defined within the opposition of form and matter, or expression versus life. Politics operating as 
multiple interstrata is a transversal vector that cuts through all planes. Within the trilogy life-
expression-politics politics is the third element that binds the first two elements within milieu of flight 
on different levels or strata. This study researches how from a philosophical point of view politics 
forms life. It intends to unlock the impasse of our time in which dualities – citizen and non-citizen; 
people and non-people – by exploring another political gesture as Ten Bos (2011) suggests. I have 
chosen for the term gesture due to the fact that – as we have seen in the previous chapter – within 
gesture assemblages of bodies and assemblages of expressions connect. Yet I do not mean to create 
another idea of truthness about life or expression; I rather plead for another relationality in-between 
life and expression. It is not a plea for a manifestation of a politics but rather creation of another 
political gesturality in which liveliness of life is not lost in its form. This study is merely an attempt to 
understand our current transitional times and to create another discourse, not only in order to critically 
observe the state of affairs, but also in order to affirmatively propose a different attitude toward what 
it means to create a community without an essential identity. This is not a type of political gesture that 
needs to find or is distracted from a universal truth. I want to understand truth in a different way; as an 
appeal, not for the sake of truthness but as a lived exposition of difference. This study aims to unfold 
space, i.e. literally to ex-plain another field of expression, in which Nahid’s expression can be 
sensitized beyond choking.  
 
The next question that rises is addressed to philosophy. In order to unfold this political gesture, we 
need to add a transversal dimension to philosophy. This is not a specific branch of philosophy, such as 
political philosophy. It is politico-philosophy. What is the meaning of this hyphen? Let us start with 
the political task of philosophy. It is in exposing the investment of power in so-called general and 
universalized propositions that philosophy becomes political. Deconstruction is but a first step. In 
unveiling its presuppositions philosophical deconstruction first and for all articulates itself in its 
critical attitude not only toward its ancestors, but also toward the reality in which it is placed. 
Philosophy is in a sense always on a diet; always disembarrassed by its heavy weight. In unlocking 
segmentations and fixations in thought, philosophers permanently asking why are principally 
troublemakers. They are never satisfied in their desire for wisdom, always in search of other options, 
i.e. always in adoration of the virtual and natal (im)potentiality. That is the reason why philosophy 
defines itself as a desire, love (philo) for, instead of possessing wisdom (sofia). It is not exclusively 
the clarity of analysis that she strives for, but rather the exposition of a potentiality of changing minds 
by sacrificing the comfort of understanding for the sake of the experience of thinking. It cherishes the 
affect of in-comprehension within comprehension (as I have elaborated on in 2.2.1). Philosophy 
desires its own endless movement, its infinite speed, as Deleuze and Guattari (1994) phrased it. In line 
with this manner of understanding philosophy, they argue that philosophy strives to “give consistency 
without losing anything of the infinite” (p. 42). Her consistency ‘consists’ of configuring segmentary 
  
lines into a network, yet keeping the flight lines open within itself. Herein lies the generative and 
productive act of concepts. 
 Philosophy urges politics to reflect and problematize its thinking. Placing a hyphen in-
between bears witness to an intrinsic relationship; a marriage in which both parties add something to 
the table. What does politics enforce within the heart of philosophy? While philosophy longs for the 
infinite, politics is the force that pulls the philosopher back to the earth, it makes the philosopher feel 
the mud; the fertile ground that feeds transcendental ideas. Politics makes life in philosophy pulsate. It 
is always a living body that thinks. Politics problematizes something within philosophy by addressing 
the oblivion of a body. The pejorative disqualification of the body in Arendt’s elaboration is not only 
due to the horrors of totalitarianism, but also to an ancient philosophical attitude toward body and 
mind as separate phenomena that she still repeats. Therefore, her reduction of life to the private realm 
is not a political, but a philosophical gesture. Yet Agamben’s term ‘form-of-life’ is neither merely a 
political notion nor a strictly philosophical idea. It is an idea that emerges from the hyphen between 
politics and philosophy.  
 The hyphen encapsulates all these paradoxical terms: from Foucault’s modern ‘man’ as an 
empirical-transcendental doublet to Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism (see: 2.1). Although 
Deleuze (2011) defines transcendental empiricism as purely conceptual, I would rather argue that the 
term is not merely a philosophical term but a politico-philosophical term as well. It refers to life itself 
while implementing the act of permanent reflection. A thinking in which life is implemented, and a 
life that permanently changes itself through feedback loops. How does this life within transcendental 
empirical thinking differs from the impasse of life as a bare life? How does this idea on life affirms a 
new gesture politics? In ‘Immánence: A Life….’ Deleuze, (2011) argues that it is the idea of a life 
instead the life that links the two concepts: transcendental empiricism. A life as an empirical 
expression, a stream of consciousness that cannot be defined by notions such as object and subject; 
these latter notions belong to empirical representation. Nevertheless “transcendence is always a 
product of immanence” (p. 31). Transcendental in Deleuze thought is not above, or beyond, but re-
flects from an immanent process back upon that very process. In line with Kant but slightly different 
it points towards the conditions of (im)possibility, but now in terms of impotential and virtual. 
Transcendental empiricism is pure immanence and as such Life, or rather a life. While a subject 
covers the life of an organism (a particular closed whole), a life emerges in its singularity in a process 
as a whole. 
 
We will say of pure immanence that is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not 
immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life. A life is the 
immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete 
bliss (p. 27). 
 
Politics and philosophy supplement one another, but are not interchangeable. Politics feeds 
philosophy in its hypocritical thinking on life, and philosophy distresses the rigidity of ideas that 
within politics fixate life. There is of course a distinction between philosophers and non-philosophers, 
yet the hyphen cannot be explained as an oppositional connective. As Deleuze and Guattari (1994) 
state: “the philosopher must become a nonphilosopher so that nonphilosophy becomes the earth and 
  
people of philosophy” (p. 109). It is evident by now that I do not define philosophy as the 
institutionalized experience of a long academic tradition of thought. By mapping its rhizomatic 
rooting (radix=root) I radicalize its most significant trait, namely problematization. Philosophy as a 
problematizing practice deconstructs the conventional way of communication. It makes language 
hamper and stutter. It is philosophy on a weight loss diet, philosophy as praxis of thought on thought, 
feeding on itself as it were in challenging her fossilized tree roots, fragmenting segments suggest 
eternal weightlessness, yet grounding it into a ‘fundamentum inconcussum’ so eternal meaning can 
blossom in the fruit unfolding in its top branches. In the final instance, philosophy must get rid of its 
binary assumptions: an opposition between theory and praxis, and hence the binary assumption 
between knowledge and experience.  
In this act of reflection on life within politics, philosophers are never alone. The hyphen 
connects other thinkers, but also revolutionary scientists that functionalize their concepts and artistic 
figures that sensitize the act of reflection. With their scaled and multiple observations scientists are 
capable of inspiring philosophers in their creation of concepts; on the other hand, philosophers, due to 
their problematization, can challenge scientists out of their routine. Willem Schinkel’s (2008) notion 
culturalization is in this sense an example of a hyphenation between science and philosophy. Urged to 
observe differently he puts a new idea on the agenda that forces us to think differently on the 
relevance of cultural differences for political decisions (as we will see in 5.3). Artists are often 
motivated by philosophical concepts in their resistance to regimes of expression. They never let 
philosophers forget the sensation of bodies. I have experienced this with Parisa Yousef Doust. Her 
film on Nahid, as we have seen, has been an inspiration for me. In our collaboration, I have always 
thanked her for imagining a life; and she was always happy with my concepts that gave words to her 
imagination.  
 
I am a philosopher, and yet I am sitting at a table with multiple companions in thought. On the agenda 
is the event of flight, and I am assigned with the task to connect politico-philosophy to this event. 
Philosophy is the permanent act of deconstructing fixed meanings and of redefining and reintroducing 
new concepts of relationality within political communities. It is the exposition of flight lines that 
rupture binary relations in order to unfold other connections and segmentations within communities. 
Philosophy and flight are both cutting edge: they reach out for the other option. Flight starts with an 
idea of a means (a journey) with an end (residency). Yet, in the course of the act of fleeing, the 
experiences and the complexity of its eventuality creates differentiated virtual and differenciated 
actual realities that escape the so-called intentional strategy of a subject, as I have argued in the first 
chapter. What is created by the event of flight is mediation without an end, but unlike philosophy that 
intervenes in a body of knowledge – intertexuality – it is literally enacted through real bodies. With 
the problematization of the idea of means to an end in connection to flight, also the apparent 
opposition and finally even the distinction between praxis and theory dissolves due to the idea of 
form-of-life as a reflective act. In a politico-philosophical experiment I intend to show how flight 
traverses the rupture between life and its form by breaking the impasse of a bare life. This does not 
mean that philosophy provides a consistent ‘theory’ for the ‘praxis’ of flight. Precisely in differing 
each other’s expressivity philosophy and flight are more intricately related to one another. They both, 
each in their own way, make expression stammer. 
  
 
It's easy to stammer, but making language itself stammer is a different affair; it 
involves placing all linguistic, and even nonlinguistic, elements in variation, both 
variables of expression and variables of content. A new form of redundancy, AND 
... AND ... AND ... … AND is less a conjunction than the atypical expression of 
all of the possible conjunctions it places in continuous variation (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, pp. 98-99). 
 
This is why in this study the focus not merely lies in the conventional question: what does political 
discourse implicate for refugees? The focus bends back upon itself in order to experiment with 
Agamben’s effort to impose another question: what does refuge mean for politics? What does refuge 
mean for philosophy? And eventually what does it mean for politico-philosophy? The hyphen 
between philosophy and politics also implicates that the political process of refuge maps out the core 
practice of philosophy: the act of breaking through the banality of segmented thinking. In these 
different ways, the hyphen expresses an unresolvable bond between politics and philosophy. It rejects 
the idea that politico-philosophy is just a sub-genre of academic philosophy. And even more so, let us 
distance ourselves from the idea that it is a genre in western academic philosophy. In order to 
sincerely implement politics and flight into philosophy, in line with Olúwolé (2014), I state that we 
must make use of a diversity of conceptual frameworks as well as of a connective framework in order 
to surpass the monotheistic western conceptual frameworks; thus, also frameworks that divide the 
world in cliché frameworks of western and non-western philosophy. In order to genuinely embrace 
the transversality of philosophy, we must comprehend the untraceable connectivity of philosophical 
thinking around the globe, a connectivity that was always there, long before philosophy started to 
define itself as from here and from there.  
 
3.4 Differentiating Political Milieus 
 
3.4.1 Naming Political Interstrata  
What does politico-philosophical stammering within politics of flight indicate? As we have seen this 
stammering affects the epistemological attitude toward flight. Politics of flight demands a thinking 
that implements incomprehension within comprehension; knowability is always affected with the 
unknown. Secondly, politics does have an ontological implication. Ideas on community and formation 
of a community in form of life relate and affect life and lives of individuals. Yet, there is a third aspect 
within politics of flight that needs our attention: ethics. Ideas on community are derived from and in 
turn produce values such as freedom, loyalty, respect, equality, solidarity, responsibility and security. 
The interpretation of these values in each community creates a different regime of signs, images, 
gestures and faciality. The veiled face of decency for a woman is for some a virtue, but for others an 
exclusive sign of repression or even worse terrorism. There is thus not only a local idea of values, but 
also a global discourse that effects the manner in which values are actualized as norms and as such are 
implemented within national policies. Values, but most of all our interpretation and approach of 
values create different forms of politics. In this study, I will elaborate on how different ethical and 
  
moral approaches create three different types of communities: totalitarianism, multiculturalism and 
coming community.  
 
Let us thus examine a value, a value that plays a crucial role in political discourse as we have seen 
with Trump before and after his election: security. Security as a value can mean many things. Security 
can indicate securing freedom; or feeling secure. Yet due to global events this securing of freedom 
immanently has become a reduction of freedom for the sake of freedom, as Žižek (2002) argues. His 
analysis on the paradox of democracy – sacrificing democracy for the sake of democracy – has only 
gained more reality since the publication of his book Welcome to the Desert of the Real. Žižek shows 
that values are not a given; they do not only create tension within a certain time and space due to the 
multifarious involved parties – the freedom of women and the security of refugees – but also within 
one and the same statement – sacrificing our freedom to an overruling government for the sake of 
democracy that is based on values like freedom and equality. We, the European people, love our 
freedom and privacy; yet gradually we have sacrificed these more and more for the comfortable 
consumption of technology and the excitement of the spectacle. Our mobiles are controlled and our 
media expose our private lives. It is perhaps this temperament of modern times that urges Arendt 
(1958) to reach far back in time to make her point. Contemporary time is in a sense for Arendt a 
negative inspiration. In modern political discourse the distinction between action, labor and work has 
disappeared. Through policies and treaties actions have become identifiable as labor and work. The 
collation of the three planes ends the distinction between public and private, and introduces a new 
phenomenon: The Social. In The Social matters that previously have been private – financial 
problems determining political engagement – invade public space and start dominating this sphere. In 
this process, the traditional notion of politics brings out the demise of the public sphere as such. 
Arendt states that in line with this phenomenon new forms of relationality arise. Society becomes the 
essential form of the human condition: a large family called The Society and in a global setting as a 
Society of Mankind (p. 24). 
In this society, the distinction between public and private is not only undermined, but their 
definitions are additionally changed. In ancient times the a-political life in the private domain was 
stripped of human individuality. Individuality was merely the privilege of the free men in the public 
sphere. In modern times, however, the private domain is enriched by modern individualism and the 
intimacy that belongs to such a life, such as the sexual affairs of Clinton and Berlusconi. In this 
modern era, the private is not the opposite of political life, it penetrates the latter visibly through the 
social life. It does not however only involve the intimate affairs of lives of those who chose to 
participate, but often intrudes the life of those who are close to these persons as well. Thus, the 
distinction between the private and the public in the Greek period is completely different from the one 
in current times. For the Greeks only the public space was political, all other domains belonged to the 
private as the law of the house, the nomos of the oikos, i.e. economy.  
Arendt concludes that in her time this distinction, that had been obvious for the Greeks, had 
lost its clear distinctiveness. In the contemporary age the concept social refers to family life that 
endures in the public domain. What becomes political is kinship within a nation-state: identity instead 
of difference. We speak of national and social economy, of national culture – which in case of 
Cologne imposes an artificial conflict between western cultures with other societies – and politics that 
  
has been organized around an idea of the nation. For modern men, a notion such as political economy 
is a common term, while for the Greeks it would have been a contradiction in terms. For the ancient 
Greek, matters such as material interests referred to necessity, and hence they belonged to the private 
sphere of the house. In the current time, it is this materiality that makes men experience ‘freedom’, or 
put more appropriately a ‘personal freedom’ rather than a public one. In a sense, Arendt regrets the 
manner in which freedom in modern times emerges from an individual interest instead of a political 
affect that indicates a fundamental relationality with others within a public space: inter homines esse. 
Our political choices are often based on personal economical interests; paying more or less taxes. In 
line with Arendt and Agamben, Ten Bos (2015) argues that within this dominancy of economical 
interest over ethical and political considerations, humans – defined as political agents – disappear (p. 
94).  
 
Thus, although we could criticize Arendt due to her radical distinction between an economic and 
political realm, yet by accentuating the problematic and contradictory relationship between economy 
and politics her argument makes sense. According to Arendt, the rise of The Social starts the very 
moment that private property becomes the main concern of a community and is no longer merely an 
interest of an individual. Common wealth – which is often used as an argument to exclude refugees – 
is then purely gained for the sake of common wealth and no more for the sake of independency in a 
common world. A government derives its legitimacy from its power to guarantee the safety of the 
properties of various parties. As we have seen in the case of Cologne, even values become modifying 
properties of a certain society that must be defended against the hostile other. Arendt shows, that these 
developments are also manifested in the transformation of immobile property into mobile property. 
Every thing has become a consumer article. Property no longer refers to things that are fixed or 
tangible. Property also refers to mobile things as a human body or – following Marx – labor. While 
the safety of property discursively refers to an artificial localization within a nation-state or in case of 
Europe a nation-continent – and in case of Brexit a European nation-state against other poor European 
nation-states – due to globalization appropriation motorizes the world economy. This idea is 
eventually not merely an expressive phenomenon but due to its political characteristics also affects 
lives. Our consumerism stands in line with 45.8 million modern enslaved people (The global Slavery 
Index, 2016). On the one hand Europe does not respond to the economic motivations for migration 
and refuge; on the other European international companies prosper and maximize their profits by the 
exploitation of laborers elsewhere. Within policies on possession properties are no longer objects that 
are created on the plane of work, but also concern bodies that can be exchanged, and eventually 
someone’s life that can be decided upon.16 
  
The social realm, where the life process has established its own public domain, has 
let loose an unnatural growth, so to speak, of the natural; and it is against this 
                                                     
16 The term QALY (quality-adjusted life year) illustrates this. The quality of life of individuals in the medical care is 
calculated by its utility, not for the individual but for the society in general. From this perspective, it could then be argued 
that the life of an Alzheimer patient has a lower QALY. The utility also depends on your nationality (De Brabander, 2008, p. 
132-133). 
  
growth, not merely against society but against a constantly growing social realm, 
that the private and the intimate, on the one hand, and the political (in the narrower 
sense of the word), on the other, have proved incapable of defending themselves 
(Arendt, 1958, p. 47). 
 
For the ancient Greeks private is the place where a man must rule over his inferiors: his wife, slaves 
and children. Let us be fair that – despite Arendt’s adoration for the ancient Greeks – it was exactly 
those bodies that were excluded from politics. Nowadays this exclusion makes the political figures 
per se. Arendt argues that the household is born out of necessity, while the polis is the sphere of 
freedom and of choice. And exactly this clear separation guarantees the balanced existence of both 
realms. Yet contemporary Greeks know better than most Europeans that global politics and economy 
defines their households. Nevertheless, her analyses on the disruption of this balance caused by the 
social – because of initiation of the imbalance of power within policies – is relevant for our analysis 
of political life today. This imbalance does not refer to economical aspects of the social; more than 
anything the disaster of the social emerges from its tendency to homogenize individuals within a 
society as loyal members of a society. Nationalism – Brexit is merely an example – favors an idea of 
one homogeneous mass opposing another. Populist political parties each argue to be a better father for 
a family – a people – by arguing to serve and protect them. Freedom as the political equality in 
difference is mutilated and relocated “in the realm of the social, and force or violence becomes the 
monopoly of government” (p. 31).  
 
As we have seen, when Arendt speaks of politics, she speaks of politics in the strict sense of the word: 
Politics – public distinct from privacy – without binding ideologies and homogenous identities. 
Politics in a wider sense, which is the field under investigation here, consists as a milieu of 
connections, counterfactuals and contradictions. It is a field on which many planes intertwine. Politics 
is not only an open space, but also consists of rigid strata of isolation and exclusion, as Arendt shows 
with her idea of the social. Within this network of different planes the political plane of flight unfolds. 
The economic plane of calculation and the social plane of inclusion/exclusion and identity, the artistic 
plane of multiple affection and perception, and the philosophical and scientific plane of reference 
influence the milieu of flight with critical evaluation in concepts and functions as well as resistance to 
the state of affairs. Politics in a broader sense of the word affects and is also affected by different 
religious regimes of signs. The secular processes in politics are also affected by religious discourses, 
or by what Deleuze and Guattari (1994) call a plane of transcendence. The differences between these 
planes do create multiple political communities and different forms of politics. Let us thus finally, 
against this background of the social as a dominant discourse, map out, i.e. approach from within, as I 
have argued in the first chapter, the diversity of politics of flight. This approach differs from a clear 
and distinct tracing: 
 
A map has multiple entryways, as opposed to the tracing, which always comes 
back ‘to the same.’ The map has to do with performance, whereas the tracing 
always involves an alleged ‘competence.’ … Drives and part-objects are neither 
  
stages on a genetic axis nor positions in a deep structure; they are political options 
for problems, they are entryways and exits (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, pp. 12-13). 
 
Given all these differences and distinctions, how do we then map out a politics of flight? Even a map, 
despite the good intentions of its cartographer, is a reduction, an artificial cutting act within the 
complexity of a chaotic web, preconditioned by connectivity. My choice for one language, in this 
particular case English, is already a betrayal of the multilingual trait of politics of flight. On top of 
that, for the sake of comprehension, my act of mapping will reduce the multiplicity of milieus within 
the politics of flight to three forms of milieus that are not juxtaposed, nor exclude each other, yet are 
nevertheless distinctive. This cutting act is inspired by Arendt’s (1958) idea on political action and the 
tendency of social to reduce politics to labor and work; Agamben’s (2000) trilogy of life, form of life, 
form-of-life; and finally, Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) distinction between territorialization, re- and 
deterritorialization (relative and absolute).  
 
Each milieu penetrates and transforms other milieus. Deleuze and Guattari speak of different 
intensities of deterritorialization and distinguish relative and absolute deterritorialization. The earth is 
the plane that deterritorializes absolutely. With its body without organs it ruptures any idea that we 
create on the world. Yet, humans are persistent and inventive. Our evolution and technology is 
changing the structure of the earth; with environmental disasters ahead. This environmental argument 
is not beyond the politics of flight. The dryness in some parts of Africa due to environmental changes 
causes flows of refuge; adults and children that due to a lack of food search for life elsewhere. Yet, 
they often do not reach a destination. They are often stuck in-between the country of origin and the 
promised lands. They often die for the sake of survival.  
How do we call a politics that creates such limbic territories; territories that belong to no rule 
yet are the result of policies and ideas on who belongs or does not belong to a community? Within 
politics of flight as a multiple interstrata I will distinguish three types of interstratum: politics of exile, 
politics of segments, and politics of life. Each of these interstrata refers to different types of ideas on 
what it means to create a community.  
 
1) Chapter four is an exploration of this politics. I call this politics: politics of exile. As we will see, 
this has a contradictory logic and in this sense, shows affinity with Arendt’s (1958) idea of the 
homogenization within the social realm and Žižek’s (2002) idea of contradictory values. This 
politics also shows resemblance to Saskia Sassen’s (2014) idea of expulsion. This politics exists 
by the force of exclusion of those who do not belong to its territory; or an idea of an identity that 
regulates the homogenization process of the social. Yet, I have explicitly chosen for the term 
exile in order to emphasize the territorial tendency of this politics. Policies, the spectacle and the 
political jargon of this politics result from the idea of here versus there. Even the weather 
forecast on TV doesn’t neglect to mention how the weather is in ‘our country’. The distinction 
between country of origin versus country of arrival is merely an example of this idea of here 
versus there. Here represents the normal state of affairs and there represents the peripheries that 
do not belong to ‘our’ social order. “We are the people, go home!” was another slogan that was 
introduced by anti-refugee protesters in Saxony. The territorial effect of politics of exile is 
  
characterized as totalitarian and universalist due to its absolute molar force (see: 2.3.1). It 
segments fiercely in dual territories, in which – in Agamben’s (1998 & 2000) words – life is 
detached from its form of life. It is – in words of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) – a tree-minded 
society, branching binary and tracing identities in which people and non-people can be separated 
in excluding territories. The age of totalitarianism is old and there have been multiple critiques 
and resistance toward universalism. Scientists and philosophers within anthropological studies 
have often criticized universalistic tendencies of right and wrong within politics of exile. Thus, 
although politics of exile still persists, there always have been forces within communities and 
ideas on community that resist the totalitarian tendency of this politics.  
 
2) Multiculturalism has now for decades offered an idea on community that pretends to implement 
differences. I call politics within multiculturalism politics of segments. This form of politics 
creates segments within the totalized territories of totalitarianism. Multiculturalism thus has 
deterritorializing effects on the molar force of a totalitarian distinction between here and there by 
introducing multiple communities within a larger community. Therefore, in the fifth chapter I 
argue that this deterritorialization is relative. Multiculturalism creates an idea of tolerance 
toward differences; yet in this attitude it neglects to evaluate connections, especially ambiguous 
connections. In the setting of Belgium and The Netherlands Dirk Geldof (2013) argues – with 
Steven Vertovec’s term superdiversity – that the reality of European cities are beyond 
multicultural segments. There is no here and there in the absolute sense of the word, yet there are 
multiple heres and theres. The divisions within multiculturalism still divide territories and create 
a disconnected morality. What you tolerate here, is not tolerated over there. The segments have 
the tendency to create smaller totalitarian regimes with multiple types of peripheries. Politics of 
segments does not deconstruct the tracing tendency of politics of exile; it just introduces multiple 
possibilities of tracing within a segment based on religion, ethnicity, culture and often enough 
physical appearance such as skin color or sexual differentiation. In Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1987) terminology it has a fascicular temperament (as I have shown in 1.2.3) due to introducing 
multiple segmented ideas of regimes of faciality and subjectivity. While totalitarianism enforces 
one form of life; multiculturalism makes room for multiple forms of life.  
 
The strata themselves [not only on the level of content but also on the level of 
expression TR] are animated and defined by relative speeds of deterritorialization; 
moreover, absolute deterritorialization is there from the beginning, and the strata 
are spinoffs, thickenings on a plane of consistency that is everywhere, always 
primary and always immanent (p. 70). 
 
3) Having made these systematic distinctions by now we can return to the politico-philosophical 
gesture that I intend to introduce. The final chapter of this study is an ode to Agamben’s coming 
community (1993b); Arendt’s (1958) world and Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) nomadic earth. I 
call politics that includes these ideas politics of life. This life is thus not a life that is regulated by 
the disciplinary powers of biopolitics or biased by the totalitarian urge to detach life from its 
form. The preposition of in politics of life operates as the preposition of within politics of flight. 
  
Life is both genetivus objectivus and genetivus subjectivus of politics; meaning a politics that 
emerges out of life and has living itself as its object. It is a life that does not create a general idea 
but simulates the impotentiality of earth. A life – in Agamben’s terms form-of-life – is lived for 
the sake of ‘happiness’. Its ethics is an ethics of inclusion. It is neither global nor local; it is 
glocal. At this level, it functions as a connective processing of all strata, triggering reflective 
judgments in which responsibility for the world is not something that we redeem through 
distanced charity; we live responsibility permanently and immediately in every action. Politics of 
life is a politics that deterritorializes the idea of here and there, so characteristic for a politics of 
exile; as well as the act of differenciating detached territories of multicultural politics of 
segments. It differentiates singular connective communities, addressing its impotential and thus 
resisting the molar tendencies of the previous forms of politics. It has a molecular and nomadic 
temperament; yet not by neglecting these molar tendencies but rather by questioning it all the 
time. Politics of life sensitizes heterotopias and cacophonic silence in which Nahid can become a 
political life instead of a psychiatric one. It does not trace order and sanity; but maps out 
rhizomatic relationality in difference. It is this tendency that inheres politics in philosophy; the 
realm of politico-philosophy. Was it this absolute deterritorializing force that made Rudyard 
Kipling write something that surpassed his own colonial framed mind? 
 
Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never the two shall meet 
Till Earth and Sky stand presently at God’s great Judgment Seat; 
But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth, 
When two strong men stand face to face, tho’ they come from the ends of the earth. 
 
3.4.2 Paradigm: Political Objects of Thought  
We have mapped out a plane of politics as interstrata that create a community by connecting 
assemblages of bodies to assemblages of enunciations, redefining Arendt’s critique on the social in 
terms of Deleuze and Guattari. Within these interstrata I have distinguished three types of 
interstratum: politics of exile, politics of segments, and politics of life. As for the latter Agamben 
(2000) evaluates its transition as follows:   
 
The great transformation of the first industrial revolution destroyed the social and 
political structures as well as the legal categories of the ancient régime, terms such 
as sovereignty, right, nation, people, democracy, and general will by now refer to 
a reality that no longer has anything to do with what these concepts used to 
designate … The new categories of political thought – inoperative community, 
compearance, equality, loyalty, mass intellectuality, the coming people, whatever 
singularity, or however else they might be called – will be able to express the 
political matter that is facing us only if they are able to articulate the location, the 
manners, and the meaning of this experience of the event of language intended as 
free use of the common and as sphere of pure means (pp. 109-110 & 117-118). 
 
  
In this quote Agamben sums up two sets of notions in politics: the political categories of ancient 
regimes and the new political categories, referring to his companions in thought: inoperative 
community (Blanchot), compearance (Nancy), equality (Rancière), loyalty (Badiou), mass 
intellectuality (Hardt and Negri), the coming people (Derrida). The apparently nonsensical notion of 
whatever singularity is introduced by Agamben and will perform a significant role in the exploration 
of coming community in the final chapter. These new categories however do not indicate that the 
categories of ancient regimes are bygones. The political categories of the ancient regime insist until 
this day, as we notice in the political discourse on refugees. They play a crucial role in determining 
the life of individuals. Both sets refer to the political reality of our time; both sets denote fundamental 
ideas that characterize these political communities. Agamben (2002 & 2009) typifies these political 
ideas as paradigms. In other words, the object of thought in politics for Agamben is paradigm. In the 
perspective of Deleuze and Guattari, next to concept, function and sensation this is the fourth object 
of thought. Politics with its policies is regulated by these paradigms.   
 
3.4.2.1 Paradigm, Episteme, Dispositive 
Why the term paradigm? Instead of interpreting paradigm as merely a trait of function or an element 
of scientific plane of reference, Agamben prefers to explore this notion not scientifically, but 
politically. Yet how can a paradigm be positioned as a political object of thought that differs from a 
philosophical concept, a scientific function and an artistic sensation? Of course, politics relates to 
concepts (invented by human sciences and political philosophers), functions (scientific reports for 
parliamentary committees or scientific statistics for policies), and affects and percepts (sensations 
mobilizing the masses by means of electoral rhetoric and utopian visions). Yet, in this section I argue 
that paradigm, such as ‘the people’ and ‘the citizen’ are objects of politico-philosophical thought. 
Through their paradigmatic ‘radiancy’ these create their own type of assemblages of bodies and 
enunciative regimes of expression, as we have seen in case of Saxony in the previous chapter. I will 
argue that it is in Agamben’s (2009) reading of the notion of paradigm that the political discourse 
discerns itself from the artistic, scientific and philosophical discourse, precisely because in evaluating 
policies it poses the question of the political.  
 
In his analysis of the notion paradigm, Agamben oscillates between Michel Foucault’s episteme and 
Kuhn’s elaboration of paradigm. Foucault does not refer to Kuhn, and in his lecture What is a 
Paradigm? for the The European Graduate School Agamben (2002) wonders whether this is because 
of a personal and/or academic vendetta. Agamben thus wonders whether Foucault’s use of paradigm 
as episteme is not a synonym for the term used by Kuhn. Both thinkers refer to epistemological 
conditions, that constitute discourse while remaining hidden and unknowable within that discourse for 
those that speak and act from within this discourse. In the end, Agamben defends Foucault by arguing 
that, although the two thinkers appear to be dealing with the same idea, the paradigm in Kuhnian 
sense is not the same as Foucault’s episteme. Kuhn focuses on natural sciences – Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (1994) function – and Foucault on human sciences and the combination of knowledge and 
power that produces subjectivity. So, from the perspective of the political Agamben’s paradigm – due 
to its reference to power and subjectivity – has more affinity with episteme (knowledge) than with 
Kuhnian paradigm. Yet, what inspires Agamben in his reference to Kuhn is the manner in which, 
  
according to Kuhn, paradigms while setting rules yet essentially function without rules and 
explanation. Kuhn (1970) states: 
 
That is why, at the start of this essay, I introduced shared paradigms rather than 
shared rules, assumptions, and points of view as the source of coherence for 
normal research traditions. Rules, I suggest, derive from paradigms, but paradigms 
can guide research even in the absence of rules (p. 42). 
 
In connection to this relation between paradigm and rules, Herbert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow 
(1982) point out the similarities and differences between Foucault’s thinking and Kuhn’s discussion. 
Both thinkers suggest that the shifting from one paradigm to the other, or from one discourse to the 
other, is not a gradual or a quantitative progress. The “radical reordering” of the episteme and 
paradigms happens “without recourse to an immanent rationality” (p. 69). Nonetheless, while Kuhn 
suggests that paradigms create rules, but nevertheless can function without them, Foucault suggests 
that within the discourse, although not resulting from a prior rule, principles of a discourse are in their 
function rule-governed. Thus as “explanatory principals … instead of being described as a law 
operating behind the discursive phenomenon, they are described as rules operating within the 
discursive itself” (p. 70). In contrast to natural sciences, in which a paradigm creates a consensus, 
within a discourse of society, or even social sciences for that matter, there are different approaches 
and even conflicting strategies. The binding elements in a discourse are thus not always explicit and 
acknowledged paradigms, but also non-discursive processes that remain unknown to those that act 
from within this discourse. Finally, there is a difference between their critiques on normalization. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow argue that “whereas normal science [in Kuhn’s work TR] aims in principal at 
the final assimilation of all anomalies, disciplinary technology [in Foucault’s discussion TR] works to 
set up and preserve an increasingly differentiated set of anomalies, which is the very way it extends its 
knowledge and power into wider and wider domains” (p. 198). In Foucault’s analysis of disciplining 
power relations are part of the process. And it is exactly this being part of a process that distinguishes 
Agamben’s paradigm from Foucault’s episteme. 
 
Agamben’s analysis oscillates in-between that of Kuhn and Foucault. Although Agamben agrees with 
Foucault that some paradigms answer to a logic of a discourse and function as rules, there are those 
paradigms – such as people in case of Saxony – that operate beyond any logic or trace of rules. Yet 
this paradigm does not intend to assimilate the anomaly; it rather produces the anomaly of non-
people. In the final instance, the introduction of both terms by Foucault and Kuhn – episteme on the 
level of human sciences as well as scientific paradigm on the level of natural sciences – show how 
tricky our knowledge of things is. They both question an epistemological condition in thought. Yet, 
Agamben (2009) states that this act of problematization goes deeper in Foucault’s analysis. Foucault’s 
discussion on discourse is much broader by its reference to the society as a discursive amalgamation 
of many practices, which due to political characterization of Agamben’s paradigm becomes more 
relevant. It is this amalgamation of practices that has given me the tools to differentiate the 
abovementioned political interstrata. 
 
  
Unlike Kuhn’s paradigm, the episteme does not define what is knowable in a 
given period, but what is implicit in the fact that a given discourse or 
epistemological figure exists at all (p. 15). 
 
Next to episteme, there is however another term in Foucault’s work that we can link to Agamben’s 
paradigm. By the time Foucault (1980) raises the question of power-knowledge, he has abandoned the 
archeological notion ‘episteme’ and introduced the genealogical notion ‘dispositive’. The term 
‘dispositive’ in which the machinic aspect of an ‘apparatus’ resonates, means:  
 
A thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions … Such are the 
elements of the apparatus [French: dispositif TR]. The apparatus itself is the 
system of relations that can be established between these elements. Secondly, what 
I am trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection 
that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. Thus, a particular discourse 
can figure at one time as the programme of an institution, and at another it can 
function as a means of justifying or masking a practice which itself remains silent, 
or as a secondary re-interpretation of this practice, opening out for it a new field of 
rationality (pp. 194-195). 
 
Is Foucault’s dispositive positioned at the same interstratum as Agamben’s paradigm? Or is paradigm 
a sub-category of dispositive? Although, in some cases Agamben’s paradigm functions as a sub-
category of dispositive; there are however also differences between Foucault’s use of dispositive, and 
Agamben’s use of paradigm. Agamben’s paradigm does not necessarily refer to a discursive practice 
that disciplines or normalizes. Foucault refers to the discursive disciplined ‘docile body’ as a 
produced configuration – the law abiding, normalized citizen – but in Agamben’s text it is not 
necessarily a subject or an identity; nor a phenomenon that necessarily creates a logical connection 
within a discourse, as we will see in the fourth chapter.  
 
3.4.2.2 Paradigm: Exemplary beyond Particular and General 
The word paradigm means literally an example.17 For Agamben, paradigm is an ex-ample, or as I will 
show, operates as excluded-inclusion. It is a within-without. Let us examine this through 
contemporary political regimes. Beyond the factual laws that are installed, a notion like law and order 
is paradigmatic. While the application of laws gives rise to jurisprudence, these processes never 
exhaustively define the notion of law and order. Thus, while from an ethnocentric perspective Europe 
accused others – such as Turkey and Russia – for violating international laws and human rights, they 
do not hesitate to abolish the same laws in their deal with the Turkish government. There are 
                                                     
17 The word comes from the Latin ‘paradigma’ and Greek ‘paradeigma’, that can be translated as ‘example’. The prefix 
‘para’ means ‘alongside’, ‘deiknunai’ meaning ‘to show,’: ‘alongside shown’ or ‘what shows itself beside’. 
  
paradigms that rather define the exceptions. Yet, in not belonging to their domain these constitute all 
that occurs.  
The illegal subject is such an inclusively excluded phenomenon. In Foucault’s work the 
delinquent and the sexual ‘pervert’ function within the discourse of disciplinary power by being 
categorized and locked up in prison and psychiatric clinics in order to be normalized and included 
again. On the other hand, the stateless alien – the inhabitant of the limbolike state of exception – is 
not enclosed in an assignable territory. It is rather a vector that cuts through everything. The stateless 
alien is a subject that in being banned consolidates the law. While according to Foucault the abnormal 
is normalized, Agamben shows how the exemplary excluded constitutes the law without being 
included. Finally, the paradigms in Agamben’s work are in the last instance not only discursive, but 
material, physical bodies that are beyond discipline, i.e. lacking any inclusive expression at all. 
Agamben identifies this state of being – this state of life – as homo sacer, as we will see in 4.5.1, 
distinguishing itself by a disconnection to form of life that defines its state of being. In this sense 
Agamben’s idea of paradigm has more affinity with the Foucaultian non-discursive. Yet, while the 
Foucaultian body still has the power to resist or subvert – its potentiality to enforce new discourse – 
Agamben’s homo sacer, as we will see in the fourth and fifth chapter, bares witness to an inability to 
break its structures.18 The young single male refugees – who after the events of Cologne in advance 
were considered to be dangerous by various parties – did not become part of the regime of bodies; nor 
were permitted to say something in the regime of signs. Even their expressions of frustration merely 
serve to confirm the idea that their exclusion is just. 
 
Being careful is about softening the very form of your appearance so that you do 
not appear ‘aggressive’ because you are already assumed to be aggressive before 
you appear (Ahmed, 2014, p. 217).   
 
Figures such as ‘homo sacer’ and the ‘sovereign’, or The Muslim and The American people cannot be 
reduced to ordinary people. A paradigm such as ‘state of exception’ is not assignable on a map, as we 
will see in the fourth chapter. Paradigms like ‘security’ or ‘terrorism’ are never captured by laws and 
measures, their application is never saturated, never satisfied. While the deal with Turkey, considering 
refugees, still remains ethically and legally questionable and in the final instance probably practically 
unmanageable, European politicians and policy makers are already looking toward Libya in order to 
create new refugee camps. Through its radiant vectorality, paradigm does not refer to an origin but 
operates as an originary phenomenon. To explain this Agamben (2009) refers to Goethe’s notion 
Urphänomen: “As a paradigm, the Urphänomen is thus the place where analogy lives in perfect 
equilibrium beyond the opposition between generality and particularity” (p. 30). Paradigm is not 
presupposed but merely exists in its exposition, supplementing a remainder ‘outside’ its exposition. 
“In the paradigm, intelligibility does not precede the phenomenon; it stands, so to speak, ‘beside’ it 
(para)” (p. 27). In this sense, a paradigm is partly epistemological (Kuhn), partly para-ontological 
                                                     
18 This is Arendt and Agamben’s central point on the notion of statelessness, which is challenged by Rancière. In section 
4.5.2 I will discuss his critique.  
  
(Foucault); and at all times political due to its ethical implication of belonging and non-belonging to a 
community. 
In his text ‘What is a Paradigm?’ Agamben (2009) mentions specific notions that he rephrases 
as exemplary cases or paradigms that function within the current political discourse. 
 
Homo sacer, the Muselmann, the state of exception, and the concentration camps. 
While these are all actual historical phenomena, I nonetheless treated them as 
paradigms whose role was to constitute and make intelligible a broader historical-
problematic context (p. 9). 
 
A paradigm is a singular phenomenon that is repeated and as the result of this repetition becomes self-
evident not only within policies but also in other domains such as the spectacle of the media. In line 
with Ten Bos’ (2015) analysis of bureaucracy, we could state that paradigms manifest their power in 
ink. They have written effects, and within this ascertainment they operate self-evidently. In being 
evident they never define, yet radiate their course. In this sense, the term The Muslim – which for 
instance resonates endlessly in Donald Trump’s outcries – has become a paradigm. So, paradigm must 
neither be understood as something particular that gives rise to a general or universal state, nor as a 
universal phenomenon dispersed in multiple particular states. The particular case of Humayun Khan 
– dying for the safety of American people – does not change the public image of Muslims. Nor can a 
general idea on Muslims – despite Trump’s belief – refer both to Islamic State and Malala at the same 
time. A paradigm, Agamben (2009) argues, distances itself from this dual setting by being a particular 
to another particular; it is an analogical rather than a logical relation. Arendt’s use of Kant’s 
reflective judgment (which I have elaborated on in 2.2.1) is exemplary. Reflective judgment of 
Agamben’s paradigm is neither merely a sensible object nor a general law. There is Merkel’s “Wir 
Schaffen das” that stands as a singular expression. One measure on security against a so-called 
Islamic State threat enforces the next, connecting both measures in a pragmatic way. 
 
A paradigm entails a movement that goes from singularity to singularity and, 
without ever leaving singularity, transforms every singular case into an exemplar 
of a general rule that can never be stated a priori (p. 22). 
 
One paradigm triggers another without universalizing its content. Paradigms as The Muslim and 
security trigger one another but are not determinative for each other. The paradigm of the hostile other 
strengthens the paradigm of the nation-state, the idea of borders and finally the illusion of closing off 
these borders while refugees and food suppliers both are banging on the fence. In order to manifest 
the analogy – security threat, Muslim and refugee – policies in The Netherlands eventually neglect to 
mention that most people migrating to The Netherlands since 1996 have a Christian background (Van 
Dyke, 2016). So, in order to define paradigm, Agamben (2009) leaves behind the idea of the 
particular that can be compared to another particularity due to a quality that they share referring to a 
more generalized category. Paradigms engender analogies that make situations analyzable for 
policies. While academic philosophy conceptualizes, regular sciences formalize and entertaining 
spectacles sensitize for assemblages of bodies and assemblages of expression, a paradigm assembles a 
  
state of affairs. It is this state of affairs that enable philosophers of difference to problematize, 
revolutionary scientists to observe and describe critically, and for which critical artists in resisting 
given forms of life sensitize their audiences. A critical attitude towards exemplary cases cannot 
emerge from a general rule or sentiment. In unveiling an unjustifiable situation, it asks for permanent 
engagement as relational agency.  
 
Policies feed on paradigms that produce communities in enforcing a certain way of life on bodies. In 
terms of Deleuze and Guattari it is on the intertwined field in-between assemblages of enunciation – 
not only expressions of policy makers, but also expressions of anti-refugees and refugees in Saxony 
and Cologne – and assemblages of bodies that are included in excluding, that a plane of politics as a 
cluster of interstrata is created. A paradigm enforces multiple kinds of relationality. Paradigms as 
singularities, as examples, also influence one another. In interconnecting paradigms create a network 
of concepts, sensations and functions.  
Paradigm is thus also not a Begriff in the dialectical sense. It does not deal with the 
understanding of its own essence, but rather exposes constructions of thought from which it remains 
hidden and exterior. Subject and identity differ in this sense. While subject refers to immanent 
intensities and affects, to endurance within its own assemblage as well as sensitivity in relation to 
other notions, identity, in a political sense, behaves as a paradigm that creates communities without 
explaining what these are. The paradigmatic identity, which gives rise to flight lines as well as 
segmentation lines, remains an incomplete substance (in content and in expression). It has changing 
forms and mutable matters. Its form and matter are not compatible. Take misogyny. Being a global 
problem it does not weaken the form of the paradigmatic application in case of Muslims. In western 
societies, the Middle Eastern culture male harassment becomes an originary phenomenon. “In the 
paradigm, there is no origin or archē; every phenomenon is the origin, every image archaic” 
(Agamben, 2009, p. 31). The sincere attempts to explore and subtly differentiate ‘Dutch identity’ by 
politicians and political critics, lacking a conclusive answer have no consequences for the populist 
impact of the paradigm. Geert Wilders is not interested in defining the paradigmatic quality of the 
Dutch identity. He exploits the manner in which this paradigm serves as a contagious example to 
constitute a politics of exclusion.  
Paradigm as an example is supplementary to an assemblage, a community for instance. Yet, 
according to Agamben, it is not exhausted by the assemblage. It remains singular while at the same 
time operating as a constituting example for an assemblage, a compositional whole. It is the 
connective that constitutes the relations within the machine. It is the machine’s peculiar raison d’être, 
the machine’s ‘desire’. Security has always been a crucial notion. Yet nowadays it has become a 
paradigm. In its exemplary impact the paradigm of security also means securing our women from the 
barbaric other, leading to policies and measurements, such as the internalization of European norms 
and values by the Others. Khan and Trump operate differently in this paradigm of security, despite the 
fact that they both do not question the legitimization of the war itself. Both Trump and Kahn awake 
an exemplary sentiment; the one as a head of state triggers fear and the other as a sad father that has 
lost his son, triggers compassion. The paradigm itself is not justified, nor culturally confirmed; yet it 
forces its subjects to react in a specific way. Thus, although the harassment of women was not 
scientifically backed up to be a character trait of refugees, within the policies that were installed 
  
afterwards and the spectacle that was performed, refugees were required to distance themselves and 
engage with trainings to unlearn something that was presupposed. Agamben (2009) states:  
 
It is thus impossible to clearly separate an example's paradigmatic character – its 
standing for all cases – from the fact that it is one case among others. As in a 
magnetic field, we are dealing not with extensive and scalable magnitudes but with 
vectorial intensities (p. 20).  
 
According to Agamben, paradigm as a singular radiancy inaugurates processes in a vectorial sense. 
With the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), the abstract machine relates these vectors. The 
machine is that which allows the vectors to cross one another, creating nods in complex layers of 
political states of affairs. Moreover, there is never only one paradigm at work. The abstract machine 
relates these paradigms within a network of paradigms: terrorism, radicalism, The Muslim, a tsunami 
of migrants, rapists. The machine that empowers the state of affairs always operates not only through 
a multiplicity of paradigms, but also through a non-reflective incorporation of other objects of thought 
such as concepts, functions, affects and percepts.  
In contrast to Deleuze and Guattari (1994), Agamben (2009) does not juxtapose paradigm to 
the syntagmatic trait, but argues that the syntagmatic trait of paradigm appears “by virtue of … 
nonfunctioning and suspension” (p. 24). A tsunami of migrants and refugees does not explain 
Europe’s current state of affairs, yet its threatening radiancy keeps the voters in suspense, expecting 
something that will disrupt their secured lives. In Agamben’s analysis, paradigm creates an exclusive 
inclusion: In trying to exorcize it, it determines all that happens. A paradigm, such as security, is 
included in all states of affairs by its extraction from this state at all times, by remaining singular and 
exceptional as a state of emergency, yet inclusive in determining all measures taken. In case of 
security, paradigm enables states of affairs to connect on a vertical intentional axis, ignoring its 
transversal tendency of human relationality.  
 
Ontology of insecurity within the constitution of the political: it must be presumed 
that things are not secure, in and of themselves, in order to justify the imperative to 
make things secure (Ahmed, 2014, p. 76).  
 
Agamben’s (2009) paradigm does not ‘mind’, it ‘matters’. It formats and disorganizes. It operates. It 
articulates itself through living bodies. Precisely these living bodies explain that Agamben’s paradigm 
is a political object of thought. In interacting with concepts and functions a paradigm can become 
discursively embedded, but it is most of all highly aesthetic, i.e. experienced via affects and percepts. 
In that sense, it is more gestural than discursive. In line with Lyotard, sustained by Deleuze and 
Guattari, we could argue, that paradigm becomes effective through thinking as sensation. A paradigm 
is, in other words, sensible in terms of sensational (Molendijk & Oosterling, 2001, pp. 10-12), i.e. it 
has, in terms of Deleuze, a haptic quality: One feels and ‘sees’ its meaning immediately. The 
paradigm bends back upon itself, sensing its own emergence, as something ‘beside’ (para) its own 
‘diction’. It radiates meaning.  
  
Approaching a paradigm demands another image of thought. As an object of thought it calls for a 
form of thinking, which does not necessarily exclude other forms of thinking – science, philosophy 
and art – but nonetheless differentiates itself from them. It is in political thinking that paradigm starts 
to operate differently than in sciences, also differently from concepts in philosophy or sensations in 
art. In political thinking the sensing of a paradigm can be compared with the sublime experience as in 
arts, with the aporetical conceptualisation in philosophy or the impossibility to prove something in an 
exhaustive sense in science, but in politics this sensing first and for all indicates the oscillation 
between to be or not to be, between life and death, between belonging and non-belonging. The body 
in its most barren exposure, its breathing, is that what is exposed in politics.  
Politics thus asks for a specific sensibility: Thinking in which sense or sensation is not 
disconnected from thinking. We already referred to Lyotard who speaks of a tautagoric quality of 
thought. Martin Luther King’s dream is exemplary. It refers to a desire, to sensing a desire; yet this 
sensational comprehension emerges out of his incomprehension for inequality in his time. Criticizing 
a paradigm asks for a politico-philosophical critique, i.e. a thinking in-between as well as a cutting 
through this paradigm, deconstructing its immediate evidence. It is the task of politico-philosophy to 
show how paradigm’s capability to develop and radiate, affects not only thinking, but life or living as 
such. Nowadays human rights operate as paradigms. These rights mean something different for 
different parties, not from an ethical perspective, but from the perspective of policies. 
 
3.4.2.3 Paradigms: Axiomatic, Differencial and Impotential 
The ontology that these paradigms disclose is a para-ontology, para in the sense of beside and 
beyond, because an example operates from within to the beyond, i.e. beyond itself being part of a 
‘whole’ that it effectuates. This is its radiant operation. Therefor a paradigm must be distinguished 
from the creation of concepts as the image of thought that Deleuze and Guattari (1994) propose. 
While a concept has endoconsistency and exoconsistency in relating to other concepts, a political 
paradigm functions as a pure exteriority. Paradigms operate transversally on different planes, 
radiating in all directions. Due to this radiancy it has a vulnerable center. In line with Lefort’s (1988) 
analysis of democracy, we could state that paradigm has an empty center; not because it is internally 
empty, but more due the fact that the consistency of its internal elements and its external connections 
changes permanently. Moreover, its manner of creating analogies is filled with inconsistencies as has 
been shown above in case of the European policies to stop the flows of refugees. The different 
paradigms introduced by Agamben – people, citizen, identity, homo sacer, security, The Muslim, 
Tsunami of refugees – affect the political interstrata that connect enunciations to bodies, and vice 
versa. An attempt to define each one in its own fails. There is not one form of paradigm.  
 
In the beginning of this section (3.4.2.1) I have shown that Agamben (2000) introduces two sets of 
political categories: the old ones of the Ancien Régime and categories of a new political thinking. In 
the previous section (3.4.1) I distinguished three interstrata in connection to a politics of flight: 
politics of exile, politics of segments, and politics of life. Due to their essential differences and their 
fundamental different ways of deterritorialization these types of politics contain different forms of 
objects of thought. I have typified politics of exile as a tree-minded plane with binary tendencies. This 
plane permanently creates dual oppositional sets: Country of origin and country of arrival; east and 
  
west; north and south; the west as the land of free and the rest as the land of repression; in and out; us 
and them. The oppositions within this plane create global values in enforcing not reflective but 
determining judgments (see: 2.2.1). These trigger conflicting sentiments, like fear and security, 
splitting basic values: freedom of speech versus freedom of religion. As we have seen in Žižek’s 
(2002) analysis, within this oppositional tendency there are multiple inconsistencies. As we will see in 
the fourth chapter, sacrificing democracy for the sake of democracy is merely one exemplary case. 
Politics of exile desires its own demise, it pleads for freedom within repressive security measures. It is 
due to this capitalistic tendency that in chapter four I will, in line with Deleuze and Guattari (1983 & 
1987), typify the object of thought of this politics as axiomatic paradigms.  
 
Let me remind the reader that politics in the strict sense – macropolitics in Foucault’s analysis – is 
about who is in power and who is not part of a whole, i.e. of a community. It is all about inclusion and 
exclusion, about being a law abiding, lawful citizen or an illegal nomad. Policies define the networks 
– homogenized by categories such as women versus refugees – and thus create types of relations that 
balance on the verge of being part of and being excluded from a whole. Due to their task to ascertain 
law and order, macropolitical policies abhor the rhizome. They categorize vertically – the government 
and the people – and homogenize horizontally – the citizens of a nation-state. Yet, not al policies refer 
to oppositional or conflicting paradigms. Politics of segments – which I have typified as fascicular – 
rather functions through differencial paradigms. Identity policies create segments, which do not fully 
distance themselves from determining judgment of totalitarian regimes, but by accentuating cultural 
and national diversity they create multiple regimes of determining judgments. Politics of segments is a 
fascicular mechanism, in which several methodologies and approaches are at hand and tolerated. Here 
the idea of a ‘true’ method remains, but this time it does not refer to a total whole but to the parts 
within this whole that I will qualify in the fifth chapter as multiculturalism. 
 
The paradigms of the Ancien Régime in Agamben’s (2000) quote at the beginning of this section 
(3.4.2.1) thus function both in politics of exile as well as in politics of segments, nonetheless they 
differ in their effects. In this sense, Trump’s exclusive typification of people with Islamic background 
is more in line with the first type of politics and Kahn’s plea for inclusion more in line with the 
second type of politics. Nonetheless, they both do not question the paradigm of nation-state, in this 
case the United States of America. A politics that becomes rigid in its method is constantly seduced to 
trace a lost or corrupted origin, while being unaware of its own rhizomatic nature and past. It needs 
oppositions. Politics beyond this oppositional need has a permanent urge to deconstruct its tracing in 
order to rhizomatically map its process.  
What is the attitude of a politics that needs to move beyond this oppositional thinking; to 
move beyond the universalizing determinant judgment of axiomatic paradigms and nonconnective 
segmented determining judgments of differenciating paradigms? How do we name paradigms that 
empower reflective judgment; or in line with Agamben lead to new categories in political thinking? I 
call these in line with Agamben impotential paradigms. These are paradigms that do not desire to 
define themselves once and for all, whether globally, national or within a segment. They rather abhor 
final actualization that stagnates their movements and the intensity of their connections. They do not 
rest by the connection they make, but permanently long for new connections. They are thus not 
  
potential paradigms that long for a form of actualization, they rather implement impotentiality as the 
rhizomatic virtual reality that cannot be captured by the actuality of state of affairs. Martin Luther 
King’s dream gives in to such virtuality. Judging such dreams cynically by its effects in the state of 
affairs neglects to comprehend its impotential affects within politics.  
Such impotentiality is also sensible in Arendt’s (1958) analysis in The Human Condition. Her 
foundational notions – action and speech – are never defined. Such paradigms invite a permanent 
reflection in the same way inter-est is protected against any dogmatic content. The singularity of 
speech and action – like Agamben’s whatever singularity and coming community and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s nomadology and body without organs – radiates as an absolute deterritorializing force 
through the categories of ancient regime. They give rise to a community that expands itself without 
becoming a paranoid machine that merely functions in the binary or segmentary setting of exclusion 
and inclusion. Belonging never opposes itself to non-belonging. As Agamben, Arendt proposes a 
politics of life. Impotential paradigms do not pretend; they contain a critical attitude toward their own 
tendencies toward actualization. Through their reflective act of judgment, they critically affirm 
impotentiality of connection without reducing difference to the order of The Same, as Deleuze (1997) 
argues (as I have elaborated on in 1.4.2). It is the political gesture that such paradigms affectuate that 
fortifies my act of writing. 
 
3.4.3 What or Who is a Political Persona?  
Let me call upon you Nahid, you sensitize multiple sounds, imagine heterotopia, a face that surpasses 
our regimes of faciality, and your gestures chokes us with horror. Who are you? Who made you? 
Which politics do you represent? What shall I call you; the daughter of Venus, the planet of fogs? 
Your impotentiality is never thought. Let us map the lines of flight that you inspire.   
 
Which paradigm does answer to our question: what kind of object of thought is flight? I have 
characterized flight as many things: a concept (philosophy), a function (science) and a sensation (art). 
Yet the main exercise in this study is to evaluate how flight functions as a paradigm defining the 
radiancy of politics of flight. As you suspect, the theorem that I present here is that flight operates as 
multiple paradigms; it has the tendency to be axiomatic; the urge to differenciate; and finally, the 
virtual natality to be an impotential. Yet, in order to examine this multiplicity of flight as a paradigm 
we need to relate this object of thought to persona just as Deleuze and Guattari (1994) relate objects 
of thought to the conceptual personae, the revolutionary observers and artistic figures. Who is the 
persona of flight if its object of thought is this multiplicity of political paradigms?  
Just as paradigm, political persona functions within the interstrata of politics, connecting 
assemblages of bodies to assemblages of expressions. Paradigm and political persona are thus not 
respectively the expression and the body of political interstrata; they are both the linkage between 
assemblages of expression and assemblages of bodies. As we have seen (2.3.5) regimes of faciality 
and gesturality show how political personae interconnect assemblages of expressions to assemblages 
of bodies. Nahid’s face and women in Cologne are not merely bodies; they are interconnective 
phenomena linking discourses of sanity and insanity, sexuality and repression, to physical bodies. It is 
this liveliness of the body that distinguishes politics from the previous mentioned disciplines: 
philosophy, science and art. In politics life and its form are in immediately related. A paradigm does 
  
not only affect the way of living, but living itself. While the life of Kant is fascinating – the man who 
lived in a small town all his life yet imagined a philosophy that referred to the whole of humanity – 
Gandhi, Mandela or Malala resisted paradigms of repression immediately as living beings. It is easy 
to conclude that refugee is the persona of politics of flight. Yet as I argued in 3.1 the persona of flight 
is more complex and more intertwined than conventionally presumed. Politics of flight affects more 
lives than that of refugees alone. Yet, the manner in which this politics affects the refugees differs. 
Thus, in line with the previous distinction between paradigms it is merely self-evident to also 
distinguish different types of persona within politics of flight.  
 
What does otherness mean on a plane of flight? Words may sound the same, but they, as we have seen 
with Barthes (1982), have paradigmatic dimensions. They are multiple in their signification and due 
to their connections operate on different planes, strata and milieus. This counts for otherness as a 
word as well. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) already typified it as a potential world. Yet, as a paradigm 
it radiates not only as a potentiality, but also through discourses of segmentation. The persona Other is 
not merely the faceless face of God, the hidden holy other, as is conceptualized by Levinas. Within 
the same radiant intensity of the paradigm Otherness, the Other can become the underdog and the 
excluded sacred; for instance, pariahs. Also, the privileged citizen is the other of the non-citizen. With 
each configuration of the abstract machine, forming multiple interstratic types of political 
communities, the affect as well as the function transforms: other sense-abilities, other scientific ex-
planations emerge. Yet this otherness never absolutely materializes, in a specific body or a mental 
frame. It affects the matter of the body, but the other stays immanently virtual. The comprehension of 
the other as a challenging possibility or as a fearsome reality creates different types of personae within 
politics of flight. Politics is a milieu that is shaped by multiple rhizomatic diagrammatic lines that 
connect multiple personae. What does it mean to map this political milieu, defined by complexity and 
multiplicity of its personae?  
In order to answer this question, let us return to Arendt’s (1958) conception of a who (1.3.3). 
In The Human Condition she refers to action as a political process in which men lose their whatness 
as living beings or producing beings and become whos that are exposed in a public space. These whos 
are not entities that decide to be political or not, or decides when and how. As political personae, they 
unfold themselves as pure inter-esse: in-betweenness that radiates, never leaving the realm of politics. 
Following Arendt, a political actor is more alive than a laborer or a worker. In words of Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987), they give in to the rhizomatic temperament of a body without organs; and in words of 
Agamben (2000) they experience a political life as form-of-life. This hyphenation also endures in 
Michelle Fine’s (1994) analysis when she states that our scientific and epistemological as well as 
cultural, political and ethical thinking must surpass the binary setting of selfness and otherness; in 
which both the self and other are doomed to a homogeneous thinking. Through the hyphen in-between 
I-other she argues we finally implement contextuality within thinking in which an approach of each 
person becomes a singular approach instead of a particular manifestation of a general idea of an 
identity. Fine thus disposes of the idea of an objective manner of researching. In a sense, she pleads 
for a permanent revolutionary tendency within science. Fine states that a researcher must always 
question her way of observation. The contextuality of the researcher is always intertwined with her 
manner of approach. My way of approach, my choice for a political gesturality, and my accentuation 
  
of possible themes are not accidental; but they emerge from a life, a life that is connected to politics 
and refuge as well as philosophy.  
 
How does life sensitize itself within politics of flight? Mohamed Bouazizi and before him the student 
Jan Palach, and recently the Tibetan monks burned themselves alive. Refugees commit suicide in 
refugee camps. Then there are those who risk their lives, yet survive. Ghandi starved himself, Nelson 
Mandela was imprisoned, Malala Yousafzai got shot in the head, Nahid was tortured, the women in 
Cologne were assaulted. An idea on life, no matter how particular or general it seems to be, in its 
singular modes and possibilities, effectuates the formation and the transformation of a political 
community and bodies. In these bodies life itself is at risk, not a particular isolated life, but life in 
connection to others. From this perspective, Arendt’s clear distinction between the political and the 
private, and the unambiguous dissimilarity between life, work and action, are in contrast to her own 
experiences. It was the harshness of her life as an outcast and refugee within the homogenizing forces 
that has made her a political thinker par excellence. It was her need of physical survival that forced 
her to criticize political thinking and human rights. Lefort (1988) states that when Arendt in her 
interview with Günter Gauss declares that due to the events in Germany in 1933 she is shocked and 
feels responsibility, she connects thought on politics to a life experience. Lefort also adequately states: 
“This is neither an anecdotal fact nor a biographical detail. The feeling that she was responsible, that 
she had to respond to the fearful challenge of totalitarianism made her aware of the motor force 
behind all thought” (p. 46). Arendt’s life is more than anything a political life. In other words, life – 
which is, as we have seen in the first chapter, always connective – is always related to political 
expression. It is through her thought on life and politics that I can differentiate different personae 
within politics of flight.  
 
3.4.3.1 Politics of Exile: Civic Subjects and Limbic Lives  
Let us start with the totalitarian regime that is characteristic of politics of exile. A regime defined by 
its oppositional axiomatic paradigms dividing a community spatially in terms of here – the homeland 
or Heimat – and there, in terms of us versus them. This is the world that Arendt (1958 & 1968) has 
examined and that she defines as the realm of the social. It is a community in which according to 
Agamben (1998 & 2000) life is fully detached from its form through paradigms of the ancient regime 
such as homo sacer and sovereignty. Arendt (1978a) argues that within this community the other as 
the one that does not answer to the order is forced into an either/or: being a pariah or being a parvenu. 
She calls both these figures social phenomena due to the fact that they both do not interact within the 
political: as pariah, they are isolated and excluded and as parvenu they adjust fully to the order by 
disposing themselves of every element that makes them different. Both pariah and parvenu lose their 
singular character, by being either homogenized by isolation or by adjustment to the image of an ideal 
citizen. The Prime Minister of The Netherlands Mark Rutte (2017) wrote a letter to the Dutch 
electorate in which he stated that Dutch citizens are characterized by ‘normal’ behavior while never 
defining what this ‘normality’ indicates. 
Pariahs and parvenus as political figures do not expose their whoness but are merely a 
whatness; in terms of Arendt merely objects rather than political subjects acting and speaking 
intersubjectively. In a sense, these two figures refer to Agamben’s (1998) two paradigms of ancient 
  
regime: homo sacer and sovereign. Homo sacer relates to the bodies that are excluded and sovereign 
refers to the bodies that decide on how paradigms of exclusion radiate, i.e. decisively determine both 
body and mind of the others. Pariah and parvenu are excluded from the order of the sovereign; their 
individuality is not allowed to express itself within the order. Parvenus just differ in the manner they 
define their survival. They adjust by forgetting their excluded background. Parvenu is thus not part of 
the majority, but an adjusted politically dead subject within the majority. While their essence consists 
of forgetting their pariah-background, the sovereign majority ensures that they will never forget it 
fully. 
 
The pariah Jew and the parvenu Jew are in the same boat, rowing desperately in 
the same angry sea. Both are branded with the same mark; both alike are outlaws. 
Today the truth has come home: there is no protection in heaven or earth against 
bare murder, and a man can be driven at any moment from the streets and broad 
places once open to all. Along last, it has become clear that the ‘senseless 
freedom’ of the individual merely paves the way for the senseless suffering of his 
entire people (Arendt, 1978a, p. 121).  
 
Thus, despite the discursive differences we cannot divide personae of politics of exile merely into 
pariah and parvenu. Yet, the two ‘ancient’ terms – homo sacer and sovereign – within the dual 
oppositional setting of totalitarianism invite us to pinpoint two other types of personae. Given my 
previous examples, the dual set of citizen and non-citizen/denizen/stateless alien/sans papier/illegals 
seems to be the obvious choice. These all can be situated within the discourse of citizenship and 
nation-state with its claim on respectively autonomy and sovereignty. Yet, with these two types of 
persona I do not only refer to the people with or without a proper passport. Nahid is, legally spoken, a 
European citizen; and not all refugees are stateless.  
The second set that presents itself is the people and the non-people. This distinction however 
seems problematic due to the fact that people suggests a collective. Yet, in this study the term people 
is used as a paradigm and the term persona refers to a collective as well as an individual body. 
Moreover, the distinction between the two personae – people/non-people – thus relates to a broader 
discourse that reaches beyond the duality between a collective versus an individual, but also beyond 
that of legal versus illegal. As paradigms, these must refer to the multifaceted spectrum of politics, 
including social and cultural interactions that subjectify bodies through policies’ formalizations and 
spectacular visualization. When all this is taken into account the political personae I envision are civic 
subjects and limbic lives. The first, civic subjects, are personae that signify the paradigm of 
sovereignty. They represent law and order, not only legally and politically, but also ethically, 
culturally and socially. In words of Foucault they are the docile subjects that present the norm, 
normality, and civilization. As we saw in case of Cologne, defending the rights of women is not 
introduced as something that we all must fight for, but as a right that is merely a product of western 
civilization; and its exclusive and excluding attack on Muslim males neglects the inherent misogyny 
within European civilization itself. While the majority creates its own illusion of normality, the other 
is doomed to barbaric stereotyping. Female refugees with severe sexual abuse background bear 
witness to lives that are forgotten by all orders. If they tell their tale of rape, they risk being banned by 
  
their families and if they do not, they risk rejection of their asylum request. Nonetheless telling their 
tale is never a guarantee for entrance; they need to prove their rape.19 And even if their rape gets 
acknowledged they do not escape the judgment of a vicious misogynistic culture. They implicitly 
become guilty of their exclusion. They are the limbic lives par excellence: individuals, as we will see 
in the fourth chapter, that are not merely prohibited to enter a community, but even more severely 
from being admitted to any formation of a community. While the philosophical, scientific and artistic 
figures unfold and are enveloped in their ‘objects’ – concept, function, sensation – these political 
figures pulsate the radiancy of the paradigm of exclusion. These personae are the inhabitants of 
limbo’s, i.e. of heterotopias that are designated as peripheries by the utopic imagination of totalitarian 
idealism. As we will see in the fourth chapter, refugees in refugee camps are in terms of Agamben 
exemplary cases of these personae of limbic heterotopias; nonetheless they are not the only ones 
suffering from the I versus other binary set of politics of exile.  
 
3.4.3.2 Politics of Segments: Differenciated Identities and Multipolar Individuals 
The universal agency of the majority – let us classify them for this moment as human, white, 
heterosexual, highly-educated, law-abiding, child-producing, non-disabled, non-disturbed, non-
traumatized, middle-aged, middle to upper class, Christian or secular, monogamous, married 
working male citizen – has often been disputed. As I already argued in the first chapter (1.1) the 21st 
century is the age of minorities. Minorities – perhaps not necessarily in gaining power, but within the 
regime of visibility – have gained terrain over the majority. Within a politics of segments minorities 
can dispute the politics of exile, yet differently than within a politics of life. In the fifth chapter I will 
elaborate on the first type of minority through the paradigm of majoritarian minority. This type of 
minority depends dialectically on the majority in order to define itself. So, if we define majority as the 
articulation of normalization, minorities are characterized by at least one of its traits ex negativo: that 
is the non-whites, women, LGBTQQIAAP+20’s, childless individuals, poor, childlike, elderly, neuro-
typical and/or physically challenged people, unemployed and polygamists. The sum of these 
minorities is by far larger than the presupposed majority. Thus, majority is not about numbers, the 
quantity21 of the matter, but about the traits that qualify or appreciates something as ‘normal’. Yet, 
the manner in which these so-called a-typical individuals resist differs. Within the politics of 
segments minorities resist by creating segmentalized territories in which they do not resist their 
counter-identification – they do not resist the definition of who they are as such – but rather the 
appreciation of this anormality within the society. Multiculturalism thus introduces – especially in 
connection to sexual, ethnic and cultural background – an exclusive space within the society for 
different types of communities. Within these communities however the power of normalization is not 
                                                     
19 See on this issue also Baillot, Cowan, & Munro & 2012 and Refugee Council 2009. 
20 Stands for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered, Queer, Questioning, Intersex, Asexual, Allies and Pansexual +…. 
21 Along with Deleuze and Guattari, Patton (2000) argues that the difference between minorities that depend on the majority 
for their formation is a quantitative difference while the difference between majorities and minorities that are independent 
from this homogeneous formation is a qualitative difference (p. 48). I think this distinction between quantitative and 
qualitative is nevertheless problematic. Although minoritarian minorities never distinguish themselves on a quantitative 
level, the formation of majoritarian minorities is quantitative as well as qualitative. 
  
abandoned. Multiculturalism, as will be shown in the fifth chapter, introduces fragmentary ideas on 
normality within an I versus others discourse. As Geldof (2013) argues, within the European cities 
persons that do not belong to one of the segments are excluded from all segments, due to rigid and 
absolute defined understanding of the segments of multiculturalism. He also argues that social and 
economic problems become a problem of a segment within a society instead of a nationwide or global 
problem. Thus, politics of segments also introduces two types of persona: differenciated identities – 
subjects that are defined, included, civilized and normalized within a segment – and multipolar 
individuals – individuals that surpass the order of segmentation and hence therefore experience 
exclusion. These multipolar individuals surpass the nonconnective relativistic manner of agency of 
politics of segments; they rather experience connectivity between the segments. In The Netherlands, 
especially a new generation suffers from this exclusion; their lives as we will see cannot be captured 
within one segment. They experience hostility from all sides. In other words, this politics has its own 
multiple forms of pariahs and parvenus; their own way of reducing an individual as a who to multiple 
whatnesses.  
 
3.4.3.3 Politics of Life: Singular Assemblages 
The above-mentioned minorities nonetheless also resist in another manner. There are those who resist 
the identification as such, identification of their sexuality, ethnicity, cultural or spiritual affinities, 
exposing a who in Arendtians sense. She is perhaps herself a fine example of what she calls conscious 
pariah. This political figure as Arendt (1978a) argues, does not only resist the order of the majority but 
is eventually also critical toward the communities that define its belonging through rigid forms of 
identification. A conscious pariah is also critical in relation to pariah and parvenu (pp. 64-66). 
Arendt’s (1995) Men in Dark Times is a tribute to conscious pariahs such as Rosa Luxemburg, her 
dear friend Walter Benjamin and her beloved teacher Karl Jaspers. It was in accordance with her 
teacher’s attitude that Arendt could experience how a member of a so-called majority could become 
another type of minority. Deleuze and Guattari (1986 & 1987) also speak of a type of minority that 
resists the regime of identification as such, proposing a true sense of singularity within political 
relationality. In line with their thought I call this second type of minority: minoritarian minority. 
Conscious pariahs are individuals that behave extraordinarily in the darkest times. The personae of 
politics of life are thus, as we will see in the sixth chapter, neither a universal nor a segmented 
relativistic modification of agencement, but relational and singular. It is within the personae of this 
politics that Arendt’s who, Deleuze and Guattari’s body without organs, and Agamben’s whatever 
being intertwine. It is within a contextualized and differentiated singularity that in Fine’s (1994) 
words the hyphen in-between I-other can create a life beyond the rupture between life and its form. I 
call these personae singular assemblages. They are those who love to live in an Arendtian world. 
This idea of loving the world – amor mundi – has been a drive for my approach of politics of 
flight. Arendt, despite everything, never gave up loving the world. Until her last breath, she kept 
thinking through this love. The idea was already present in her dissertation. In Love and Saint 
Augustine Arendt (1996) explains that, although Augustine introduces the idea of individuality, he at 
the same time sacrifices this sense of an I in his devotion for the Creator. The I that connects itself to 
its Creator must do this through self-denial in overcoming its fear of death, which belongs to the 
worldly life. According to Augustine one must not devote oneself to the world but to the Creator and 
  
the future that awaits it. Yet, this self-denial is motivated by a specific form of desire: love. And each 
love, of the world or for thy neighbor, and even the love for oneself, is for the sake of the loving act 
itself, an act that eventually connects the individual to the divine. According to Augustine love is not 
a choice but a desire that befalls us. Love creates fearlessness due to its exposition of a future to 
come; in Augustine’s case a future in which the I evaporates in its devotional focus. The existence of 
men, that lingers between not-yet and no-more, between birth and death, is thus described as a 
becoming. The life of men is a process of change. It is the very existence of men that obstructs its 
being, or a sense of essence. Existence is the lack of essence. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari, the 
only thing that really exists is a body without organs. “So long as men exists, he is not” (p. 26). 
Essence (the ability to be) belongs to God while men merely can exist temporarily. According to 
Arendt, this leads Augustine to conclude that while God is, men become. 
 
Everything that is created exists in the mode of becoming … Since created things 
have come into existence, they change and alter … Strictly speaking, their mode of 
being is neither Being nor non-Being, but something in between (p. 52). 
  
How does love of the divine and essence-less becoming, in which men although living in the world 
distance themselves from the world, relate to Arendt’s notion of amor mundi? Arendt simply states 
that love in Augustine’s work is not of the world, but in the world of the divine. Nevertheless, this 
form of love demands in its being in the world a specific attitude. From Augustine’s Christian 
perspective this love creates a community of faith. This does not limit itself to the true and just 
believer, since the sacrifice of Christ does not limit itself to some men but to all men. The community 
that is based on such faith thus creates a radical possibility through which each person relates 
individually to all others as individuals. This universality binds us in twofold manner. First through 
Adam mankind is shamefully distanced from God, creating the world of men; second, through Christ 
men has become aware of his sin, and is related to this everlasting sin. The sin does not undo the past 
that men owe to Adam, but redefines it into another order, Arendt states. Men distance themselves 
from the world through their life in the world. The distancing from the world thus paradoxically can 
only emerge from radically relating to all possible individuals in the world.  
It is crucial to note that for Augustine the love of the other is not love for mankind, or for a 
shared humanity. Being-human is that which men have gained through sinful Adam. The love is for 
the sake of the connection between each individual to his Creator, the radical possibility between each 
human and its God. Therefore, loving thy neighbor – at least from the perspective of Augustine – does 
not literally mean the person next door, but the closeness that each individual radically shares with all 
others, both foes and enemies, in connection to the Creator. There is no choice in this relationality. 
We are connected radically. It is this radical link that translates itself into Arendt’s idea of amor 
mundi. On a non-metaphysical level the plurality and becoming is connected to this radical bond 
between men. Yet, Arendt (1958) does not bind men through their shared connection to a Creator, in 
shame or sinfulness, but through their ‘shared’ difference.  
 
It is in this idea of shared difference that the love of the world, the urge to live in the world, becomes 
a political rather than a religious matter in Arendt’s (1958) later discussions. The act of distinguishing 
  
and in a sense protecting the world – which for her is the only milieu of politics – has been the main 
drive of Arendt’s political and philosophical work. In The Human Condition amor mundi is not 
something done for the sake of another divine world. The love of the world becomes a love in the 
world for the world itself. A love for a political world in which people unfold another political 
gesturality in acting and speaking; a world in which men are not reduced to a whatness, given an 
essence, but unfold as a who, given its becoming. This study thus, in its critique, does not write 
against Arendt, but in love for her life and thought writes through her thinking, and approaches her – 
her efforts, suffering, resistance despite the cost of marginality – as a singular assemblage par 
excellence. She is a child of multiple politics. The question is: 
 
How do we expose the multiplicity within politics of flight? 
  
 
 
Part two: Exposition of Milieus 
Unfolding Milieus within Politics of Flight 
 
 
 
No, no, no, no 
I did not become someone different 
I did not want to be 
But I’m new here   
Will you show me around?   
 
No matter how far wrong you've gone   
You can always turn around   
 
Met a woman in a bar   
I told her I was hard to get to know   
And near impossible to forget   
She said I had an ego on me, the size of Texas 
 
Well, I’m new here and I forget   
Does that mean big or small?   
 
No matter how far wrong you've gone   
You can always turn around 
 
And I’m shedding plates like a snake   
And it may be crazy   
But I’m the closest thing I have   
To a voice of reason 
 
Turn around, turn around, turn around   
And you may come full circle   
And be new here again 
 
Gil Scott-Heron (2010)  
I’m New Here 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Politics of Exile 
 
Fury said to a mouse,  
That he met in the house, 
‘Let us both go to law: I will prosecute you. 
Come, I’ll take no denial;  
We must have a trial:  
For really this morning I’ve nothing to do.’ 
Said the mouse to the cur,  
‘Such a trial, dear Sir,  
With no jury or judge, would be wasting our 
breath.’ 
‘I’ll be judge, I’ll be jury,’ Said cunning old Fury: 
 ‘I’ll try the whole cause, and condemn you to 
death’  
(Carroll, 1982, p. 35). 
 
4.1 The Protagonist of State of Emergency 
 
Exile is an in-between territory where citizenship and belonging remains undecided. Axiomatic 
paradigms (as I explained in 3.4.2.3) determine the evaluation of refuge and fleeing. How to map and 
unfold a milieu of exile? What kind of discourse is applied and what kind of politics does it entail? Or 
rather is politics as a coherent discourse of action and speech even possible in a politics of exile? In 
Means without End Agamben (2000) states that politics has become inferior to other domains, such as 
economics, religion and law. Politics, according to him, has lost sight of its ontological status. This is 
due to political transformations that have made the application of conventional political categories 
meaningless. Agamben’s implementation of notions such as refugee, being-in-language and 
gesturality asks for a politico-philosophical critique, in which ancient political categories such as the 
state of exception, the concentration camp, nation-state and citizenship are revalued and combined 
with new categories that will be elaborated on in the final chapter. These ancient so-called universal 
categories still insist inadequately in ever more mobile territories, due to historically recent 
globalization and digitalization. To counter this insistence Agamben introduces new political issues 
and forms of communication. He agrees with Arendt’s prediction of the loss of politics by arguing that 
coherent political communication has ceased to exist. However, Agamben does not search for answers 
in history as Arendt does. In his work natality is the ability to be born again and again as that which 
  
always has to come. This is the impotential paradigm (see: 3.4.2.3) that motivates a community that is 
about to unfold. This configuration will be dealt with in the final chapter. 
Agamben’s critical analysis on contemporary politics is nonetheless inspired by Arendt’s 
reflections on totalitarianism and her evaluation of the illusion of human rights. Agamben (1998 & 
2005) is also moved by Walter Benjamin’s analysis of the contradictory permanence of the State of 
Emergency and Michel Foucault’s analysis of biopolitics as the underlying grid of the disconnection 
between life (zoē) and form of life (bios). Agamben describes our current political space as a zone in 
which axiomatic paradigms such as non-citizen and citizen, law and fact, inclusion and exclusion, 
truth and lie are diffusely instrumentalized and as a result have become indistinctive. The exclusive 
meaning and binary tendencies of these paradigms is veiled in a zone of indistinction.1  The notion of 
refuge is crucial in this analysis, not because of its productive potential that could enrich the society or 
as an icon for juridical or social experiments, but rather as a political paradigm. This emerges 
simultaneously with a political persona: refugee. According to Agamben (2000) it is this figure who 
becomes the protagonist in political affairs of our time.  
 
It is even possible ... to ... build our political philosophy anew starting from the one 
and only figure of the refugee (p. 16). 
 
The insistence of ancient political categories creates a milieu in which the refugee becomes the limbic 
lives. In his lectures Agamben pleads for a politics that highlights this figure in order to break through 
this form of politics. In this chapter the axiomatic structure of such a politics, as it has been introduced 
in the third chapter, is mapped out. How do notions such as migrant and refugee function within the 
discourse on exile, given the fact that refuge, just as flight, is a multifaceted paradigm. I will start with 
a more detailed examination of an axiomatic paradigm in order to explain a politics of exile in 
connection to flight and refuge. The manner in which the axiomatic paradigm of exile affects political 
territories is examined in 4.2. This section elaborates on the constitution of territories within a 
totalitarian setting. Arendt’s reflections on totalitarianism have influenced Agamben’s thought 
extensively. Nevertheless, Agamben’s political reflection is above all a combination of different 
philosophies in which different thinkers – such as Heidegger, Averroës, Aristotle, Benjamin, Schmitt, 
Blanchot, Arendt and Foucault – are connected. On top of that in his reflections different styles, 
disciplines and historical events are combined. Paradigms such as homo sacer, a Roman juridical 
subject referring to a person who has been abandoned from a territory by the law of men as well as the 
law of Gods, and Greek terms such as zoē (naked life) and bios (political life) are used to elaborate on 
the paradigmatic presuppositions of the current refugee camps. Agamben’s notions refer explicitly to 
contemporary politics, outlining a zone of indistinction in which the classical bifurcations, such as law 
and fact, inside and outside, life and death, political and apolitical, become blur. What kind of a milieu 
gives rise to an axiomatic paradigm like homo sacer and its type of radiancy? In order to keynote 
some crucial traits of a politics of exile I will enhance Agamben’s analysis with three crucial notions 
                                                     
1 The zone of indistinction is, explicitly and implicitly, a crucial theme in various works of Agamben. See for example: Homo 
Sacer, Remnants of Auschwitz and Means without End. 
 
  
that are developed by his fellow travellers: the Arendtian (1968) concept of totalitarianism, the 
concept of biopolitics of Michel Foucault (1978), and the concept of control society by Gilles Deleuze 
(1995). In terms of the fourfold of Deleuze and Guattari this concerns the form of content.  
 In 4.3 the form of expression of a milieu of exile is exposed. How are paradigms such as law 
and identity expressed within politics of exile? Through Agamben’s vocabulary in this section I will 
argue that paradigms such as law and grammar define the form of expression within totalitarian state 
as a form of truthness. Due to this it creates endless zones of expressions that do not belong to its 
form. Law creates its own lawlessness.     
 In 4.4 the axiomatic paradigm of camp, one of Agamben’s crucial notions, is explored. How 
does the camp, not merely as a physical territory, but more specific as a matter of expression create 
lawless spaces? In the final section 4.5 it is argued that the inhabitants of camps as matter of content 
become limbic lives of such a totalitarian territory. I speak of limbic lives instead of limbic bodies due 
to the fact that this persona does not only appear as an assemblage of body; but rather functions as an 
interstrata in-between assemblages of enunciation and assemblages of expression. This persona 
sensitizes a specific discrepancy in-between form and matter within a state of totalitarianism.  This 
will lead to the conclusion that a politics of exile operates in an axiomatic way that excludes life from 
its forms. This politics represses a potentiality of life and its multifaceted expression. After having 
explained how this silencing of bodies is the result of inconsistent policies, in the final paragraph I will 
raise the question as to how the resistance of these limbic lives creates another milieu. With the aid of 
Rancière (2004), I will argue that the analysis of the exclusion within politics must always be 
accompanied with the analysis of the multiple effects of the reality of unavoidable inclusion.  
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4.2 Territory and Access 
- Capitalistic isomorphic state 
territories and international 
nationalism  
- Democracy: tyranny of 
majority/atomized masses and 
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- Consistency of negation: here 
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- Human rights  homo sacer 
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4.4 LL: Unheard voices 
- Egalitarian equality 
- Statistics and bureaucracy 
- Blood and soil: negligence and 
resentment 
- Deformed statements 
- Fortune seeker: politics versus 
economy 
- Hell of cacophonic silence 
- Camp: expression of a state of being 
- Gesture of torture: police and homo 
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4.5 LL: Exiled Bodies 
- Biopolitics: the living dead 
- Limbic bodies 
- Zoē versus bios 
- Complete witness 
- Purification: state of racism 
- Non-place: faceless face 
- New ethics of limbic lives 
- Resisting bodies: gestures and faces 
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4.2 Territory and Access  
 
4.2.1 The State and its Overcoding Radiancy 
In this section I will elaborate on the form of content of politics of exile. First, I will define this form 
as a nation-state with capitalistic tendencies. It is within this amalgamation that I argue that within 
politics of exile nationalism and internationalism go hand in hand. Second, through Arendt’s analysis 
of violence and power I will define democracy in the setting of totalitarianism as the tyranny of 
majority. This is due to the tendency of politics of exile to create homogeneous masses; here in the 
center as well as there in the peripheries. Hereafter, I will argue that these masses rather are gathered 
due to a sense of negation instead of connection. Finally, it is argued that this force of negation will 
lead to multiple forms of exclusion within politics of exile.  
 
  
Politics of exile is an interstratum. It effects and connects assemblages of bodies and assemblages of 
expression. It territorializes the earth, the body without organs, by an act of capture, isolating and 
segmenting a territorial form of matter, a substance, articulating itself in territorial axiomatic 
paradigms such as (nation-)states, country of origin, country of arrival, borders, inhabitants and 
foreign policy. Through axiomatic paradigms such policy assumes clear boundaries, clear definitions 
and opposition between different territories. Although this interstratum finds itself, as any other 
interstratum, on the chaotic surface of a body without organs, it creates a shield around itself in order 
to totalize the multiplicity and the connectivity around it as well as to ignore the multiplicity within its 
borders. A politics of exile operates from within, circling as it were around an imaginary center that 
extends its segmentational forces.  
 
Strata are Layers, Belts. They consist of giving form to matters, of imprisoning 
intensities or locking singularities into systems of resonance and redundancy, of 
producing upon the body of the earth molecules large and small and organizing 
them into molar aggregates. Strata are acts of capture, they are like ‘black holes’ or 
occlusions striving to seize whatever comes within their reach. They operate by 
coding and territorialization upon the earth; they proceed simultaneously by code 
and by territoriality (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 40). 
 
Every territorialization triggers its specific deterritorializing effects. Striving to seize whatever comes 
into reach through its radiance. In this chapter I argue that politics of exile is radiant in a contradictory 
manner. On the one hand, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, it operates as a black hole by absorbing 
ideas – no matter how farfetched – and transforms these ideas permanently into axiomatic paradigms. 
On the other hand, this interstratum has a centrifugal force. It permanently forces all imperfection 
towards the peripheries, creating a state of exile in order to establish its adequate identity. It is a form 
of politics where the distinction between le politique and la politique, between force and power 
becomes obscure, as already suspected by Lefort (1988). The institutions are the engines of political 
thought and political deliberations manifest the logic of exclusion. It is however too premature a 
conclusion that the politics of exile is merely a line of segmentation. As we will see later, elaborating 
on the practice of segmenting, it is driven by an urge to destroy all imperfections, and thus also creates 
a form of absolute flight-line that ruptures the multiplicity and connectivity of the BWO. 
 
In order to investigate a politics of exile we have to ask the obvious question in our present political 
context that is problematized within for instance the European context: what is a sovereign nation-
state? Deleuze and Guattari (1987) state that the “theses on the origin of the State are always 
tautological … We are always brought back to the idea of a State that comes into the world fully 
formed and rises up in a single stroke, the unconditioned Urstaat” (p. 427). However, in a 
genealogical analysis a state emerges from an idea with a temporal and special consistency, whether 
juridical, ideological or territorial. Deleuze and Guattari speak about a threshold of consistency. This 
refers to the idea that each formation, despite its tendency to unite and insure the security of the 
included – civic subjects – remains on a threshold through which the uncalculated and the non-
included remain invasive – limbic lives. They distinguish between two types of threshold of 
  
consistencies: towns and states. Towns are territorial networks, or what Deleuze and Guattari label as 
phenomena of transconsistency. Towns polarize internal flows as well as the flowing through 
entrances and exits. The immensity of networks in Hong Kong is a fine example. While towns operate 
out of the middle and through horizontal lines, the State objectifies those territories from a hierarchical 
vertical line. Deleuze and Guattari define the State as a phenomenon of intraconsistency that 
effectuates the resonance of multiple points, “points that are not necessarily already town-poles but 
very diverse points of order, geographic, ethnic, linguistic, moral, economic, technological 
particularities” (p. 433). States are by Deleuze and Guattari defined as apparatuses of capture that 
deterritorialize the earth in their attempt to create a homogeneous society, based on a closed territory 
(pp. 427-435). Thus, while some of the inhabitants of London plead for a network, Brexit appears 
within the logic of state through the axiomatic paradigm: us versus them.  
 
States are not at all transcendent paradigms of an overcoding but immanent models 
of realization for an axiomatic or decoded flows (p. 455). 
 
Within this perspective a politics of exile can be described as a milieu in which the State functions 
through the radiancy of its paradigms, which function axiomatically. That territorial entity, which is 
called nation-state, thus rests on the idea of an axiomatic collective subjectivity – and a defined 
persona: civic subject – in which the nation and the people simultaneously function by repetitive 
patterns as a refrain (p. 456). The national anthem is the most explicit form of expression of this 
refraining. In case of The Netherlands the emphasis on this anthem – which was more implicit before 
– changed due to explicit nationalistic discourse; for example, during integration courses. 
 
Through repeating some gestures and not others, or through being orientated in 
some directions and not others, bodies become contorted; they get twisted into 
shapes that enable some action only insofar as they restrict capacity for other kinds 
of action (Ahmed, 2014, p.145). 
 
In line with Deleuze and Guattari (1987), we could also state that the refrain of a nation-state relates to 
modern international political affairs, which they characterize as capitalistic. Once we label this as a 
market-State, it appears – next to town and state – as the third form of threshold of consistency.2  
Capitalism connects different types of states: totalitarian, bureaucratic, monarchy, and democratic 
states. First, it has a tendency to permanently add and subtract new axioms. Second, this saturation 
within the process of capitalism is always relative. Capitalism is a permanent immanent struggle in 
order to expand borders, or fill the gaps. Third, capitalism creates models or isomorphic traits that 
become transportable within different types of states. Even socialist states could not escape these 
models, due to the fact that these models dominate the process of exchange. The examples are not only 
China or Russia, but economic boycott of countries such as Cuba and Iran shows the immensity of 
economic force of capitalism to determine policies of such countries. Fourth, power that is installed by 
capitalistic regimes always tends to widen its reach beyond what its axioms initially define as 
                                                     
2 In plateau 13 of A Thousand Plateaus they differentiate only two thresholds, the town and the state.  
  
territorial. Nevertheless, capitalism simultaneously function from a center and by the principle of 
unequal exchange toward the subjects that have no access to this center. These are, from the 
perspective of the majority, the minorities. The included middle and the minorities on the periphery are 
the fifth and sixth traits of global capitalism. Un-included or not-fully-included minorities motorize 
the formation of undecidable propositions, the final trait of capitalism, according to Deleuze and 
Guattari.  
It is through this third articulation of a threshold – capitalism – that different types of states, 
heterogeneous but nevertheless isomorphic, are encompassed in a global political procedure. Traits of 
this political procedure are, as we will see later on, relevant for our understanding of processes of 
politics of exile and its totalitarian state of affairs, which are by no means limited to one form of 
community. The undecidability of the above-mentioned propositions cannot disappear within the logic 
of capitalism. The unpredictability is inherent and permanent to capitalism. Yet, capitalism always 
creates new paradigms in order to deal with such unpredictability. In words of Agamben (2002 & 
2009), these paradigms function as an ex-ample, an outside phenomenon functioning without rules 
while defining the rules of engagement within capitalistic states. Most slogans in the election of 2017 
in The Netherlands on ethical issues such as elderly-care, social-care of vulnerable members of 
society, education and global state of refugees, were not based on factors that play crucial role in these 
ethical areas, but on the economic feasibility of the matter.  
Nonetheless Deleuze and Guattari (1987) also argue that there are undecidable propositions – 
impotential paradigms – creating other forms of consistency that in relation to this third threshold of 
consistency function as revolutionary flight lines that infiltrate the capitalistic state of affairs (pp. 461-
473). 
 
From this standpoint, when we talk about ‘undecidable propositions,’ we are not 
referring to the uncertainty of the results, which is necessarily a part of every 
system. We are referring, on the contrary, to the coexistence and inseparability of 
that which the system conjugates, and that which never ceases to escape it 
following lines of flight that are themselves connectable. The undecidable is the 
germ and locus par excellence of revolutionary decisions (p. 473). 
 
Nevertheless, the question remains whether a global state of affairs merely characterized as capitalistic 
is sufficient in order to map out adequately and affirmatively the state of migrants and refugees. It 
appears that the more globally connected and communicative we get, the more intense becomes the 
desire for a small closed community as a nation-state where an exclusive group of people is connected 
to a certain territory with a specific history. Schinkel (2011) states that the moment that nationalism 
loses its natural implementation of a ‘we’; it starts more severely implementing a ‘we’ (p. 16). “Social 
hypochondria is the convulsive fixation of a social body on its possible unity-threatening diseases, in 
order to turn the attention of its coming death away” (p. 25, Translation TR). This is not only visible in 
the rise of ultra-nationalistic parties during the last two decades, but also for example in the 
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and former Soviet Union. Even the minorities, which have 
been defined as such by the logic of nation-states, function within this logic, using the same arguments 
in order to manifest themselves and gain rights for their people, such as has been the case with Bosnia 
  
and Palestine. The president of the state of Palestine Mahmoud Abbas’ plea in 2011 for the 
acknowledgement of a nation-state by the international community shows the complexity and 
inconsistency of the world that we are living in. Palestinians know as no other that nowadays only 
through international relations a people can be acknowledged as a sovereign community and it is only 
through being defined as a nation-state that a people can be recognized internationally.  
 
What we could call nationalism thus is not the opposite of internationalism, but by its very essence is 
defined in relation to international affairs. Nor are nationalism and the desire for the founding of a 
nation-state a trait of majority against minorities or migrant communities. The nationalistic sentiments 
of some minorities with a Turkish background in Europe in 2016, accusing Gülen supporters of the 
coupe d’état in Turkey, is a good example. Minorities can share with the majority the tendency to 
statism and thus long to become majorities themselves instead of creating a multiple layered society of 
communities. What thus still defines a politics of exile is this majoritarian longing, thus becoming-
majority,3  more than being one. Furthermore, nationalism is not necessarily defined through the 
axiomatic paradigms of ethnicity or nationality. As George Orwell (2007) eloquently shows, 
nationalism is a “habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole 
blocks of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labeled ‘good’ or ‘bad,’” which is 
according to him done due to multiple paradigms such as religion, culture, democracy or class, and 
even by merely being against something or all things without the care to define oneself. Nationalism is 
thus not necessarily bound to an existing country or community. In that sense Orwell differentiates 
nationalism from patriotism, which is rather defensive by the individual appreciation of a way of life. 
Nationalism instead is offensive in its urge for power and its need to diminish individual’s sense of 
politics. This shows the centrifugal tendency of nationalistic discourse; it is not based on what one 
wants but rather refers to that what it does not want.4 The Erdogan’s mass imprisonment of people in 
heterotopia called prison is merely one example. What is negated is disagreement within inter-speech. 
 
Thus, nationalism with its local logic is not beyond the global tendencies of capitalism.  Erdogan’s use 
of national security, as an axiomatic paradigm in order to exclude the other, saturates the Western 
vocabulary on the matter. It is copy: a connection through an isomorphic model. Nationalism, as a 
state affair, does not map out networks, but functions as a refrain of vertical relationality repeating 
itself around the globe. Tasmin Lorraine (2011) states: “capitalism has precipitated an unraveling of 
cultures, reducing all cultural difference to a set of variables that can be inserted into a globalizing 
                                                     
3 I am aware of the fact that the term becoming in Deleuze and Guattari’s thought can never be associated with the paradigm 
of majority, but rather minorities such as becoming-women, becoming-child, becoming-animal or the becoming-minority. 
Nevertheless, distancing oneself from the moral point of view and by understanding that flight-lines could develop multiple 
ways, this becoming could become a trait of minorities as well as majorities. Yet, the types of becomings essentially differ 
from one another. While totalitarian becoming strives to become a being, Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming overflow being 
and do not long to end their process of belonging. 
4  This was also the case with patriotic protests against the United States war against terror. Patriots with multiple 
backgrounds and religious preferences protested against the war in Iraq due to their belief in the American way of life and the 
fear that the participation of US as a nation in other countries was unfair due to the monopoly of power by the West, 
especially the US. See for an example: Freeman, 2003.  
  
axiomatic that welcomes difference without being affected by it” (p. 44).  The paradigm of security is 
never defined. We don’t know when we are safe, or what security means. We just identify a growing 
number of situations that makes us insecure. Both Bush presidents – father and son – justified their 
military interventions elsewhere – Middle East – for the so-called safety of national security. 
 
4.2.2 A-political Movements 
How does the totalitarian state enter this picture? It is exactly this urge of power and this longing for 
territorial expansion that gave rise to the totalitarian state. How do we approach the totalitarian milieu? 
It is through Arendt’s discussions of totalitarianism that I intend to set apart the further axiomatic 
paradigms that form the content of politics of exile.  
 
The elements of totalitarianism comprise its origins, if by origins we do not 
understand ‘causes.’ Elements by themselves never cause anything. They become 
origins of events if and when they suddenly crystallize into fixed and definite 
forms. It is the light of the event itself which permits us to distinguish its own 
concrete elements from an infinite number of abstract possibilities, and it is still 
this same light that must guide us backward into the always dim and equivocal past 
of these elements themselves. In this sense, it is legitimate to talk of the origins of 
totalitarianism, or of any other event in history (Arendt, 1994, p. 325 n12). 
 
It is within the idea of violence that Arendt’s conception of the human body becomes a political 
matter, as it became micropolitical in Foucault’s analyses of the penitentiary, disciplinary discourse. 
Arendt’s analysis sensitizes an event: the end of politics. Totalitarian violence operates on the body by 
diminishing its connective plurality and political uniqueness, i.e. by homogenizing its vitality. 
Violence is not an apolitical but an anti-political notion. Although Arendt (1970) does not believe that 
violence is an essential characteristic of men 5  or that it could be justified by socio-economic 
conditions, it is nonetheless a phenomenon that must be analyzed within political thought due to its 
urge to decrease the political power of plurality. 
 
The chief reason warfare is still with us is neither a secret death wish of the human 
species, nor an irrepressible instinct of aggression, nor, finally and more plausibly, 
the serious economic and social dangers inherent in disarmament, but the simple 
fact that no substitute for this final arbiter in international affairs has yet appeared 
on the political scene (p. 5). 
 
Her elaboration on violence as anti-political process urges her to create a new form of opposition 
between power and violence. Power – which is political according to Arendt – is gained by co-
                                                     
5 It is often assumed that warfare has been the reason for our ancestors to create cities in order to protect themselves against 
enemies by creating walls. Yet recent discoveries of an ancient city of pyramids at Caral in Peru dispute such a theory. There 
are for instance no walls around the city. As far as it could be argued this city was built in order to connect people in the area, 
exchange goods and find pleasure (BBC Horizon, 2002).  
  
operative acts of a plurality of people. The concept act in concert, expresses literally Arendt’s 
understanding of politics (p. 44). In a concert, the musicians differ in their elements, instruments and 
expertise, nevertheless only through this network of plurality something can be gained that is as 
sublime as a musical concert. Just as politics, music evaporates immediately after its performance. The 
sounds in music and the actions of men in politics affect only in their performance. Power, according 
to Arendt, is experienced in the moment of action, and is not defined by the gains exceeding this 
process.  
It is this non-teleological trait that distinguishes political power from anti-political violence. 
Violence for Arendt is a force that is in need of homogenization and future purpose. It is goal-oriented 
and is based on the idea of using every means necessary to realize this goal. Thus, while the 
legitimization of power is based on a collective effort of an act in concert, violence merely justifies 
itself as a means for something that is not yet there (pp. 51-52), for instance a security that is not 
defined. Furthermore, Arendt argues that while power is realized in a legitimized plural community, 
violence on the other hand justifies itself through the idea of a majority. This majority does not only 
indicate the elite, but in case of totalitarianism it also refers to the masses: the so-called ‘power of 
many’. Arendt thus distinguishes different ways of understanding democracy. ‘Power of the many’, 
the domination by the masses is not equivalent to power of plurality. Instead, here democracy loses its 
plurality – a political trait – by its tyranny of majority. Arendt (1958) claims, because men have lost 
their diversity and have disputed plurality in order to reach a consensus, they will also lose their power 
of creating a community (pp. 221-227). 
 
An unanimous public opinion tends to eliminate bodily those who differ, for mass 
unanimity is not the result of agreement, but an expression of fanaticism and 
hysteria. In contrast to agreement, unanimity does not stop at certain well-defined 
objects, but spreads like an infection into every related issue (Arendt, 1978a, p. 
182). 
 
Unanimity is radiant. Not only the axiomatic paradigms are not defined through a rule or a logic, but 
the persona civic subject is also not assignable. Erdogan’s civic subject does not necessarily live in 
Turkey; nor is he or she necessarily a Muslim (Özdil, 2016). He manages to gather masses, even 
outside his territory, defending a certain idea of democracy. Nonetheless, it is this homogenization of 
the masses and their desires – Wilders, Farage, Trump and Erdogan all speak of the will of The People 
– that creates an idea of democracy as an axiomatic paradigm. 
 Whenever the realization of democracy has become a political project with the desires of the 
many as an end, whether this democracy is a means to achieve something or is an end in itself that 
must be gained at any cost as we often see nowadays, then democracy cannot only be qualified as an 
impotential paradigm of a politics of plurality. In a certain state, it could need a type of efficiency that 
will justify the application of every resource, even of extreme violent methods such as torture and 
harassment just to maintain itself. And precisely in this radiant movement the democratic politics as an 
event – as an experience of power in its performance – to which Arendt (1958) refers, will entirely 
disappear. As long as we believe that political thought is for the sake of a desired goal, we will remain 
unable to halt the fatal instrumentalization of men for the sake of this goal (p. 229). This utilitarian 
  
trait is crucial for ‘power of majority’ and by implication for a politics of exile, formulated in 
statements such as: sacrificing a few – the limbic lives – for the sake of ‘many’.  
 
For it is quite conceivable, and even within the realm of practical political 
possibilities, that one fine day a highly organized and mechanized humanity will 
conclude quite democratically – namely by majority decision – that for humanity 
as a whole it would be better to liquidate certain parts thereof (Arendt, 1968, p. 
299). 
 
In fact, this is still happening on a global scale – outsourcing to cheap labor countries, sweatshops – as 
the heritage of ethnocentric and racial colonialism and imperialism, two other axiomatic paradigms 
defining the form of content of totalitarianism. It is this utilitarian trait, that differs from the Kantian 
judgment and categorical imperative, in which each individual is a goal as such, and the sacrifice of an 
individual for the sake of the many, will always be in disagreement with the universality of this 
imperative. Yet, politics, even before Plato, has been occupied with malleability and fabrication of the 
ideal state, in which the individual is subordinated for the sake of majority. The traditional idea of 
politics aims at predictability and regulations in order to manifest and maintain order. It sets sights on 
final judgments and administration of power, and not for the natality of actions that take place for the 
sake of the event as such. This is politics that functions as his master’s voice, the Voice of majority as 
we will see in 4.3, which in some cases refers to majority of numbers and in other cases merely to the 
few with access to power. According to Arendt this politics differs in a crucial sense from democracy 
as a process of disagreement. I will elaborate on this literally ‘alternative’ form of democracy in 
which the others that differ come to the fore in the last chapter. Yet, in order to disclose this space for 
re-evaluating politics I need to elaborate on its relevance for the totalitarian movement, that initiates 
assemblages of unsatisfied, disinterested political masses as the form of its content. The axiomatic 
paradigm of here and there is thus not merely designating country borders – the waters are still 
resisting our territorial tendencies. Here is where the masses agree on their homogenization; and there 
is the object, territory, or body that the masses reject.   
 
Arendt (1968) refers to an established fact that the leadership in the totalitarian regimes, whether it 
concerns the Nazi regime or Stalinism, is never effective without the support of the masses. 
Totalitarianism, in contrast to dictatorship, only remains in power thanks to the formation and 
mobilization of masses. Totalitarian tendencies within the masses do not necessarily come to an end 
with the death of their leaders. Furthermore, in Arendtian considerations, the totalitarian propaganda is 
not a brainwashing process of the masses. Masses often act willingly and knowingly,6 and are not 
                                                     
6 By this I think Arendt (1968) refers to the access to information, or being informed, rather than the intellectual and affective 
ability to comprehend the consequences of such knowledge. She states that totalitarianism is destructive even towards the 
intellectuals and artists that did sympathize with their doctrines: “Wherever totalitarian movements seized power, this whole 
group of sympathizers was shaken off even before the regimes proceed toward their greatest crimes. Intellectual, spiritual, 
and artistic initiative is as dangerous to totalitarianism as the gangster initiative of the mob, and both are more dangerous than 
mere political opposition. The consistent persecution of every higher form of intellectual activity by the new mass leaders 
springs from more than their natural resentment against everything they cannot understand. Total domination does not allow 
 
  
mere products of their leaders’ conspiracy. Finally, the masses do not necessarily act in their own 
interest, but through the intensity of conviction, which can even lead to their own destruction. 
Totalitarianism thus remains intact as long as the masses close their ranks in accordance to uniform of 
the (ideo)logical idea of existence and territory. Arendt even suggests that within this process masses 
censor themselves from illogical experiences, due to the fact that experience refers to multiple 
possibilities of relationship between the subject and the formation of power. The totalitarian 
movement thus functions on the homogeneity and immensity of the masses. This is why for such 
totalitarianism movement a mass eventually needs to become classless. 7 . The introduction of 
difference, such as classes, will merely differentiate the mass, and stop its movement as a whole and 
its identification as a mass with their leaders. Masses thus do not characterize themselves through self-
interest, or a common ideology, but rather are defined by their inability to be identified with a social 
group or political ideology. Arendt defines the masses thus as a-political or indifferent people. 
Indifferent thus indicates that a people neglect to accentuate their internal differences. The urge of 
these masses is thus not to give in to a disinterested inter-esse; but in their urge of rejection – think of 
global tendencies, thus not only in Europe, to categorize the other as an enemy of democracy – the 
indifferent people are determined to break the ties. Brexit is merely a tie-breaker; Trump intends to 
follow.  
 
Let me give an example from The Netherlands. The Arendtian a-political attitude of the masses is 
noticeable in the protests in The Netherlands for preservation of the Saint Nicolas festivity and Zwarte 
Piet (Black Pete) who accompanies the old bearded man on the 5th of December each year, bringing 
presents from Spain for the children. In autumn 2013 the UN announced to start an inquiry in which 
the figure of the Black Pete was under investigation. Part of the Dutch public experienced the intrusion 
as offensive. This attitude was strengthened when Jamaican intellectual Verene Shepherd, who is 
intended to lead the investigation, prematurely uttered her disapproval of the festivity by stating that 
the figure that represents a colonial mentality is something that cannot be tolerated in our time (NOS, 
2013). Almost at the same time a critical report on racism in The Netherlands was published by the 
European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance (Council of Europe,, 2013). The comments of 
the ECRI on a lack of discussion on racism in The Netherlands and the UN initiation of this 
investigation was later followed by a critique of Amnesty International on racism in The Netherlands 
(Amnesty International , 2013). The external critique led to severe reactions in the Dutch media and 
society. A face-book manifesto to preserve the tradition unconditionally with the name Pietitie – a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
for free initiative in any field of life, for any activity that is not entirely predictable. Totalitarianism in power invariably 
replaces all first-rate talents, regardless of their sympathies, with those crackpots and fools whose lack of intelligence and 
creativity is still the best guarantee of their loyalty” (p. 339). 
7 Arendt (1968) distinguishes between the masses and mobs. Mobs are outside the political process due to their class, while 
masses remain outside the political discourse due to their non-reference to a class or distinct ideology. Masses are moved by 
homogeneity and de-individualization, while mobs and bourgeoisie remains in the logic of individual political state and 
thought. Nevertheless, the mob and the mass remain related, for the leaders of the masses such as Hitler often were member 
of a mob. However, according to Arendt, even the elites were extremely attracted to the doctrines and the process of 
totalitarianism. Both mob and the elite felt excluded from the political discourse, which mostly belonged to bourgeois. 
Totalitarianism starts with this antibourgeois tendency (pp. 313-314, 317-318. & 326-340). 
  
word play connecting Piet and petition – was initiated and in no time gained more than 2 million likes. 
The term refers to petition, while at the same time the web-makers claimed no political engagement. 
Shortly after, the sixteen-year-old Dutch girl Mandy Roos organized a demonstration, in which the 
Pietitie was presented to a PVV-member of parliament. PVV – Party of Freedom – is a populist party 
led by Geert Wilders. The main argument of the preservers of the tradition was that the oversensitivity 
of a few people couldn’t be an argument to abolish the figure of Black Pete from this traditional 
festivity. Yet, Roos’ argument was based on one individual, namely her little sister, who was upset 
due to her fear that Black Pete would not bring her presents this year. Her sister became a symbol for 
all the children in The Netherlands. Such argumentation is, Ahmed (2014) argues, based on the 
“assumption … that those who are most afraid are those who are most vulnerable” (p. 68); “Fear 
works to restrict some bodies through the movement or expansion of others” (p.  69). Thousands 
demonstrated against the foreign critique on the matter. Previous to the matter, none of the current 
political issues in the turbulent political atmosphere of The Netherlands – such as decrease of social 
and health insurances, issues that concerned the majority of the Dutch citizens and affected their 
economic and political status – did motivate such an amount of protests. The issue mobilized the 
masses, depolitizing a post-colonial practice.  
The depolitization as a trait was also embedded in the discussion on the matter. It is argued 
that this painted figure had nothing to do with race or discrimination. It was just a simple traditional 
festivity about having fun with children that had nothing in common with political discrimination. 
Therefore, it is believed that the education of children apparently excludes any political motivation. A 
few arguments were given. First, in order to suggest that it was not a problem of race Pete’s blackness 
was caused due to the fact that he had to enter a house through a chimney in order to deliver the 
presents. Yet the soot in the pipe could not explain the sudden appearance of curly hair, thicker lips 
and clownish clothes. The second argument was tradition, or as Deleuze labels this: the habit of doing 
something (see my evaluations in 1.4.2). This revealed the hypocrisy of the matter, when the PVV 
party that had based its previous arguments on abolishing the traditional characteristics of the Islamic 
minorities who according to the party refused to progress and accept the contemporary liberal 
democracy, on the imbecility of tradition, now in the case of Black Pete suddenly glorified tradition. 
Tradition suddenly became an axiomatic paradigm that did not need any political reflection. Quinsy 
Gario, who was violently arrested during the arrival of Saint Nicolas in 2011 merely for wearing a T-
shirt with the text “Black Pete is racist”, argues in a TV show that even the tradition has changed in 
the two centuries of its existence (Pauw & Witteman, 2013).8 
Yet the pro- and anti-Black Pete people did not divide themselves in classical faces of white 
versus non-white. Some people with Moroccan, Turkish, Iranian and Hindu background also plead for 
the preservation of the Black Pete. A man, with Middle-Eastern background, even states on the 
evening-news that he did not see the problem, due to the fact that it had nothing to do with one’s 
religion. While sensing discrimination against his religion as politically unacceptable, the objection of 
                                                     
8 An analysis of the title - Quinsy Gario does not want the Black Pete with the Saint Nicolas festivity – of the website is 
essential here. Gario repeatedly states that he wants a discussion on the matter; he wishes a political evaluation of the figure. 
It is the lack of political discussion that Gario criticizes the most. The hosts instead merely provoked statements rather than 
enhancing a discussion with other guests. 
  
the other based on one’s skin-color did not seem politically relevant to him. On the other hand, when 
the Dutch artist Anouk, the chosen representative for The Netherlands for the annual Eurovision Song 
festival, commented against the preservation of the Black Pete, some bombarded her with 
imprecations such as nigger-whore and patricide (Zantingh, 2013). The ambiguity was even more 
sensed when Tilly Kaisiepo during the protests organized by Mandy Roos intended to support the 
masses by stating that the UN must instead of attacking Black Pete, be more obliged to protect the 
Papuans who are persecuted by the Indonesian regime. Yet, she was jeered by the same masses. The 
protesters called her: the cancerous nigger that should be sent back to her own black country. They 
even attacked her physically, in such a way that the police had to remove her from the demonstration 
for her own safety (Sharifi , 2013). 
 The collision between white and non-white is inherent to the figure of Zwarte Piet, not only 
because it is almost always a white person who is painted as a black figure, while in first half of the 
twentieth century it was played by Surinam sailors, but also in the naming itself. The two elements of 
naming ‘Black’ and ‘Pete’ create in their connection confusion as to what is inside and outside. Black 
refers to the other, the one that does not belong; yet, Piet is one of the most common Dutch male 
names in The Netherlands. It is then in this line of argumentation that our Piet with its clownish 
clothes and funny acts, has the right to mock the other. In this perspective, the whole matter gets an 
immanent axiomatic quality. Our identity – we-ness – embodies an ambiguity, that covers an elusive 
argument that the other – who is mocked – has no right to criticize one of ours.  
 
It is within this setting of de-politicization of a political problem that Egbert Alejandro Martina 
(2013), one of the initiators of the critique on the Black Pete, argues how the community binds itself 
by an affective trait, namely pleasure in the act of mocking itself, and creates a social reality in which 
violence, in this case racism, is accepted as an engine of sociality. Martina shows how the idea of 
pleasure as such becomes paradigmatic, and a-normative at the same time. It is neither why nor how 
one experiences pleasure, nor how pleasure is experienced by others through which the ethics of the 
pleasure is at stake. Just the fact of having fun becomes the sole justification of the practice. Who are 
you to deny us just having fun? Within this axiomatic paradigmatic state of pleasure the other is not 
approached as a subject that can reflect and react to the matter, but rather as an object that is defined 
by the sense of pleasure of the majority. This other must not object at any time, due to the fact that its 
objection might ruin the sense of happiness of this majority. The problem is even magnified by 
manipulative statements: Your objection ruins the happiness of children; do you really want to do 
that? Yet there is also a sense of surprise that the objectified black body is talking back, and even is in 
disagreement with the vicious way it is positioned. Martina argues that objectification, in which 
commercialization of the submitted body of the other is at hand, the black body becomes a 
commodity, and hence is dehumanized. Zwarte Piet is a face within a totalitarian regime of faciality 
and gesturality. As is argued in the second chapter as a phenomenon of faciality and gesturality it 
connects content and expression; as well as their form and matter, to one another. Yet in its visibility 
as a face and gesture it permanently contradicts itself. It is invisibility within visibility. “Zwarte Piet is 
the not”, Martina states. Even the affects that the body provokes are not of its own but belong to the 
happiness of the children. It is in this idea of dehumanization that Martina does not reduce the idea of 
Black Pete to the emotions of some individuals. Against the depoliticization of the masses, he re-
  
politicizes the figure. The dehumanization, as we will also see further in this chapter, is not limited to 
emotions of some people, but to a form of politics as a generative process and to the formation of a 
political milieu.  
 
In this sense, the totalitarian regime of politics of exile axiomatically creates a paradigm of there 
where limbic lives are at stake; and a here where civic subjects even define the state of pleasure and 
having fun, let alone all other aspects and affects in a community. The here and there define the 
manner in which politics of exile forms its content. Yet, as we have seen with the analysis of Zwarte 
Piet these paradigms of here and there do not only create a physical here and there, but also a here and 
there within the same territory. These axiomatic paradigms effect on inter- as well as intra-level. On 
an inter-level, they operate as a black hole sucking all forms of paradigms in order to justify the 
homogeneous center.  On an intra-level the axiomatic paradigms drain the center by pushing all forms 
of difference toward the peripheries. As Schinkel (2008) argues, a society in order to negate its death 
– meaning denying the fact that its existence is based on an idea, a con-fiction, and neglecting the fact 
that a society permanently changes from within – gives in to a kind of auto-vampirism. It 
consummates its own produced residue (p. 307). Schinkel argues that the teleological tendency of 
such a society rest upon its normative belief that it can move toward a form of perfection; and as a 
whole each member must act accordingly. It is due to this teleological tendency that such a society 
creates residues; i.e. individuals that are not in consistency with the whole and are doomed to the 
peripheries. 
 
4.2.3 Atomized Masses  
The absence or lack of political involvement brings about two inadequate assumptions of democratic 
thought. On the one hand, this thought assumes that the political involvement of the masses contains 
the ideology of democracy by differentiation of political interest, and on the other hand, democratic 
thought presupposes that the political neutral state of the masses does not affect the political state of 
affairs (Arendt, 1968, pp. 305-312). Totalitarianism is the formation of atomized masses, Arendt 
argues. The entanglement of two groups, the elite and the mob, initiates this formation. They seem 
oppositional, yet the two groups share a common sentiment: They both did not occupy a political 
position in the prior democratic regime, and they both felt that the bourgeoisie put them aside. The 
resistance of the masses against this sense of dominant bourgeoisie is obvious in nationalistic jargon of 
populist parties in Europe, but also in the course of elections in the US in 2016. Trump did not merely 
use a nationalistic jargon, but along with Bernie Sanders rejected the existing establishment. These 
sentiments come along with bourgeoisie’s loss of sense of political resistance. As Barthes (1982) 
argues, bourgeoisie – once the icon of anti-establishment – has become an establishment itself. The 
resistance toward political correctness of the left parties in The Netherlands is even now present within 
the vocabulary of those parties representing this correctness before. Totalitarianism is an anti-
bourgeoisie movement, but moreover a movement of masses without a common interest and thus 
without a common interest in self-preservation as such. There is not a truthness that connects the 
masses. There is not a common trait – gender, class or even ethnicity – that connects the masses that 
vote for right-wing parties in United States or Europe. Even some of the members of Moroccan 
community – the community that has been targeted the most by PVV – vote for this party. The truth of 
  
such movements is thus not in order to manifest a clear identity, but rather to negate something. 
Masses are thus, according to Arendt (1968) atomized due to their lack of relation to one another, and 
they have become masses due to their negation of an outside world, that contain all others. It is a 
movement against different forms of life rather than the affirmation and maintenance of a form of life. 
It is due to this strong lack of interest that the movement could maintain its strength, even despite its 
destructive attitude in the preservation of the negating atomized masses (pp. 316-317).  
 
A short intermezzo is needed to specify Arendt’s emphasis on totalitarianism as a negating movement 
and compare this with Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) analysis of totalitarianism:  
 
Totalitarianism is quintessentially conservative. Fascism, on the other hand, 
involves a war machine. When fascism builds itself a totalitarian State, it is not in 
the sense of a State army taking power, but of a war machine taking over the State. 
A bizarre remark by Virilio puts us on the trail: in fascism, the State is far less 
totalitarian than it is suicidal. There is in fascism a realized nihilism. Unlike the 
totalitarian State, which does its utmost to seal all possible lines of flight, fascism 
is constructed on an intense line of flight, which it transforms into a line of pure 
destruction and abolition (p. 230). 
 
Although, akin to Arendt, they state that a totalitarian trait was present in Nazi Germany as well as in 
Stalinism in Russia, nevertheless the extreme tendency of flight lines that time and again ‘solve’ the 
aporia of its endeavor is more connected to fascism rather than to the totalitarian state in general. I 
rather argue that if Arendt had defined totalitarianism in terms of lines of flight and lines of 
segmentation, she also would have described totalitarianism as an extreme suicidal flight line – due to 
its intra-level tendency to empty its center in order to keep alive an idea of homogeneity. This is due to 
her characterization of totalitarianism as a movement instead of a permanent State or a regime. 
Given the aporetical foundation of the movement – survival while being suicidal, loyalty 
within a paranoiac mindset – the consistency of the movement contradicts itself even from within. 
While it appeals for one form of belonging – the Great German Empire – and one form of perfection – 
the victory of the Arian race – it layers itself from within by differentiating different states of 
belonging, different intensities, that manifest themselves by degrees of anonymity and secretiveness. 
The layers of belonging begin with the leader, who does not need to give orders in order to affect 
general sentiment. The persona of the leader – as a civic subject – is that which remains consistent, 
while his will changes constantly. Yet, civic subject – subject from whom abnormality is detached 
while neglecting to define normality as Willem Schinkel (2011) argues – is not bound to a personality 
but to multiple layers in a society. Each layer is positioned in the rank by its closeness to the leader. 
The masses are the lowest layer.  
 
How do masses as atomized entities in their negation operate as civic subjects? Schinkel states that 
they do not do so by defining their identity, but rather through redefining the other as non-belonging 
masses through an impossible jargon of integration. The civic subjects define the manner of belonging 
for the other; without fulfilling the promise of integration themself. It is not by indoctrination – 
  
whether of an identity or an idea of collectivity – that the masses are convinced to remain loyal to the 
movement. It is rather the consistency of the logic of territorial exclusion that defines the 
intraconsistency of totalitarianism. Arendt (1968) argues that even lies, deception and tricks are 
allowed – as Trump performs everyday – as long as these were able to convince the masses that these 
were for the sake of the cause, or an ideology that has negation at its core, and thus remained 
consistent within the overall narrative. This narrative becomes even more effective in contemporary 
times due to the effects of the media. De Mul (2017) argues that the spectacle of social media 
functions as a new type of political phenomenon that defines and shapes democratic processes. 
Mediacracy and tweetocracy create a field of untraceable and segmented information bubbles: a fact 
free politics. Trumps permanent act of twisting the facts in order to keep on the consistent idea of an 
external threat for American people remains thus, despite the critique, effective for a large population.  
 
Politics of exile always subtracts new axiomatic paradigms. Collateral damage is such an axiomatic 
paradigm analogically connecting to the axiomatic paradigm of here versus there and which due to its 
oppositional moral implications – or as Schinkel (2008) puts it digrammatical moral implications – 
remains consistent with the narrative of us against them. Orwell (2007) states: “actions are held to be 
good or bad, not on their own merits, but according to who does them, and there is almost no kind of 
outrage — torture, the use of hostages, forced labor, mass deportations, imprisonment without trial, 
forgery, assassination, the bombing of civilians — which does not change its moral color when it is 
committed by ‘our’ side.” 
Political and social homeless masses could sense residency within a consistent ideology, and 
thus break out of their reality in which they are detached of everything that mattered. Yet, the urge for 
consistency does not flow from an amoral nature but rather from the need for self-respect, Arendt 
(1968) claims. Arendt often states that the masses knew about the propaganda lies of the totalitarian 
regimes with regard to the outside world. Nevertheless, as long as the government could convince the 
masses of the necessity of these lies for the sake of the movement and these remained consistent, there 
was no harm done internally. In case of Syria, for example, it is often suggested by the Western media 
that the Syrian government keeps its faithful citizens in the dark in order to restrain their loyalty. It is 
however improbable that in the present state of global communication and radical mediocracy 
(Oosterling, 2000b), Bashar al-Assad could maintain such overall ignorance concerning internal affairs. 
It is more feasible that the Syrian government gains the loyalty of these citizens by maintaining a 
consistent argument that the West and capitalized Middle-Eastern countries are determined to deprive 
Syria of its independence and sovereignty, and manipulate Syria’s own citizens to rebel against the 
state. The situation is further complicated by the role of the global media, for which it is nearly 
impossible to gather some genuine nuanced facts. In modern times, it is not the war between truth and 
lies, but one partial lie/truth against the other. The US policy also gives in to a consistent narrative of 
alleged economic necessity and terrorist threat to justify its forced involvement in the Middle East. 
The millions Syrian, Eritrean and other refugees, literally trapped in-between the multiple excluding 
doctrines, are the silent witnesses – the limbic lives – of the impact of such totalitarian antagonisms. 
The current refugees are not the victims of one form of totalitarianism, but of a complex network of 
totalitarian regimes that oppose, yet feed on one another. Politics of exile always refers to multiple 
forms of exile. Exclusion is always multidimensional (Levitas, et al, 2007). Arendt (1968) states: 
  
 
Propaganda, in other words, is one, and possibly the most important, instrument of 
totalitarianism for dealing with the nontotalitarian world; terror, on the contrary, is 
the very essence of its form of government (p. 344). 
 
Arendt maps out the plane of totalitarianism as an isolated form of consistency with a double face, the 
propagandistic face to the outside world and the face of consistent terror towards its own people. 
Totalitarianism as well as other forms of dogmatic government – such as dictatorship, absolute 
monarchy or oligarchy – is related to terror, i.e. violence not power. Nevertheless, what distinguishes 
totalitarianism from these forms of governments is their terror does not become an instrument of 
power, but rather defines and forms its brutal essence. It is not just instrumental but essential. 
Totalitarianism is a movement and this movement’s significant task is not gaining power for one or 
some people, but the sustainment of the terror as a guarantee for the survival of the movement. While 
in 2011 Al-Assad repeats in the external media that he will not use force, or that he is not in charge of 
the groups that use force, or that he will immediately stop using force once diplomatic negotiation 
starts, it is violent terror consistency within the nation that keeps the loyal masses in his favor (BBC 
News, 2011 & ABC News, 2011).9 The dismantlement of the chemical weapons of Syrian government 
in 2017 does not help. The damage of terror is already done.  
 
Totalitarianism is never content to rule by external means, namely through the state and a machinery 
of violence; thanks to its peculiar ideology and the role assigned to it in this apparatus of coercion, 
totalitarianism has discovered a means of dominating and terrorizing human beings from within. In 
this sense, it eliminates the distance between the rulers and the ruled and achieves a condition in which 
power and the will to power, as we understand them, play no role, or at best, a secondary role (Arendt, 
1968, p. 325). This vague distinction between the ruler and the ruled in totalitarianism creates a zone 
of indistinction, a notion introduced by Deleuze and Guattari and applied by Agamben, as we will see. 
Arendt (1968) initiates this thought in her elaboration on the manner in which totalitarianism subverts 
the distinction between oppositional pairs such as truth/false, reality/fiction, ruler/ruled, 
offender/victim, for the sake of the movement and the consistency of its logic. The image of the Syrian 
rebel eating an internal organ of a Syrian Soldier, does not only horrify us by its act, but also due to 
the fact that it obscures the distinction between the good side and the bad side. Does this deny the 
consistency of the narrative? In reality consistency does not strive for actualization, and can even 
contradict its supposed goal of perfection. The movement holds on to its rhetoric of a safe future, 
while never intending to achieve this end. Other interests are served. The war on terror and the war on 
drugs are examples of this inconsistent logic. The movement keeps its idiom of a desired solution alive 
in the diabolization of its multiple opponents. This rhetoric – in which a plea for democracy has lost 
any reference to difference and plurality (De Mul, 2017) – allows figures such as Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdogan to call simple protesters and his opponents potential terrorists. 
 
                                                     
9 Assad even in the end admits that international politics is a game that must be played but it is not necessary to believe in 
such a game, while at the same time he suggests that he does neither own the country, the people, nor the means of violence.   
  
The consistency-hungry masses will accept the fiction as supreme proof of their 
truthfulness; whereas common sense tells us that it is precisely their consistency 
which is out of this world and proves that they are a fabrication (Arendt, 1968, p. 
352). 
 
Nevertheless, the blur between truth and falsehood is not the only confusion necessary to hold the 
totalitarian movement together. Totalitarianism, although feeding itself with strict distinction of one 
versus other, in the end rather weakens the distinction between an inside and outside, local and global, 
and finally between friend and foe, we and they. Totalitarian regime oscillates between an ideology of 
the included family members within – that as we have seen is never permanent and each member can 
become the other who is pushed to the peripheries – and the potential enemy from without – who can 
always appear in the middle of a society. Thus, in words of Ahmed (2014); it is not merely a “coming 
from within moving outward”; but rather also “come from without and move inward” (p. 9). Thus, as I 
argued before, totalitarianism not only divides the world on an inter-level, but also on an intra-level 
between one locality and the other, one all against other alls. Finally, such division does not limit itself 
to a macro-level; it feeds on the idea that this movement only realizes itself once every detail of daily 
life is under its control. Arendt (1968) states, “even a single individual can be absolutely and reliably 
dominated only under global totalitarian conditions” (p. 392). Totalitarian regime thus does not 
segment itself, but declares a future total perfection, that is shaped by the principle of “whoever is not 
included is excluded, whoever is not with me is against me” (p. 380).10 
In this way totalitarianism testifies of the sentiment in George Orwell’s (1993) novel Animal 
Farm. After the banishment of Snowball, Napoleon, the smartest pig, becomes the sole leader of the 
farm. During his reign, the seven commandments of the idealist Old Major to bind the animals and 
strengthen them against a common enemy, change. The changes seem small; nevertheless, their 
political implications are immense. The sixth commandment: “No animal shall kill any other animal” 
(p. 21) is issued to protect the animals from one another. Still years after his death and the revolution 
the commandment changes into: “No animal shall kill any other animal without cause” (p. 68, Italics 
TR). The two added words obscure the formation of belonging. In the end, even those who belong 
become vulnerable themselves. The layers of belonging start to show when a new doctrine is 
introduced. “All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others” (p. 99). Even so the 
form of belonging changes its inner core, the central-layer. The leading pigs start to imitate those 
whom they propagated as enemies: the humans. Slowly they start to change and transform in those 
two-legged creatures, which they wanted to cast out, by stating: “Four legs good, two legs better” (p. 
99, Italics TR). 
 
                                                     
10 It is remarkable that Arendt, long before the War on Terror, points out the same sentiment, which is associated with among 
others George W. Bush today. This remark has also been used in Hollywood vocabulary in blockbuster films such as Star 
Wars, Episode III The Revenge of the Sith (Lucas, 2005), when Anakin Skywalker, who soon will become the Darth Vader, 
states: “If you are not with me, then you are my enemy” and so becomes an untrue Jedi. Yet, apparently the true Jedi had no 
problem with stigmatizing people by giving specific accents – such as Asian and African ones – to typically facialized aliens 
in the trilogy of Star Wars. Of course, the rhetoric of for and against Jesus’ words in the Gospel of Mattew. 
  
The creatures outside looked from pig to man, and from man to pig, and from pig 
to man again: but already it was impossible to say which was which (p.104). 
 
The leader creates consistency, but the transformation creates a sense of indecisive anonymity: a zone 
of indistinction. But anonymity is not only due to the transformation of the civic subject and the 
enemy, but totalitarianism creates anonymity systematically on every level. According to Arendt 
(1968) the anonymity is also realized due to the ambiguous multiplicity of organization. She shows 
how the totalitarian regimes never dismantled the old organizations, but rather multiplied them into 
different branches, even duplicated them. The bureaucratic organizations as well as the murderous 
ones were multiplied in the movement. This form of multiplicity, which remained intact by permanent 
removal and new entanglement, insulated its participants from a sense of team spirit as well as loyalty. 
This anonymity depoliticized the horrors, in so far as it was impossible to address the responsible 
party. The totalitarian movement amalgamates two extremes. On the one hand, it desires a strong 
structure to manifest the imperatives of an ideology. On the other hand, the movement needs to avoid 
any form of stagnation – by implementing traits such as lawlessness, ambiguity and shapelessness – in 
order to remain in motion. Lines of segmentation and flight lines, to phrase it in terms of Deleuze and 
Guattari (1987), situate the movement of totalitarianism not beyond the law, but install its lawless 
outcome within the law and order itself, as we will see in 4.3. Yet there is, beside this lawlessness 
created by the law itself, another phenomenon that disturbs the consistency of totalitarianism in its 
process: life. How does totalitarianism relate to life in its urge for exclusion? 
 
4.2.4 Multiple Powerplay: Totalitarianism and Biopower 
According to Agamben (1998), current politics is a state in which lives are systematically excluded 
and have no access to the political arena. Agamben’s main question in Homo Sacer is formulated as an 
aporia:  
 
What is the relation between politics and life, if life presents itself as what is 
included by means of an exclusion (p. 7)? 
 
Included exclusion indicates that individuals are excluded from within the system, yet as such are 
paradoxically still included by the system. The political reality of the twentieth century is, according to 
Agamben, a twilight zone between subjectification of men in disciplinary practices through bio-power, 
as Foucault described, and the ‘exceptional’ practice of the totalitarian regimes. Although, Arendt in 
The Origins of Totalitarianism focuses on other events in history than Foucault, both philosophers 
often point out similar characteristics in contemporary political power. As we have seen in 3.4.1, in 
The Human Condition Arendt (1958) argues that the division between the private and the public in 
modern ‘society’ has disappeared. By pointing out the influences of sciences such as statistics, 
economics, but also ‘social behavior’ she shows how the human body as such is instrumentalized by 
society: “through society it is the life process itself which in one form or another has been channeled 
into the public realm” (p. 45). In her biographical article ‘We Refugees’ Arendt (1978a) thematizes 
another body: zoé. This is a naked body, nothing more than that. It is a body stripped of its ability to 
communicate with others. This body as a political object has been deprived of its humanity, of its 
  
ability to be a political subject (p. 65). According to Arendt (1968), this limbic life is the victim of a 
totalitarian ideological power. It is legitimized by an ideology in which a person is not judged by his 
deeds, but by his assumed potential to break the law, i.e. commit criminal acts, which is by Arendt 
qualified as the objective enemy (pp. 423-424). 
Arendt’s reflection on the axiomatic paradigm of ‘objective enemy’ – which relates to the 
paradigm of us versus others – can be compared to Foucault’s (1977 & 1978) reflections on the 
manner in which subjects become internal instruments of an all-pervasive power in the disciplinary 
society. Yet, this subject is no longer judged by his deeds and status, as it happens with sovereign 
power. The sovereign in Foucault’s sense needs the confession of the suspect, even if this confession 
is gained by torture. He needs evidence, no matter how falsified, as a proof of an unlawful act in the 
past. Disciplinary power on the other hand focuses on the potential of the body to transgress the norm, 
to become an offender or delinquent, a sexually disordered person, etc. in order to normalize and 
discipline the subject. The disciplinary mechanisms focus on this abnormality in order to construct 
normality and produce subjectivity. This mechanism is crucial in biopower, in which governing every 
aspect of a life of an individual, such as desires, sexuality, and work has become the main focus of 
disciplinary power. It is therefore not surprising that while analyzing contemporary politics of exile, 
Agamben (1998) emphasizes the importance of the reflections of both philosophers, by arguing that 
Arendt and Foucault elaborate on different parts of the same form of politics. According to Agamben, 
Foucault does not elaborate on the extreme outcome of such a biopolitics, namely the politics of 
totalitarianism.  
 
The inquiry that began with a reconstruction of the grand enfermement in hospitals 
and prisons did not end with an analysis of the concentration camp (p. 119). 
 
Mutually, according to Agamben, Arendt does not acknowledge the importance of the body as an 
instrument of politics in totalitarian regimes. In her reflections biopower seems to be a subsequent 
effect of totalitarianism. Agamben states:  
 
Only because politics in our age had been entirely transformed into biopolitics was 
it possible for politics to be constituted as totalitarian politics to a degree hitherto 
unknown (p. 120). 
 
To understand the combination of these two forms of politics – biopolitics and totalitarianism – one 
must elaborate on the relevance of all multiple forms of Foucaultian power in Agamben’s work: 
sovereignty, discipline, biopower and security. Although in his reflection biopolitics seems to be the 
most explicit reference to Foucault, other forms of power are implicitly present in Agamben’s 
analysis. In his lectures at the Collège de France, in 1978, Foucault (2007) introduces, besides 
sovereignty and disciplinary power, a third form of power: security. The three forms refer to different 
forms of space; different ideas on the configurations of bodies that form the content of power. The 
space of the sovereign power is the territory. The civic subjects – in this configuration for kings, 
queens, emperor and nobility – do not so much care about the number of inhabitants and the wellbeing 
of these inhabitants in their territory. The relation between the sovereign power and the inhabitants of 
  
the territory defines itself rather in the simple binary attitude of the law. The subject relates itself only 
to the sovereign, or even only becomes a limbic life in such territory, by disobeying the law of a 
sovereign, becoming an outlaw. Without disobedience, the individual is non-existent as political or 
juridical subject.   
 The space of disciplinary power is constructed around the individual body. Power is in 
constant contact with its subject, it is a constant process of subjectification and civilization of civic 
subjects. This form of power divides space into different cells. Assemblages of bodies are segmented 
in a matching cell, like the child in the family home, the worker in the factory and the students in the 
university. Each cell has its own set of norms, and the individual body has to adjust itself to these 
norms. While the sovereign characterizes itself as an excluding power, a power to let live or to kill, the 
disciplinary power is the power of inclusion, it affects the way of living from cradle to the grave 
(Agamben, 1999b, p. 83). Nothing escapes this power, or so it is claimed. Each individual must settle 
in one or more forms of a normative cell. Disciplinary power desires optimalization of productive life 
and hence effectuates the formation of this life according to its understanding of the norms. The limbic 
life becomes an a-normative life.  
 Exactly this urge for perfection loses its force in the mechanisms of security. This form of 
power does not necessarily focus on territory or the particular individual bodies. According to 
Foucault (2007), the space of security is constructed around the body of population as its civic subject, 
instead of the body of the individual subject or the body of the sovereign. With the rise of statistics, a 
society no more aims at the repression of an individual in order to affirm the law, nor does it desire 
disciplining bodies. Security is the economy of normalization. Its focal point is not the incarceration of 
the outlaw or even to execute him in public to reconstruct the broken law, as was the case with 
sovereign power. Nor is it an educative practice in which the delinquent must become an exemplary 
individual, as in disciplinary power. The mechanism of security rather asks: ‘What is the average of 
theft that a population can accept?’; ‘What is the cost of treatment of this thief for a society?’; or 
‘What kind of political discourse is profitable?’. A society guided by security does neither primarily 
aim at the upholding of the law nor at the perfection of the norm, but is rather based on statistical 
probability (p. 63). It is driven by numbers instead of an ideology. This paradigm of security thus does 
not ethically dispute collateral damage or state of being of refugees; but calculates it. The limbic lives 
are the offerings we make through this average acceptability. Foucault states: 
 
The apparatus of security inserts the phenomenon in question, namely theft, within 
a series of probable events. Second, the reactions of power to this phenomenon are 
inserted in a calculation of cost. Finally, third, instead of a binary division between 
the permitted and the prohibited, one establishes an average considered as optimal 
on the one hand, and, on the other, a bandwidth of the acceptable that must not be 
exceeded (p. 6). 
 
Although in his lectures it seems that different types of power refer to different periods in history, 
Foucault repeatedly emphasizes that all forms have always been present, there is only a difference in 
the degree of dominance. In this sense Agamben’s critique of the Foucaultian notion of biopower is 
not accurate, when he states that the power over life has been the practice of power since ancient 
  
times, and is not a contemporary matter as Foucault suggests. The difference in our time is however 
that zoé – the naked form of life stripped from its political subjectivity, i.e. bios – does not find itself 
on the peripheries of politics but exactly at its center. The naked life, which has been abandoned in 
traditional political discourse to the borders of the territory, becomes in our time an excellent focus of 
control and repression of life itself. The difference is visibility; according to Agamben (1998). 
 
It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity 
of sovereign power. In this sense, biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign 
exception. Placing biological life at the center of its calculations, the modern State 
therefore does nothing other than bring to light the secret tie uniting power and 
bare life, thereby reaffirming the bond (p. 6). 
 
Yet, in defense of Agamben, I believe that although Foucault seems to acknowledge the existence of 
different forms of power at the same time – it is a systematic and not a historical distinction – he 
somehow fails to present this in his analysis. In his descriptions one form of power seems to dominate 
in a specific period. Still, if we involve exclusive practices of sexism, racism and heterosexism, 
domination of these practices is – even on the matter of visibility – an old and contemporary 
phenomenon.  
 
In contemporary state the three forms of power, in Agamben’s reflections amalgamate explicitly, 
although his description of political practice starts with the characterizing of sovereignty. Foucault 
(2007) points out that sovereignty and discipline should not be analyzed as unitary processes. Both 
mechanisms are multiple.  
 
The effective, real, daily operations of the actual exercise of sovereignty point to a 
certain multiplicity, but one which is treated as the multiplicity of subjects, or [as] 
the multiplicity of a people … Discipline is of course also exercised on the bodies 
of individuals, but … the individual is not the primary datum on which discipline is 
exercised. Discipline only exists insofar as there is a multiplicity and an end, or an 
objective or result to be obtained on the basis of this multiplicity (pp. 11-12). 
 
Nevertheless, Agamben (1998) would rather not speak of a simultaneous appearance of biopolitics and 
sovereignty, but rather implies that biopolitics is a trait of sovereignty. The multiplicity for Agamben 
implies rather a multiplicity of exclusion: different manners in which the body can be used and 
misused, life can be included and excluded. In that sense Foucault and Agamben are in agreement with 
Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) statement that resonates in Arendt’s distinction between power and 
violence: “violence is found everywhere, but under different regimes and economies” (p. 425). Power 
as an outcome of violence instead of plurality, that as such is present today, is the power to exclude. 
Sovereignty with its persona – civic subject – is for Agamben that which decides on the exclusion of 
the naked life. The civic subject can be a person or a mass, an individual or a population. The force of 
sovereignty can be an idea, a slogan within the spectacle, a law or other mechanisms of policies of 
norms and processes of normalization. Sovereignty is a pyramidal grid of processes in which 
  
exclusion – territorial and subjective – is decided upon, while sovereignty itself remains outside the 
territory upon which it decides. The civic subject’s urge to refer to uncivilized manners of the other is 
accompanied by an uncritical, non-reflective attitude toward the self. In Foucault’s graphic 
visualization the sovereign resides on top of the pyramid, deciding who will live and who will die. In 
Deleuze and Guattari’s visualization the sovereign decides on the manner in which the strata are 
formed, cutting through the chaos of the rhizome in order to segment and fixate, manifesting its 
power. And in line with them, Agamben (1998) argues that the paradigm of sovereign is never defined 
by this power (pp. 15-29). 
 
The rule applies to the exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it. 
The state of exception is thus not the chaos that precedes order but rather the 
situation that results from its suspension. In this sense, the exception is truly, 
according to its etymological root, taken outside (ex-capere), and not simply 
excluded (p. 18). 
 
Sovereignty is the axiomatic paradigm in Agamben’s thought as a radiant center, with absolute flight 
lines in order to segment. Agamben agrees with Foucault that this sovereignty is closely connected to 
law and territory. These two concepts as the categories of ancient regime have not disappeared from 
the political discourse, but their classical connection is transformed. In the practice of power, we are 
faced with laws, international or national, which do not limit themselves to a specific territory. Yet 
they have territorial lines of segmentation. As Saskia Sassen (2003) argues, the new power-
constructions demand us to rescale notions such as place, local and nation. Denationalization is for 
Sassen not a process that only takes some citizens into account, but rather penetrates the locality of a 
nation as a global dynamic, transforming the traditional fixed ideas on nationalism as a one-
dimensional place. Thus, the idea of territory must not be dismissed but rather reconceptualized: 
Notions of local and global are redefined through multidimensional scaling. In order to do this the idea 
of territory that is formed through axiomatic paradigms must be problematized by revolutionary 
observations and subversive sensations (as I have argued in 3.2). This political analysis needs another 
image of thought: A transcendental empiricism that contains multiplicity of hyphens between politics 
and its counterparts, i.e. a politico-philosophy that connects to life, to revolutionary sciences that 
demand a critical observation, and to art practices that resist the sensation of the spectacle through 
other affects and percepts in order to express an impotential paradigm of political territory.   
 
Let me summarize this paragraph that dealt with the form of content. I have thematized different 
axiomatic paradigms that shape the territories and bodies of the politics of exile. In 3.3.1 I have 
introduced the axiomatic paradigm of here versus there. This section is an introduction to other 
axiomatic paradigms that analogically relate to this paradigm and affect the form of content of a 
politics of exile. With the aid of Deleuze and Guattari (1987), I relate this type of politics to capitalism, 
a theme that was already elaborated on in the first chapter. Capitalism is a saturating form of force that 
is typified by Deleuze and Guattari as a black hole sucking everything in. Second, politics of exile has 
rather State tendencies instead of town tendencies, due to its vertical orientation and segmentation 
instead of horizontal networking. It forces a discourse upon the body without organs, homogenizing its 
  
rhizomatic networks. Third, with the aid of Arendt (1968), we have also seen that politics of exile with 
its totalitarian tendencies does not only function as a black hole, but also has centrifugal tendencies; it 
cleans its center in order to purify itself. While capitalism defines itself by production and destruction, 
totalitarianism is mostly a negating force. It does not defend. It is defensively offensive. In 
homogenizing itself it is suicidal. Politics of exile creates two types of flight lines: the Other over there 
as a threatening line of flight and the Other in here as an internal negating tendency. The masses that 
belong to such politics – which can appear in democratic and non-democratic states – define their 
movement by negation. They do not act on a specific idea but through axiomatic paradigms of here 
versus there, us versus them, and civic subject versus limbic lives. These masses, however, do not 
create a sense of belonging. In their negation, they are better typified by Arendt’s notion: atomized 
masses.  
Furthermore, politics of exile is consistent in its consistency, meaning that it applies to lies and 
truths in order to strengthen and manifest its exclusive territorial thinking. Even the ethics of this 
politics shows the same opposing tendency. Collateral damage and severe security measures for the 
sake of democracy and freedom are examples of axiomatic paradigms of this politics. The ethics of 
here is never intertwined with the ethics over there. With the aid of Foucault, in his various lectures 
Agamben shows how these paradigms affect assemblages of bodies through axiomatic paradigms such 
as the norm and normalization. Law and order define the course of normality, the world of the civic 
subject. Still, as I have already argued in 1.3, the subject of flight is more complex. As Foucault 
(2007) shows there are no safe zones within the power of security. The so-called civic subjects can 
easily turn into limbic lives. Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein are recent examples. The milieu of exile is 
thus never conclusively traceable. Its ultimate axiomatic paradigm sovereign is never captured by its 
form of content. It functions as an included excluded phenomenon creating zones where truth and lies, 
law and facts, civic subjects and limbic lives become indiscernible. This is the zone of indistinction of 
politics of exile.  
 
4.3 Constitutional Doublespeak 
 
4.3.1 The Multiplicity of Constitutional State  
The previous section dealt with the territorial form of content of politics of exile. I have introduced 
axiomatic paradigms such as here versus there, nation-state, majority, negating atomized masses, 
terror, colonialism, imperialism and objective enemy that shape the contours of the content of politics 
of exile.  In this section I discuss other axiomatic paradigms in connection to the expression of this 
politics. The zone of indistinction appears as the result of an intertwining effect in-between axiomatic 
paradigms that define the form and matter of content and expression of politics of exile. What kind of 
expression enforces politics of exile? What does create its consistency, give rise to its judgment and 
normative approach? These questions will be dealt with in this section, which elaborates on the form 
of expression of politics of exile.  
 
Let us revise the state of democracy within politics of exile. With protagonist such as Trump, Wilders, 
Le Pen and Erdoğan the tendencies of democracy to give into plural forms of expression and lifestyles 
  
is permanently under attack. As De Mul’s (2017) title Panic in the Polder already suggests the 
European and American sense of democracy in contemporary times is not based on a rational or 
factual debate. The March for Science around the globe in 2017 is a counter effect of such politics. 
The debate is rather based on a sense of panic, De Mul argues. As we will see in this section it is 
exactly this manufactured panic attack within politics that fuels the means of violence and terror of 
citizens and non-citizens around the globe. As Ahmed (2014) argues, the panic itself becomes the 
rational for the vulnerability of a people. Yet, these so-called populist protagonists do not only attack 
an idea of plurality within democracy, but also the constitutional fundament of such democracy. 
Through an idea of an objective enemy – which is religiously, politically, ethnically and racially 
stereotyped – these political movements often plea to change the law that forbids to discriminate based 
on such characteristics. Their movements are thus not only seen as an attack on democracy, but also as 
a fundamental assault of the constitutional state.  
 
This is due to the fact that modern democracy bases itself on the two principals: equality and freedom. 
The integrity of a democratic state is guarded by a set of rules that protect these elementary principals. 
These rules are the basic elements of a constitutional state that upholds the promise to impartially 
protect the principals of democracy. Populist attack on equality and hence freedom of some people 
thus creates a severe imbalance within the constitutional contours of a democratic state. Yet, only 
based on these two principals we could state that the attack on democracy and constitutional state is 
not something that merely belongs to populist political parties. First, through the discourse of security 
and the technology that creates control mechanisms the principal of freedom was under attack long 
before these protagonists entered the stage of politics. Other factors such as systematic ethnic and 
racial profiling by the police or within the labor market in Western societies also argue against the 
existence of equality. Second, constitutional state is not an unambiguous system. Within the 
constitutional framework itself as well as concerning the access to institutional frameworks of a 
democratic state there are factors that contradict the two principals of equality and freedom. Third, the 
constitutional state just as the democratic state – especially in relation to one another and ethnically 
and racially profiled as Western and white – are perceived as ideal state. But just as Ghorashi (2010) 
argues, democracy and constitutional state do not have a single effect, but multiple effects. They could 
simply give in to protection of difference as well as become a will of majority that annihilates 
difference (pp. 23-28). In this section I will thus argue how law and human rights for that matter in a 
totalitarian setting function as counterparts of the two principals of equality and freedom.   
 
The point is that as long as reality is identified and formulated within the 
conceptual structure built around the image and logic of Either/Or, read in the 
exclusive sense, in which every existence is not just independent of the other, but 
in opposition to it, there can be no rationally compelling and alienable obligation 
on the part of an individual to recognize and respect the existence and equal rights 
of other human beings (Olúwolé, 2014, p. 155). 
 
Even more so I will argue how law within constitutional frameworks of politics of exile rather 
deterritorializes its own existence and merely functions as a centrifugal force.   
  
 
Politically speaking, it might be an honor to stand outside the law when all men 
were no longer equal before it (Arendt, 1978a, p. 112). 
 
Arendt (1968) shows that the total law, or total manifestation of law in totalitarianism, differs on two 
points with the traditional understanding of the law. The law as an abstract form of metaphysical 
knowledge is different from human laws, which are often arbitrary and contradictory, thus needing the 
permanent interpretation and calculation of the metaphysical law within an ever-changing 
jurisprudence. The laws of the totalitarian society aim at an amalgamation of the two, which in its 
actual working leads to contradictions, i.e. the oppositional temperament of its axiomatic paradigms. 
The manner in which the so-called universal laws were expected to protect the human dignity are set 
aside in favor of laws for the sake of security also testify to this temperament.  
 Next to that the democratic idea that the law was supposed to be made for the self-interest and 
utilitarian need of the people or community, was mystified. Due to the fact that the masses do not have 
a clear common interest and only are gathered by a negative sentiment – excluding the enemy, the 
others – the law – whether based on an idea of nature (Nazism) or an idea of history (Stalinism) – 
appears as a suprahuman matter, yet needs to manifest itself in human bodies. The law is not 
legitimized by the obedience of the arbitrary men and women and their unpredictable actions, but 
depends on its internalization in each citizen: the possibility and the impossibility to become a civic 
subject. Again, Orwell eloquently succeeds in the sensitization of such an embodiment of the law as 
an idea. In Nineteen Eighty-Four (1983) the protagonist Winston Smith as a member of fabrication of 
truth is confronted with the falsity of it. The Big Brother of Oceania does not tolerate his betrayal and 
he is tortured to believe in the reality of the idea once again. Finally, at the end of the novel, when he 
gives in to the idea, not as a form of obedience from outside, which he was long before prepared to do, 
but as a total inner conviction, he is murdered. The reader is perplexed. Why, he believed it. Except, it 
is precisely in this violent and brutal end that the totalitarian state shows its essential characteristic: the 
urge to maintain its movement rather than the preservation of the perfect civic subject. Once the 
embodiment of the civic subject is complete, the subject itself becomes irrelevant and redundant. 
Totalitarianism rather lives by increase of limbic lives. 
 
The law – although demanding obedience of its civic subjects – thus is not in need of the participation 
of these personae. Its arbitrary and lawless movements are for the sake of its perfect embodiment in 
the future. “In the interpretation of totalitarianism, all laws have become laws of the movement” 
(Arendt, 1968, p. 463), and morally “right is what is good for the movement.”11 Law thus is not in 
service of the prudential self-interest of men, but becomes “the expression of the motion itself” (p. 
464). Yet, if the law does not serve men, their equality and freedom, what does it serve? The law 
operates according to the ideology, which is literally the logic of an idea, Arendt states. From this 
idea, the movement of totalitarianism gains its consistency. Only one idea as presented in totalitarian 
regime, not even a multiplicity of ideas, can gain such a substantial consistency. This idea – which in 
our contemporary times has been many things; such as lack of security or fear for economic decay – 
                                                     
11 Motto in Organisationsbuch der NSDAP, p. 7. Cited in Arendt, 1968, p. 412. 
  
gains due to its negating nature within the politics of exile an axiomatic paradigmatic quality. Yet, in 
its manifestation it does not stand alone. Scientific data such as statistics are used to back up the 
consistency; philosophical concepts such as Enlightenment are functionalized in order to argue for 
backwardness of the other; and artistic sensations such as comedians mocking the other are 
implemented as affects to confirm percepts towards the other. It explains its own outcome, process and 
future. Arendt (1968) even suggests that it is the logic of this idea, this ideology, that keeps 
totalitarianism in motion, eventually, given its rupturing oppositional founding, devouring its own 
idea, in order to maintain the logical process and the consistency of the statements up till its suicidal 
apotheosis. Žižek (2002) relates such suicidal apotheosis to contemporary discourse in which 
democratic principles are overruled for the sake of democracy. The truth of the matter is never only 
manifested in the actuality of the current state, but just as any panic attack by its virtual future. Arendt 
(1968) states: 
 
The trouble with totalitarian regimes is not that they play power politics in an 
especially ruthless way, but that behind their politics is hidden an entirely new and 
unprecedented concept of power, just as behind their Real-politik lies an entirely 
new and unprecedented concept of reality. Supreme disregard for immediate 
consequences rather than ruthlessness; rootlessness and neglect of national interests 
rather than nationalism; contempt for utilitarian motives rather than unconsidered 
pursuit of self-interest; ‘idealism’, i.e., their unwavering faith in an ideological 
fictitious world, rather than lust for power – these have all introduced into 
international politics a new and more disturbing factor than mere aggressiveness 
would have been able to do (pp. 417-418). 
 
The axioms of the totalitarian thought are never applied to a current state of affairs but projected on a 
coming prospect. This non-substantial, sheer form of content of an idea strengthens the mass oriented 
anonymity of belonging. It is a form of content that in its formation of atomized bodies destructs any 
sense of connectivity between assemblages of bodies. In line with Žižek (2002), and in words of 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987), we could state that the totalitarian machine as an interstratum – in its 
force to form its content and expression – disfigures its territory and its constitutional framework 
through two types of lines of flight. One that is suicidal internally – forsaking freedom for the sake of 
freedom or murdering a people for people’s sake as Assad does – and one that stigmatizes the other as 
a threatening line of flight from the terrorist to the flow of refugees that will end our civilization as 
Trump, Wilders and Le Pen see it. Frauke Petry’s alternative for Germany is otherless. Yet, a non-
panicking historic review on the state of panicking Western politics shows that the axiomatic 
paradigm of here versus there, or us versus them, for a long time does not only define the contours of 
the content of politics, but also the constitutional frameworks of the expression of politics. There is a 
law that applies for us – in the virtual here – and a law that applies for them – in the virtual there. It is, 
in words of Schinkel (2008), a diagrammatic idea of law.  
 
  
4.3.2 Force of Law 
I am not a historian. My aid to issues such as these is rather from another nature. I have lived there and 
I live here, different territories and different perspectives on history. My skepticism of integrity of 
democracy springs from the multiplicity of historic backgrounds and my skepticism for sincerity of 
constitutions and human rights just as with Arendt springs from a long experience of refuge and 
illegality. Both experience define my perspective. My claim here is thus not to introduce another form 
of neutrality, but rather to dismantle the neutrality claim of Western societies on impartialness of their 
democracy, constitutional rights and exclusive claim on human rights. In order to dismantle such 
impartiality one needs to bring the faces forth that are been silenced by such so-called impartial 
attitude. The last part of this chapter, and more so the whole of this study, is an ode to men and 
women, boys and girls, that remain silent in our political expression. Then, let us first sketch out the 
frameworks through which this cacophonic silence (which I have introduced in 2.3.2 &2.3.3) has been 
fueled.  
 
Being silenced is not something that happens once in a while, but something that permanently affects 
the manner of reaction in a country that sees you, even after 27 years, as a permanent host. This 
silence does not only determine your present condition, as Ghorashi (2003) argues, but also the 
manner in which you rewrite your past experiences. An incident in my life in the past months is 
exemplary. Just couple of months ago I met a colleague for the first time. He already knew my name, 
so the obvious question for him was to ask: ‘Where are you from?’ My reverse question was: ‘Why 
does it matter?’ He did not accept my response and stubbornly asked the question for five times. His 
response was a refrain of the question that permanently hunts and defines your live. When I said I was 
born in Iran, he started talking about Iran as if he was born and raised there. Finally, he admitted that 
his knowledge was based on a novel written by a Dutch writer. He ended his lecture by stating: ‘You 
must read that book, only then you understand the Iranian revolution and the importance of democracy 
for your country.’ He left immediately and I remained behind perplexed. How could an educated man 
think that I needed a novel to understand a revolution that I have lived through? His ignorance 
however did not only show a lack of understanding of history there, but also a lack of knowledge of 
Western involvement in ruination of democracy in Iran since the 1950’s. Due to Western economic 
interest many democratic and social movements in the Middle East – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq 
and finally Syria – were attacked. Middle Eastern countries as well as African countries are not a 
territory over there, but multiple territories that discursively are essentially intertwined with the 
international and Western affairs. The people of Palestine were the collateral damages of twentieth 
century’s economic and political discursive colonialism of the West.  
 
Yet, my objection to his ignorance is not only based on his lack of knowledge of this intertwined 
history, but also the ignorance of the possibility of his ignorance. There was no moment in his attitude 
that invited me to have a conversation. My knowledge of my own past was not something of interest. 
Nevertheless, in these Western societies, there are also auteurs that essentially invite us to 
communicate by explicitly putting their ignorance on the agenda. Jean Baudrillard's (1995) lecture on 
the Gulf War is an example. He resists the spectacle of the media in connection to the Gulf War, by 
explicitly arguing that the so-called informed civic subject does not have a clue what a war is. We 
  
have no clue on how and why a war proceeds. Our knowledge is rather based on fictive imagination of 
the media. The term Gulf War – just as Middle East and Africa – suggests a territorial clarity, while 
Baudrillard states that the war itself is initiated through an international hegemonic understanding of 
democracy and freedom. And, even within this hegemonic idea of democracy there is an inconsistency 
towards democratic processes. Democracy has not only been enforced but undemocratic processes in 
these countries are permanently been simulated by economic traits and initiated warfare by the West. 
The policy of democracy and constitutional rights elsewhere creates a permanent state of exception, 
undemocratic and unconstitutional territories.  
The form of expression of politics of exile, just as its form of content, creates a permanent 
discursive negation: a doublespeak. This doublespeak – or as Schinkel (2008 & 2011) put it 
diagrammatic talk – shows the same contradictory injection of the axiomatic paradigms of here versus 
there; us versus them. Territorial thinking unfolds through the ambiguity instead of clarity of the 
borders of sovereign territory. The ambiguity lies in the contradictory trait of sovereignty that operates 
by excluding itself from the territory that it decides upon. The Gulf War – the event that started masses 
of refuge and rising up the walls of Europe – is just an example. Agamben (1998) speaks of an order 
without localization (p. 175). This is the case in the state of exception. Guantanamo Bay, often used by 
Agamben, is an adequate example. Here sovereignty, whether it is the American government, the 
American law, or the American way of life, creates a territory that is literally placed outside the 
borders, the way of life and the juridical system of United States. The oppositional setting of the state 
of exception is however not only territorial, it also defines the application of different rules for the 
other. While according to the juridical system of Israel an individual falls under the criminal law at the 
age of 18 according to the same system this does not apply for Palestinian children. They become a 
juridical subject by the age of 12. These children are not judged by the civic law, the law that is set for 
civic subjects, but by military law. The state of these children in jails – hundreds of kids exposed to 
systematic torture, mental, physical and sexual abuse – shows how a child is reduced to a limbic state 
of being (Witte, 2016).  
 
In this exceptional state, the law lawfully suspends itself to manifest sovereignty. The exception that 
manifests the power of the sovereign is created as such to ambiguously manifest the sovereignty itself. 
The law disconnects itself from territory and creates a space in which sovereignty can manifest its full 
force. Inspired by Jacques Derrida (1992a & 2000), Agamben (2005) even speaks of force of law: 
 
The concept of ‘force of law,’ as a technical legal term, defines a separation of the 
norm’s vis obligandi, or applicability, from its formal essence, whereby decrees, 
provisions, and measures that are not formally laws nevertheless acquire their 
‘force’ … The state of exception is an anomic space in which what is at stake is a 
force of law without law (which should therefore be written: force-of-law) (pp. 38-
39). 
 
In this sense, it is possible even to suggest that the law (sovereign power), the norm (disciplinary 
power), and statistic control (security) do not characterize three different forms of power, but rather 
that they, in their effects, become indistinguishable. The law, the norm and the control through 
  
security operate as axiomatic paradigms within contemporary politics defining not only its 
assemblages of bodies as negating atomized masses but also its assemblages of enunciations as 
doublespeak. Normality, defined by statistics, is installed in bodies via norms, manifesting itself with 
the force of sovereign law. Alongside this all-encompassing process of order without locality 
Agamben also points to its flipside: lawless locality as it has been realized in camps. Agamben and 
Arendt state, in their critique on the practice of human rights, that life and death of the limbic lives in 
the camp do not depend on the law or right to live, but rather on the mood of the police, i.e. the civic 
subject. Abu Ghraib and The Killing Team are adequate examples of such a lack of law and the rule of 
the police. This blurring of power, the inability to distinguish between different forms of practice 
refers to Agamben’s notion of the zone of indistinction.  
 Zone of indistinction is the milieu of exile, its form of content; a milieu without an inherent 
consistency. In this zone, one cannot distinguish between law and life, between life and death, 
between the people that dominate and the people that have been excluded. A population, as civic 
subjects, could easily become limbic lives. A population, Foucault already tells us, is identified as 
statistical facts, masses with diseases, with abnormalities and other statistical characteristics. This 
identification is the force and the curse of the population. This population becomes rather, as Deleuze 
(1995) suggests, axiomatically codified by paradigms that form the expression of politics of exile. 
They are those that have access to and could affect the information flows and those that lack this 
access. This is the underlying problem of segregation. The discussion on segregation is often 
conducted by misplaced arguments on freedom of choice. People must be set free in order to choose 
their network with whomever they prefer to communicate and to commune. It refers to the freedom of 
communities to isolate themselves from other communities. The problem of segregation is however 
not that of freedom but rather that of access, as is still at hand in the after pains of Apartheid in South 
Africa. Closed and isolated communities often suggest a lack of access, as in ghettos, or a privilege to 
access, as in gated communities (Levitas, et al, 2007). Moreover, in the control society populations do 
not limit themselves to a territory. This is however not the end of locality, but rather implies that each 
locality is penetrated by discursive axiomatic mechanisms that come from beyond this locality. The 
engine that expresses types of relationality in a local territory blurs its internal and external distinctive 
constructions and constitutions (Deleuze, 1995, p. 180). 
  
4.3.3 The Void of Statelessness 
The event with my colleague is not a momentary incident. It is rather an example of a systematic 
enunciative field in which the other is defined and explained by somebody else than himself or herself. 
Ghorashi (2003) shows that even in extremely self-reflective disciplines such as anthropology the so-
called observer remains ignorant of the manner in which the paradigms of here versus there and use 
versus them are implemented in ones thinking. Even within the experimental anthropology the deep 
longing for generalization of the other – whether exotic, romantic or demonic – remains powerful (pp. 
38-45). This theoretical discipline on multiplicity of voices does not weaken the deep-rooted Voice 
that determines other people’s lives. This Voice contains a form of judgment that Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987) typify as a judgment of God (see also: 1.2.2). 
 
  
The strata are judgments of God; stratification in general is the entire system of the 
judgment of God (but the earth, or the body without organs, constantly eludes that 
judgment, flees and becomes destratified, decoded, deterritorialized) (p. 40). 
 
Of course, this judgment does not exclusively refer to a religious conviction or a belief system. 
Metaphysical rigidity is as intensely present in the non-religious and anti-religious practices, not only 
when they are concerned with their fight against religion, but even more in their use of axiomatic 
paradigms and ideology. The anti-Christian and pro-sexuality movements in the sixties and the 
political simplification of Islam as well as communism testify to isomorphic forms of rigidity, and to 
the tendency of an ideology to elevate its central idea beyond reality and other forms of knowledge. 
Religious practices, as is often assumed, are not beyond the realities of everyday life and politics. Nor 
are they necessarily segmentary. Knitter (2010) argues that humility – a widespread religious virtue – 
creates room for interreligious dialogue. As any other form of practice religious practices have the 
potential to contain multiplicity and connectivity. What is indicated by ‘the judgment of God’ is the 
impetus of a practice, whether religious or non-religious, to close off its territory from the diversity 
around it. There is a hierarchical trait in this narrowing focus. This judgment of God, which is 
invented and acted upon by men, contains a dual operation of segregation and vertical ranking; hence, 
Foucault’s (1977) critique on the graphic visualization of power as a pyramid. Arendt’s (1968) 
discussion of human rights and the exclusion of stateless people and refugees from these rights, 
explicates this pyramid scheme. Can human rights function as an axiomatic paradigm?  
 
The very phrase ‘human rights’ became for all concerned – victims, persecutors, 
and onlookers alike – the evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded 
hypocrisy (p. 269). 
 
Arendt’s (1978a) description of the conscious pariah, the meaning of the figure refugee, is extracted 
from a political point of view and not from the legal standpoint of human rights. This is due to her 
criticism of the notion as well as the practice of human rights. Arendt emphasizes the manner in which 
the two World Wars have been a catalyst exposing the impasses of Western civilization. A civilization 
based on the rights of men, but once the refugees and the stateless, driven from one nation-state to the 
other, started to claim their rights, the problematic character of these foundations began to appear. 
When refugees – as human beings without land, home, state and nationality – appealed to their rights 
merely based on their humanity, they were nevertheless rejected (Arendt, 1968, pp. 269-302). 
Observing the state of refugees nowadays, not much has changed. International treaties are aborted in 
order to make a deal with Turkey, despite the warning of Amnesty International for human rights 
violations within the refugee camps and on the borders, not only with Syria but also at the Moroccan-
European walls in Ceuta and Melilla, which are blocking the path of refugees and migrants from sub-
Saharan African countries. As Huijer (2015) argues we are slowly changing Europe into a gated 
community. In line with Arendt we could thus state that such an understanding of human rights creates 
an axiomatic paradigmic understanding of the term human. In its formalization, human rights as a 
juridical and political form of expression, are disconnected from the thing that it refers to: living 
humans. In Agamben’s (2000) line of reasoning we could state that within human rights the rupture 
  
between form of life and life becomes sensible. The term ‘human’ within human rights rather refers to 
the oppositional set: citizenship (humans with rights) versus non-citizenship (humans with no rights), 
the political personae of which are divided into respectively civic subjects and limbic lives.  
 
Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their 
state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they 
were rightless, the scum of the earth (Arendt, 1968, p. 267). 
 
Arendt states that modernity – through its idea of nation-states and this division between citizenship 
and non-citizenship – creates a sense of rightlessness that differs from the centuries before. She 
typifies both the state slavery as well as modern stateless as rightless and cruel. Nonetheless, what 
differs is the functionlessness of the modern non-citizen ‘human being’. The refugee has become 
undesirable because the system has deprived him from any functionality in any society. As Agamben 
(1998) shows the idea of functionlessness is ancient and concerns the paradigm of homo sacer. For 
Roman law this was a criminal who was banned by the sovereign to the borders of its territory. He is 
the man that can be killed without being sacrificed or being murdered. This is a state of exception in 
which the homo sacer is both beyond the law of men and the law of God. He has become pure zoē, life 
force (pp. 71-74). Homo sacer is not the obvious criminal. Agamben argues that in contemporary 
biopolitical era it is the stateless, the refugee, and the Other’s body that has become the new target of 
biopolitical power. It is here that the new naked body of the modern homo sacer is created within new 
forms of no-mans-lands (pp. 183-184). From this perspective, in contrast to Arendt, I rather argue that 
enslavement was not beyond this cruelty. Functionality is in this sense defined from the perspective of 
the slave-owner – the sovereign as a civic subject – and not from the perspective of men and women 
who were and are enslaved. Even more so, older or disabled enslaved men and women awaited a 
senseless death. This emphasis on lack of connection, lack of functionality, is essential in our analysis 
of politics of exile in which homo sacer, as we will see, is an exemplary case that appears to be an 
axiomatic paradigm. 12 
 
The wars, in Arendt’s time and as we have experienced also in our time, have not only triggered 
extreme inflation and unemployment, but also uncontrollable flows of migration. War, creating 
multiple forms of exiles, is not only an abnormal period. In line with Foucault and Arendt (1968), we 
could state that it is rather a mindset that expresses itself by naming abnormalities without being able 
                                                     
12 There is thus a historical connection. Art practices often ‘sensitize’ their audiences for such political issues far more subtly 
than newspapers articles. The Kassel Documenta (13) in 2012 pleads for this spatial repetitiveness in the exposition of 
Charlotte Salomon’s artistic work. Salomon was a Jewish-German visual artist who was killed in Auschwitz. She sensualizes 
the toxic air of exile and death, which as Griselda Pollock (2012) shows, surpasses her ethnicity (jewish) and her gender 
(female). While Arendt could flee from the camp at Gurs, Salomon was the nameless woman that left the same camp towards 
the inhumanity of Auschwitz. The organizers made an effort to show that the impact of Salomon’s work is not merely 
historical by exhibiting images of the horrors in Syria in the same space as the exposition of her work. In this setting 
Salomon’s namelessness gains a name in its extraordinary ability to connect what was to what is and what we fear to be. 
Salomon’s war and contemporary wars are not the same; they are not the repetition of the same, but as Deleuze (1997) 
argues, repetition in difference. Yet, despite their differences they are able to connect, a tactile affect. 
  
to define the characteristics of the normal. This centrifugal trait also belongs to the form of expression 
of politics of exile, creating more and more limits. Not in order to include something, but rather in 
order to exclude more. This is the reason that Agamben (1998 & 2000) repeatedly states that refugees 
are more than marginal figures. Both Agamben and Arendt state that once the exclusion starts, it 
spreads itself as an infection through society. What starts with refugees, does not end with refugees. 
The right-wing jargon always grows more and more in its negating doublespeak, defining the form of 
expression.  
According to Arendt (1968) the affect that fuels this negating form of expression is aimless 
hate. Within the homogeneity of the masses, there are no more organic opponents, such as the laborer 
and the factory owners, no struggles of the classes. There is a war of all against all. Within this state of 
war there is not simply an external threat, but the threat is immanent. Despite the idea of a clear-cut 
enemy – as we see in case of ISIS – in this all against all it is far less obvious who is the enemy. Yet, 
whatever the conflict, Arendt argues that the consistency of nation-state determines the form of 
expression. This is not only present in the formation of the juridical system, but also within the jargon 
of resistance of minorities. Both majority and minority believe in salvation through construction or 
maintenance of a nation-state, Arendt argues. Within the logic of politics of exile, minorities – while 
they had been categorized as a minority by majoritarian power – long to become a majority. They 
intend to build a nation founded upon an assumed shared history and a common regime of signs and 
images. Simultaneously this nation defines in return the homogeneity of its people. Neither majority 
nor minority distrusts the nation-state as a mechanism of exclusive belonging. They accept the law and 
the constitutional framework as the necessary precondition of the nation-state.  
However, the belief in the logic of the nation-state creates exclusion itself. Arendt gives an 
example. In order to enable a long-lasting peace, after the First World War new treaties are agreed 
upon by the victorious nations. However, although these conventions seem to protect the rights of 
minorities, they eventually became the very objects of new forms of discrimination upon which the 
fundaments were raised of new hierarchical structures. Arendt shows that exactly because of such 
treaties some people started to become minorities, while many others were not even mentioned. 
Majority appeared not to be the same as the majority of numbers. While the foundation of law defines 
itself as universal, endless exceptions were the practical consequences, she states. The end of 
colonialism of the conquered states was ordained in straight lines that dived Africa. The massacre in 
Rwanda was to a high degree caused by these mathematical divisions and the favoring of some tribes 
over others by the colonial powers. The idea of the masses is not a matter of size. The masses 
permanently gain weight and lose weight. The exclusion of a minority can affect more than half of the 
population. This was also the case in Iraq. While the ruling government was Sunni, the majority of 
people were Shia. In Syria on the other hand while the majority is Sunni, the ruling government is 
Shia. In both countries, the Kurds were excluded independent of their preferences. In Jordan, however, 
the ruling population has become a minority due to the influx of refugees: Palestinians and recently 
Syrian refugees. Consequence of such divisions finds its violent echo in 21st century. 
 
During the interwar period, according to Arendt (1968), the so-called inter-European and international 
organizations remained bound to the nation-states and their needs. The stateless had two options, 
either they remained outside the law or became an exception within the law. Which often implies that 
  
eventually they would be excluded from the law. The treaties defined the responsibilities of the 
minorities and obliged them to assimilate. A painless assimilation as it was phrased (p. 272). Next to 
the axiomatic paradigmatic idea of human rights (citizenship and non-citizenship), hate, naming the 
abnormalities and the logic of nation-state, assimilation is the next axiomatic paradigm of form of 
expression within politics of exile. However, Arendt (1978a) notes, assimilation remained an 
impossible quest, despite all efforts. She gives personalized examples of assimilation, in which men 
and women, despite the fact that they fully assimilate into societies, are eventually forced to leave. She 
describes Mr. Cohn who has become fully German, Czech, Austrian and French.  
 
I think I had better not dilate on the further adventures of Mr. Cohn. As long as Mr. 
Cohn can’t make up his mind to be what he actually is, a Jew, nobody can foretell 
all the mad changes he will still have to go through (p. 63). 
 
Politics of exile demands something, yet makes it impossible to achieve. This is for example the case 
with high-educated refugees. They often become unemployed in the country of arrival, and if they find 
a job it is in most cases a form of employment that does not match their level of education (Valk, 
2007). Krahn et al. (2000) focus on the state of employment of refugees and immigrants in Canada, 
raising issues that exceed the borders of Canada. Although the Canadian policy of immigration favors 
those refugees with high credentials, according to them the reality of the matter is that these refugees 
in most cases are unable to access occupations that are in line with their level of education. The 
disadvantage is systematic, not only due to racism and sexism, but also due to the lack of tools to 
access such forms of occupation. The basic language trainings for immigrants do not cover the level of 
their education and type of occupation. They are not allowed in Job-Training programs, due to the fact 
that they do not have a job to support the cost. These negative experiences are not restricted to 
Canadian practices, but are widespread in the Western approach towards migrants from non-Western 
countries. Krahn et al. even speak of the institutionalization of Downward Mobility, in which 
institutions in advance agree on the value of the credentials without further analyses.  
 
Thus by accepting as fact the assumption that foreign credentials are generally 
inferior, such programs can reinforce the barriers faced by refugees and immigrants 
attempting to restart their former professional careers (p. 80). 
 
And what did await Mr. Cohn despite his efforts? Denationalization and further denormalization are 
perhaps the most powerful axiomatic paradigms of form of expression of politics of exile. Arendt 
(1968 & 1978a) argues that the amount of totalitarianism of a country could be measured by the 
quantity of its urge to denationalize. New juridical-political categories arise, such as statelessness and 
displacement. These are the political axiomatic paradigms that analogically relate to the paradigm of 
citizenship and the constitutional rights of some citizens. In 2013 the estimate of human beings that 
are of concern to UNHCR (2013) is more than 35 million. Four years later it has become more than 65 
million. These are not only refugees, but also internally displaced persons, and stateless individuals 
due to political tribulations, transformation of borders of nation-states and denationalization as modern 
form of exclusion.  
  
The denationalization, however, affects not only the stateless, but within the state also the citizens or – 
as Sassen shows (2003) – the nation-state as a whole. It is not the military that leads and controls this 
process of denationalization, Arendt (1968) argues, but rather the police. The police – as civic subjects 
– function as a mechanism to trace abnormalities. Nonetheless, this tracing is not limited to the 
borders. Policing acts beyond the national law.13 Arendt argues that in a police state the stateless as 
well as the operations of the police in its blurred ambiguity were outright illegal. Both police and the 
stateless minorities became criminals due to the fact that their acts are not written or reflected upon in 
the realm of the law, or have been ‘lawfully’ abandoned from the law. I will elaborate on this in the 
next section of this chapter. For now, it is important to note that the police and the stateless are related 
to one another, be it that each is positioned on an opposite end of the legal spectrum. It is the police 
that locks up the stateless as a criminal or deports him without consulting any authority. The fate of 
the latter is even worse than the fate of a criminal. Arendt elaborates on the fact that some stateless 
even become criminals because only as a criminal they could obtain access to the legal system and 
legal representation.14 For a mere stateless person the law does not function in a form or representation 
and acknowledgment. It is not what they do that makes them criminals, but what they are that puts 
them in a state of disobeying the law. 
 
The asylum seeker exercising his or her right under international law to seek 
asylum frequently becomes the ‘unlawful non-citizen’ under domestic law. He or 
she suffers the ‘imputation’ of ‘double criminality’, having entered in an irregular 
manner, often with the assistance of people smugglers, and being aligned with 
‘crime’ by officials and the media, leading to assumptions about the (il)legitimacy 
of their claims (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2007, pp. 384-385). 
  
The treatment of refugees is usually rather deportation. American TV-series such as Law and Order 
are often a fine demonstration of such logic. While most witnesses are gently pursued to testify in 
court, witnesses with illegal status are threatened with deportation in order to make them testify 
against the criminal. Although the lawyers and the detectives appear momentarily morally troubled by 
their acts, nevertheless it remains morally reasonable for them to use coercion. In the end the illegal 
men and women, who are not criminals and often the victims, are deported. The law and order logic 
mainly protects the system and not a human as such. 
 
                                                     
13 That is why the Dutch labeled their military campaigns after World War II in Indonesia after it declared its independence 
in 1945 ‘politionele acties’. Even more interesting as to the experience of identity of the nation-state is the fact that until then 
The Netherlands had the largest moslim population of the world, due to the fact that their colonies were part of the nation-
state.  
14 The complexity between exclusion and criminal activity is also present in the attitude of European Youth. In their rapport 
Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus, Basra, Neumann and Brunner 
(2016) make – against the populist religious argument – a connection between criminal past and radicalization of youth. Yet 
in their research they do not target the systematic racism, economic and social exclusion of these youth from the political 
arena. In her research Kaulingfreks (2015) rather pleas for a political inclusion of this youth in order to target radicalization 
as well as criminalization that results from politics of exile.  
  
All discussions about the refugee problems revolved around this one question: 
How can the refugee be made deportable again (Arendt, 1968, p. 284)? 
 
In spite of its ideological appeal to the masses to legitimize its illegal operations, formally the 
totalitarian regime is, as any other regime, dependent on a general consent of its citizens to eliminate 
its so-called enemy. The discourse of denationalization is then the first step in a long process to gain 
the approval of the majority. Through denationalization people lose their jobs, properties, and their 
sense of purpose. In order to stay alive, they become schnorrers (beggars), Arendt (1968) states. 
‘Men’ are annoyed by beggars, avoid them, do not care for them, and do not even see them. Arendt 
adequately notes that they become unwanted long before their deportation by arguing that the camps 
are at the end of a road, that began with a sign that shames and names people as abnormal, the 
minorities.  
 
Even the Nazis started their extermination of Jews by first depriving them of all 
legal status (the status of second-class citizenship) and cutting them off from the 
world of the living by herding them into ghettos and concentration camps; and 
before they set the gas chambers into motion they had carefully tested the ground 
and found out to their satisfaction that no country would claim these people. The 
point is that a condition of complete rightlessness was created before the right to 
live was challenged (p. 296). 
 
It is within this setting of mass deportation, denationalization and statelessness that rights for men in 
general – human rights – become elementary. After the French Revolution, human rights were the 
starting point of the people – as a political entity – to underpin justice. The people, or men in general, 
rather than God or the King as instances of sovereignty became the object as well as the subject of the 
law. There is no longer any transcendence for and to the law. Men judge men. Nevertheless, during the 
revolution the intrinsic equality of all men before god in the realm of men becomes negotiable.15 
According to Arendt, through the process of defining a ‘human’ the paradoxical nature of human 
rights emerges. She shows that the stateless people do not have the traits of humans as they are 
presented in human rights. This is due to the fact that when stateless individuals claim their basic 
rights they are confronted by the fact that only a state, which the stateless lacks by definition, has the 
justifiable power to defend those unalienable rights. The stateless people have no access to a state and 
no state is obliged to defend their rights. As Guy S. Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam (2007) dispute, 
                                                     
15 This is what Nietzsche (2001) actually means when he speaks of the ‘death of God’. It does not refer to the God of religion 
but to the death of any form of fundament from which certainties can be derived. This ‘nihilism' is the reason why the 
madman runs in panic to the market place and wonders if the market men do realize what we have done by murdering God. 
“Isn’t empty space breathing at us? Hasn’t it got colder? Isn’t night and more night coming again and again? Don’t lanterns 
have to be lit in the morning?” (fragment 125, p. 120). And Nietzsche also states: “Even less may one suppose many to know 
at all what this event really means – and, now that this faith has been undermined, how much must collapse because it was 
built on this faith, leaned on it, had grown into it - for example, our entire European morality. This long, dense succession of 
demolition, destruction, down fall, upheaval that now stands ahead” (fragment 343, p. 199).   
 
  
the Convention of 1951 does not guarantee the States to oblige to the international law. The State 
remains sovereign in its choice to grant asylum, and may have an ethical but not legal obligation to do 
so. “State practice is replete with examples of asylum given; the humanitarian practice exists, but the 
sense of obligation is missing” (p. 369). 
 Entrance to the legal system remains limited to the citizens of those states. The nation-state 
carries the idea of a family. The idea of brotherhood excludes anyone that is not kinsfolks. And the 
stateless is certainly not family (Arendt, 1968, p. 291). In his lectures Foucault (2007) refers to the 
notion of family too and its use in the society of security. Nevertheless, he states, this use of the notion 
of family by the government to define the population eliminates at that very moment the sense of 
family as well as the classical understanding of government (pp. 104-105). The family – and the love 
for this family through the hatred for the other, as Ahmed (2014) shows – is not an engine to include 
people but – just as its counterpart The Society (as I have argued in 3.4.1) and nation-state – an 
axiomatic paradigm that rather negates.  
 
The lack of access to human rights aggravates prejudice because of what such lack is assumed to 
indicate. In a society and a time where citizenship, according to Arendt (1968), is associated with 
civilization and progress as well as with the degree of emancipation of a certain people, the lack of 
such a privilege becomes equal to a lack of civilization and progress. And precisely this paradox has in 
Nazism led to the idea that the concept of citizen is equated with the concept of human. So, the 
stateless not only loses his dignity but is also transformed into a bare life, a life stripped of its 
humanity. Non-citizen becomes a non-man. In the moralistic jargon of political parties in Europe this 
division between civilization of the European civic subject and the uncivilized other is more than 
obvious. In his letter to Dutch People the prime minister of The Netherlands Mark Rutte (2017) 
vividly divides the country in two types of people: the civilized Dutch subject that suffers from the 
barbaric behavior of the other. The list of sexual harassment and violence against civic servants – that 
apparently is only committed by foreigners and people of color that are born and raised in The 
Netherlands – is completed with enfeebling accusation of the same civic subject of racism. Rutte’s 
solution for this axiomatic idea of Dutch people is simple: ‘Act normal or leave.’ To wherever that 
may be. 
 
Deportation is however not the only horror that awaits the other. While the refugees and the stateless 
have become the political objects of the modern era, Arendt (1978a) argues, they are not only deprived 
of any appeal to juridical process but moreover from (forming a) political community.   
 
Not the loss of specific rights, then, but the loss of community willing and able to 
guarantee any rights whatsoever, has been the calamity which has befallen ever-
increasing numbers of people. Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of 
Man without losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss 
of a polity itself expels him from humanity (Arendt, 1968, p. 297). 
 
It is remarkable, as we have seen in 3.3.2 with Arendt’s division between labor, work and action, that 
she argues the loss of humanity starts with the loss of economic certainties: It begins by becoming a 
  
beggar, Schnorrers. The stateless individual loses its functionality in the world, on economic and 
social level, and in line with these losses it becomes the excluded. This exclusion however is in the 
final instance political. The stateless has no access to the public domain of speech and action. Politics, 
or the public space, as we have seen in Arendt’s work, is not about harmonious hegemony but is based 
on plurality. The disappearance of stateless persons and refugees from the human arena is 
supplemented by the disappearance of the politics of plurality. Thus, what remains is an apolitical 
stateless life not only outside the state, but also within it. The stateless, that is a non-existent object for 
the law, is desubjectified in the world of politics. And, in contrast to Arendt, I rather argue that it is 
exactly this lack of access to and this blockage to create a community that connects the enslaved 
people to refugees and stateless people. 
 
 4.3.4 Who is on Trial? 
As we have seen it is not only democracy and constitutional state that are vulnerable and multi-
approachable within the doublespeak of politics of exile, but also Human Rights could become a tool 
in negating basic rights within politics of exile. The discursive axiomatic paradigms of 
denationalization and denormalization create a new human being: homo sacer. Arendt (1968) states: 
“The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human” (p. 299). How does law, 
as the form of expression of politics of exile, define the contours of enunciation? The inability of the 
law and state to handle the reality of something like Auschwitz is more extensively analyzed in 
Agamben’s work. For him there is more to the law than the illusion of neutrality. Law itself carries the 
responsibility for the horror. Agamben (2000) argues that the state of exception in the camps was not 
an anomaly. This is not the result of criminal law, but rather is born out of the ability of the law to 
enforce itself through the exception or martial law (p. 38). Just as Arendt, he states that the juridical 
discourse is elementary to the discourse of exclusion. In his analysis of Primo Levi’s work Agamben 
(1999b) emphasizes the difference between law and justice, arguing that the “law is solely directed 
towards judgment, independent of truth and justice” (p. 18). However, the force of judgment, inherent 
in law, produces truth, indifferent to its falsity or unjust effect. This judgment presents itself thus as a 
determinant judgment; and not as an open reflective judgment (as I have shown in 2.2.1). During 
detailed interview with refugees in The Netherlands they are obliged to confirm every aspect of their 
past. In August 2016 on his twitter account Wil Eikelboom published an example of how far the 
absurdity of such determinative questioning can go. A civil servant asks a refugee: “Your birthplace is 
Bagdad. You have indicated that you have left Bagdad just when you were five to six months old. Can 
you remember anything about Bagdad or Iraq?” On which not surprisingly the answer was: “No, I do 
not remember anything.” Apparently, the civil servant could not comprehend the meaning of the 
adjective just; while continuing his absurd standard questioning. 
 
It is the sensitization of the logic of such absurd consistency that attracts us in Kafka’s work. The Trial 
of Kafka adequately visualizes for Agamben that law can only appear in the form of a trial in which 
“execution and transgression, innocence and guilt, obedience and disobedience all become indistinct 
and lose their importance” (p. 19). Was K. responsible or innocent, obedient or disobedient? What a 
trial does is not punishing the guilty or bringing them to justice. According to Agamben, the judgment 
becomes the punishment itself, by defining an innocent as a person who has never been judged by law. 
  
It drives on the assumption that guilt can be identified and handled by law. The trials against the PVV 
leader Wilders and dictators of Egypt and Tunisia seem to suggest that it is within the realm of the law 
that we can judge on political matters. And hence the juridical absolution was understood as a political 
absolution and blocked the political discussion on the matter. Agamben states that such thoughts have 
gone so far that it has blocked our reflections on Auschwitz. In terms of Arendt (1982) we could state 
that the determinant judgment has taken away our ability to act on base of reflective judgment. Trials 
like Nuremberg, Agamben (1999b) states, create the idea that we have caught the bad guys and can 
move on, leaving the camps behind us.  
 
With the exception of occasional moments of lucidity, it has taken almost half a 
century to understand that law did not exhaust the problem, but rather that the very 
problem was so enormous as to call into question law itself, dragging it to its own 
ruin (p. 20). 
 
As it is mentioned before, the totalitarian regime in its consistency relies on the production of 
confusion between lies and truth. The state, with the multiplicity of institutions, forces its masses to 
participate in their own destruction, and the internalization of the destructive doctrines within each 
citizen. The doctrines of security are not something that is forced upon the masses; but the masses, in 
their negation of the other, desires the limitation of the big brother. The masses negate themselves in 
their negation of the other. As Ten Bos (2015) states: “Every form of governance starts … with self-
governance. In-between these doctrines capitalism celebrates its growth. Just think of all the bottles of 
water that we throw away during boarding, just to buy more expensive drinks on the other side. It is 
through this economic discourse that the impact of politics that is obsessed by objective enemies 
implements rules that affect both the citizen and the non-citizen. It is terror with commercial benefits. 
 
Yet, it is not just to call politics of exile an a-moral politics. It is rather moralistic in the true sense of 
the word. It preaches permanently. Dutch norms and values is perhaps the most used phrase during 
Dutch election. Still, the doublespeak is also implemented in the moralistic attitude of this politics. As 
we have seen with Mark Rutte before, the civic subject preaches what the other must practice. 
Furthermore, in the discourse of politics of exile – where law modifies and forms the expression – the 
responsibility for upholding norms and values become less and less social or ethical matters. They are 
legalized. Agamben (1999b) problematizes the concept of responsibility, stating that this concept has 
been fully inhabited by law. And as we have seen, the policies on refugees – in their negation of 
international treaties – is creation of national laws in order to avoid responsibility. In line with Levi, 
Agamben states that the reduction of responsibility to the realm of law in reality leaves us behind with 
the acknowledgement of a gray zone, a point of (con)fusion in which it is impossible to point out the 
responsible and the victim. This zone places itself before the distinction between good and evil; not 
beyond it as an illusory salvation found in confessing to a crime or in taking responsibility, Agamben 
reckons. This mockery of responsibility is visible in the way Islamic State claims to take responsibility 
for bombing; as well as in Western governments apologizing with meaningless words for the crimes in 
the past such as slavery and colonization, without the acknowledgement of the present state of affairs. 
Ahmed (2014) even argues that saying sorry in such context rather function as a tool in order to repair 
  
the image of a nation-state. It is in order to negate the relevancy of the past for the present. We did it 
then, we are not doing it now (pp. 113-118). Ta-Nehisi Coates (2014) shows how after 200 years of 
slavery the unending policies on housing and segregation in the past decades define the life of 
descendants of the enslaved people until today. And we have merely to see through Femke 
Kaulingfreks (2015) analysis of the manner in which European youth from different ethnic 
background were banned to the peripheries of European cities to know why they lost their appetite for 
European ‘civilization’. Such manner of taking responsibility refers to a responsibility without a sense 
of redemption. The terrifying thing is the banality of it, not only of evil as Arendt (1965) states, but at 
the same time of the good which has become meaningless.  
 
However, in his resistance to such politics Agamben (1999b) does neither plead for irresponsibility and 
impunity, nor for another sort of responsibility within the law. He calls for zones of non-responsibility. 
As a disinterested inter-esse (see: 2.2.1) these zones confront us all, not only the so called guilty ones, 
“with a responsibility that is infinitely greater than any we could ever assume.” The responsibility of 
the wars, poverty and environmental decay of the world is not of a nation or a government. It is the 
responsibility of every human living in a global world. “At the most, we can be faithful to it, that is, 
assert its unassumability” (p. 21). These zones are not zones of all against all as was mentioned by 
Arendt (1968). It is not about one nation against the other. The zones of non-responsibility connect 
through a common responsibility: my colleague and me. They ethically surpass the axiomatic 
tendencies of paradigms of nationalism that create a world in which most people are either stateless or 
second-hand citizens due to their religion, ethnicity, color of their skin, sexuality, sexual preferences, 
age, mental or physical challenges. What Trump did was not presenting a new reality, but a reality that 
was long present in our societies. The horror of the Second World War is not only the responsibility of 
Nazi Germany, and the intensity of statelessness in current times is not the responsibility of one part of 
the world against the other. While Hillary Clinton indignantly protested against China and Russia’s 
lack of commitment to solve the political horrors in Syria, and calls it accurately travesty, nevertheless 
these horrors are historically bound to a toxic political affair in which Western as well as Non-Western 
countries were involved (NBC News, 2012). 
 
Do such examples of political meaningless responsibilities endure in the notion of human in human 
rights? Is the paradigm of human a hollow phrase and in this void the engine for the juridical non-
existence of rights? Can the rights of a human be more than an axiomatic paradigm of politics of 
exile? It is unjust to accuse the human-right activists of being naïve men and women whose good 
intentions cause ill outcomes. Most of our genuine knowledge of refugees, political exiles and 
prisoners as well as of the causes of famine and environmental pollution originate from the 
experiences and investigations of these activists. Their plea for justice as well as their disappointment 
in international institutions such as the UN shows a frustration in the legal mechanisms. In a sense, we 
could argue that the critical thought on the practice of law – as a form of expression that creates 
statelessness and illegality – would never have been formed if these activists were not doing what they 
do. It is the same critical thought that inspires men and women to fight. Critics thus must not cynically 
accuse the activists but must refer to the discourse of law and universal rights, by permanent 
evaluation of this discourse, and by permanent awareness of the tendency of the law to give rise to 
  
closed territories as well as the metaphysical elevation of some form of thought above the other. What 
do we mean by universal? What do we mean by right? These are not transitory questions with absolute 
answers, but due to the multiplicity and transformability of the world, chronic matters. Actions and 
immediate decisions are needed; nonetheless these actions take place in the middle of a rhizomatic 
web of ethical complexities and are never the final course of action. The law is in need of neutrality; 
nevertheless, the desire for neutrality, no matter how noble it may be has never manufactured actual 
neutrality. As David Luban (2005) states: “Judges do not fight their culture – they reflect it” (p. 1452). 
The responsibility we take is the responsibility to rupture the certainty and consistency of determining 
judgments through reflective judgments. Let us not simply mock the civil servants for their line of 
questioning, but criticize the law that creates room for such a banal absurdity.  
 
4.4 Limbic Lives: Unheard voices  
 
4.4.1 The Centre and its Peripheries 
Both form of content and form of expression within politics of exile emerge out of the pyramidal force 
of the state. The form of content creates territories of here and there; in which the civic subject of here 
determines the life of limbic live over there. The expression of this politics is also formed by 
axiomatic paradigms such as denationalization and denormalization that confirm the territories here 
and there. As we have seen, the term human in human rights within the juridical and political 
doublespeak of politics of exile operates as an axiomatic paradigm dividing the citizen from the non-
citizen; and finally condemns the other to a non-human life. The politics of exile permanently names 
the other as the abnormal. Yet, the responsibility for such determining judgment of the other as the 
abnormal is colonized by the law, with its pretense of neutrality. The prohibition of headscarves on 
schools in France relies on such neutrality. Its neutrality relies on an idea of exclusion of another 
image of thought. The judgment is determinant to axiomatically divide, as Schinkel argues (2011), the 
here as neutral – an in line as free and civilized – and the other as non-neutral, repressive and 
repressed. It is within this logic that secularism sensitizes its tendency for a monotheistic attitude with 
its judgment as a God of freedom. Yet the values of such politics are not given. Its freedom is 
commonly sacrificed in its tendency of prohibiting other forms of lives – thus the freedom of the other 
– and it defines the lives of its civic subjects through security measures. Politics of exile is in other 
words a moralistic politics. Schinkel thus states that nationalistic normativity – with its ethnocentric 
and racist temperament – although pretending to be a neutral description of reality; is rather a wishful 
and creative prescription of reality (p. 46-47).  Such moralistic politics sets norms and creates a rigid 
regime of expression: Freedom for women means to have no headscarf.  This is an example of a 
regime of faciality. At all times, it avoids any ethical and political reflective judgment on its 
interpretation of the values and norms. It weakens the plurality of expressions of freedom by judging 
some expressions – such as wearing a headscarf – as unequal toward other expressions – such as 
sexual revolution in the sixties. The doublespeak that forms the expression of politics of exile divides 
the matter of expression within this politics into axiomatic sets of right and wrong. In this section I 
elaborate on this binary tendency of the matter of expression within politics of exile; that does not 
define itself only as a lawful politics but also through moral citizenship as Schinkel confirms.   
  
 
Moral citizenship is nowadays relatively stronger than formal citizenship. Where 
former formal citizenship was the price for the immigrant, it is only the beginning 
today (p. 55, Translation TR).  
 
Law does not appear out of the blue. It is always embedded in a much broader discourse, in this case 
an ideal Society of Mankind. This idea simultaneously emerges with human rights. A society of 
mankind, according to Foucault (1977, 1978, 1986a & 1986b) and Arendt (1958 & 1968), assumes and 
expects adequate behavior of its members. It focuses on normalization and thus excludes spontaneity 
and natality. The urge of normalization has increased even more with the rise of mass-society. What 
until then had been only common in the realm of family is now demanded on a much larger scale. In 
modern times, equality does not concern the expression in difference, Arendt objects, but rather with 
sameness. In this sense, Arendt problematizes the basic fundament of democracy in another way. 
Equality becomes an egalitarian force. This attitude ignores the differences that are central to the 
public realm of politics. Traits such as preference for a political party become rather a personal matter. 
We could argue that the secretiveness of voting in elections is such a form of privatization. 
Nevertheless, it implies more than that. The fact that the financers of some European political parties 
remain implicit testifies of the same process of privatization. However, Foucault would rather argue 
that the realm of the private is as much undermined by the demands of normalization as the public 
domain. Arendt also acknowledges the fact that the private has been lost in modern times. In any case 
both philosophers define equality as equality in difference. They both fear the dehumanization of 
individuals by their homogenization in statistics. Due to the modern egalitarian equality, economic and 
behavioral sciences are undermined by this demand of statistics. The preponderance of normal 
behavior is that which matters and becomes a natural argument to view others as abnormal. The law of 
statistics within politics of exile is the law of the majority, Schinkel (2008) argues, due to the fact that 
distinction upon which categories are discriminated are based on a majoritarian idea of norm and the 
normal. It measures abnormalities. While minorities never define the majority, a small percentage 
seems sufficient to characterize a whole majoritarian minoritarian community. 
 
The application of the law of large numbers and long periods to politics or history 
signifies nothing less than the willful obliteration of their very subject matter, and 
it is a hopeless enterprise to search for meaning in politics or significance in history 
when everything that is not everyday behavior or automatic trends has been ruled 
out as immaterial (Arendt, 1958, pp. 42-43). 
 
It is assumed: the bigger the population, the more likely that the statistics are correct and the less the 
chance of defects. Even if this large amount is superfluous. The modern world is hence not a world as 
a common space of plural, but its commonality lies in the hegemony of thought in which the plurality 
  
is lost for the sake of mathematical units. It is not that which binds and separates men, but the room in 
which bodies are melting into each other (p. 283).16 
 
The monolithic character of every type of society, its conformism which allows for 
only one interest and one opinion, is ultimately rooted in the one-ness of man-kind 
… survival of the species could be guaranteed on a world-wide scale, can at the 
same time threaten humanity with extinction (p. 46). 
 
Besides these normalizing and violent interventions, the homogenizing effect of society also 
influences the phenomenon of individuality. Is the originality of an act still possible in a world where 
every human being must deviate too much from the norm, in a society of clones? The modern era is 
characterized as a time that belongs not to men but to no-one. Modern society is the bureaucratic no 
man’s land, according to Arendt, and according to Huijer (2016, p.14) a no man’s time, ruled by no-
one. This will not lead to a comfort zone where one can sense one’s freedom. According to Arendt 
(1958), precisely this irresponsibility, in which the non-responsibility in Agamben’s sense is absent, 
has led to the greatest crimes in our history. When nobody can be held ethically responsible and in a 
juridical sense accountable, there is also no individuality to experience one’s freedom. It is within such 
analysis of a bureaucratic force that we could recognize a force of law – in terms of Derrida (1992a) 
and Agamben (2005) – within Arendt’s (1958) analysis.  
 
It is true that one-man … is transformed in society … into a kind of no-man rule. 
But this nobody … does not cease to rule for having lost its personality … the rule 
by nobody is not necessarily no-rule; it may indeed, under certain circumstances, 
even turn out to be one of its cruelest and most tyrannical versions (p. 40). 
 
If political action is nonexistent in this no man's land, then it is no wonder that political speech 
eventually will become deformed and silenced, Arendt (1958) warns us. If the form of expression of 
politics of exile is characterized by the gray zones of irresponsibility – as we have seen before – than 
the matter of its expression is not simply a determining judgment, a moral rule that applies universally 
to anyone. The matter of expression is rather noticeable in deformed slogans: ‘We take responsibility 
for bombing!’; ‘A war for the sake of security comes with collateral damage.’ In modern society 
action and speech are disconnected, since speech no longer involves action. Speech has become a 
means to an end: Ideological refrain repeating the same slogans over the globe. Compulsion towards a 
final goal is an important trait of totalitarianism and politics of exile. Within this milieu speech is only 
used for the sake of persuasion rather than as an engine for human interaction. Speech therefore is no 
longer connected to a memory or a sense of history that comes with the immortality of connections in-
                                                     
16 The Greek society, which is according to Arendt the most individualistic society, was aware of the danger of large 
communities and was keen to keep the polis small. This is also one of Arendt’s pleas and advises in her book On Revolution. 
I will elaborate on this matter in the last chapter. 
  
between writers and heroes17 of the public space. Speaking in a social realm has become an instrument 
of clear communication to achieve agreement and sameness rather than to ascertain differences and 
movement of thought (pp. 26, 179, 232-233). The social banishes disagreement, which is a crucial 
element of communication. In line with the banishment of action, also political speech is, according to 
Arendt, expelled from the public domain. 
 
Every activity performed in public can attain an excellence never matched in 
privacy … While we have become excellent in the laboring we perform in public, 
our capacity for action and speech has lost much of its former quality since the rise 
of the social realm banished these into the sphere of intimate and the private (p. 
49). 
 
Modern society, with its secularized individuals in the private realm and its statistically approved 
hegemony in the public realm, has ended the Divine Judgment, Arendt (1958) argues. However, this 
ending of the transcendent world has not brought man closer to the world of men. It is not an 
alienation of self, but an alienation from the world that characterizes the modern age. Not having 
durability and not having stability on the long term has caused the fixation on wealth and property in 
the present. This is the driving force of modern human life, and is at the same time the sacrifice of 
what is human, according to Arendt.  
 From the perspective of Society of Mankind every person is a member of a family. Individuals 
are tangible entities that belong to a nation-state, to its hegemony of blood and soil.18 In the nation-
state – in which the family of the social means a certain type of citizenship – the political nature of 
public space is destroyed. Consequently, the private domain of intimacy has become meaningless and 
lost (pp. 253-257). It is due to the modern society’s alienation from the world and some modern 
science’s alienation from the earth that have led to a sense of worldliness. In this worldliness, as a 
form of expression, according to Arendt, negligence and resentment, as matter of expression, dominate 
the public sphere (p. 54 & 264). All over Europe people are captured by a feeling of resentment of 
losing European culture, and blame not themselves but the intruding other for this loss. Yet it is 
exactly due to this resentment itself – within which the complexity of the past and the self-
involvement in the loss of culture is neglected – that according to Arendt we lose a valuable thing: 
love. It is the loss of love, love not as a kind of affection for loved ones or as Sara Ahmed (2014) 
states a love for certain identity or nation-state that is embedded in the hatred for others, but the love 
as interest in the inter-est, the space of in-between within the human interaction. A faded love, since 
the urge of responsibility for the beloved space belongs to no-one. In this setting Arendt (1958) 
                                                     
17 Note that the concept of hero for Arendt (1958) does not refer to an extraordinary person but to a person’s braveness to 
reveal itself in public (p. 186). 
18 There has been often an attempt to disconnect nation-state from the axiomatic paradigm of blood and soil. Bal and 
Herscovitch (2011) plead to maintain a nation as a community, be it an open community. Nonetheless Arendt argues that 
despite any good intentions a community defining itself through the jargon of nation-state needs homogenizing processes in 
order to maintain order.   
  
sorrowfully states that “love of the world ... was the first to fall victim to the modern age’s triumphal 
world alienation” (p. 264). 
 
What does this imply for our present world and for a politics of exile? Sameness and its statistical 
demands also dominate the discourse on migration and refuge. The entrance of the other into a society 
is based on other’s contribution to a society. This contribution is, however, calculated by analogies 
between this other’s characteristics as opposed to the traits that are considered normal and valuable for 
the members of society. Not only the other must show no unfamiliar traits, but the society from within 
is mutually considered to be homogenous as well as unchangeable. As Schinkel (2008 & 2011) shows, 
a typical Dutch integration-test for migrants from abroad and already living in society is a fine 
example of such absurdities. While the migrant is obliged to learn certain cultural traits and common 
idiom by heart – even those which are arbitrary and considered to be private matters of choice such as 
sending a postcard to neighbors to congratulate them for the birth of their child – it remains 
questionable whether the great amount of the so-called autochthonous Dutch could pass the test 
themselves.19 Nevertheless, the majority of political parties accepted and cheered these forms of exam 
under the assumption that it is for the benefit of the immigrant. This ‘goodness’, nevertheless, seems 
only to apply to non-Western immigrants. Even some political and cultural counter acts of intellectuals 
followed the same logic. By introducing a Dutch-canon20 they manufactured a history, which although 
showing at its very core a long history of migration in The Netherlands, nonetheless confirmed the 
consistency of a culture by remaining in the logic of the well-known icons. Moreover, a significant 
contribution is often defined by property, not only of money or goods, but also possession of a 
passport or rather the right kind of passport. Not only territorial but also extraterritorial measures,21 
such as screening in the country of origin and neighboring countries, due to which the migrant is 
prevented from entering a safe haven legally, force the refugee and migrant alike into illegal practices. 
Such practices “focus on verifying documents, not on the motivations for travel,” Goodwin-Gill and 
McAdam (2007, p. 377) argue. This verification is often based on discrimination of those unwanted 
refugees such as for instance Eastern-European Roma; but also, people from countries that in 
comparison to Syria and Eretria at this moment are defined as safe. Even the statements on the safety 
of refugees shows a deformed tendency of the matter of expression within politics of exile. While the 
deal with Turkey is morally justified for the sake of the refugees, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam argue 
that due to the operation of states far beyond their border “the principle of non-refoulement has 
evolved to encompass non-rejection at the frontier” (p. 378). Such practices show how in political 
statements of European politicians – in their deal with Turkey pretending to be the champions fighting 
                                                     
19 See the official website: Inburgeren in Nederland. (sd). Ricky van Oers (2013) research on integration demands in The 
Netherlands, Germany and United Kingdom shows that such processes do not result to more inclusion of the migrants, but 
are rather mechanisms of exclusion.  
20 De Canon van Nederland. http://entoen.nu.  
21 “The rationale behind extraterritorial processing may be seen as twofold: first, to keep asylum seekers geographically 
distant from potential asylum States, and second (and relatedly) as an attempt to distance States from their legal obligations 
to them” (Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2007, p. 408). 
  
for the safety of refugees – neglected to be transparent about the fact that their own policies on non-
refoulement itself dives refugees to the dark world of smugglers in the first place.    
 
The same deformity within statements – as a matter of expression – is also noticeable in the analogy 
between economic and political issues. The economic state in which the immigrant or refugee leaves 
his homeland, as well as the economic state of the country of origin and the country of arrival are 
extremely relevant to the acceptance of this other. Nevertheless, this economic state seems to have a 
paradoxical relation to the concept of politics. Let us start with an example: a refugee as a fortune 
seeker. The politics of exile differentiates itself in a doublespeak discourse. The doublespeak in 
connection to fortune seeker is for example, as Huijer’s (2016) elaborations shows, present in 
evaluation of the people that migrated from Europe and people who remained behind. Not only the 
motives of European fortune seeker show intense similarity with the motives of the fortune seekers of 
the present; but even more so Europe that is eager to halt the migration from other parts of the world, 
has in the last two centuries produced immensely more migration flows than any other part of the 
world (pp. 14-20).  
 
Through vocabulary such as fortune seeker, the refugee – or legally speaking: the asylum seeker – is 
forced to hold back his desire for a better life and argue that his or her escape is merely caused by the 
need to escape death. It is purely the threat of death that gives meaning to their lives, hence life 
becomes merely survival, simply naked life. Breathing for the sake of breathing, without experiencing 
its fortune. The political subject must lack desire for a better future in order to prove its political past. 
What would be the point of evading danger other than the search for a better life? Even more so, is the 
threat of life beyond any economic reality? As Derrida (2001a) argues: 
 
The expression ‘immigration control’ means that asylum will be granted only to 
those who cannot expect the slightest economic benefit upon immigration. The 
absurdity of this condition is manifestly apparent: how can a purely political 
refugee claim to have been truly welcomed into a new settlement without that 
entailing some form of economic gain? … This distinction between the economic 
and the political is not, therefore, merely abstract or gratuitous: it is truly 
hypocritical and perverse; it makes it virtually impossible ever to grant political 
asylum and even, in a sense, to apply the law, for in its implementation it would 
depend entirely on opportunistic considerations, occasionally electoral and 
political, which, in the last analysis, become a matter for the police, of real or 
imaginary security issues, of demography, and of the market. The discourse on the 
refugee, asylum or hospitality, thus risks becoming nothing but pure rhetorical 
alibis (pp. 12-13). 
 
What is politics without its desire for happiness? Is escaping only for the sake of safety of a bare life? 
However, not any safety is sufficient. The types of danger that matter are framed legally: The person 
has been targeted by its government due to political persecution, religious and sexual preferences and 
because of racial characteristics. Any other form of danger is irrelevant to the law. It is not death that 
  
is relevant to the law, but the reason why that defines their focus. Not murder, but the manner in which 
and the reason why one is murdered. Those who are being attacked are merely objects of 
argumentation. Their urge to survive is not decisive. Only the attackers and their motives seem to form 
the process of subjectification. 
 The absurdity of these lines of thought and systematic legal judgments also show the banality 
of the distinction between economic immigrants and political refugees.22  First, we can draw the 
conclusion that through this sort of thought a death by extreme poverty is less dreadful than a political 
death. There is a form of double moral standards within a politics of exile, due to the fact that the 
matter of its expression shows axiomatic tendencies in analogy with its form of content (here versus 
there) and its form of expression (a lawful doublespeak that divides the citizen from the non-citizen). 
The matter of expression differs. There are statements for the realm of the here and statements that are 
meant for the realm of there. Derrida (2001a) argues that for refugees at the periphery of the wealthy 
West there is a clear distinction between economic reasons and political reasons for fleeing while the 
politics of the West as the center of power is significantly fueled by economic imperatives.  
 
Barack Obama’s State of the Union speech 2012 is a fine example of such contradictory discourses 
between the center and the periphery. It starts with the report that the last troops are back from Iraq 
and almost from Afghanistan. The mess left behind, the fact that in Baghdad multiple car bombings 
per day has become normal, is not discussed and is systematically avoided. The enemy is identified, 
either eliminated or weakened in its territories. From Pakistan to Yemen, the safety of Americans is 
ensured. Iran is fully isolated, and the collaboration with Israel is at its peak. Osama Bin Laden and 
Khadafy are dead. The rise of the IS is not calculated yet; thus, the military is awarded for a non-
individualistic trait: no self-interest. They collaborate optimally and do not leave one another behind. 
Then again, the tortures in Abu Ghraib and the scenes of the soldiers urinating on the corpses that 
were left behind by the Iraqi forces during the Allied invasion are not mentioned. The collaboration of 
US’s military with other countries has gained America’s respect around the world and the killing-
machines are no subject of discussion.  
The military topic however covers a small part of the speech and is keenly used to make an 
example for another political matter: the economy, which is the main subject of Obama’s speech. 
Thus, the military’s efficiency must guide America’s thought on economic problems, which contains 
the same MO: neglected and excluded peripheries versus the militarized center. Other issues, such as 
education and environment are mentioned due to their relevance for economic benefits. There is a plea 
for egalitarian economic opportunities, which only refer to American citizens. Good education and 
wise environmental investment are appreciated and stimulated – as Obama often states, “send me a 
bill” – for two reasons: 1) they create jobs for the American citizens and 2) they will make America 
independent from other countries, especially ‘instable countries’. It is also within this plea for 
education that Obama speaks with a twisted form of morality. He pleas for residency of the illegal 
children that study in the US, appreciates their achievements by becoming Americans through and 
                                                     
22 Metthew Hyland (2001) shows how the economical suffering, in which the term fortune seeker is embedded, is not less 
inferior to political circumstances and suffering. It is then in a sense naïve or unjust to remain the distinction in terms of 
measuring the affliction. Furthermore, Hyland argues that economic suffering is not distinct from the political unrest.  
  
through, while at the same time he complains about foreign students who merely travel to the US for 
good education and leave to benefit from it in their own country. As if the actions of these students are 
worse than the actions of international American companies which exploit people in those so-called 
instable countries. He even argues that the borders with South America are more secured than ever 
before. Nevertheless, capitalist corporate business must ensure the same partial form of de-
internationalization. Here Obama again explicitly differentiates between the norm in the center and the 
norm for peripheries. Companies must be stimulated to bring back their factories to America, and hire 
American people; piracy of American products abroad must be stopped; Americans must be 
stimulated to buy good American products and not that from other countries, while the American 
companies must strive to sell their products abroad as much as possible. Finally, even the juridical part 
of political thought is mentioned. In order to support these economic achievements, Obama states that 
if on the international level the playing field is leveled, America would always win. Thus, let us agree, 
Donald Trump is not really original. He repeats a refrain.   
 
As in the West political discussions often involve economic interests and ideologies, the severe 
poverty caused due to such politics is separated from political, religious, racial and sexual 
characteristics. Thus, within politics of exile the term refugee itself becomes an axiomatic paradigm; 
dividing the ‘real’ refugee from the fortune-seeker. While Arendt (1958) argues that in modern society 
political issues have become economic issues, we would rather argue that refugees in the geopolitical 
discourse have become economized in order to become depoliticized. This economization finally leads 
to another assumption, which lies behind the logic of property. The access of an immigrant to the 
market and its increase of property is immediately associated with the decrease of the property of the 
citizen of the country of arrival. This argument used by right wing politicians, and not necessarily 
contradicted by the liberal politicians even in their pleading that one must share its prosperity with 
fellow human beings, shows the contradictory character of the capitalistic economy. While capitalism 
is identified as a free growth of good and prosperity, in the process of migration the growth of 
economic wealth for some people means the decrease of wellbeing for another; yet again manifesting 
the paradigm of I (here) versus other (from there). Even more so while Western companies neglect 
their taxes in other countries, refugees in the state Baden-Württemberg in Germany cannot possess 
more than 350 euro.  
 
Who is a ‘real’ refugee? Let us not be naïve. Even the juridical demands for political refuge are no 
guarantee for finding a safe home. The fear that lies in identification of an enemy also affects the 
political refugees. As mentioned, limited numbers and economic calculations govern the treatment of 
these refugees. The detailed interviews are in this sense not so much occupied with a calm 
conversation with those who have just left everything behind, but seem rather to be a cross-
examination with the aim of breaking a banal consistency in the life stories of these refugees. The aim 
of politics of exile – within its form and matter of expression – is economic consistency rather than 
political reality. As Dirk De Schutter (2005) suggests “consistency is the mental capacity to 
dominantly draw propositions from premises, but it has lost every connection to the world” (p. 59, 
Translation TR). Our civil servant expects that refugees remember their life when they were five 
months old. Within such regime of signs, De Schutter argues, first one insists to be consistent and 
  
second demands a life to answer or to be shaped by the consistency of such regime. It is this attitude 
that connects truthness – in which an idea on neutrality gains a claim on what is true – and consistency 
to one another in disconnecting life from the natal reality of the world (p. 59 & 63). 
 From this perspective, we could note that the officials of immigration and naturalization 
services collect information, not because of the seriousness of the case, but rather to catch the stranger 
in a lie. The Dublin Regulation is used as a legal argument to deport the asylum-seekers who have 
applied for refugee status in another country to be sent back to this ‘safe’ country, which often results 
in deportation to the country of origin or illegality in the countries of arrival. The deal with Turkey is 
not exceptional, but in line with a political pattern of thinking.  
 
Its expressed aim is to identify a single responsible State and to require it to 
determine the asylum claim thereby reducing the likelihood of multiple, successive 
applications by asylum seekers, and eliminating asylum seekers ‘in orbit’ 
(Goodwin-Gill & McAdam, 2007, p. 401). 
 
There appears to be no investigation whether the previously rejected request for asylum in one country 
was grounded or not, which would have been the case if one was a citizen of one country and was 
accused of a crime elsewhere, implying that a criminal has more legal protection than an illegal 
individual. There seems to be no doubt considering the justness of the opinion – the determining 
contradictory judgment – of a co-European foreign policy. Suspicion concerns the alien, not the ally.  
 
The concept of the ‘safe country’ is a procedural mechanism for shuttling asylum 
seekers to other States said to have primary responsibility for them, thereby 
avoiding the necessity to make a decision on the merits because another country is 
deemed or imagined to be secure … States justify this practice by arguing that an 
individual genuinely fleeing persecution would seek asylum in the first non-
persecuting State, and that any ‘secondary’ movement is therefore for migration, 
rather than protection purposes (p. 392). 
 
Goodwin-Gill and McAdam then argue that an asylum-seeker is deprived of any form of individuality; 
hence the systematic negligence of its motives and singular circumstances, due to which he or she 
decides to move on from one country to an other.  
Let us thus say that within politics of exile the effects of constitutional doublespeak (form of 
expression) runs deep within political statements and protocols of policies (matter of expression). The 
Voice of such politics creates voices that confirm the doublespeak. Yet, as I promised this chapter 
intends to change the perspective of hearing, hearing the voices that are from over there, yet always 
immanent to the here. Their cacophonic silence is everywhere. Who are these unwanted voices of 
these unwanted people (matter of expression) that do not fulfill the desires of the Voice of politics of 
exile and its consistency of the doublespeak (form of expression)?  
In the documentary Dirt (2008 & 2012) Meghna Haldar eloquently shows how in modern 
societies, such as India, Canada and the US dirt has become equivalent to unwanted people. The 
documentary sensitizes that the manner in which we handle our garbage is an indication of the manner 
  
in which we treat our housekeepers, the illegal, the unwanted, the addicts, the non-virgins, the raped, 
the prostitutes. Haldar’s environmental search for the modern state leads her to the modern conception 
of men, appropriate and non-appropriate men. In this sense, this personal documentary is a fine 
example of limbic lives, excluded lives that have become normal in all forms of civilization all around 
the globe. However, while European politicians seem to be at war with Gods of others, Haldar shows 
us that only a Goddess is capable, although for a short period, to bring out the dirt in all of us. Only the 
Goddess Durga can rise out of dirt and become divine at the same time. However, after this instant 
experience of indifference towards class and gender even the deity is banished to the running waters of 
the river, and men turn back to their oblivious freshness. 
 
Legend has it that Gods created us out of dirt and spit. If we were created in their 
image, we in turn created them in ours, using dirt. … Now the first dirt to make the 
goddess is always procured from the doorstep of a prostitute’s house. Since men 
drop their virtues at her doorstep, this dirt is supposed to be an accumulation of all 
male’s virtue (Haldar, 2008). 
 
Where are our doorsteps? Are they somewhere in Greece, in North Africa, or at the borders of Balkan 
countries? Or are they perhaps somewhere in a factory elsewhere where children make our clothes, 
enslaved people make our food, or in the air that we pollute while not experiencing its consequences? 
Somewhere there, on those doorsteps, we have left our virtues behind, our promises of equality as 
plurality, freedom for all, and human rights. Beyond those steps lies the hell of limbic lives, their 
cacophonic silence. There lies another matter of expression of politics of exile creating a discrepancy 
with form of content of this politics (here versus there) and its form of expression (us versus them), 
and matters of expression (deformed statements). This hell is not a hell for bad people, but a hell 
where bodies are contaminated and voices censured. Their voices create a sense of abjection within 
the body of limbic lives. These figures become inexpressible within the current regimes of signs, 
where the double standards and doublespeak – despite their hypocrisy – create a clear dual reality 
between here and there, good and evil. The hell is not the realm of evil, but a realm where there is no 
clarity on who to trust, who to love, who to be. In that realm, one cannot in any sense name oneself as 
something.  
 
Examples of such a time and space are manifold. In Ghorashi’s (2003) research interviewed Iranian 
women call the years after the Iranian revolution years of hell, not only because of external factors 
such as violence and repressive laws, but due to their loss of faith in ideas for better times and people 
that they could trust. The loss of life and empathy, the lack of feeling, is also endured by the Bosnian 
raped women having the seed of their enemy growing inside their womb.23  The terror runs so deep in 
                                                     
23 Agamben (1998) argues how the political significance of rape in the German camps differs from the Yugoslavian war (p. 
176). Diken and Laustsen (2005) argue that rape, as a war instrument is not only an instrument of torture but also a strategy 
of ethnic cleansing. The child born as a result of such a rape is often seen as an abject, an alien born into the society.  (S)he is 
an insider as an outsider, seen as an abnormality that disrupts the normality from within. By referring to Bataille they argue 
that this abject not only is beyond the distinction between outside and inside, but “the abject is a sign of a prior animal 
existence that threatens our identity as humans. … the abject is not its impurity but formlessness. Those uncanny objects, or 
 
  
their bodies that it defied every possibility to make a distinction between us and them, here and there. 
They were left behind with a silence cry. In other cases, even the simplest questions remain 
unanswered. Who is the raped, who is the rapist in the political discourse of war? A pregnant Somali 
woman attacked by marauding gangs confides:  
 
“The gunmen issued strange orders. They asked each woman to be raped by her 
brother. 'Do it immediately,' they ordered,” said the woman … “Some men are 
more audacious than others. When they were ordered to rape their sisters, they 
raped them to save their lives. ... Death is better than doing that.” The attackers 
ordered her brother-in-law to rape her but he refused, saying: “You are men and 
I'm a man, and life and death is in the hands of God. Either kill me or spare me.” 
They killed her brother-in-law and left his body unburied (Straziuso & Malkhadir, 
2011). 
 
While fleeing for her life this victim wishes her death, and while rape is not an outcome of a certain 
culture but in this case an aspect of war and poverty, rape victims are often not recognized as political 
refugees (Baillot, Cowan & Munro n.d & 2012 and Refugee Council 2009). Furthermore, speaking of 
rape is a problematic matter even within one language. The multi-discursive level of the problem – not 
only caused by different languages but also different types of discourse such as social, cultural, 
juridical and affective ones – makes speaking of such experiences even more problematic. The 
complexity of this problem seems akin to an aphasic state in which connecting words and images of 
trauma becomes impossible. Explaining flight for our victim is a practice of a-signifying rupture. This 
is not due to a lack of consistency within one assemblage of thought, but due to a complex of 
intertwining different assemblages and in some cases of contradictory consistencies and memories. It 
is a cacophonic silence, the heterophasia, of an exiled body. Their voices matter, they are unformed 
matter.  
 
4.4.2 Camp: State of Exception 
How does all this relate to Arendt’s (1958) analysis of the totalitarian State? Does this mean that world 
politics has organized its present territory – the Center – under totalitarian conditions? The totalitarian 
regime is the end of the polis, because of its banishment of human plurality and relationality. By the 
concept of the polis, Arendt does not per se want to refer to a rigid physical place. Polis was an open 
space and the law was merely an instrument to guarantee the safety of this openness. Within 
contemporary politics on the other hand, Goodwin-Gill and McAdam (2007) repeatedly show, 
international laws are systematically used to close a territory instead of providing access.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
abjects, are both human and inhuman, both interior and exterior, both repelling and fascinating” (pp. 116-117). The child is, 
however, not the only abject. The woman becomes an abject by the rape as well, not only by the enemy but also by her own 
community. Because of her experiences she is no longer available for their traditional role of a female as being suitable for 
marriage, or innocence of virginity.  
  
At one level, State practice nevertheless permits only one conclusion: the 
individual still has no right to be granted asylum. The right itself is in the form of a 
discretionary power – the State has discretion whether to exercise its right, as to 
whom it will favour, and, consistently with its obligations generally under 
international law, as to the form and content of the asylum to be granted (Goodwin-
Gill & McAdam, 2007, p. 414).  
 
At the end of The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt (1968) analyses two ambiguous characteristics of 
this state. On the one hand, totalitarian regime is the force that creates masses, one singular body, 
meaning a total organized body where each molecule mirrors exactly the other. A totalitarian regime is 
defined as a homogenizing force imposing men to think the same, never to doubt the common norm. 
Isomorphic statements on such norms repeat themselves. We have just to hear islamophobic 
statements in different European countries and uttered by different political parties in order to know 
that the term Islam has become a sign of a regime of signs rather than reference to a religious belief.  
Yet, the repetition of the same statements does not create a connection. Politics of exile, due to 
its negation is, according to Arendt (1968), the accumulation of lonely atomized men and women that 
lack connective power from within. By depriving the other from entering or forming a community, the 
civic subject in the end sacrifices its own sense of freedom, an affect that is elementary for Arendt in 
order for individuals to politically connect. Thus, while the power within politics of exile creates 
uniform masses (form of content) and a clear law that answers to the consistency of this unifying 
power (form of expression), the copy paste deformation of axiomatic paradigms of expression (matter 
of expression) creates an affect even within the masses themselves: loneliness. The hell of being 
silenced is not only in the hell of limbic lives, but enters the core existence of the civic subject. 
Although at the first instance the two characteristics seem to exclude one another, Arendt argues that 
the first guarantees the second. Only in a world where there is plurality and thus disagreement – what 
becomes impossible within isomorphic statements with tracing tendencies – will men have the urge to 
speak to one another. If we all think the same there will be no need to speak, let alone to think. In a 
world without speech there is neither reflection nor an arguing with one’s own alter ego, no private life 
whatsoever. A conversation between men needs the openness of this relationship with oneself, i.e. 
difference. Thus, loneliness for Arendt differs from solitude in which the internal plurality is yet 
intact.  
Totalitarianism demolishes not only external plurality, but also intrinsic self-reflectivity and 
by implication responsibility. Totalitarian exclusion does never bring about new communities. It is 
rather a movement through which every form of constructing a community is blocked. The sum of 
majority in politics of exile is in the end zero, due to the fact that no one fully answers to all the 
characteristics of the axiomatic paradigm of majority. There is a scilicet misapprehended tautology 
between what is understood as majority1, namely a mass or a large amount of people, and majority2 as 
an axiomatic paradigm. There is no body that contains all its traits. Geert Wilders has Indonesian 
ancestors and has to bleach his hair, Barak Obama became famous as the first black president, Mao 
Zedong showed abnormal sexual tendencies, and finally Adolf Hitler was not a German citizen. The 
sensation of exclusion of the majority2 – despite its force to mobilize the masses (Majority1) – 
  
eventually does not consider one group or some groups, but all the subjects at the center as well as in 
the peripheries of its territory that are defined and categorized by this axiomatic regime of signs.  
Ambiguously the totalitarian movement is characterized by the inertness of its masses. “It 
destroys the one essential prerequisite of all freedom which is simply the capacity of motion which 
cannot exist without space” (Arendt, 1968, p. 466). Space is necessary, according to Arendt, in order 
for an individual to become a political entity. This guarantees human’s ability to act and to speak. 
Loneliness is thus not merely solitude or isolation from the masses. It is instead the world of 
Heideggerian (1996) anonymous ‘Man’, which results in the inability of men to think, to communicate 
even within themselves, while being a part of the masses (Arendt, 1968, pp. 476-479). There is no 
contradiction between atomization due to political loneliness and the movement of the masses. Thus, 
Arendt describes mass society as an individualized mass or mass atomization (p. 318 & 323). Through 
this once more the logic of form of content and expression of politics of exile (homogenization 
through doublespeak) shows a discrepancy with its effects as matter of content and expression (non-
communicating atoms). 
 
Nevertheless, as we have seen before, next to this ambiguous production of lonely mass society, 
totalitarianism also moves by differentiation of masses: masses that do belong and masses that do not. 
Refugee is not an individual, but within the regimes of expression of the spectacle and policies of 
politics of exile it always represents a mass, a mass of migration. It permanently creates multiple 
forms of peripheries in which the unwanted masses are isolated form the center-mass. How do we 
define the peripheries in a politics of exile? Peripheries are not only the ‘Third World’. Thresholds and 
doorsteps are everywhere. The territories defined as peripheries could be located in the center as well. 
There is a difference between limit as a sign within the regime of signs of politics of exile (expression) 
and border in a literal territorial sense (content). Peripheries are defined by limits of belonging and not 
necessarily by borders of nation-states, Saskia Sassen (2012) suggests. The defining factors of the 
peripheries are their economic and political counter-normative characteristics. This exterior structure 
owes its existence to the norm. Collateral damage concerns people from other countries or poor 
American youth without perspective, as Michael Moore (2004) shows, but it is not meant for the elite.  
 
How do we call this axiomatic paradigm (matter of expression) that refers to peripheries that do not 
belong to the order as faces that are homogenized by regimes of faciality and gestures that are 
represented as barbaric or repressed? How do we name the space where voices are deafened by the 
Voice of regimes of signs? Agamben calls this a camp. The manner in which the idea camp is 
connected and disconnected to normative paradigms creates a notion of peripheries. Charlie Hailey 
(2009) shows that camps have been more common in our history than one suspects: “Camp spaces 
have become our environment” (p. 3). In contrast to our modern understanding of it, the etymology of 
the word camp indicates open field or level space. Nevertheless, the definition of the word in the 
dictionary presents even more ambiguity. Camps have a multiplicity of inhabitants such as 
holidaymakers, campers, military, refugee, prisoners, the victims of Hurricane Katrina, or Wall-street 
protesters. Camp is an unordinary, uncomfortable space and as Hailey shows its existence oscillates 
between temporality and permanency. According to him to understand camp means that a systematic 
reflection on our contemporary understanding of place is necessary.  
  
Hailey differentiates three types of camps. Camps as spaces that foster autonomy, such as Scouting 
camp or Peace camps. The political degrees of such camps differ immensely. The second type is 
according to him camp as a mean of control. These, such as Guantanamo Bay, are meant as centers in 
which power-mechanisms of exclusion manifest themselves. The final form of camp refers to those 
that arise from necessity, such as Mass Shelter Camps built after an environmental disaster; or what in 
Italy is called hotspots for refugees. As Hailey shows, refugee issues oscillate between these three 
types of camps. European refugee camps, such as in Turkey and Greece, are often mechanism of 
controlling flows of migration, while refugee camps in Jordan oscillate between control and necessity. 
Refugee camps are also often built on the idea of autonomy such as is the case with No Border Camp, 
in which the camp is used as an open space instead of exclusion space.  
For Agamben (1998a) camps are the defining territorial sign of contemporary politics. 
Agamben defines camps as a specific political space created by the law as a territory outside the norm. 
This territory – not only those of the Nazi-regime but also currently in refugee camps and prison 
camps like Guantanamo Bay – are for him the space in which the decision of an ambiguous 
sovereignty is practiced (pp. 166-180). It is the space where the axiomatic form and matter of 
expression brand the abnormal. The exceptions proliferate, not only in Iraq, Syria, Sudan or Eritrea but 
also in refugee camps in Italy, Spain and Morocco. The international community participates in 
widening the gap in which lives are not saved for the sake of being human, thereby according to 
Arendt failing humanity. In his documentary Pursuit of Happiness (2012) Mahmoud Chavoushi shows 
the immense effects of mass migration in Greece for refugees and Greek society that struggle with the 
effects of global unrest and economic crisis combined with Europe’s need to ward off any further 
movement of the so-called fortune seekers. Chavoushi, who once as a refugee felt a warm welcome in 
Greece, is now, twenty years later, confronted with a growing racism, severe poverty and deep-rooted 
hate. His documentary sensitizes his viewers for the deep embedded inhumanity of human life in the 
camps. 
 
The state of exception is neither external nor internal to the juridical order, and the 
problem of defining it concerns precisely a threshold, or a zone of indifference, 
where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each other 
(Agamben, 2005, p. 23). 
 
Understanding the logic of camps, as suggested by Agamben and Hailey, indicates that this territorial 
space is not merely for the other, the migrant and the refugee. In terms of Foucault the undisciplined 
other, prostitutes, drug addicts, psychopaths, but also abused and violated women inhabit respectively 
tipple zones, user spaces, psychiatric clinics and safe houses. These are the heterotopias that find no 
expression in the utopian regimes of expression. The main lesson of Foucault is that disciplinary 
power never limits its realization to an exterior territory. It comes from within and manifests itself in 
ways that we do not suspect: in ‘our’ hospitals, schools, work, universities, etc. As Deleuze states we 
never leave one cell to enter another anymore. Control is all over the place. In contemporary society, 
we are determined from the beginning, even before birth, in our course of life (Deleuze, 1995, pp. 178-
179 & Foucault, 2003, p. 243). Under the reign of the discourse of terrorism, Agamben (1998a) warns 
us that we all start to live in a camp, in which through sovereign practices, each one of us is its 
  
potential enemy, or as Arendt (1968) argues an ‘objective enemy’. This even applies for smokers who 
have recently been perceived as dangerous for public health or the obese bodies that offend our 
disciplined way of consuming. All these abnormalities must be reduced to a 'normal' state of being. 
The war on impurity - being pure Christian, Jewish, Muslim or Atheist; French, Dutch or British; 
heterosexual, non-smoker, slender and slim – shows, as Arendt already suggested, that totalitarianism 
has not come to an end, nor that it limits itself to other parts of the world. It continues its war against 
each form of imperfection, an imperfection from which it aporetically gains its power. 
  
The State apparatus needs, at its summit as at its base, predisabled people, 
preexisting amputees, the stillborn, the congenitally infirm, the one-eyed and one-
armed (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 426). 
 
Thus, the logic of exile in differing between belonging and non-belonging blurs the border between 
the external and the internal. The manner in which rightwing parties as well as the members of 
leftwing parties switch from refugees to third generation Dutch youth with different backgrounds is 
exemplary. 
 The camp is the engine for ‘deterritorialization of territory’. Not only due to its penetration 
from within, but also due to its ambiguous form of existence. While on the one hand indicating an 
actual space, from the perspective of the law camp is merely a virtual space. A space that must be 
discursively excluded from ordinary life as an exceptional space. While the utopic law represents the 
Voice, the camp is an event of heterotopic cacophonic silence. While the law as a form of expression 
creates a matter, yet this matter of expression – the heterotopic voices - is included by being excluded 
from its form.  
 
Life, which is thus obliged, can in the last instance be implicated in the sphere of 
law only through the presupposition of its inclusive exclusion, only in an exceptio. 
There is a limit-figure of life, a threshold in which life is both inside and outside 
the juridical order, and this threshold is the place of sovereignty (Agamben, 1998a, 
p. 27). 
 
The voices of the camp become virtual in relation to the law. An artistic production like the videogame 
of Escape from Woomera (Oliver, n.d.) is a sneer to this virtual/actual space. This collaboration of 
journalists and game developers connects the virtual space of the game for the first time to the 
secretive actuality of the space of a refugee camp in Woomera (Australia).24 The gamer becomes the 
refugee and must find escape routes. But first of all, the gamer needs to survive. While the common 
media merely visualizes the captivity, the game maker creates an overall sensation of what it means to 
                                                     
24 Sarah Stephen (2002) describes it as follows: “Woomera detention center is hell on Earth. Located in the middle of the 
South Australian desert, it can reach 40 degrees in summer and is freezing cold in winter. There are no trees or shade, nothing 
but the scorching sun. Opened in November 1999, Woomera has the capacity to hold 1400 asylum seekers, five times the size 
of the Woomera township's population.” 
  
be an inhabitant of a camp. We have to look at Lesbos or Nauru to know that the deadly ‘game’ of 
exclusion of life still endures. 
 
Behind the powerlessness of God peeps the powerlessness of men, who continue to 
cry ‘May that never happen again!’ when it is clear that ‘that’ is, by now, 
everywhere (Agamben, 1999b, p. 20). 
 
The camps are the sovereign nomos of the totalitarian movement, in other words its axiomatic 
paradigm. This is due to their capacity to realize the indistintiveness between reality and fiction, 
between truth and falsity. Statements appear, but they do not sensitize for action. Let us look at the 
image of Oman in 2016, the Syrian five-year-old boy looking at the camera with a bloody face, 
mocking our political remarks. Perhaps his image unveils our media spectacle; a bloody face of a 
beautiful child. In a split second his gaze, just as the hidden face of Alan Kurdi, mocks our shock, 
saying “really, did you forget this was happening.” The horrors of politics of exile’s internal state 
make our political statements unconceivable as realities. It blurs the distinction between the offender 
and the victim, as we will see. Camps do not only murder, Arendt (1968) states, but also annihilate 
people, as if they have never existed at all. Just imagine the hundreds of children in Calais in 2016 
being silently abused every day. Arendt states that this explains why the location of the camps 
remained hidden or disguised. It is this ability of eradication of existence that differentiates totalitarian 
camps from their previous formations. The inhabitants of these camps were made useless, purposeless, 
and lifeless. “Totalitarianism strives not toward despotic rule over men, but toward a system in which 
men are superfluous” (p. 457). Here not only life is destroyed but also death, i.e. the ability to die (p. 
443). Agamben coins this non-existence as homo sacer. The refugee disappears just as thousands of 
men and women disappear in jails such as Guatanamo Bay.  
 
Camps is thus more than a physical state (matter of content), an expression of a state of (non)being. 
Carl Schmitt marked this as the State of Exception, a notion that Agamben (2005) adapts. In this state 
politics and law merge through the logic of necessity and emergency. Foucault's normalization does no 
longer suffice, hence axiomatic paradigms are applied through force of law (p. 24). There are 
measures within the law for the civic subject here; and lawless measures for them, the limbic lives 
over there. 
 
If exceptional measures are the result of periods of political crisis and, as such, 
must be understood on political and not juridico-constitutional grounds, … then 
they find themselves in the paradoxical position of being juridical measures that 
cannot be understood in legal terms, and the state of exception appears as the legal 
form of what cannot have legal form. On the other hand, if the law employs the 
exception – that is the suspension of law itself – as its original means of referring 
to and encompassing life, then a theory of the state of exception is the preliminary 
condition for any definition of the relation that binds and, at the same time, 
abandons the living being to law (p. 1).  
 
  
Next to this blurring of borders between law and politics, law and non-law, law and life, the state of 
exception, Agamben explains, is also ambiguous due to its non-exceptional exceptional state. Schmitt 
marked the appearance of this state necessary for the times of war. Inspired by Walter Benjamin 
however, Agamben states that the exception has gained a permanent state in our political life. The 
axiomatic paradigm of security, also within Foucault’s analysis, has disengaged the nation-state from 
its exceptional siege, and has become a necessity to permanently create a territory that is lawfully 
suspended from the law (p. 14). The state of exception thus becomes the nomos of contemporary 
politics.  
 
This nomos does not only give rise to deformed slogans. The matter of expression of politics of exile 
is not merely lingual or only a voice. It is also gestural as well as facial. The political violent gesture 
of torture of the terrorist is one of the practices that emerge from such a necessity. The emergency of a 
ticking bomb and the urgency to save lives have become favorite themes of Hollywood cinema. In his 
‘Liberalism, Torture and the Ticking Bomb’, David Luban (2005) shows how the practice of torture, 
which was fearsomely rejected by the American society, within weeks after 9/11 becomes commonly 
accepted among American citizens. Luban also adequately argues that the liberal tendency in order to 
plea for or reject torture could not simply be covered by the opposition between left-right, or 
progressive and conservative. Although liberal arguments against torture seem to be more than 
obvious, Luban states that modern politics has developed mechanisms in order to weaken such liberal 
aversion towards torture. It is not merely the logic of deformed slogans: What ‘they’ are doing is a lot 
worse than what ‘we’ are doing. The ‘they’ as victims of torture are also isolated from the realm of 
actual life. They are privatized in an absurd state of friendship and intimacy, in which the pain 
suffered by the one who is tortured becomes unimaginable for liberal understanding of a human-being. 
Panic, humiliation and the pleasure of mastery is the spectacle of torture, Luban states along with 
Montaigne. A common form is Victor’s Pleasure: “the victor tortures captives for the simplest of 
motives: to relive the victory, to demonstrate the absoluteness of his mastery, to rub the loser's face in 
it, and to humiliate the loser by making him scream and beg” (p. 1432). Luban also recalls other 
traditional traits of torture such as terror, punishment, and extracting of confession. All these traits 
contributed to the people’s fear for the sovereign, and keep them in line. However, what drives the 
liberal argument in favor of torture is rather the fifth trait, intelligence gathering. There is a difference 
between confession and intelligence gathering, the first is backward-looking, the second is forward-
looking. The liberal does not refer to pleasure of punishing a criminal or causing terror, but rather the 
prevention of a future disaster that motivates its action. Luban concludes that such an idea could 
become a dangerous delusion where “liberals can for the first time think of torture dissociated from 
cruelty” (p. 1436). It is the greater evil that motivates the liberal to do what he does. Torture becomes 
the state of exception in which non-liberal liberalism secures liberal way of living.  
Luban argues that this aporetical liberal rationality finds its expression in the image of a 
ticking bomb, which forces the opponent to choose between the terrorist and many innocent people. 
The opponent of these interrogation practices slows down the hero to save good people. The opponent 
is thus not ignored but rather ridiculed in his or her unrealistic idealistic image of the world. Even if 
the bomb is not really there, even if one does not know if the detainee knows something, which is 
more often than not the case, the idea of its ticking away affirms this logic. You may never know. 
  
Finally, all captives can be tortured for the sake of the one that might know something, yet the logic of 
the torture remains: We torture one to save the many. Two utilitarian oppositional rationalities of 
numbers thus emerge that differentiate the peripheries from the center.25 Luban thus argues that while 
the ticking bomb indicates a momentary emergency, the torture becomes a common practice of a 
culture. “The ticking time bomb distracts us from the real issue, which is not about emergencies, but 
about the normalization of torture” (p. 1446). It is this normalization or rather the re-normalization of 
abnormal behavior – which again shows the dual moralism of politics of exile – that is opposed by 
Luban. Torture and abuse are neither incidents nor the act of a few people. “Abu Ghraib is not a few 
bad apples – it is the apple tree” (p. 1452). 
 
It is this state of modern politics that urges Agamben (2005) to characterize it as politics of the state of 
exception. This state is defined as a no man's land, an empty space, because it is negatively related to 
the law due to the exclusion of the law from its domain. The state of exception does not simply oppose 
the inside and the outside of the legal order. It instead constitutes a threshold of undecidability in 
which fact and law slowly devour one another (p. 29). That is what is also analyzed by Luban: The 
law is adjusted in order to manifest the exception as a rule. This is precisely the efficacy of an 
axiomatic paradigm: an example that becomes the rule. The exceptional measure as matter of 
expression of what Agamben typifies as force of law. In the wasteland of the state of exception the law 
is reinforced in the act of extradition and exclusion. 
 
That is to say, the concept of ‘force of law,’ as a technical legal term, defines a 
separation of the norm’s vis obligandi, or applicability, from its formal essence, 
whereby decrees, provisions, and measures that are not formally laws nevertheless 
acquire their ‘force’ (p. 38). 
 
In other words, many ad hoc measures and arbitrary regulations (matter of expression) acquire force of 
law (form of expression) while the law is suspended. Thus, Agamben argues that force of law becomes 
detached from form of law in order to manifest a norm that prior to this procedure did not contain the 
force to manifest itself. The matter of expression also detaches from its form of content: territorial 
                                                     
25 See for an illustration Nolan’s The Dark Knight (2008). The Joker is a typical Homo Sacer, nameless, without history. He 
disrupts plans, and introduces a little anarchy. Even the common Mob rather has his head due to the unpredictability of his 
action. He has been beaten and humiliated by the Batman in order to save the life of two other heroes. The viewer agrees with 
the main hero and the spectacle of the security of the good people. Joker’s plea comes later and in a sense, shames the same 
viewer by stating: “The Mob has plans. The cops have plans. Gordon got plans. You know, they’re the schemers. Schemers 
trying to control their little worlds. … You were a schemer, you had plans and look where that got you. I just did what I do 
best. I took your little plan and turned it on itself. … Nobody panics when things go ‘according to plan’. Even if the plan is 
horrifying. If tomorrow I tell the press that, like, a gangbanger will get shot, or a truckload of soldiers will be blowing up, 
nobody panics. Because it is all part of the plan. But when I say that one little old mayor will die, well, then, everyone loses 
his minds. Introduce a little anarchy, upset the established order, and everything becomes chaos, I am an agent of chaos. Oh, 
and you know the thing about chaos? It is fair.”   
  
here, which creates the dislocated locality of the camp: the there. It is within this distinguishing act 
that zone of indistinction26 manifests itself as the zone of banishment. 
 
What is the form of law that expresses itself in the ban? The ban is the pure form of 
reference to something in general, which is to say, the simple positing of relation 
with the nonrelational. In this sense, the ban is identical with the limit form of 
relation. A critique of the ban will therefore necessarily have to put the very form 
of relation into question, and to ask if the political fact is not perhaps thinkable 
beyond relation and, thus, no longer in the form of a connection (p. 29). 
 
This state of exception articulates the non-relationality in-between two abstract figures: the homo 
sacer and the sovereign. The sovereign shows its full authority through its active suspension of the 
law. By being both inside and outside the law the sovereign decides on the implementation of the 
normal and the abnormal. The sovereign includes itself, just by its own exclusion (Agamben, 1998a, 
pp. 15-29). The other is exposed to exceptional torture in order to guarantee the safety of the sovereign 
people who abhors violence against itself. This gesture, however, produces a new form of excluded 
human condition: the homo sacer. Agamben, like Luban, insists that this locality of the state of 
exception is neither an anomaly nor a historical fact: “The camp is the space that opens up when the 
state of exception starts to become the rule” (p. 39). 
In Agamben’s discussion, this state of affairs is no longer just a characteristic of classical 
totalitarian regimes; it has already become a principle of democratic political argumentation or as 
Luban suggests the logic of liberal thought on political practice. In line with Žižek (2002), we could 
state that the state transforms democracy and liberal rights into axiomatic paradigms by arguing that 
they must be protected undemocratically and illiberally.27 The unconditional protection is the rule that 
excludes democracy itself.28 This is why Agamben (2000) gives examples of states of exception in the 
democratic states. In modern politics – and here Agamben agrees with Arendt – birth implies nation 
and nation implies states. Except, it is exactly this solemnity that is starting to crumble in its reference 
to its own exteriority. 
 
                                                     
26 Deleuze and Guattari (1987) speak of three zones: “Every central power has three aspects or zones: (1) its zone of power, 
relating to the segments of a solid rigid line; (2) its zone of indiscernibility, relating to its diffusion throughout a 
microphysical fabric; (3) its zone of impotence, relating to the flows and quanta it can only convert without being able to 
control or define. It is always from the depths of its impotence that each power center draws its power, hence their extreme 
maliciousness, and vanity.” (p. 226) The zone of indistinction in Agamben’s sense of the word seems to have some 
characteristic of the zone of impotence in which the power manifests a reality. 
27 Žižek (2002) in reference to Agamben ironically states: “If you (pretend to) take the hegemonic liberal ideology seriously, 
you cannot be both intelligent and honest: you are either stupid or a corrupted cynic. So, if I may indulge in a rather tasteless 
allusion to Agamben's Homo sacer, I can risk the claim that the predominant liberal mode of subjectivity today is Homo 
sucker: while he tries to exploit and manipulate others, he ends up being the ultimate sucker himself. When we think we are 
making fun of the ruling ideology, we are merely strengthening its hold over us.” (p. 71) To turn Žižek’s argument against 
himself: is homo sucker an ironic ridiculization of those in power? 
28 In his elaborations Agamben quotes Rossiter when he confidently states: “No sacrifice is too great for our democracy, least 
of all the temporary sacrifice of democracy itself” (Cited in Agamben, 2005, p. 9). 
  
The increasingly widening gap between birth (naked life) and nation-state is the 
new fact of the politics of our time and what we are calling ‘camp’ is this disparity 
(pp. 43-44). 
 
It is within this gap and this ambiguity between lawful and lawless that life and its endurance becomes 
undemocratically decided upon. It becomes dependent on the mercy of those who are in charge: the 
police (Arendt, 1968, p. 283). There is a difference between the police and the army. Hobbes in 
Leviathan speaks of a monopoly of violence by the state, which differentiates itself in military activity 
in order to protect against the external threat and the police. Military organization could never 
manifest itself within the borders of state due to its principle of a clear distinction between foreign and 
non-foreign people. The police, on the other hand, defends the state against the internal resistance. The 
FBI oath reads as follows:  
 
I [name] do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I 
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, 
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and 
faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help 
me God (Rudd, 2009, Italics TR). 
 
Arendt (1968) speaks of totalitarian police that blurs the difference between the traditional 
understanding of military and the police. Police – by which I do not mean individuals but a 
mechanism – in a totalitarian movement alienates everyone as a foreigner, as other. The police are the 
machine that manifests the centrifugal force of politics of exile. It distinguishes itself from legitimate 
military by not being trained as military. Legitimate military gives the soldiers a sense of belonging 
and loyalty as a group. This is usually considered a lifetime loyalty. Police members, however, remain 
temporal and exchangeable. They are placed in the same peripheries as homo sacer and in the obscure 
blur between law and force of law, while defining the norm through the nomos of exception.29 The 
events in Egypt and Syria during and after the Arab Spring show how military members either lack the 
will to attack their own citizens or change their tactics and behave as police rather than soldiers. 
Khadafy even hired foreigners to terrorize his own citizens as foreigners.  
 
State policing or lawful violence … consists in capturing while simultaneously 
constituting a right to capture. It is an incorporated, structural violence distinct 
from every kind of direct violence. The State has often been defined by a 
‘monopoly of violence,’ but this definition leads back to another definition that 
describes the State as a ‘state of Law’ (Rechtsstaat). State overcoding is precisely 
                                                     
29 Arendt (1968) states: “Like the secret police of the Soviet Union, the SS formations usually arrived after the military forces 
had pacified the conquered territory and had dealt with outright political opposition” (p. 421). Police thus create oppositions 
out of thin air in order to maintain the movement between the other and us. They create chaos rather than the stability. 
  
this structural violence that defines the law, ‘police’ violence and not the violence 
of war (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 448). 
 
Police is the engine of the totalitarianism’s focus on its utopian future. In order to realize this future, 
they need an enemy that is neither necessarily present in current time nor bound to a specific place or 
domain. Neither the Jews, the homosexuals, disabled, sick or communists during World War, nor 
currently the Muslims, non-Muslims bound to a specific territory, but define themselves as an 
immanent global threat. They are seen to endanger the freedom of Western countries or to hinder 
authenticity of the non-Western people. The new enemy, while being placed in camps just as criminals 
and law offenders, is not necessarily defined and feared by its deeds in the past or present, but mostly 
by the possibility to do something in the future. While Trump emphasizes the fear for the terrorists and 
lobbies for owning guns – a threat that after 9/11 cost averagely less than 20 lives a year – he neglects 
the fact that gun-owning in United States costs more than 11.000 lives a year (BBC News, 2016). In 
this logic, thus Omar Mateen – with his brute actions – immediately becomes a Muslim terrorist, while 
the same judgment does not apply for other brute murders of gay and non-gay people in United States.   
 
The enemy is never understood as to the crimes and deeds of one person or several, 
but always becomes a potential hostile collective within the regime of signs of 
politics of exile.  
The chief difference between the despotic and the totalitarian secret police 
lies in the difference between the ‘suspect’ and the ‘objective enemy’. The latter is 
defined by the policy of the government and not by his own desire to overthrow it. 
He is never an individual whose dangerous thoughts must be provoked or whose 
past justifies suspicion, but a ‘carrier of tendencies’ like the carrier of a disease 
(Arendt, 1968, pp. 423-424). 
 
And due to the developments to come new forms of enemies and populations are added to this absurd 
form of ‘objective’ logic, through which each individual can in an arbitrary manner become the police 
as well as the enemy. Social media enables state politics to handle this ambiguity. In our lustful 
consumption of media, we are controlled the very moment we are enjoying our freedom (Oosterling, 
2000b, p. 68-70). This leads to another blur within the zone of indistinction of a totalitarian regime. 
“The innocent and the guilty are equally undesirable” (Arendt, 1968, p. 433). The victims become as 
anonymous as the offenders. The anonymous objective enemy is one of the crucial axiomatic 
paradigms of totalitarian regime. It is an enemy that, despite the statistics as we see here above, 
remains a general threat. In its radiancy, it creates non-milieus, which despite their territorial settings, 
do not define a comprehensible discourse, certainly not a consistency of feeling at home or belonging. 
Mateen was born in United States, nonetheless his brute crime is judged differently than the crimes of 
others. Yet as we have seen in de second chapter, such crimes of an individual always radiate to a 
collective. And vice versa Mateen’s hatred was toward a collective, towards people with different 
sexual beliefs and preferences who until this day are the targets of exclusion and brutality around the 
globe. Our Others are never at ease, always beyond a sense of home.  
 
  
What is unprecedented is not the loss of a home but the impossibility of finding a 
new one. Suddenly, there was no place on earth where migrants could go without 
the severest restrictions, no country where they would be assimilated, no territory 
where they could found a new community of their own (Arendt, 1968, p. 293). 
 
How could we then from this perspective define the act of refuge and the refugee? Is fleeing a 
reduction of a haunted subject to a political object, called enemy, by totalitarian regimes and 
totalitarian thinking? Is it the confirmation of the ultimate loneliness in a space of non-difference, a 
zone of indistinction, where a lonely mass of civic subjects opposes a lonely mass of limbic lives? Or 
is the act of flight rather the realization of the opposite, an escape from mass solitude, in order to force 
difference? Flight is a movement towards a community. Even pathological forms of assimilation 
reflect the urge to enter a community. Flight is an act of participation, a desire to belong. Arendt 
(1968) poetically writes that in our time: 
 
The question is not as for Hamlet, to be or not to be, but to belong or not to belong 
(p. 84). 
 
The lack of belonging, despite the intensity of one’s attempts to participate, has been the main notion 
of various migrant and refugee studies. The Afghani’s back and forth movement to and from 
Afghanistan during the last decades indicates such a sense of homelessness. Migrants and refugees 
often sense their territories as exceptional and unordinary and it has often been an unpleasant 
awakening to sense this exceptionality in their country of origin as well as country of arrival. Afghan 
refugee families that return from Pakistan to Afghanistan find themselves in the same condition of 
living in camps and enduring the cold and the inability to build a home (Tan, 2008). They are forever 
replaced between the illusion of having a home and its lack of actuality. In connection to European 
citizens that remained behind after the big waves of European migration, Huijer (2016) even argues 
that they remained behind with a sense misfortune and pessimism. In a world that romanticizes the 
European mobile adventurer, those who remained behind sensed their staying as unheimlich and 
immobile within such a world. Although they stayed, the immobility changed their lives by creating a 
sense of non-belonging to a world of modernity and mobility. Despise their immobility they were also 
replaced forever. The Politics of exile thus oscillates between this multiple sense of belonging and 
non-belonging. 
 
4.5 Limbic Lives: Exiled Bodies  
 
4.5.1 The Living-Dead 
In the previous section, we have elaborated on the matter of expression of politics of exile. It is by 
now argued that the matter of expression does not always confirm the form of content and expression 
of this politics. The unheard voices of the limbic lives as well as atomization of non-communicating 
masses as matters of expression create a discrepancy between form and matter. In this section I will 
elaborate more on this discrepancy by focusing on the matter of content: bodies that are produced as a 
  
result of such form of content and form of expression within politics of exile. As we will see, these 
bodies are more related to the unheard voices and atomization than formatting axiomatic paradigms 
such as here versus there, and us and them.    
 
The web of speech and action in the in-between space, as an inter-ested space of inter-action and 
inter-speak, has been torn apart disastrously in totalitarianism, a movement that is characterized by 
banal disinterest, literally no inter-est in in-between-beings. In violence and war there is neither speech 
nor action because the war is not occupied with the exhibition of a who. There is no action without the 
revelation of speech; there is no action without a name (Arendt, 1958, p. 180). However, even modern 
society, despite its far-reaching global economy and digital communications, is at the political level 
not capable of telling the stories of who its actors are. Due to its uninterested and homogenizing 
character, there is no remembrance of unique lives that could surpass the mortality of those 
individuals. Immortality owes its vitality to a political community that will remember its members due 
to their differentiating act. Except, in postmodern times life stories are neither told nor seen as a form 
of unpredictable events, but rather fabricated and formatted as objects in face-books or as mass media 
events. Media pretends to differentiate by the introduction of various types of measurement and 
sentiment. While in 2011 the prime ministers of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the French 
president Nicolas Sarkozy are gathered in a media spectacle by accusing each other of racism – which 
already started in the First World War during which Ottoman Empire allied with the Germans, while 
French promised Armenians land in order to rebel against the empire – the actual sufferers of this 
discussion, namely Turkish people living in France and Armenians living in Turkey, remain in the 
background. The massive deaths, genocides and disasters become the engines of measurements for 
sadness and the right to complain. Who suffered the most, the victims of tsunami or the victims of 
overflow in Pakistan? Our sensibilities are measured in the cash amount of our financial aid. At the 
end of the day, what remains are corpses and numbers, casualties, life passed without remembrance, 
story or any form of history. The silent loss of individual lives that could not belong to the web of 
men. 
 
The postwar term ‘displaced persons’ was invented during the war for the express 
purpose of liquidating statelessness once and for all by ignoring its existence 
(Arendt, 1968, p. 279). 
 
After having articulated the axiomatic paradigm of here versus there (form of content), the captivity of 
responsibility and judgment by law (form of expression), and finally the force of law leaving us with 
the unheard voices in the camps (matter of expression), we have arrived at the matter of content of 
politics of exile: exiled bodies. Exile oscillates in its meaning between the act of departing from one’s 
community and the permanent state of enduring the loss of a sense of community. Departure oscillates 
between death (of one form of life) and natality of a new life, articulated as partage, fluctuating 
between being part of something and to part from something. The thing that is exiled, is a body, a life. 
Limbic lives thus do not only present us with an assemblage of expressions (voices), but also with an 
assemblage of bodies. In order to analyze this, we must first elaborate on the political role of the body 
in the modern age.  
  
What is the meaning of life in contemporary political thinking and what is the meaning of an excluded 
body? In his discussions Agamben presents the refugee as a limit figure of biopolitical power. The 
refugee gives testimony to the lawlessness of democracy that has sacrificed its basic principles in 
order to preserve itself and to survive. It seems that the refugees, Agamben suggests by citing Arendt, 
not only have become the vanguard of their peoples but of all men. (Agamben 2000, p. 16 & Arendt, 
1978a, p. 66) Refugee becomes the paradigm of modern politics. In order to pinpoint the heart of the 
matter - the matter of content – Agamben (1998) reintroduces an ancient distinction between zoē, a 
concept that refers to the fact of life or bare life, and bios, a political life or a form of life. In our 
biopolitical era zoē, which for the Greeks was initially excluded from politics, has become the main 
object or care of the politics all over the globe. The camp is the biopolitical delocalizing localization 
in which those who were not born under a jurisdiction become the inhabitants of a lawless virtual 
discursive territory: generations of refugees in refugee camps in Pakistan and of Palestinian refugees 
in camps in Jordan. They are those who are identified as anomalies by the sovereign and forced to (be) 
part of a non-acknowledged community. These are the naked limbic bodies “that increasingly cannot 
be inscribed into the order” (Agamben, 2000, p. 43) 
 
What defines politics of totalitarianism, what feeds it, according to Arendt (1968), is “the solid 
conviction that everything is possible” (p. 387). This possibility not only creates the refugee and the 
stateless, and does not only blur the distinction between politics and law, between fact and fiction, but 
along these lines also obscures a distinction that becomes the engine of its destructive nature. 
Totalitarianism makes it possible to blur the difference between human and non-human, not only by 
dividing rights of humans into the rights of the citizen and the non-rights of the non-citizen, but more 
so by obliteration of life in a living being. The final act of totalitarian power through its need to secure 
perfection is the creation of a life without a form of expression: the lonely masses and the lonely 
inhabitants of the camp. Can we imagine a life without form, and without a form of expression? 
Exactly due to the rigidity of its axiomatic form of content and form of expression, politics of exile as 
a result gives rise to lives and expressions without form. This politics creates a mere zoē without bios, 
which in current times is unimaginable even with animals. We have even shrinks for our dogs. Such 
life appears in the figure of Muselmann in German concentration camps that, Agamben (1999b) states, 
is the complete witness, i.e. the one who is silenced and without testimony. No one alive can testify of 
the deathly machine. However, these figures are more than sheer witnesses of the gas chambers; they 
are the ones who became a non-human by the inhuman conditions of the camps: the actual living-
dead, long before they entered the gas chambers.  
Muselmann is the name given to those in the camps that are no longer able to communicate. 
Technically the mental state of these non-interactive beings is caused by severe hunger and neglect. 
Their bodies’ movements slow down and their ability to react decreases fatally. The victims become 
unable to react to pain or emotional stimuli. They start repeating meaningless words and are unable to 
communicate with others. After a while they suffer from edemas, causing small and large swellings in 
the body and, as a result of this, the victims are not capable of natural movements. The stiff bodies 
resemble, especially for the inhabitants of Auschwitz, the praying and reading of Koran by the Arabs, 
from which the word Muselmann, presumably originates. The limbic state of these bodies even 
indisposed the guards. The observation of the body without reflexes by fellow inmates, a lifeless body 
  
moving automatically without hope, reminded the ones who wanted to survive of their fatal destiny. 
The very sight of the Muselmann takes their breath away. For the sake of their desire to survive, the 
Muselmann is ignored by the ‘healthier’ part of the inmates. They are unable to feel compassion or 
sympathy for the walking-dead. This figure presents the end of life. “Every group thought only about 
eliminating them, each in its own way” (Ryn and Klodzinski cited in Agamben, 1999b, p. 43). This is 
not merely a clinical diagnosis. These figures shatter our perception of a human-being. They disrupt 
our anthropological intuitions. Along with Primo Levi Agamben wonders whether the Muselmann is 
still a human-being. So, If This Is a Man becomes an adequate title for Levi, who himself stood on the 
threshold between humanity and its negation. Human as a concept becomes phenomenologically 
problematic due to the fact that political power has managed to eliminate its ontological (content) as 
well as its epistemological (expression) traits in order to produce a non-human. Agamben (1999b) 
states: 
 
In Auschwitz ethics begins precisely at the point where the Muselmann, the 
‘complete witness’, makes it forever impossible to distinguish between man and 
non-man (p. 47). 
 
Muselmann is the ultimate exiled body as a non-place, a zone of indistinction, in which it is impossible 
to distinguish between the physiological elements of life and its political and ethical components, 
between zoē and bios. Eventually, in this ‘limit situation’ it becomes even impossible to distinguish 
between life and death. This zone is neither Foucaultian sovereign territory - to let live and to make die 
- nor Foucaultian disciplinary territory - to make live and to let die. In this zone life and death are both 
made (Agamben, 1999b, p. 83 & Foucault, 2003, p. 241). As Foucault (2003) argues the biopower does 
not limit itself to something as individual life. From the eighteenth century on it orients itself by 
statistical management of populations, or in general the human species. Within this process it is not 
only the construction of life that fascinates power, but also the manipulation of death, the statistics of 
death that dominate planning and policies.  
 
Death was no longer something that suddenly swooped down on life – as in an 
epidemic. Death was now something permanent, something that slips into life, 
perpetually gnaws at it, diminishes it and weakens it (p. 244). 
 
War, wherever and whenever, is the mechanism that centralizes this death in life. That is the 
cacophony within the gaze of Oman. In this sense Foucault (1977) turns over Clausewitz’ remark by 
stating: 
 
It may be that war as strategy is a continuation of politics. But it must not be 
forgotten that ‘politics’ has been conceived as a continuation, if not exactly and 
directly of war, at least of the military model as a fundamental means of preventing 
civil disorder. Politics, as a technique of internal peace and order, sought to 
implement the mechanism of the perfect army, of the disciplined mass, of the 
  
docile, useful troop, of the regiment in camp and in the field, on manoeuvres and 
on exercises (p. 168). 
 
Politics purifies the population. This purification does not emerge from traditional racism. According 
to Foucault (2003) biopolitics with its desire for cleansing is accompanied by State racism that 
positions the other as a threat of disease emerges. The other becomes a potential illness that must be 
quarantined and secured from the rest (pp. 254-256). Foucault thus shows how the civic subject in line 
with such State of racism legitimize its argumentation: 
 
The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his 
death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the 
inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in 
general healthier: healthier and purer (p. 255). 
 
The Nazi’s attempt to distinguish themselves from the non-human – by replacing the inmate’s names 
by the tattooed numbers – has been one of the many cruel deceptions of this form of regime. The 
other’s impurity that gives rise to its non-humanity demolishes not only their lives, but also their way 
of dying as well, according to Agamben (1999b). 
 
In Auschwitz, people did not die; rather, corpses were produced. Corpses without 
death, non-humans whose decease is debased into a matter of serial production. 
And … precisely this degradation of death constitutes the specific offense of 
Auschwitz, the proper name of its horror (p. 72). 
 
The Muselmann’s existence in the non-place is the faceless center of the camp. It is face that does not 
belong to a regime of faciality, a faceless face. The invisibility of the face of the Muselmann has 
paradoxically made our own facelessness visible. This limit figure pointing out the limits of any ethics 
does not merely bring out the impossibility of dignity and self-respect, but, as it is argued, as “the 
threshold between the human and the inhuman” (p. 55) destroys our freedom to be merely human, i.e. 
living being. The Muselmann is the ethical threshold, a ‘point of no return,’ as Agamben calls it. It is 
the face that makes the civic subject lose its civilization. Remarkably, Agamben seeks for an answer in 
the same figure, namely in the Muselmann. This figure is the ultimate expression of a new form of 
ethics.  
 
The Muselmann, who is its most extreme expression, is the guard on the threshold 
of a new ethics, an ethics of a form of life that begins where dignity ends. And 
Levi, who bears witness to the drowned, speaking in their stead, is the cartographer 
of this new terra ethica, the implacable land-surveyor of Muselmannland (p. 69). 
 
  
Before articulating this new ethics still one issue must be addressed, namely the obscure use of the 
term Muselmann as a reference to the Muslim.30 This act of naming is a testimony that must be 
thought through. Agamben criticizes the term Muselmann, or Muslim, arguing that it refers to a 
European legend that the Muslim, who faithfully submits to the will of Allah, is the man without a 
will. In this vocabulary, the Muslim is prejudicially desubjectified.31 
 
But while the muslim’s resignation consists in the conviction that the will of Allah 
is at work every moment and in even the smallest events, the Muselmann of 
Auschwitz is instead defined by a loss of all will and consciousness (p. 45). 
 
S Parvez Manzoor (2001) realizes that criticizing this notion will turn him into an anti-Semitic. 
However, according to him despite Agamben’s good intentions it is unimaginable for a Muslim to 
read in Remnants of Auschwitz how he is defined as a creature without life, thought or desire, a will-
less man or woman not worthy to live, meant to be killed in the gas chambers. Manzoor argues that 
Agamben’s reflections, despite his critique of the term, remain a Judeo-Christian reflection that does 
not address the perception of the Muslims. This is indeed odd because in other works Agamben is 
eager to use Islamic thinkers. The Muselmann remains truthfully silenced even so in Agamben’s 
writings. 
 
It is disconcerting to learn that even for the inmates of the camp, the Muslim was 
the Untermensch, the lowest of the low. This is certainly what Agamben has in 
mind when he, in a moment of brutal encounter with the truth, seeks refuge in ‘the 
postmodern irony’ …. For others, there’s no escaping the perverse logic of the 
Holocaust: While the Nazis killed the Jews, the Jews in turn sacrificed the 
‘Muslims’ (die Muselmänner)! (Manzoor, 2001).32 
 
Manzoor speaks of the victims of the victims, which in its repetition affirms Agamben’s reflection on 
the indistinction between good and evil. Despite this fact, we must not despair but be urged to ask the 
questions, each time, no matter how hard they are, no matter how guilty we feel. Let us remember the 
warnings of Arendt (1968).  
                                                     
30 The term is sometimes written as Muschelmann, the shell-man, but according to Agamben (1999b) this interpretation is not 
convincing (p. 45). 
31 This is also shown in the figure of the Muslim women in early Hollywood cinema, as is indicated by Shaheen (2001). See 
also the documentary Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People (Earp & Jhally, 2006). Shaheen however also states 
that from the second half of twentieth century the female Muslim figure – either fully covered or challengingly uncovered – 
hops to another prejudice category of murderous terrorist machine. Shaheen howls how in movies such as Rules of 
Engagement (2000), even the murder of children is logically explained by their categorization as monsters with weapons and 
sweet faces, to which extend the sense of empathy is fully eliminated. The child is dangerous and anonymous, and the 
description of the film in Internet Movie Data Base is sufficient enough: “An attorney defends an officer on trial for ordering 
his troops to fire on civilians after they stormed a U.S. embassy in a third world country.” Not even the specific country is 
mentioned, but merely an indistinct ‘over there’, the third world. 
32 Manzoor refers here to Agamben’s (1999b) statement: “In any case, it is certain that, with a kind of ferocious irony, the 
Jews knew that they would not die at Auschwitz as Jews” (p. 45). 
  
 
Like virtually all other events of our century, the solution of the Jewish question 
merely produced a new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the 
number of the stateless and rightless by another 700,000 to 800,000 people (p. 
290). 
 
A new ethics has to take into account both the naming of the Muselmann and Arendt’s warning. Not 
merely as an experience of Auschwitz, but in its meaning for contemporary times. What also remains 
problematic is the division in time as pre-Auschwitz and post-Auschwitz. Why is our ability to 
distinguish between man and non-man resolved just after this event? Has slave trade, not only from 
Africa, but also in the ancient Greek, Persian and Arab world, and also in contemporary times 
deprived men from the clear distinction between man and non-man? Has the female body or the bodies 
of those individuals with different sexual preferences not always been the target of violence and 
banned to the threshold of human and inhuman? In connection to the Jewish history, Arendt shows 
how the forced poverty of this people in Europe had made their life inhuman long before Auschwitz. 
Novels such as Bernard Malamud’s The Fixer (2004) are based on such old stories on the repression 
of the Jewish people, their unbearable lives in the ghetto and their exclusion from politics. This story 
of the life of Yakov Bok sensitizes how the repression of the freedom to think surpasses the horrors of 
the physical torture. It is not only on the level of body, but on all levels of living, that the other 
endures the course of becoming non-human.   
Given Manzoor's critique, I will approach the dehumanized condition that Arendt and Agamben 
analyze via the persona of limbic lives instead of the problematic persona of the Muselmann. The 
cartographer of new ethics must thus wonder: Who is the limbic live nowadays and where are the 
invisible camps of pure visibility of the naked life? Is it the Muslim? Or the Palestinians who are not 
merely Muslims? What makes their dehumanized condition so unbearable is that even in their defense 
Palestinians are not merely themselves, but always already an object within the agenda of global 
powers. Or is it the more than one billion people who live in severe condition of poverty? (UN, 2013c) 
We also have to ask questions on the role of the spectacle. The images of children with kwashiorkor 
are common nowadays. Also, the image of children with flies on their faces without reflexes to chase 
them away. Around the globe 21 children die per minute mostly because of the lack of food or from 
diseases such as diarrhea, malaria and AIDS (UNICEF, n.d.). The stories of these bodies – in the past 
and in the present – are the unheard voices of exiled bodies. These are bodies that are doomed to the 
peripheries, isolated in camps that we do not even know about. Or hardly know, like Manus Island 
where abused Afghani refugees who took pictures of their bloody bodies, were asked by the police to 
erase these images (Doherty, 2016). The space, the refugees, or the police, or the immanent violence 
on these bodies are the secrets of politics of exile. How does expression block communicability of 
voices of these exiled bodies, the limbic lives?  
 
To allow such bodies disappear in our own analysis would be to repeat the crime 
rather than redress its injustice (Ahmed, 2014, p. 57)  
 
 
  
4.5.2 The Natality of Survival: Resistance of Bodies 
In approaching a politics of flight rhizomatically and applying Deleuze and Guattari's fourfold of 
matter/form and content/expression, we are able to discern different approaches in which paradoxes 
and aporias occur as indications of diffused and contradictory policies within politics of exile. It also 
enables us to more specifically pinpoint the political status of the body as a matter of content. We may 
conclude that down through history the ‘Muselmann’ is not the only example or axiomatic paradigm 
of a body without expression, introduced by Agamben. The homo sacer and refugee are both 
speechless. From this perspective we could wonder whether according to Arendt and Agamben any 
agency is left for limbic lives within politics of exile? Resistance of forcefully silenced bodies is 
problematic in their lectures. To them resistance seems not to be a trait of limbic lives, homo sacer, 
refugee or the stateless, since speechlessness, i.e. political impotence determines these figures. Or at 
least it is a aporetical configuration: The inhabitant of the camps becomes the true witness precisely 
because of his incapability to witness. And when at the end of Agamben’s Remnants of Auschwitz 
those who survived the horror start to speak, it remains ambiguous whether they testify of the horror 
or they have lost their ability to merely witness, as was the case with the raped women. The refugee 
and the stateless have become mere life without expression, i.e. limbic bodies that, according to 
Arendt, become a-political due to their inability to speak and act, thus inability to form a community. 
The relation between body and politics is either negative in Arendt’s discussions in The Human 
Condition or at best ambiguous in its political significance in her On Violence. In her critique of 
modern society, Arendt (1958) argues that the emancipation of laborers in modern times has not 
effectively freed men from the necessities of labor. With the rise of mass industry, it is merely the 
body of labor that presents itself in the public life. Life, its pleasure and pain, i.e. direct consummation 
is the sign that shape the contours of our current society, Arendt states.  
 
In the last resort, it is always life itself which is the supreme standard to which 
everything else is referred, and the interests of the individual as well as the interests 
of mankind are always equated with individual life or the life of the species as 
though it were a matter of course that life is the highest good (pp. 311-312). 
 
Thus, in Arendt's view there seems to be an unbridgeable gap between a body that feeds its needs and 
politics that strives for freedom. There is no room for body politics in an affirmative sense. With 
affirmative I do not necessarily mean a happy life or a comfortable bodily experience. I rather argue, 
as I have done in the previous chapters, that body is a multidimensional phenomenon that even under 
sever circumstances resist the regimes of assemblages of bodies. Gestures and faces are not only 
resistant in their expression but also present us with ontological form of resistance. Heterosexism, 
sexism, ethnocentrism and racism attack bodies and make them passive. Thus, it is time in our 
approach to change discourse by problematizing exactly this enforced passivity on these bodies as 
apolitical. Arendt 's view on life is classical Greek in that sense that life, as a biological process, is 
surgically disconnected from the ‘good life’ that refers to the political process.  
 
Without mastering the necessities of life in the household, neither life nor the 
‘good life’ is possible, but politics is never for the sake of life. As far as the 
  
members of the polis are concerned, household life exists for the sake of the ‘good 
life’ in the polis (p. 37). 
 
Are ‘good lives’ lived without bodies? Are vita contemplativa and vita activa not connected? In line 
with Richard Sennett (2008), I thus disagree with Arendt. Sennett, former student of Arendt, disagrees 
with his teacher as to the valuation of work as a political force. In this study, next to work, also the 
apolitical or anti-political state of labor in Arendt’s work is problematized. Bodies are not merely the 
necessary property of a-political figures, but also a locus for the political urge to fight for the 
endurance of life. The political body of the refugee undermines Arendt's radical distinction between 
apolitical labor/work and political action. To comprehend survival is to comprehend how life is never 
absent in politics. Refuge is an action initiated by a fear of torture, of repression or simply of end of 
life. This threat not only intimidates life previous to the journey, but also during and after the act of 
refuge. Some common images, such as the images of suffocations in trucks, floating corpses on the 
shoreline, refugee camps and deportation to the country of origin, illustrate this idea. Many refugees, 
in spite of the fact that they are not immediately threatened, choose the most dangerous roads for the 
sake of a happy life. Natality and not mortality is the bearing of escape. Despite its risk to not survive, 
fleeing as a fleeting movement is not for the sake of death. Flight, also in Arendtian terms, is an action 
par excellence because it bears the hope of a new birth. Given this natality body and mind must not be 
distinguished in a new binary setting of labor and politics. Matter and form in expression and content, 
even in their permanent discrepancy within politics of exile, effect one another.    
 This rigid implemented passivity on limbic lives has also been criticized by Jacques Rancière 
(2004). According to him the analysis of Arendt on human rights leaves us in a paradoxical state. 
These rights either refer to stateless persons who have no rights, or they refer solely to the rights of the 
citizens who presumably already have civil rights. Human rights thus are either negative or 
tautological, but nevertheless leave refugees with an apolitical life; a bare life and not a life lived in a 
community or life that can resist the structure of power. Rancière criticizes the distinction between 
bare life and political life, or as Arendt would put it, between necessity of labor and social life versus 
freedom of politics. In line with our terminology we could state that freedom is not only experienced 
at the level of expression but also at the level of content. Boys and Girls of the suburbs of Paris are not 
only mentally excluded from the center of the city, but also physically. Thus, their bodily appearance 
in these areas of power and commerce is a form of bodily resistance.  
 
Yet in defense of Arendt’s lectures, it remains highly peculiar that Rancière does not refer to The 
Human Condition, in which she far more explicitly assumes this distinction. In her chapter on human 
rights in The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt instead refers to a bare life incapable of forming a 
community that is essential for a political life. Rancière’s critique starts with a quote in which Arendt 
states: 
 
Their plight is not that they (rightless, TR) are not equal before the law, but that no 
law exists for them; not that they are oppressed but that nobody wants even to 
oppress them. Only in the last stage of a rather lengthy process is their right to live 
threatened; only if they remain perfectly ‘superfluous,’ if nobody can be found to 
  
‘claim’ them, may their lives be in danger (Arendt, 1968, pp. 295-296 & Rancière, 
2004, p. 299). 
 
Rancière wrongfully assumes that being beyond oppression means a lack of oppression or non-
oppression. Arendt would argue that the violence in which men and women become functionless as 
subjects of oppression is the worst kind of terror. Although Arendt’s analysis seems to be ambivalent 
in her On Violence – again, not mentioned by Rancière – she shows that due to the effects of terror on 
politics, violence must be dealt with in political thought in as far as it effectuates exclusion. State of 
exception thus is not an a-political notion, but rather an axiomatic paradigm. Neither is politics not 
opposed to anthropology, as Rancière seems to suggest. This is due to the fact that in Arendt’s analysis 
merely through political action men become human and thus depolitization means the negation of 
anthropology, as Arendt understands it.  
 Nevertheless, despite Rancière’s negligence to cite the right books, his critique stands. Why 
are people only humans through such specific political action, and why are they political in negating 
their social and economic life? Even on the concept of oppression – although Arendt is right to state 
that oppression beyond oppression is the worst kind of terror – she fails to mention other forms of 
oppression, such as slavery and misogyny, which were common traits in her examples in the ancient 
Greek and Roman society. Her inability to react to consequences of slavery becomes obvious in her 
On Revolution (1990) and her discussion of Black Power. Due to her distinction between private and 
public the experience of enslavement becomes merely a private matter and loses its relevance for 
political thought. Consequently, people who were enslaved are neither bare lives, due to the fact that 
they still function as bodies of oppression within a society; nor political due to the lack of their distinct 
voice in the public realm. In her analysis, she unintentionally makes the people who were enslaved 
and their descendants’ silent bodies by not mentioning that these bodies too were deprived of the 
formation of a community. And finally, due to her distinction between body and politics, she fails to 
see that exactly the bodily resistance against enslavement, misogyny and heterosexism are the finest 
examples of the past centuries on how bodies could engage within the realm of politics.  
 Rancière’s (2004) critique also concerns Agamben’s lectures on bare life. He suggests, that 
bare life, which becomes broader in Agamben’s sense due to the inclusion of Foucault’s concept 
biopolitics, nevertheless seems to leave persons in “a state of coma”. It becomes an “ontological 
destiny” which is ratified by a “biopolitical trap … from which only a God is likely to save us” (pp. 
301-302). Bodies have become depoliticized and are eventually placed in a state of exception from 
which escape becomes impossible. Is there no other option? Rancière’s critique on bare life and 
human rights, and the trap of either tautology or negation, is motivated by Arendt’s and Agamben’s 
ambiguous personification as well as abstraction of these notions. Rancière states that rights are not 
rights of a person, but elements of a process of subjectivation in which a person incorporates both 
elements of statelessness and citizenship. Individuals do not become stateless or citizen, limbic lives 
or civic subjects. The loneliness of the atomized masses shows that within this process citizen and 
non-citizen are the two aspects of the same subject.  
 
Even though actual situations of rightlessness may give them the lie, they are not 
only an abstract ideal, situated far from the givens of the situation. They are also 
  
part of the configuration of the given. What is given is not only a situation of 
inequality. It is also an inscription, a form of visibility of equality (p. 303). 
 
Rancière also states that freedom and equality – the basic principles of democracy and constitutional 
rights – are not qualities of a person but open predicates that give rise to a dispute in which subjects 
not only passively incorporate the consequences of these rights, but also confirm and deny the process 
in which the rights are either given to them or deprived from them. Rancière states that the non-
comatose subject, despite the injustice done to him or her, remains active and communicative about 
these predicates. Bana Al-Abed’s messages on Twitter show us how a 7-year-old child still has the 
courage to resist her reality in Aleppo. She bears witness to the fact that the limbic life that refuses to 
be politically active is at the very same time a civic subject that shows intense political activity.  
Politics thus for Rancière is not mere politics within an open community. It is articulated on 
the limits in which bare life unjustly becomes distinguished from political life. Bare life sensitizes 
politics. If execution of bare life is a political decision, then this exiled body and its cacophonic voice 
– the matter (of content and expression) of politics of exile that are detached from its form (of content 
and expression) through the lawful Voice of here – must become political, i.e. has to be voiced as 
well. If Arendt suggests that democracy is in need of disagreement, then this dissensus on the limits of 
politics must be included within the political inter-speech. The refugee activist – who during 2012 
throughout The Netherlands opposed the Dutch policy that forced people to live in tents in the middle 
of the city of Amsterdam – did show such resistance. While sympathizers urged them to occupy a 
building, the refugees hesitated, realizing that the visibility of their exiled state was politically much 
more effective than the comfort that was offered by sympathizers (Spijkerboer, 2012). Rancière (2004) 
labels this as an affirmative included exclusion: “They put together a relation of inclusion and a 
relation of exclusion” (p. 304). These interventions in public space rhizomatically connect a politics of 
flight beyond a sheer politics of exile. Rancière and Agamben agree on the fact that an affirmative 
politics must focus beyond the impossibility of exclusion. 
 
I think that we had rather leave the ontological destiny of the human animal aside if 
we want to understand who is the subject of the Rights of Man and to rethink 
politics today, even if out of its very lack (p. 309). 
 
What does this ‘beyond’ a politics of exile means? In the next two chapters I will elaborate on this 
issue. The history of exclusion of difference is as old as the history of inclusion of difference. Yet, the 
manner in which difference is included differs in different forms of politics, policies, and regimes of 
expression and regimes of bodies. The most dominant discourse on inclusion of difference in our time 
is called multiculturalism. The question however remains whether multiculturalism could fulfill the 
promise of difference. Can multiculturalism let us surpass the desire of becoming majority. Let us thus 
for a second resist such longing. Let us hear a little voice in the hell of exile. Let us experience a little 
gesture. Let us look at Oman beyond the spectacle that numbs its spectators. Political responsibility – 
a responsibility that is not capitalized by the totalitarian realm of the law, regulated by an axiomatic 
paradigm of here versus there – starts with an ethical act that surpasses the rigid morality of 
determinant judgments of an I toward The Other. Let us thus respond to the gaze of Oman. We have 
  
heard you, seen you. Let us touch your face, let our gestures break through the regimes of gestures that 
have banned you to an exiled live, hypocritically arguing that refugee camps are your best option. Let 
us leave the camps and the state of exception together behind us, by asking:  
 
How do we map out territories of inclusion? 
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Chapter 5: Politics of Segments 
 
We do not need, have never needed, settled 
community, a homogeneous system of values, in 
order to have a home. Cultural purity is an 
oxymoron  
(Appiah, 2006, p. 113). 
 
5.1 Power and Resistance 
 
Totalitarianism is just one form of formation of power within a politics of flight. In line with Foucault 
we can suggest that within a heterotopic state of a milieu of flight power articulates itself far subtler 
than the hierarchical forms of repression and domination. In this chapter I will argue that 
totalitarianism’s characteristics – colonial affects, racist prejudices and imperial pretensions – are still 
engrained in late modern consciousness that presents itself as multiculturalism. Disciplinary power is 
more than the destructive force of totalitarian power. It is productive at the same time: it produces 
subjectivities and identities. As a result of which, the clear binary opposition between power and 
resistance relapses into a mechanism in which the two movements annihilate each other, but also 
produce one another. Urban culture testifies of this double exposure. Graffiti, which started as a 
subversive, illegal practice, nowadays is caught within a dissensus. It is conceived as both a legally 
accepted form of expression and an illegal act of civil disobedience. Both practices produce 
subjectivity. The war between two graffiti artists Banksy and Robbo is an example of such a 
transgressive dynamic between legality and illegality, between what is seen as hip and what is seen as 
sheer pollution. Society’s ambiguous in- and exclusion eventually intends to turn this urban art into an 
incomprehensible matter of expression: a heterotopic voice within an accepted subculture, with a yet 
comprehensible form (Preston, 2011). 
Nevertheless, within various works Foucault argues that it must not be assumed that resistance 
has become impossible. His own political biography testifies of his deep faith in various forms of 
resistance. Resistance realizes and actualizes itself from within power constellations. In terms of 
Deleuze and Guattari, with whom in spite of some controversies he shares his political views, it 
radiates from the center, following a flight line that has been generated from within the belly of 
segmented thought. Thus Rancière’s (2004) main question on the matter of politics remains: where 
does the dispute between belonging and non-belonging take place? How do minorities express their 
resistance and how does this resistance rupture power? Are there different types of minor movements, 
and different types of minorities, as a result of which there will be different types of resistance against 
the homogeneity of power? In this study, as already introduced in section 3.4.3, I make a distinction 
between two types of minorities: majoritarian minorities and minoritarian minorities. This chapter is 
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dedicated to the first type. Majoritarian minorities resist the majority by redefining the value of the 
excluded identities in totalitarian thought. This type of minority strives for the empowerment of the 
subjects on the peripheries by use of the same identities that are defined by and excluded from the 
center. The majoritarian minorities’ movement brings the peripheries into the center of power. They 
maneuver themselves within the hegemonic discourse. This act of redefinition and transfer gives rise 
to the second milieu that unfolds within a politics of flight: a politics of segments. I introduce the 
notion ‘segment’ because it refers to the Latin segmentum as a piece or a zone that is cut off (secāre 
(sectum)). It has the same etymological root as ‘sectarian’ and ‘section’. These segments were 
previously incorporated by the axiomatic paradigm of majority, but are now detached. They freed 
themselves as a new type of paradigms: differencial paradigms. These paradigms – as it has been 
argued in the third chapter – create differenciated wholes, segments each with their own internal logic. 
 
Politics of segments is the battlefield of majoritarian minorities. The need to resist the axiomatic 
paradigm of majority radiates through emergence of multiple paradigms of identities. Even populist 
politics of Geert Wilders refer to votes of minor mob, which as Arendt suggested, operates from 
within a state of homelessness, due to their lack of connection to politics and power. It is, according to 
Arendt’s definition of politics, an anti-political movement, not a non-political movement. It defines 
itself by rejection of the establishment, it presents itself as an anti-established political state of affairs. 
It is a politics of negation. Their disapproving attitude gives rise to the statements of the right-wing 
Dutch political party PVV, but also to the political statements against them. As R. A. Koole (2006) 
suggests populism and anti-government attitude fit both conservative and liberal1 parties, left-wing 
politics as well as right-wing politics. Koole also argues that populism and an anti-government attitude 
can be destructive and productive at the same time. Populism refers to a gap between the common man 
and politics.2 Koole argues that there is however a difference between a political-technical gap – in the 
sense of the ability to influence politics for example through voting – and a political-affective gap. The 
homelessness of the mob refers to an affective gap that gives rise to a sense of minority and to political 
resistance.3   
 
Chapter five elaborates on this affective sense of politics and distinguishes multiple differencial 
paradigms of politics of segments that define the assemblages of both bodies and enunciation of this 
                                                     
1 Nevertheless, Koole (2006) describes it as illiberal. He also describes politics from this liberal perspective as a sense of 
compromise between different parties, and searches for possible solutions (pp. 8 & 15). As we have seen in chapter 4, David 
Luban (2005) shows how liberalism and compromise of different liberal norms can actually bring about justification for 
torture as a solution to a problem created by liberal politics. Koole’s image of Dutch politics thus remains optimistic; the only 
critique is that non-populist politicians fall into the populist jargon when criticizing populism. Although he repeatedly 
suggests that politics is more complex than populists represent it to be, he fails to make an argument demonstrating the 
complexity he defends. Populist thought seems mostly to rebel against the government and political elite. Their consistent 
rejection of migrants as one of their main themes seems to be minimized in Koole’s analysis.   
2 Citing Suzanne Berger and Margret Canovan, according to Koole (2006), there is a difference between anti-government 
sentiments and populism. Populism is not only critical of an ideology but also of the repression of a people (pp, 7-8 & 11). 
3 Koole (2006) refers to the ambiguous sense of dissatisfaction of Dutch citizens. While on the political level citizens do not 
seem to be satisfied with politics, statistics show that Dutch people are extremely happy with their personal lives (p. 12 & p. 
24 n.54 & Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2004, p. 72). 
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politics. As been argued in the first part, differencial paradigms base themselves on an illusion of 
actual segments that divide individuals, communities and bodies according to traceable identities. In 
5.2 – the form of content – I discuss the construction of multiculturalism, differentiating multiple 
relationalities and participations by evaluating the characteristics of belonging within this politics. The 
differencial paradigm of loyalty will be discussed as an ambiguous affective paradigm of current 
forms of politics and multicultural tendencies. In 5.3 – the form of expression – the various ways in 
which differencial paradigms such as context, culture and identity operate will be explored. Context 
and culture are complex notions; they operate as different types of paradigms. In the previous chapter, 
we have witnessed the manner in which they give rise to axiomatic differentiation, in this chapter I 
will elaborate on their segmenting differencial effects, and finally in the last chapter they will be 
deployed as impotential paradigms. In this chapter I will explore the manner in which context and 
culture create differenciated arbitrary and artificial structures in expression by creating an idea of 
transparent communication. In 5.4 – the matter of expression – I will treat the manner in which 
migrants, refugees and homo sacer express themselves. Feelings such as shame, guilt, nostalgia and 
displacement seem to predominate the discourse of these testimonies. Finally, in 5.5 – the matter of 
content – I will examine Arendt’s distinction between social subjects, namely pariah and parvenu, on 
the one hand and conscious pariahs as political resisting bodies on the other hand, and link these 
analyses within a politics of segments.  
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 Content Expression 
Form 
 
5.2 Loyalty within Multiple 
Territories 
- Passive toleration 
- Liberalism, autonomy and community 
- Minorities within minorities 
- Multiple doctrines 
- Adequate segmentalized assimilations 
- Adequate segmentalized assimilations 
- Identifiable focus 
- Molar territories 
- Segmented morality 
- Differenciating loyalties 
 
5.3 Contextualization and Cultural 
Discourse  
- Politics of context and identifiable 
networks 
- Politics of culture and segmented 
normation 
- Politics of identity of majoritarian 
minority 
- Politics of communication and molar 
segments 
- Emancipation and tracing identity 
- Equalizing equality  
- Common language: transparency, non-
violent and exclusive creativity 
- Excluding freedom of speech 
Matter 
 
5.4 Differencial Affects 
- Private voices of pain 
- Schizophrenic memories 
- Inhuman humans 
- Politics of shame 
- Identifiable stories 
- Desubjectified subjectification and the 
faceless 
- Analogy of resemblance: re-
presentation 
- Homesickness: nostalgia and 
resentment  
- Global differenciated displacement  
5.5 Collective Bodies 
- Passive non-political refugees 
- Politics of suppression and politics of 
mercy 
- Voluntary blind optimism  
- Desirable voluntary amnesia 
- Migrative refugees 
- Hyper-awareness and masks 
- Prisonniers voluntaires 
- Passive physicality 
- Social pariah and parvenu  
- Political conscious pariah 
- Life versus forms of life 
 
 
5.2 Loyalty within Multiple Territories 
 
5.2.1 Coherencies and Territories 
In this chapter, the focus shifts from totalitarianism to multiculturalism. Not as much as a historical 
given, but as a systematic distinction. How do we define multiculturalism? Let me start with a 
summary of Susan Song’s (2010) disquisition in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on 
multiculturalism, in which all the related notions are mapped out. Multiculturalism is, according to 
Song, based on toleration in order to effectuate equality for all citizens. The intensity of this tolerance 
and the manner in which equality is realized is a permanent issue in the process of multiculturalism. 
How do individuals’ rights relate to the equality of groups and when do they conflict? Yet, the 
emphasis is not on all kind of groups. Song justly argues that multiculturalism – although including 
273 
 
other minorities such as women and LGBTQQ – is often associated with specific forms of minorities 
such as migrants, indigenous peoples or minority nations.4 It is worthwhile to notice a distinctive 
relationship of these groups to the act of migration. Migrants move from one country to the other and 
thus become minorities; indigenous people on the contrary become minorities due to the movement of 
other types of migrants, namely colonists5; and minority nations refer to a physical immobile force 
where power structures define them as minorities. According to Song, that which often specifies 
multiculturalism is cultural differentiation (Parekh, 1999 & Kukathas, 2004) rather than racial 
difference, although race – despite the fact that it is biologically non-existing – and culture remain 
related to this form of distinction. Different types of minorities, however, can clash in a multicultural 
setting. In case of The Netherlands, it is argued that the rights of women and LGBTQQ are often at 
odds with the freedom of religion. The rights of religious groups and their equality are presumed to 
offend the rights and equality of other groups. And exactly this idea of opposition of rights, Butler 
(2004) argues, weakens the resistance of both minorities in their mutual resistance and claim for 
equality. In case of rights of women, Ghorashi (2010) speaks of culturalizing feminism, in which 
emancipation rather leads to polarization instead of improvement of the rights of minority. In this 
argumentation, the other women – meaning non-western women – at best becomes a passive victim of 
her culture. The dichotomies also appear in-between the same type of minorities; such as religious 
minorities. Religious groups can oppose one another. For example, the PVV often argues that Jews 
and Muslims oppose one another. Yet, being a person with Jewish background from a Middle Eastern 
or African country is not an argument to include people. PVV excludes people also based on their 
nationality and in many cases based on their differences in physiognomic appearances. The levels of 
conflict even strengthen one and other, creating an intersectional reality of exclusion (Crenshaw, 
1991). Tofik Dibi (2015) – an ex-politician – is an example of the struggle to combine his 
homosexuality, with his belief in Islam and Moroccan background. While he is at ease with these 
different elements in his subjectivity, the world he lives in cannot comprehend the combination of 
these intersecting elements. Nonetheless for Dibi “it is about selections from intersecting cultures, 
rather than a selection between one or another culture” (Ghorashi, 2003, p. 218). 
                                                     
4 Kymlicka (1995) refers to two categories of minorities. First, national minorities appear within the same territory as the 
majority, but nevertheless strive for a form of self-government. Multination states define themselves as such in the course of 
history. The national minorities often struggle for a form of political, lingual and cultural independency, as has been the case 
with American indigenous people. The second group is ethnic groups or migrants, who strive for acknowledgment by the 
host society as full members while preserving their ethnic differences. Kymlicka speaks of a polyethnic society. Migrants on 
the other hand are often expected to assimilate to the dominant culture, which Kymlicka calls civic nations or cultures. These 
minorities are at least expected to adjust on the level of language, legal and political structures. Yet not all forms of 
immigration function according to this principal. In case of colonization, Kymlicka states, migrants, not as individuals but as 
a group, recreate a whole new society within a territory, and force the indigenous people to assimilate to their imposed 
political system. Enslavement is on the other hand a form of forced migration through which minorities are compelled to 
leave their homeland for the benefit of majority. These people had neither the right to keep their cultural heritage nor were 
allowed to integrate into the society as full members. In the end Kymlicka also states that within the global setting the current 
states are often both multinational as well as polyethnic (pp. 10-33 & See also: H. De Schutter, (2005, p. 21) emphasis on 
immobile groups that are characterized as minorities). 
5 Chandran Kukathas (2004) shows how in case of Australia these migrants excluded other migrants from non-European 
countries (p. 4). 
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Dibi does not only endure a rejection of an element of his identity. The non-toleration of his identity is 
mostly due to the combination of elements. The intersection of his being is, as we will see, fatal for the 
politics of segments. Toleration and non-toleration refer to the formation of identities that do not 
belong to the majority. The formation of a group itself is based on another affect: recognition. In a 
multicultural society groups are formed due to their recognition of a common history, language, sexual 
preferences, traditions, cultural expression, political inclinations, etc. These traits are also present in 
the acknowledgement of subjects as refugees. Within international law refugees are thus identified as 
participants of a minority group that is excluded from the center of power and often persecuted for 
these specific traits. The formation of groups is, however, not solely due to a sense of toleration, 
recognition or exclusion. It is also in view of processes of empowerment to improve the legal status of 
these groups in order to gain the rights and social status that come easily to the majority (Song, 2014) 
Ghorashi (2003) shows how the existence of different Iranian organizations in California has helped 
the Iranian migrants and refugees to make the first introductive steps in a new country and how such 
organization help the members with legal problems. Such groups, even as “essentialist cultural 
groups” in some processes “can become a basis for negotiation and engagement in a new surrounding” 
(p. 223). Yet Ghorashi also argues that within such groups there are endless forms of sub-groups. 
Every group is characterized by hybridity. There are, for example groups that aim to improve the 
status of women in society and in corporate and scientific milieus. Still, such a group often does not 
remain homogeneous. Every group divides itself in multiple subgroups in order to gain specific 
privileges that are relevant for that specific subgroup: organizations for Catholic women, for lesbian 
women, socialist women, highly educated women, childless women, single women, etc. Subgroups 
divide themselves again in smaller segments, for example the society of highly educated single 
women.6 
 
As Song (2010) also shows, the sense of formation of such communities and understanding of 
multiculturalism is not merely for the sake of recognition and improvement of one’s status in society. 
The formation of communities is also a form of resistance against the atomization, which results from 
forms of liberalism that accentuates the rights of an individual above the rights of a community.  
 
The target of the communitarian critique of liberalism is not so much liberal ethics 
as liberal social ontology. Communitarians reject the idea that the individual is 
prior to the community, and that the value of social goods can be reduced to their 
contribution to individual well-being (p. 3). 
 
                                                     
6 Kymlicka (1995) refers to Iris Young and her plea for motivating representation of minorities by profiling a group as people 
who are oppressed one way or another due to their identity traits. Kymlicka rightly suggests that this considers 80 percentage 
of the population, due to the fact that only a highly educated, rich, able-bodied, middle-aged, heterosexual male does not 
suffer from such forms of oppression. Yet, his comment on Young shows an implicit form of prejudice that only this majority 
is capable of acting beyond its identity, its sub-identity and finally could represent a larger population: “It is hard to see how 
this criterion would avoid an ‘unworkable proliferation’, since each of these groups has subgroups that might claim their own 
rights” (p. 145, Italics TR). 
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The emphasis on individuality seems to conflict with the unity of the group. In referring to Kymlicka 
and Appiah, Song shows that autonomy according to these thinkers does not take precedence over the 
community.7 Autonomy and self-respect are the results of internalization of a shared narrative and the 
recognition of such narrative. What remains problematic here is that on the one hand, self-respect and 
self-disrespect can be gained both by membership to a certain group; groups can form and empower 
individuals in their narrative of life; on the other hand, membership to an identified group could also 
be forced and cause disrespect. For example, minorities could commune in order to gain rights, but 
migration as a homogeneous characteristic could equally become a tool of exclusion by prejudicial 
thought. In The Netherlands third generation migrants’ children are often thought to lack certain 
lingual abilities. The fact that this prejudice has severe effect on one’s life and that it can become a 
self-fulfilling prophecy seems to be common knowledge, and nonetheless often neglected in the 
scientific analysis. This is, as Kymlicka (1995) suggests, an example of unchosen forms of 
membership due to internal restriction.8 Song (2010) argues that this membership is not only enforced 
by the majority, but can also be imposed from within the minority itself. Those who are not willing to 
join the group are marginalized by both the group and the majority. New minorities emerge: internal 
minorities or minorities within minorities (p. 9). In this chapter I will argue that it is in such acts that 
minority groups show their majoritarian tendencies.  
 
Despite these internal and external political complexities of in- and exclusion, Bhikhu Parekh (1999) 
characterizes multiculturalism as an expression of multiple visions on a good life. These visions are 
not all equally valuable. They are internally plural, and lack a political doctrine with a programmatic 
content. Multiculturalism cannot be defined exclusively as forms of liberalism, nationalism, socialism 
or conservatism. All these doctrines are present in multiculturalism, yet multiculturalism always 
exceeds such doctrines. Parekh states that due to the newness of the concept traditional doctrines and 
political thought lack the ability to describe the process of multiculturalism. Kymlicka (1995) claims:  
 
All political theories must accord recognition to certain forms of group differences 
and support certain cultural communities. This is inevitable in any theory which 
confronts issues of language policy, public holidays, political boundaries, and 
immigration rules. This is as true of liberal individualists and social internationalist 
as of conservatives, communitarian, and postmodernists (p. 129). 
 
                                                     
7 On enforced membership Kymlicka (1995) distinguishes between two liberal principals: autonomy and toleration, and 
although he seems to value both, in case of conflict the first principal seems to overrule the second when he states: “a liberal 
conception of minority rights will not justify (except under extreme circumstances) ‘internal restrictions’ – that is, the 
demand by a minority culture to restrict the basic civil or political liberties of its own members.” (p. 152) and “liberals have 
historically seen autonomy and tolerance as two sides of the same coin. What distinguishes liberal tolerance is precisely its 
commitment to autonomy – that is, the idea that individuals should be free to assess and revise their existing ends” (p. 158). 
8 Kymlicka (1995) distinguishes between internal restriction referring to intra-group relations through which members are 
submitted to the laws of the group; and external protection referring to inter-group relations due to which groups are 
protected against the power of other groups (p. 35-36 & 109 & See also Song, 2010, p. 4). 
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Nonetheless, despites Parekh’s (1999) plea, the question remains whether multiculturalism is without 
a programmatic content and exceeds beyond the traditional forms of doctrines such as liberalism, 
nationalism, socialism or conservatism. I prefer to argue that multicultural politics has a programmatic 
content in its method of division: division by cultural, ethnic and national differences, i.e. division of 
closed wholes that as territories categorize and identify their members. In this chapter, I will elaborate 
and criticize this method of division, by arguing that although multiculturalism may not have one 
general consistency, yet its process divides territories with an internal structure of multiple 
consistencies. Multiculturalism is not without doctrine; it is characterized by multiplicity and division 
of multiple doctrines. It resists the homogeneity of the single nation-state through “miniaturizing the 
state by providing national groups with a ‘proto-independence package’” as Helder De Schutter (2005) 
suggests in his critique of Kymlicka (p. 25). Parekh’s understanding of the concept of plurality is 
influenced by this form of multiple divisions. Although he states that multicultural segments are 
internally plural, this plurality is in its turn defined as consistent wholes within segments. Each 
segment seems to divide itself into new segments that remain identifiable. We could speak of 
multiculturalism within the multicultural segments. I will argue that these segments are multiple but 
do not in the end give rise to Arendtian plurality.9 
 
The political programmatic content of multiculturalism does not only refer to the internal processes of 
the segments. Their external relation also shows different forms of consistencies and doctrines on 
proper relationality. Chandran Kukathas (2004) distinguishes five common forms. First, one could 
relate by isolation. A nation or a community defines itself by exclusion as a homogenous organism. 
Fearing to lose its culture or economic benefits, it decides to exclude migrants from participating in its 
way of life. Second, in addition to isolation another option arises: assimilation. Cultural traits are 
assumed to be protected if the newcomer adjusts fully to the culture, no matter how indefinable and 
nuanced these rules of conduct may be. The others are only tolerated as long as they eliminate their 
own fear of losing their culture, by simultaneously giving in to the fear of the majority by not 
threatening their culture. Kukathas also shows that assimilation in case of the colonist in Australia 
worked the other way around: not the migrants but the indigenous peoples – who also became 
minority by numbers – were forced to assimilate to the European culture – hence also became cultural 
and political minority. Thus, the European citizens, who plead for assimilation, show their 
diagrammatic tendencies – in words of Schinkel (2008) – by their long history of failing to assimilate. 
The third form of relationality according to Kukathas is a weak multiculturalism. This form of 
                                                     
9  While Kymlicka (1995) acknowledges the complexity and broadness of the notion of culture within the idea of 
multiculturalism, nevertheless, his definition of culture is limited to paradigms of nations and ethnicity. He states that he does 
not intend to “use ‘multiculturalism’ as an umbrella term … What matters is not the terminology we use, but that we keep 
certain distinctions in mind” (p. 19). His statements are however problematic. The distinctions made are imposed, rather than 
justified. The question remains whether any such distinction, even with the inclusion of other forms of subcultures, would 
pass the test of justification. Kymlicka even admits that refugees could not be subdivided in these categories. The problem of 
his analysis is even more apparent due to the fact that not necessarily multiculturalism, but culture as such deterritorializes 
the idea of coherent distinction as well as coherent identifiable multiplicity, as we will see in the next section. Thus, although 
Kymlicka often makes use of the term pluralism, a clear identification of different types of plurality distances his sense of 
plurality from Arendt’s understanding of the term. 
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multiculturalism, which is preferred the most by Kukathas, builds on classical liberalism in which 
difference is tolerated. Even some non-liberal acts are accepted, by minimalistic liberal norms. 
Kukathas, however, is not explicit on these norms. He pleads for a neutral form of norms. Except, how 
could neutrality and norms coincide? Norm is by definition not neutral.10 Moreover, liberalism is only 
one way of thinking and not a universal form of thought.  
 The fourth form is strong multiculturalism, which lies at the other end of the spectrum of 
multiculturalism. This form of multiculturalism pleads for active interference of the liberal 
government. Here multiple reactions are possible. While Kymlicka (1995) would encourage the state 
to actively protect the variety of cultures, others within strong multiculturalism argue that the state 
must actively exclude rigid cultures in order to maintain the diversity within. As has been the case 
with war for the sake of democracy, multiculturalism must exclude difference in order to maintain its 
internal diversity. Kukathas (2004) states that both forms of strong multiculturalism, despite their 
differences, are based on a plain belief in liberal values. The final fifth form of relationality that is 
suggested by Kukathas is apartheid. Although apartheid often is engaged by the same affects as 
assimilation, it is rather the opposite of assimilation. Apartheid is multiple isolation, different groups 
are tolerated in one territory, given strict divisions in this territory. They must not interact. In short, 
multiculturalism is mapped out on a spectrum in-between weak multiculturalism or lack of interaction 
on the one end and the strong multiculturalism and total assimilation on the other end. 
 
The sincere believe in liberalism, however, is deeply rooted in Kukathas' thought. His light version of 
classical liberalism is universalistic in stating that liberalism must also include non-liberal 
communities: “If the liberal tradition accepts anything, it is that toleration is of fundamental 
importance, and that toleration requires a willingness to put up with what one dislikes” (p. 19-20). Just 
as capitalism, Schinkel (2008) argues, liberalism gormandizes the peripheries and its resistance into its 
center and in doing this in a subtle way neutralizes all opposition. Relations between multiculturalism 
and liberalism remain persistent in thoughts on how cultural difference and individual rights relate, 
due to the assumption of opposition between unorganized differenciation as an individualistic trait 
versus a community that is solely based on sameness. Identity in multicultural society thus oscillates 
between individual traits and its recognition within different communities, or in terms of Ahmed 
(2014) an economy of recognition in which the idea of recognition gives rise to the circulation of the 
idea itself. The question arises whether these different communities can even appear in the light of 
sameness, and whether individuality always implies difference. The atomized masses of 
totalitarianism seemed to blur this difference.  
What remains problematic in Kukathas’ analysis is an unproblematic toleration. Toleration as 
an affect is not necessarily connective or peaceful, due to its strong association with the acceptance of 
something that is essentially disapproved, and often disrespected. Toleration can manipulate people in 
                                                     
10 In line with Kymlicka, H. De Schutter (2005) states: “Idea of ethnocultural neutrality is simply a fiction, since one cannot 
be neutral in the field of language and culture” (p. 19). Kymlicka (1995) states: “So the ideal of ‘benign neglect’ is not in fact 
benign. It ignores the fact that the members of a national minority face a disadvantage that the members of the majority do 
not face. In any event, the idea that the government could be neutral with respect to ethnic and national groups is patently 
false” (p. 110-111). 
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isolation and apartheid while pretending to be communicative. As Ghorashi (2010) shows, it has the 
tendency to create passivity in creating relations. She calls this passive tolerance (p. 26). ‘I tolerate 
you, what more do you want?’, can easily become a final argument not to accept difference. 
According to Ghorashi (2003) in such settings “the emphasis on tolerance is about distance and not 
respect for difference” (p. 227).  
Finally, in Kukathas’ elaboration (2004) the notion of integration and assimilation seem to be 
identical. Although it must be admitted that more often than not, claims of integration refer to 
assimilation – such as Dutch integration courses that are merely intended for the non-western 
newcomers – these notions must be set apart. While the notion of integration initially is meant to 
involve all groups; assimilation forces a majoritarian form of conduct on minorities, while the majority 
in the center of power is not obliged to perform in this strict sense themselves. In integration, all 
groups are included into the transformation in order to bring about a new whole.11 Yet, even in this 
setting of mutual transformation Schinkel (2008) argues, even the term integration – which has created 
a market of its own in The Netherlands – creates an idea of a whole and a teleological form of 
movement toward a new ‘ideal’ and static form of society. It neglects the complexities of difference. 
Schinkel (2011) states that within integration market 
 
diversity becomes a marketable value. ... A plea for diversity is rather a plea for 
lack of diversity. Since, ‘diversity’ in multiculturalism only includes those 
differences that are harmless to the neoliberal economy and the liberal democracy 
in which secularism revamps (p. 112, Translation TR). 
 
Integration in the end, even a critical one, remains captured by the idea of a perfect whole, a perfect 
society. Multiculturalism does not defeat such fundamental ideas on society or its claim for an 
empirical reality. It rather in its discourse multiplies it endlessly. One perfect assimilation becomes 
adequate segmentalized assimilations. Tofik Dibi refused to implement this demand of 
multiculturalism; due to the fact that the segments of a society – ethnically, culturally, sexually, 
religiously or politically – could not comprehend and include the multiple connectivity of his 
personality. 
 
Relationalities that do not move toward a whole, on the other hand, need plurality within engagement 
in Arendt’s (1958) sense, which is a process that gives in to change rather than enforcement of a 
model. Arendt would describe history and culture as a web of stories, as a constant happening in 
which events cause unpredictable and uncontrollable movements, resulting in undisturbed 
                                                     
11 In line with Parekh, Kymlicka (1995) argues that “integration is a two-way process – it requires the mainstream society to 
adapt itself to immigrants, just as immigrants must adapt to the mainstream” (p. 96). Yet a clear systematic distinction 
between assimilation and integration is also lacking when he states: “I believe, however, that some limits on immigration can 
be justified if we recognize that liberal states exist, not only to protect standard rights and opportunities of individuals, but 
also to protect people’s cultural membership” (p. 125). This membership comes along with citizenship and even group-
differentiated rights are bound to this multiplicity of cultural memberships within a state and the idea of citizenship. In a 
sense, Kymlicka holds on to some form of consistency, that – although majority must adapt to immigrants – yet contradict 
itself by insisting that the majority culture must survive this adaptation and must be protected. 
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contradictions (p. 252). In contrast, multicultural territories, which are defined within a consistent 
whole, whether historical, lingual or cultural, are dealing with persuasion of recognition in a 
controllable and identifiable sameness. In this segmented form of content, there is no room for 
nomadic lives and unwritten events in a history that blindly follows the dominant linearity. This 
incongruity is for example shown in interviews where asylum seekers are forced to tell a story that is 
consistent with the interviewer’s scientific and historic knowledge of the refugee’s country of origin.12 
The current and accepted reports and statistics on the events in one’s country are thus more relevant 
than the attempted inter-speech of the refugee or the migrant. History, even an individual history, 
belongs so to speak to a definable majority and demands only the form of consistency, that belongs to 
such majority. There is no alternative history. The legal system is not able to deal with the stuttering in 
an event, as I explained in 2.4.1 referring to Deleuze. It has no ear for the fatigues of a person who has 
been on the run for months. It lends no ear to the madness of sleepless nights. It is focused on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the rejection and not on a story that appeals to inter-speak. The law is 
not an instrument of men: both the interviewed and the interviewer are stuck in between multiple legal 
territories that are defined according to an idea of clear national and cultural segments. The question is 
not “what have you been through?” but rather “show us adequately that you fulfill our image of you.”  
 
Multiculturalism is thus not the final argument of the idea of coherency as such. Multiculturalism 
shares the identifiable focus with totalitarianism. What multiculturalism favors is a multiplicity of 
coherencies or identities that occur in certain milieu and territory. On a rhizomatic level 
multiculturalism is a form of relative deterritorialization that breaks the deadlock of totalitarianism 
from within by unfolding its repressed and oppressed diversity. However, the urge of becoming 
majoritarian, even within one group, thus remains. Moreover, since there is no genealogy in the 
rhizome – neither fatherhood nor motherhood, neither brotherhood nor sisterhood – the ontology of a 
family is nevertheless always on a secondary level added to the connections. It is the assumption of a 
coherent identity that binds the community and, as we have seen with Foucault, this identity is 
internalized by its members, as a result of which subjectification takes place. Paradigms such as 
fatherland and motherland – which could operate as axiomatic as well as differencial – show that in 
tracing the origin an amalgamation occurs between a sense of family and a sense of belonging to a 
nation/territory. 
 
The tracing has already translated the map into an image; it has already 
transformed the rhizome into roots and radicles. It has organized, stabilized, 
neutralized the multiplicities according to the axes of signifiance and 
subjectification belonging to it. It has generated, structuralized the rhizome, and 
                                                     
12 The demanded consistency depends moreover on the judgment of one person. The role of the judges in The Netherlands in 
asylum procedures is a good example here. The content of the story of asylum seeker is the responsibility of the officer, the 
judge must only deem on the juridical process. Yet, there is only one officer that reflects on the content of the story of an 
asylum seeker and there is no second monitoring (Kas, 2013). The consequences of such a regime was demonstrated when 
Russian asylum seeker Aleksandr Dolmatov was wrongfully considered to be deportable in the system. Eventually 
Dolmatov’s suicide led to severe critique on the asylum procedures in The Netherlands. The same administrative error was 
done with hundreds of asylum-seekers (Boon, 2013). 
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when it thinks it is reproducing something else it is in fact only reproducing itself. 
That is why the tracing is so dangerous (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 13). 
 
5.2.2 Molar Territories 
Is toleration of others by a community evaluated by the criteria related to the history of those others, 
such as refugees, or is their admission into a society contrasted to the community’s capacity to hold on 
to its identity or segmented identities?13 Toleration is allowed as long as crucial change is not the case. 
While advocates of liberalism plead for freedom and diversity, liberal European governments are 
paradoxically very anxious about the differences that do not match their national histories. The 
European culture must thus sincerely acknowledge the fact that her fear is not based on the desire of 
maintaining the diversity but rather is based on the desire to uphold hegemony – as an axiomatic 
paradigm as Luban (2005) shows – or at most multiple hegemonies – a differencial paradigm that 
defines the form of content of multiculturalism as segmentalized territories. A desire to belong to a 
hegemonic nationality, as Arendt (1968) argues, is longed for by the citizens as well as the non-
citizens. ‘Everybody’ wants to be part of a family, despite the fact that exactly this urge of illusive and 
modern way of belonging to a nation is the key to one’s prior exclusion.  
 
What the European governments were so afraid of in this process was that the new 
stateless people could no longer be said to be of dubious or doubtful nationality … 
Even though they had renounced their citizenship, no longer had any connection 
with or loyalty to their country of origin, and did not identify their nationality with 
a visible, fully recognized government, they retained a strong attachment to their 
nationality (p. 283).14 
 
Assimilation, whether within the discourse of the majority or the discourse of majoritarian minorities, 
has thus a paradoxical agenda: it demands explicitly complete loyalty. Let us examine a Dutch 
example. With the rise of the ‘Pim Fortuyn movement’ in The Netherlands and the attack on the Twin 
Towers in the United States, the relationship between citizenship as a civic subject and governmental 
                                                     
13 One of the puzzling remarks of Kymlicka (1995) is – despite his awareness that minorities, national minorities and 
immigrants, endure systematic inequality in comparison to majority – that in the case of protection of national minorities the 
majority is disadvantaged the most. “There are many ways of promoting diversity, and it seems likely that protecting national 
minorities involves more cost to the majority than other possible ways. For example, a society could arguably gain more 
diversity at less cost by increasing immigration from a variety of countries than by protecting national minorities. The 
diversity argument cannot explain why we have an obligation to sustain the particular sort of diversity created by the 
presence of a viable, self-governing national minority” (p. 122). This is due to the fact that in Kymlicka’s analysis 
immigrants, in contrast to national minorities, do not wish to separate themselves from the majority, but have willingly 
decided to leave their homelands in order to assimilate with another territorial majority. In this sense immigrants do not form 
a threat, because in his analysis they implicitly, despite the two-sided adaptation, long to assimilate in the country. This is 
also different from the refugees’ state of mind, due to the fact that they did not voluntarily leave their country. Immigrants, 
according to Kymlicka, choose the liberal states willingly and specifically. Except, the question remains how this 
assimilation would bring about diversity. Are economic values the determining factors? 
14 This is also H. De Schutter’s (2005) comment on Kymlica and Gellner. In their analysis of multiple cultures, the logic of 
nation-state remains within the segments as well as in the overall form that keeps the multiplicity together (pp. 23-27). 
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policies became explicit in the Dutch politics. This relationship was sensed as a gap between the 
course of governance and the needs of the citizens. Although Koole (2006) argues that this gap in the 
case of The Netherlands and in comparison to the rest of the world was rather a fiction than reality, the 
fact remained that this fictive gap, which was sensed on an affective level, rigorously transformed the 
political composition of the Dutch government. The tension between citizens and government, 
however, did not lead to discussions on subjects such as emancipation on political, economic and 
social level; they have instead primarily crystallized specific themes, such as migration, refugees and 
allegedly unbridgeable cultural and religious differences between the Muslim community and the rest 
of the society (Schinkel, 2008 & 2011). An atmosphere evolved in which the murder of Theo van 
Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri became a motivation for suspecting the entire Muslim community; 
while the assassination of Pim Fortuyn by the eco-socialist Volkert van der Graaf did not lead to 
doubting the loyalty of large groups of so-called indigenous Dutch. The suspicion of disloyalty further 
expanded into not only the simplistic axiomatic paradigm of the Other but also differencial paradigm 
of the others so that diverse groups such as Antilleans and refugees, even those who had escaped 
Islamic regimes because of their own secularism, became objective enemies. Due to criticism of dual 
citizenships in the Turkish and Moroccan communities, the campaign against Muslims has, for 
example, also led to criticism of secular Iranian refugees who, entirely against their will, are likewise 
blessed with dual nationalities.15 The so-called liberal demand of individualism, as Schinkel (2008) 
shows, deindiviualizes the same individuals by their ethnicity, culture, religion and finally simply by 
their otherness (p. 156).  
The problem of this double nationality did not merely apply exclusively to these groups, but 
other Dutch citizens with dual nationalities also endured political exclusion (Jessurun D'Oliveira, 
2011). Yet the ethnic and racial stigma of dual nationalities was in some cases demonstrated with 
more open bias. When in 2010 the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD, a right-wing 
neoliberal party) and Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA, a right of center party) formed a minority 
government with the support of Party for Freedom (PVV, extreme right-wing party) one of the State 
Secretaries Marlies Veldhuijzen van Zanten appeared to possess double nationality: Dutch and 
Swedish. The PVV and VVD were obliged by their previous rhetoric on dual nationalities to react on 
the matter. Although the PVV is famous for its endless repetition of slogans, only a few remarks 
sufficed and they decided to tolerate Veldhuijzen van Zanten. The reaction of the Prime minister Mark 
Rutte (VVD) however was more explicit. Rutte had objected to the double nationality (Dutch and 
Turkish) of a prior State Secretary Nebahat Albayrak (PvdA, a moderate left-wing party) arguing that 
in case of Veldhuijzen van Zanten it was a different matter. The Turkish government, according to his 
argument, interferes with its subjects living abroad; the Swedish government does not (De Mul, 2017, 
p. 74).16 Such approach of double nationalities, according to De Mul creates once more a dangerous 
context for the monomyth of blood and soil nationalism (p. 205). 
                                                     
15 The same is true for Moroccan citizens. They are not allowed to denationalize voluntarily. It is even striking that municipal 
governments have decided not to register the double nationality of babies, while the question remains whether this non-
registration has substantial effect on the possession of forced nationalities (Dubbele pas baby's niet meer in register 
gemeenten. 2011). 
16  See: ‘Lastig kwartiertje over dubbel paspoort’, 2010.  
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While the fear of violent radicalization of multiple points of views raises real questions, the one-sided 
accentuation of radicalization as well as the simple demonization of an entire community is by some 
political theorists associated with the political mechanisms of the Second World War. Especially 
discussion on denationalization fed this fear.17 The argument is that the discourse of objective enemy 
and the logic of problematic citizenship – as Arendt (1968) warned us – is not shrinking but growing 
over time. The Jews and the LGBTQQ+ community, the Romani people18 and anti-racist activists such 
as Anton de Kom are not the only the so-called enemies of majoritarian culture. A new enemy is 
manufactured: a common enemy of the West, ‘the Muslim’ has become a global threat, even in the 
Middle East. The right-wing parties turned the multicultural tendency of tolerance against itself, by 
arguing that toleration of groups have led to their freedom to violate liberate values; without 
examining whether they themselves were upholders of the same values. Yet, in order to implement 
their axiomatic paradigms of exclusion these parties could simply make use of differencial segments 
of multiculturalism that already divided the Dutch community into sections such as Moroccan, 
Antillean, Turkish, etc. In order for politics of exile to work, it needed politics of segments to divide 
territories. 
This division however did not limit itself to western countries. Political Islamic movements 
and parties, whether radical or progressive,19 are even rejected when they enter the political stage in 
Islamic countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Syria. In the West, through their supposed internal 
characteristics (cultural and religious profiling) owed largely to their external features (racial 
profiling), they are a danger to society. The criticism is not directed exclusively at those who 
misbehave and also happen to be Muslim, but to the faith itself. Due to this abstraction, the court 
acquitted PVV leader Geert Wilders from charges of racism. The Islam and the Muslim were detached 
in a juridical process and the political implication of such abstraction remains a mystery in the court of 
                                                     
17 It was however ironic to see how this issue was dealt with in the particular case of Ayaan Hirsi Ali, an anti-Islamic 
politician who switched from the PvdA to the VVD. When it appeared that she had logically spoken selectively about her 
past during her interview for an asylum request, information that was broadly known for that matter, Rita Verdonk, minister 
of integration, who was from the same political party, was nevertheless eager to follow the law consistently. Verdonk pled to 
reverse Hirsi Ali’s Dutch nationality. Hirsi Ali, who by then worked for the American government on the same issue of 
denationalizing Muslim Western Citizens, was highly indignant when the same policy was applied to her (De Jong, 2006). 
18 The fact that the extermination of Romani People has never extensively been discussed in literature implicitly states that 
this form of condemnation as objective enemy rarely has been taken seriously while its effects endure in contemporary 
politics.  
19 The attitude of the politicians towards Tariq Ramadan and Dyab Abou Jahjah in The Netherlands and Belgium are good 
examples in this regard. Tariq Ramadan is often accused of doublespeak. His attempt to promote and encourage participation 
of the Islamic youth in Dutch society and the juridical system is often dismissed by alleged accusations due to his attitude 
toward homosexuality. Ramadan at all times states that his attitude towards homosexuality is neither hostile in the West, nor 
in Islamic countries. Dyab Abou Jahjah’s radical attitude towards Western hypocrisy and his sympathy for Hezbollah 
movement in the Middle East is approached with the same form of hostility. Abou Jahjah’s comments are consistent with the 
logic of cultural differences. He pleads for freedom of cultural identities as long as they obey the law. In his way of thinking 
the juridical system is the neutral territory through which political inclusion and exclusion could be justified. The demands of 
total assimilation are thus unlawful. Yet, despite this problematic belief in the neutrality of the law, Jahjah’s critical 
comparison between fascism and demands of assimilation based on racial, ethnical and cultural differences remains 
substantial in the description of a politics that segregates citizens based on their background. Eventually Abou Jahjah’s views 
on these matters became problematic due to his sympathy for the Hezbollah movement.  
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law.20 This led to a process, in which hate, terrorism and the repression of women are not attributed to 
individuals in circumstances with variable characteristics and widely divergent histories, but to 
religion as such, with the result that the right to freedom of expression appealed to a double moral 
standard, or as Schinkel (2008) calls it digrammatical standards. Statements made by Theo van Gogh 
and Pim Fortuyn resided under freedom of expression and assumed not to incite extreme and violent 
behavior. In contrast, statements by imams apparently did awake hatred for the European society and 
stimulate terrorism. 
 
This intrinsically contradictory segmented morality is justified with such terms as disloyalty and 
disrespect for Dutch society and democratic values and norms. This line of argumentation raises 
contemporary rhetorical questions such as: How is someone to be respected if he is not completely 
loyal? The idea of loyalty lies, as we will see shortly, in the simplistic endless repetition of “yes or 
no?”, and “if you do not agree with us fully, then you are against us completely”, statements that are 
often associated with George W. Bush and Geert Wilders. It is not only a seemingly unproblematic 
opposition used against immigrants, but also imposed on other politicians who tend to think more 
nuanced. 21  In February 2012 the Labor Party’s (PvdA) leader Job Cohen resigned under heavy 
pressure. Absurdly, the main critique on Cohen was that he was too civilized to debate with Wilders.22 
What lies behind these lines of thought and politics is an idea that presumes a given perception of 
loyalty; only one specific discursive territory could establish someone’s loyalty. Phrased in the critical 
discourse of Deleuze and Guattari, Lorraine (2011) states:  
 
Molar segmentarity precludes subtle differentiations, reducing identity to yes–no 
categories rather than allowing molecular mutations of these roles. … Everyone 
must submit to the dualism machines of subjectification, either identifying their 
subjective experience with one of two opposing categories in a series of opposing 
categories or being subjected to such identification by others. … Insofar as one’s 
identity is regulated with respect to the majoritarian subject, the oedipal subject 
positions of the family are affirmed and amplified rather than unraveled or 
undermined through competing lines of identification (p. 51). 
 
                                                     
20 Parekh (1999) states: “Citizenship is about status and rights; belonging is about acceptance, feeling welcome, a sense of 
identification. The two do not necessarily coincide.” As to these affairs however the relation between citizenship and 
belonging is more complex, and less separate as is suggested by Parekh.  
21 Humor often shows the simplicity of such rhetoric, which changes its opponents while repeating the same slogans. Two 
Dutch comedians play ex-shit-Moroccans – referring to the way that Moroccans are identified by populist politicians. They 
are fed up with Polish people, and state that since the PVV has put its target on the Polish their place in the rhetoric of 
discrimination is decreased. They ironically state that they were the ones who helped the PVV to their success by being the 
excluded minority, and are flabbergasted that they have jobs now and without a fight can enter dancehalls. In this short film, 
they mock the manner in which PVV without hesitation moves from the exclusion of one minority to the other (DWDD, 
2012) 
22 According to Bas Heijne (2012) the problem of Cohen was not that he was too civil, but rather that this civilized attitude 
failed to connect with the common man. It remained a personal characteristic rather than a connective political trait. It was 
Cohen’s upper-class attitude within a laborer setting that ended his career as the leader of the social-democratic party.  
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The segments of multicultural politics thus show molar tendencies. They are defined and separated, in 
other words differenciated by enforcing some reconstructed form of identifiable segment claiming an 
actual reality. In order to implement such differenciation, politics of segments needs more than the 
willingness of the majority. It needs the belief of its majoritarian minority to implement this 
segmentation within the content of this politics. In a casual interview on Dutch television The Girls of 
Halal (Meiden van Halal), a Dutch television show, the Muslim girls confront the stand-up comedian 
Hans Teeuwen with his perverse comments on the girls and Islam. Teeuwen, a very provocative stand-
up comedian, rigidly defends his right to offend people, and his rigidity can be conceived as an 
acceptable form of resistance to totalitarian thought. He is convinced that words cannot harm people, 
and if people take offence it is due to their own totalitarian thought. There is no moment of self-
reflection in his thinking that it is often a male, white, heterosexual, well-educated, not-disabled and 
prosperous person that demands others to not be offended by their enforced state of minority. 
Nonetheless, when Teeuwen confronts the girls with the fact that another guest in their show excludes 
homosexuals and women with revealing clothing, the girls offer no riposte. They are unable to 
compare this form of insult with that of their own. Neither the comedian nor the girls step out of their 
boxes; they remain loyal to one form of thought and consistency (Hans Teeuwen en De Meiden van 
Halal, 2007)  
 
Is loyalty unconditional?23 Do immigrants, the children of immigrants and refugees suffer from their 
double loyalties, and hence due to their alleged indecision immediately become fatally disloyal to the 
rest of the inhabitants of a society? Are there no more critical questions to be asked, as is the case for 
military personnel, who must blindly follow orders, or for ‘docile bodies’ as Foucault labeled the 
substance matter for disciplined subjects? There is no question of reciprocity, just mindless allegiance. 
This form of loyalty is exclusive due to its reference to closed segments that rhetorically reproduce 
their own consistency that is presumably incompatible – as Schinkel (2011, p. 144) argues – with 
other consistencies in other segments of the multicultural construction and the general context of a 
society. It excludes other forms of loyalty, or turbulences and intensities within their form of loyalty.  
The connection between the logic of politics of segments and politics of exile is once again 
shown when we see how both paradigms of identification within politics of segments are frequently 
used by the PVV in order to enforce politics of exile. The decision to assimilate to Dutch society, for 
example by becoming a non-Islamic woman, is misleadingly interpreted as the final liberation of the 
subject. According to this line of reasoning full submission to the homogeneity of the dominant 
culture is the key to liberty; freedom of speech is placed within one form of consensus in which 
freedom and speech are fully defined; equality in this interpretation of liberation thus presented as an 
egalitarian trait. Schinkel thus argues that only in sameness – by defining emancipation of women 
through standard categories of secular thinking – is equality perceived. The so-called unliberated other 
is doomed to what he calls secular purgatory. 
 
Could we choose to be loyal to some parts of a culture or does loyalty mean total admission to a 
‘whole’? If loyalty is rephrased in terms of trust, the kind that is sensed between two friends, then, by 
                                                     
23 See on this issue also Rahimy, 2007. 
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definition, loyalty cannot be forced or demanded. It is achieved by mutual respect, voluntarily and 
always at varying levels. Loyalty to one’s friend does not exclude other forms of friendships and 
loyalty to others. Loyalties are not bound to passports. They are supported by given bodies of thought. 
As Ghorashi (2003) shows, in an open and communicative context one can be loyal to a specific 
background, with its tradition of hospitality and modesty, and also fight for freedom of speech, doing 
everything possible to uphold antidiscrimination laws. These loyalties are not contradictory, nor are 
they characteristics of a certain nationality or culture. They bear witness to an ethical plurality of trust.  
 
The reduction of potential plurality of trust appears within a politics of segments by imposing the idea 
of a differenciating sense of belonging to a group, i.e. groups that isolate through a fixating and non-
connective manner of identification. I have typified such tendency of segmentation and approach in 
the first part as fascicular and molar. The molar territories of multiculturalism emerge from an 
exclusive, oppositional thinking claiming that different territories demand loyalties that by definition 
must pose obstacles to one another and finally exclude each other. Majoritarian and majoritarian 
minority movements could not claim such an exclusive state without necessarily becoming totalitarian, 
even if this totalitarianism refers to one particular segment in a society. 
 
Totalitarian movements are mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals. 
Compared with all other parties and movements, their most conspicuous external 
characteristic is their demand for total, unrestricted, unconditional, and unalterable 
loyalty of the individual member. … Total loyalty is possible only when fidelity is 
emptied of all concrete content, from which changes of mind might naturally arise 
(Arendt, 1968, pp. 323-324). 
 
History shows us that almost every stratum of thought with universal claims of truth runs the risk of 
becoming literally exclusive. Indeed, any group that, because of an absolute conviction of being 
utterly right, no longer tolerates any other political or religious truths, is not only fundamentalist, but 
also leans toward militant extremism. Also, exclusive universalism of this kind is visible in 
Guantanamo Bay, coined by Agamben as an exemplary case of excluded inclusion beyond and yet 
within the law.  
 
Another important example is the car bombings in Baghdad. This city has become a zone of war 
largely due to American invention “for the sake of democracy” and due to the rigidity of multiple 
conflicting factions. This state is the result of an amalgamation of multiple exclusive loyalties and 
thought for which the West as well as the East are mutually responsible. To justify this exclusivity, an 
image of an enemy is required in order to have an object onto which to graft an illusory, immovable 
we, an identity of one's own. The image of an enemy is of vital importance for this sense of we. In 
terms of Deleuze and Guattari the percept and the affect are fused in a sensation that is reproduced 
time and again by ‘sensational’ media exposure. It is created by constructing fixed identities, which as 
a rule are based on ethnicity, religious conviction, sex and political or sexual preferences. This also 
counts for policies of other countries like Russia. While in Russia homosexuals, bisexuals and lesbians 
are systematically banned from the protection of the law, in Dutch society the political parties 
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instrumentalized these groups in order to exclude other minorities. Art practices try to subvert this 
sensational media exposure with totalitarian traits. As a result, the photographer Erwin Olaf became a 
victim of both forms of rigidity himself. He preferred neither to become a racist, nor a repressed 
homosexual. Eventually torn by these affects of segmentalization it became unbearable for him to live 
in Amsterdam. Anil Ramdas (2012), Dutch journalist and writer, was tormented by depression due to 
his rejection of segments in thought in a world that demanded such a differenciating loyalty. This 
plurality of connections was also a theme of his final show, shortly recorded before his suicide.24  
 
Once more, what is misleading is the reference to clear loyalty to affect such political ideals as 
integrity and political notions such as participation. Integrity, with its literal meaning of ‘not to be 
touched’ – noli me tangere – but politically interpreted and applied in the notion ‘integration’ as 
becoming part of a whole, is affirmed not by critical thought and serious inter-speak between political 
agents that respect one another while holding different views, but merely by an unproblematic I do 
belong to this group. Parekh (1999) even states:  
 
The commitment to the political community involves commitment to its continuing 
existence and well-being, and implies that one cares enough for it not to harm its 
interests and undermine its integrity. It is a matter of degree and could take such 
forms as a quiet concern for its well-being, deep attachment, affection, and intense 
love.  
 
Therefore, when the submission is not total but problematic, the non-integrity of the agent is a fact, 
Schinkel (2008) argues. Even if the subject is fully active in the society, merely being critical of this 
society bears witness to his non-participation within a segment that he or she is supposed to 
participate. The lack of sameness thus is not only viewed as the lack of integrity, but also as a lack of 
being connected to society. 
At the same time, as shown before, the discrepancy between individual liberty and loyalty to a 
group is always implicitly effective. Multiculturalism – the formation of its content – appears in the 
twist between two differenciating paradigms: identification of a group and identification of an 
individual and their differenciating affects: loyalty and liberty. At the one hand, it creates groups of 
people based on specific identity and demands a certain loyalty of its members. On the other hand, it 
imposes an idea of an isolated individual that must liberate itself from a group of people. Yet, a molar 
principle remains intact in both paradigms by their neglect of the rhizomatic connections that underpin 
both. Neither groups nor isolated individual, due to a certain approach toward affects loyalty and 
liberty, are capable of surpassing the segments. It is within such logic that multiculturalism creates 
within its presupposed opposition between individual and group, as well as between segmentalized 
groups, a non-relating sense of relativism. In the end the narrative of multiculturalism, as Ahmed 
(2014) argues, projects sameness  
                                                     
24 The title of Kort’s article ‘The Man Who Always Wanted to Belong Somewhere’ (2012) misses the complexity of 
Ramdas’ sense of belonging. Anil Ramdas fought for a sense of belonging but not to somewhere specific, a plural form of 
belonging by not belonging to a defined group.  
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into a love for difference. Difference becomes an ideal by being represented as a 
form of likeness; it becomes a new consensus that binds us together. … it conceals 
how love for difference is also a form of narcissism; a desire to reproduce the 
national subject through how it incorporates others into itself.  … These 
communities are constructed as narcissistic in order to elevate the multicultural 
nation into an ideal, that is, in order to conceal the investment in the reproduction 
of the nation (pp. 138-139). 
 
5.3 Contextualization and Cultural Discourse 
 
5.3.1 Multiple Paradigms and Fleeting Concepts 
The idea of distinctive segments as form of content defines a multicultural milieu. Discourse on 
loyalty in the contemporary European politics in this sense affirms the idea of absolute distinction 
between these segments. Yet this discourse, with its self-proclaimed imperative of toleration, does 
neither create a peaceful treaty in-between the segments, nor understands the complexity within these 
segments and their relation to one another. Segments clash and disrupt each other. It is the 
impossibility of non-involvement in-between segments. Some artworks sensitize such settings of in-
between. Such reterritorialization is sensitized by Danis Tanovic in his recall of the war in former 
Yugoslavia in his film No Man’s Land (2001). The misty scenery in which the film starts is pregnant 
with political themes and affective reactions. The haze stands for being lost, and the outcome is 
uncertain. The misty figures in the image are shielded from contact with the enemy: friends and foes 
are both blinded by the mist. How do the men who are trapped in this mist define themselves? How do 
they relate to the complexity of the uncertain surroundings? The con-fusion reaches its peak when the 
Bosnian Ciki and the Serbian Nino get stuck in a trench in-between lines of fire. Lines are inhabited 
by soldiers who, while having been horrified by newspaper images of Rwanda, nevertheless do not 
comprehend the rigidity of their own way of thinking. Two naked men waving white flags, each 
facing the other side, introduce the dividing line within the trench. Nonetheless, they depend on one 
another in order to survive. The two naked targets indicate multiplicity that neither the soldiers on 
either side of the trench nor the UN peacekeeping forces can comprehend the in-between setting of 
war. Two means that by extension the number of friends or foes is unknown. Their survival depends 
on the ‘impartial’ involvement of a third party, the UN – ironically called UNPROFOR – and their 
dubious form of humanitarian aid. They are called the Smurfs due to their blue helmets. They lack 
involvement even when everything is under control and no shots are fired. The Smurfs are an 
uninterested party and arrogantly confident of their own civilization and convinced of the madness of 
the combating parties. While the French Charlie, an UN merchant, finally, with the help of journalist 
Jane, detaches himself from the uninterested smurfness, by stating “Neutrality does not exist in the 
face of murder. Doing nothing to stop it is, in fact, choosing”, the bleakness of the state of Ciki and 
Nino becomes unavoidable. In the end, when Ciki and Nino are finally saved, they murder one 
another. The war goes on; the uncertainty of the zone of indistinction is endures at all cost.  
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Art has a role in sensitizing its audiences for different perspectives on identity and belonging. These 
forms of expression open lines of flight within lines of segments that enables me to criticize the sense 
of belonging from this molar perspective. There are artists who combine or dismantle a sense of 
segmentalized loyalty. Tanovic images show how violent such loyalty could become. Nonetheless, 
through his images Tanovic creates room for another form of loyalty, a connective form of loyalty. 
The conversations within the setting of the trench permanently oscillate in-between segmented 
loyalties and connective loyalties. Another, such potential loyalty can also be found in the work of the 
Chilean Dutch artist, Jorge Kata Núñez. The proposed sketch he submitted for a mural painting, which 
was made in commission of the Centrum Beeldende Kunst (Centre of Visual Arts) in Rotterdam, 
shows a trotting world-travelling horse (La Trotamundos) (Thissen, 2007, p. 241) whose markings are 
a map of the globe. Time after time, this ever-in-motion creature escapes being closed in to join up 
with yet another we that opens its arms to him. Núñez, who fled his country in the seventies, portrays 
the image of a body that has submitted to multiple we’s: Chile, The Netherlands, Salvador Allende, 
communism, mural painting communities, prisoners, tortured people, refugees, eco activists. He never 
denies any we but maps out their lines of connection. In response to a society at odds with itself, one 
individual demands reciprocity that has been lost as a basic right, while the other abandons that 
dubious space the moment that the reciprocity of loyalty no longer exists.  
The Iraqi writer Al Galidi is a different matter. He lost his loyalty to The Netherlands when he 
was forced to choose between his dying father and a residence permit. In order not to forfeit his right 
to the permit, he needed permission to leave The Netherlands to visit his dying father in Jordan, for the 
last time. Repeated visits to the Dutch Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) proved fruitless. 
In the end, Al Galidi put his rights at risk by seeking a false passport. He is rather loyal to his father 
instead of a nation-state. Before he could visit him, his father died in a strange country without seeing 
his son. In 2007, following a general pardon, Al Galidi has his residence permit, but for him, it is 
nothing more than a “massage for a dead body” (Koelewijn, 2007). Al Galidi is an example of a lack 
of loyalty. Neither Iraq nor The Netherlands offers him a sense of we. Only writing in movements can 
claim his affection, loyalty to writers that surpass borders. 
 
If the form of content in multicultural society could be typified, as suggested by Helder De Schutter 
(2005), as mosaical wholes in which segments are assumed to be distinguishable, what then is the 
form of expression of such politics of segments that demands disconnecting forms of loyalty? How do 
we communicate and construct these forms of consistency, reterritorializing a diffuse matter of 
expression in another way than artists do? In other words, with what kind of discursive paradigms do 
multicultural segments form consistency within expression? One of the paradigms that shape the form 
of expression of multiculturalism is the differencial understanding of the paradigm context. Context, 
although etymologically referring to textuality - con-text - is a broadly used notion. It indicates: “a 
joining together of texture”. Let us define it as a weave of networks, or as mentioned before it operates 
as a sieve: a plane of consistency (see: 2.4.2).  
 
Except, despite the potentiality and complex reality that this notion expresses; within the frameworks 
of expression of a politics of segments this paradigm rather functions as a differencial paradigm. First, 
it can function as an analytical or political tool; thus, as we have seen in chapter three, introducing a 
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differencial paradigmatic characteristics into functions of ordinary sciences or conceptual thinking 
within philosophy. Political ideologies and thought are often formed by a reference to a so-called 
contextual reality and to the formation of political subjects in certain, identifiable networks. While 
classical liberalism accentuates the individual differences in a liberal context, communism accentuates 
the formation of communities and the formation of power as a socioeconomic context in which 
individuals are shaped. The differencial paradigmatic use of the notion context gives rise to a certain 
political discourse. Social, psychological, biological or as Schinkel (2008) shows cultural context 
become singular explanatory elements to clarify individual behaviors or tools for statistical 
evaluations of a group of people.  
Second, context is not only a differencial paradigmatic tool to analyze a certain reality but also 
a discourse strategic tool that eventually can be implemented itself within policies, such as identity 
politics as we will see shortly, and to counter politician's rhetoric. Context can be used intentionally as 
a versatile instrument in order to justify a political agenda. This rhetoric could be used to defend the 
idea that there is a ‘given’ context, which can be isolated and defined, consequently bringing about 
political and social decisions. A contextual complexity is vulnerable to molar differenciation into 
oppositional-segmented contexts that could be detached from one another forming different political 
points of view. This raises the question whether such a detachment occurred in the case of the conflict 
between Israel and Palestine. The intertwined territories as well as amalgamated context were 
maneuvered into two incommensurable contexts, one representing the Western interest and the other 
the Middle Eastern; with Donald Trump in the middle kissing holy walls after selling guns.25 It was not 
surprising that the Palestinian performer Taher Najib in a debate Far From Conflict, in Rotterdam, in 
2009, was amazed that the public could not make a difference between the Jewish people as a historic 
entity, the State of Israel as form of government, and the west as the overall manipulator of it all. 
When he was asked: “How can the international community help their cause?”; he fiercely stated: 
“Please stop helping us!”. In his performance In Spitting Distance, a Palestinian suddenly is identified 
by the east, becoming an Arab and by implication the face of terror after the events of 9/11. The 
discrepancy of contexts is neutralized through the connecting act of spitting. A spit that travels beyond 
the borders of segments. Najib creates a potential affect of context by resisting its axiomatic as well as 
differenciating affect.   
 
Opposition can be silenced by introduction of a new context that binds the so-called opposed 
positions. This was the case when the PVV started a discourse in which East- and Middle-European 
migrants were characterized as drunk and unmanageable individuals who threatened the harmony of 
                                                     
25 In case of The United States, Butler (2004) comments: “Like ‘terrorist,’ ‘slaughter’ is a word that, within the hegemonic 
grammar, should be reserved for unjustified acts of violence against First World nations, if I understand the grammar 
correctly. Giuliani hears this as a discourse of justification, since he believes that slaughter justifies military self-defense. He 
calls the statements ‘absolutely untrue,’ I presume, not because he disputes that there have been deaths on the Palestinians 
side, and that the Israelis are responsible for them, but because ‘slaughter’ as the name for those deaths implies an 
equivalence with deaths of the World Trade Center victims. It seems, though, that we are not supposed to say that both 
groups of people have been ‘slaughtered’ since that implies a ‘moral equivalence,’ meaning, I suppose, that the slaughtering 
of one group is as bad as the slaughtering of the next, and that both, according to his framework, would be entitled to self-
defense as a result” (p. 13-14). 
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Dutch society. PVV made a website in which the Dutch citizens anonymously could complain about 
these specific migrants. This website was considered to be juridically unproblematic. Therefore, a 
political discussion was not necessary according to Prime Minister Mark Rutte. He used this juridical 
fact in order to waive political comment on the matter. The representatives of Eastern- and Middle-
European countries however, who for that matter were previously silent about the same form of 
discrimination against non-European migrants, began a European campaign. This campaign 
emphasized their shared territorial context: Europe; their shared economic context: the labor efforts of 
these migrants; and their shared historical context: the participation of citizens of these countries in the 
Second World War and their heroic acts in The Netherlands during this time. While PVV divided the 
contexts, failing to mention the fact that these migrants work in places that many Dutch citizens do not 
wish to work due to the low wages and harsh work,26 the Eastern- and Middle-European communities 
challenged the artificiality of the bias context by the introduction of a form of shared context. Yet, this 
argumentation for a shared context remained within the logic of politics of segments due to its desire 
to detach from other types of context. The campaigners implicitly expressed that this shared context is 
needed for their support to empower political parties such as PVV to exclude other forms of migration, 
namely non-European migrants.27  
 Next to opposing tendency of context as a differencial paradigm, within the framework of 
positive discrimination, other types of policies rather create opportunities for specific types of context: 
for example, the context of being a female within an academic setting. Thus, the specific differencial 
paradigm – womanhood – gives rise to processes of empowerment of certain identities within the 
society. I was able to begin my PhD project thanks to an initiative of The Netherlands Organization 
for Scientific Research (NWO). This initiative was ironically called Mozaiek. Due to the lack of 
scientific opportunities for students with ethnic minority background, who have demonstrated 
academic excellence, a grant was initiated specifically for them. This grant gave them access to the 
scientific world. Without this grant, I would probably not have written these words. Yet, opportunities 
also backfire due to their segmentations. The fact that such opportunities exist gave no rise to a 
fundamental critical questioning of the problem of diversity within universities. The discussion on 
diversity remained in the segmented logic of this form of politics. 
 
To understand context is to understand that human beings are contextualized. However, to understand 
the immense effect of contextualization one must examine and dismantle the frequently obtuse 
presuppositions of the politics of context, meaning the differencial paradigmatic use of the term 
context.  
 First: the minority is no more contextualized than majority, nor is it more determined by its 
contextualization. Although statistics often accentuate some contexts more than others, each individual 
is moved and blocked by the context that defines its individuality and commonality. There is no more 
or less contextualization, like a gradual line starting with a free healthy heterosexual white male and 
                                                     
26 See documentary on the Dutch mushroom company with Eastern and Middle-European laborers (Keuringsdienst van 
Waarde, 2012). 
27 See: Open brief aan de Nederlandse samenleving en haar politieke leiders. (2012); Harde brief die toch niet alles zegt. 
(2012); and Haakman, (2012).  
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ending with a repressed lesbian disabled colored girl with a headscarf. The fact that Mozaiek initiated 
a context in which minority intellectuals could start a scientific career does not mean that they are 
more contextualized than others. It instead indicates that their context is more accentuated and isolated 
as a specific whole for some in order to exclude them and for others in order to empower them to 
resist this formation of power. There is no quantitative measure but a qualitative impact of context due 
to constructions of distribution of power.   
 Second, one cannot simply define and reduce a context into binary opposites, and isolate 
different forms of it, in order to manage or analyze their course. A context, as a potential plane of 
consistency, is too complex to be analyzed into clear schemes of differencial paradigms. Context as an 
abstract notion has a fragile and transforming character. It changes its face over time and in different 
spaces. The context of a laborer now is not the same as the context of a laborer in 1818, and being a 
laborer in Germany now is not the same as being a laborer in Singapore. Also, it should be clear that 
the notion of liberalism in the United Kingdom and Canada systematically differs from liberalism in 
the United States. Of course, different forms of labor-contexts or liberal-contexts are related but this 
relationship does not naturally imply that they can be equated. In line with the reasoning of Deleuze 
and Guattari (1987 & 1994), it could be stated that there are groups of affects, functions, concepts and 
paradigms that form a certain plateau. There are also families of plateaus that differ and relate to one 
and other. This indicates that there is not one particular context, verbal or social,28 that defines a 
subject. Lines of subjectification are woven into complex interaction and conflict between different 
contexts. For example: that some persons originate from the same country does not imply that these 
people share the same strata of contextuality. Due to the complexity of this notion whether on 
conceptual philosophical level, scientific functional level or political paradigm – in contrast to the 
differencial paradigm of context – understanding the rhizomatic nature of a context and contextuality 
as a potential plane of consistency does not simply comfort us with clarities but instead creates more 
confusion and generates different paradoxes.  
 
The differencial paradigmatic understanding of context in multiculturalism is inextricably related to 
another paradigm and its differencial typification: culture. Next to politics of context, politics of 
culture is determining for the frameworks of expression within politics of segments. Political, social, 
psychological and artistic arenas are all related to cultural diversity and cultural backgrounds. This 
form of diversity is appreciated and financed in the case of positive discrimination; and in other cases, 
feared and rejected. Nevertheless, the question remains what do we mean by culture? Does the notion 
of culture within politics, sciences, art and philosophy operate axiomatically, differencially or 
impotentially? To which type of images of thought does it give rise? In the previous chapter, we have 
seen the manner in which politics of exile creates an axiomatic understanding of culture by producing 
an idea of inferior cultures and a superior Culture. In the last chapter, through the idea of politics of 
life culture rather gives rise to impotential connections within coming communities. In this chapter, 
we explore an idea of culture as a differencial paradigm within politics of segments. 
                                                     
28 Verbal context refers to an assumption of understanding of a certain coherency within a specific language and social 
context refers to the assumption of a coherency and its understanding within the boundaries of a certain identity. 
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Culture traditionally refers to social relations between humans, but nowadays scientists discover more 
and more that animals are also bound to cultures and have demonstrated creativity in changing its 
elements. An elephant is an acutely social being, attached to its milieu. However, in the YouTube film 
Match made in Africa an orphaned baby elephant seems to behave differently in an alternative milieu. 
It comes under the protection of a sheep, and against all odds they create together a different form of 
community. It is even in this so-called natural state a rhizomatic connection in-between species. 
Culture and speciesism are often intertwined. Human species gain their superiority often by an 
assumption that they are superior due to having a culture next to nature. Yet, projecting culture and 
even language on merely humans is an old-fashioned modernistic idea. However, even in the human 
world, the concept of culture refers to multiple components such as anthropology, the cultivation of 
land, and urban life as in urban culture, pop culture, and visual culture. It is also linked to concepts 
such as art; urban culture for example is often partially measured by its interventions in public space. 
It implicitly and explicitly presents almost every gestural aspect of human interaction. And as with 
other notions, the term culture presupposes different forms of oppositions. This is the case in culture 
and religion;29 culture and nature; culture on a personal level versus a collective level; and finally, 
main culture as a dominant discourse versus subcultures as events that break through or get repressed 
by the main cultural strata. Culture, nonetheless, while in every aspect not a segmented concept, can 
have differencial effects through which communities are set apart as segments.  
 
Culture – on the level of nationalism and ethnicity – also functions as a differencial paradigm 
framework in our political interactions and expression. Within such frameworks lies a presumption of 
a clear understanding of culture, as is indicated by the term culturalism (Schinkel, 2008 & 2010). His 
main argument is that in modern times society is not defined as a mechanism but rather as an 
organism, divided not only in presumed racial segments but also presumed cultural incompatible 
segments. It is within these enforced incompatible characteristics that politics of segments gives rise to 
a relativistic non-relational attitude in-between people and communities. Schinkel argues that it is due 
to an understanding of society as an isolated organism – rather than in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) 
words as a body without organs – that specific ‘organic’ notions emerge such as disease and illness, 
which must be combated at any cost in order to survive. Nevertheless, Ahmed (2014) as well as many 
other critical minds within revolutionary sciences maintain the idea that culture is always artificially 
segmented and as such misused within power constructions in order to axiomatically or differencially 
detach individuals from one and other. Categories such as western and non-western migrants –
presuming a clear European and non-European culture, is an example. Yet if we follow the 
argumentation of the campaign defending the rights of Eastern and Middle-Eastern Europeans; we 
could simply state that Moroccan citizens share the same European culture due to their participation in 
the Second World War.  As Song (2010) states: “Cultures are not distinct, self-contained wholes; they 
                                                     
29 Arendt (1978a) makes this distinction between culture and religion by stating that “culture is by definition secular” (p. 92). 
She also states that individuals within the Jewish community, despite their secularism, were deprived of a formation of a 
Jewish culture, because the same secularism forced them to abandon their heritage. Nonetheless, such distinction between 
religion and culture remains dependent of a secular image of thought.   
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have long interacted and influenced one another through war, imperialism, trade, and migration” (p. 
6). 
 Cultures, despite its often disconnected relativistic approach, have always been the result of 
cross overs. Even without these forms of economic and violent penetrations cultures unfold new strata 
from within. Our global culture is the ultimate laboratory in which, as the effect of digitalization, new 
cultures are shaped. This remains also the main critique of H. De Schutter (2005) on Kymlicka. De 
Schutter states that while Kymlicka admits that the content of multiculturalism is intrinsically plural, 
nevertheless he initiates a unitary form on this plural content. De Schutter thus argues that not only the 
hegemony of the content must be problematized but also the clarity and transparency of the vehicles 
(pp. 27-28). “Many people do not live in monocultural national blocks, and there is no reason why 
political theory should coerce them to do so” (p. 37). According to De Mul (2017) such monocultural 
understanding of culture testifies of a cultural autism that fails to understand the complexity of 
individual lives in contemporary societies. A homogeneous understanding of culture is not an 
approach toward the phenomenon of culture; but arises from the miscomprehension through such 
autistic attitude (p. 100). Due to the complexity and the extent of the notion of culture it is rather 
questionable that the combination of a Libyan, an Indian and a Spaniard is more culturally diverse 
than a combination of two Eritrean people. Even two autistic people are not one and the same. Despite 
their common identification they differ. I do not want to argue or plead for the insignificance of 
culture but prefer to point out that its significance may have been misunderstood. Culture is significant 
– there is no question about it – but is it significant in order to name a collective, and in case of 
multiculturalism multiple collectives; or does comprehension of culture rather forces us to 
acknowledge an unavoidable diversity? How culture differentiates potentially and dismantles 
segmented wholes or integrates new wholes becomes a question of permanent relevance.  
 
There is no doubt that no blueprint and no program will ever make sense in cultural 
matters (Arendt, 1978a, p. 93). 
 
Despite its immensity, it has become obvious how fragile culture can become. In times of economic 
and political crisis, when the critical affect of cultural production and protest is needed most, it is 
almost invariably cut back or entirely discarded. Because culture does not lend itself to universal or 
uniform interpretation, it has an ambiguous relation to morality and juridical judgment. Despite the 
fact that culture cannot be reduced to one form of morality, politics of segments gives rise to moral 
judgments that presuppose certain homogeneity or hegemonies that are disconnected. The political 
discussion in current political affairs in The Netherlands is often moved by such segmented normation, 
as we have seen in the fourth chapter with the protest activities around Black Pete. Culture can become 
an axiomatic paradigm, an object of moral judgments, in the sense of exclusion as a form of illness, as 
Schinkel (2008 & 2011) suggests; or a differencial paradigm excluding reflective judgment within and 
in-between segments. It thus has the tendency to become a determinant judgment within the segments 
of cultures. This often happens with a specific nation-related form of culture, like the Arab culture and 
its reduction to simple terrorism. It can also appear in a more implicit sense, like the refusal to fund 
cultural sectors and institutions during war and economic crises. Cultural activities, such as public 
debates, artistic works and even educational activities are, from the perspective of capitalistic 
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economic norm, seen as non-profitable activities, some times even morally condemned as unimportant 
luxuries. Culture thus always oscillates between a segmentarized framework and a fragile impotential 
paradigm.  
 
Context and culture within a politics of segments refer to yet another differencial paradigm: identity. 
Both context and culture in their differenciating mode involve discourses infused by mechanisms of 
identification. The form of expression of politics of segments as a macro-, meso- and micropolitics is 
based on identities. Within politics of identities, each identity contains its own differencial 
paradigmatic tendency. There are many thoughts on and many forms of identity. Different structures, 
each with their own disorders, are implied by a certain perspective on identity. The history of 
philosophy testifies of numerous reflections on this concept. In a dialectical sense identity as a concept 
is defined by its opposite – difference – and the reflections on identities trigger other oppositions such 
as in-itself/for-itself, body/mind, object/subject, consciousness/unconscious, coherency/chaos, 
continuity/rupture. Philosophical reflections distinguish between multiple aspects, components and 
forms that are implied by the concept of identity. Feminist and anticolonial studies have problematized 
these normative differentiations within the concept of identity with its secondary reference to 
otherness as an excluded margin of a western and male interpretation. Luce Irigaray’s work entitled 
This Sex Which is Not One (1985) elaborates on how language forces its categories on consciousness, 
a logic she inverses by inventing a ‘new speak’ that favors feminine desire. The arguments between 
Edward Said (1978) and Ian Buruma & Avishai Margalit (2004) on axiomatic paradigmatic 
relationship between respectively Orientalism and Occidentalism bear witness to the differencial as 
well as axiomatic paradigmatic effects of identification in relation to territories. They problematize the 
images of thought in different disciplines such as philosophy, science, art and politics.  
Naming a collective, whether through recognition or for the sake of exclusion, belongs to a 
certain form of politics of identity, a politics that is popularized in stereotypes such as Muslim-
fundamentalist, sexual black man, slutty western women, but also stereotypes as the sensitive female 
and the macho man. Literature such as John Gray’s Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus 
(2012) refers not to multiplicity but to extremely prejudiced binary oppositions. In these cases, identity 
is often a fed cliché in a politics of kitsch: used by politicians to ingratiate themselves to voters and 
irresistible to comedians. Still, the same identity is also for those who it is forced upon an instrument 
of resistance. The immense amount of migrant-organizations in The Netherlands is already an 
indication of how majoritarian minorities separate themselves through paradigms of identity in order 
to form communities and enforce emancipatory empowerment (Van Heelsum, 2004). This at least 
explains why emancipatory politics in the US is often called Identity Politics. 
 
Rather than being a work-in-progress, always moving from segment to segment, I 
exist in either one segment or another with no variation. Once I ‘become a 
woman,’ I am sexy (or not) until I am ‘off the market’ (i.e., married); once I give 
birth, I am a mother for life. Segments are overcoded on a uniform grid so that they 
enter into redundant resonance (Lorraine, 2011, p. 52). 
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Within the emancipatory movements the link between identity and recognition is crucial. Yet, is 
recognition always in need of identity or can it function flexibly in its act of connecting subjects to 
others and to themselves? Renante D. Pilapil (2015) argues that the act of recognition between 
individuals is of importance paradoxically due to the inability of an identity to become permanent. 
And due to this complex connection neither identity nor recognition could last forever or become 
fixed. Pilapil argues for the necessity and the acknowledgement of misrecognition within the concept 
of recognition. It is not the negative binary relation that divides the two concepts recognition and non-
recognition, but rather the lack of a clear recognition in its reference to the paradigm of identity that 
visualizes the complexity and the plurality of the concept of recognition itself. Non-recognition is not 
the opposite but a supplementary force within recognition. Inclusion and exclusion are not simple 
givens or clear opposites, but as Ghorashi (2003) states: “processes of inclusion and exclusion are at 
work interchangeably and contribute to the senses of belonging and estrangement” (p. 22). 
    
Still, despite this instable character in-between recognition and identity, and complexity of inclusion 
and exclusion, politics of segments enforces permanently an idea of fixed clarity of identification upon 
individuals. Forms of expression in cinema, visual arts and literature can deconstruct the politics of 
identity in sensitizing its audiences for a far subtler relation between identity and difference. Fatih 
Akin’s Gegen die Wand (2004) is the devastating image of such non-recognition. Sibel and Cahit 
marry one another, neither for love or affection, nor for the sake of obeying their parents. They marry 
because they are united paradoxically in both their non-recognition and resistance to recognition 
within the Turkish as well as the German society. Akin – with the help of excellent actors – shows that 
in a world where recognition has become the same as acknowledgement of and subscription to an 
differenciating identity, these ambiguous multipolar figures are positioned against/towards the wall in 
becoming almost fatally self-destructive. Within the segments of politics of segments these multipolar 
figures leave in Derrida’s (1982) terms traces of différance, the unheard, the unseen, the unwanted. 
Despite their so-called non-existence within such politics they undermine segments of differencial 
identities in a fundamental way.  
 Reflection on the politics of identity and the condemnation of simplistic recognition is also a 
concern for the visual artist Atousa Bandeh Ghiasabadi. In her drawings and writings, she wonders: 
“what is universal and what is wrongfully generalized,” without rejecting either possibility. She has 
experienced the identifying image that politics on all levels has forced her to be and as an artist has 
obliged her to produce. How can one defy such a force? At first, she does this by refusing all the 
characteristics of such a differencial identity. On the cover of the book Sideways, Reflections on 
Changing Contexts in Art Bandeh Ghiasabadi’s multipolar affect of such rejection is imperatively 
sensitized: 
 
What I should avoid:  
- Ornaments or decorative elements 
- Mosques 
- Symbols or metaphors 
- Political statements 
- Work about women repressed or otherwise 
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- Women in scarf, veil or chador 
- Women naked or poorly dressed  
- Women at all 
- Language elements like alphabets, poetry or stories 
- Subjects referring to immigration, refugees or foreigners 
- Autobiographical works because they allude to all of the above-mentioned 
elements (Various writers, 2010). 
 
During the process of becoming an artist she, however, changes her mode of resistance by refusing to 
be a total negation. Her paintings do not deny the exotic image, but in some sense, seem to exaggerate 
the fed cliché image to such an extent that it shames the viewer to think in such identities. The eyes 
look back, forcing the supposed hegemony to be reconsidered. The images are the recognition and 
rejection of recognition of an exotic cliché in one and the same act (Various writers, 2010, pp. 9-40). 
The virtuality of non-recognition is sensitized in an extremely actualized recognizable image, as it 
were creating a differencial counter-paradigm.  
 
Then again, just as the politics of exile, within the framework of politics of segments the force of 
being identified is not only felt by minorities; but by all. This is the effect of majoritarian minorities, 
that enforce their segments upon majority as well as minority. Not only are minorities defined through 
such paradigms, but also other subjects are eventually condemned by being defined as a majority. 
Ghorashi (2010) states that the internalization of the process of culturalism at the end will define the 
whole process of experiencing culture for all who are involved (p. 131). The act of identifying the 
sexes not only condemns the female body, but also enforces homogeneity upon the male body. The 
expression ‘boys don’t cry’ is a blockage of affect that forcefully checks the affective potentiality of 
the child. Terrence Malick’s film Tree of Life (2011) is a complex image of a man following as well as 
dismantling identities. The character of young Jack, played by Hunter McCracken, is an image of a 
boy who deterritorializes the image of how a man should be. It is an affective subjectivity rather than a 
clear identity. The image of the mother is another matter. Mrs. Obrain, played by Jessica Chastain, is 
unusually young and remains young even when her boys are adults. Is she a ghost of a woman died 
young, or is she the fed cliché image of woman who over time must remain the same: without 
wrinkles, in perfect shape? Identity affects us in many ways, creating an antagonistic feeling of shame, 
arrogance and insecurity all at once (Van Duijvenboden, 2010).  
While the paradigm of exclusion often refers to the experience of being a migrant, the 
inhabitants experience other forms of exclusion. The rise of populist politics may be facilitated by 
opposing a fictional identity with a fictional enemy. The sentiment of exclusion felt by the supporters 
of for instance Wilders, Le Pen, Erdoğan or Trump nevertheless remains a reality. The notion of 
identity is a complex paradigm due to its permanent reference to its own virtuosity to redefine itself, 
but also to its real effects due to its virtuality. In the end, although there is ontologically no matter of 
content in an identity, i.e. no concrete body referring immediately and exactly to its characteristics, 
there is as a matter of expression, nevertheless a reality, due the effects and affects of politics of 
identity. There is often a reality of restlessness within the experience of identity – this is so ‘not me’ – 
that has been endured by many men and women everywhere at any time.  
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5.3.2 Equalitarian Equality  
Due to the assumption of contextual and cultural clarities as well as the segmentation by transparent 
identities, the politics of multiculturalism implies an even more specific form of expression: a politics 
of communication. In this section I will focus on how this politics changes the idea of the binary 
setting between the private and the public by introducing certain forms of subjectivity in the realm of 
the public. The language of the migrant as a form of expression of minority is often characterized as a 
broken language, like pidgin, or a lack of the ability to speak properly. This is clearly inscribed in the 
anti-migrants political discourse, but it is also an aspect of pro-migrants arguments, which aims at 
helping the migrant to assimilate. It is often the image of the migrants in the media, as the image of a 
non-English speaking Spanish illegal as a stock character in American crime series. How does this 
failed apprehension of language relate to politics of communication? How does this so-called non-
language relate to Arendt’s political public space with its necessity of speech and act?  
 
Argued from Arendt’s (1958) perspective, the personal obscurity of an experience of flight is an a-
political experience. Given the discursive, paradigmatic embedding of this experience – context, 
culture and identity – I disagree with this interpretation. Precisely the shadow and the mystery of 
‘un’speakable experience sheds light on what currently is political. Defining this form of expression as 
an inability to transmit information in a clear way, testifies to an urge of finality in speech. Yet, Arendt 
rejects this finalistic aspect repeatedly in The Human Condition. The so-called hampered speech of the 
foreigner bears witness to the plurality that the migrant incorporates due to its peculiar pronunciation 
and how she relates to the world out of this form of difference. However, the relationality of the 
refugee to the outside world through its non-language does not necessarily mean that the refugee has 
become a public subject of exclusion instead of a private victim or sufferer. In a politics of flight the 
opposition of the political public and the a-political private is ruptured. The wry matter and form of 
this expression exposes the political realm of the difference, which in modern times drives them to the 
corners of the periphery. The personal condition of those individuals becomes important for policy-
making. Policies on – not of – difference in various countries affect the personal image of migrants 
immensely. Some images come to mind: the image of hunger-striking refugees, who are fighting for 
survival and risk their own life as the only available political weapon; the image of suicide bombers 
whose limbic lives are the products of political exclusion and are therefore reduced to mere 
instruments, using their bodies as destructive weapons. These have become common public images. 
And how do young children of migrants relate to the image of their parents while being obliged to 
translate in detail every document and conversation for them?  
 While the politics have become a personal matter for these individuals the politicians and the 
media seem to deny their individuality by their constant reference to abstract masses and impersonal 
statistics. It is either mass migration that raises the fear of voters or the anonymous corpses on the 
beach that sensitize viewers. These all lack personality or individuality, let alone having any form of 
autonomy. A politics of flight in this sense oscillates between privatized politics and politicized 
privacy, as well as between individualized masses and massified individuals, or in terms of Schinkel 
(2008) deindividualized individual. All these images share a common trait: the lack of lingual 
expression of the subject within the realm of politics, i.e. public space. The suicidal bomber, the 
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hunger-striking refugee, as well as the corpses and masses of refugees lack the ability to express their 
specific being in a communicable form of expression, i.e. in comprehensible words, identifiable 
images or recognizable gestures. This lack of communication consequently indicates the 
disappearance of these lives within the political public space without privatizing their specific 
individuality. As a result, they turn into being no-body.  
 The non-linguality of the migrants is a consequence of the hegemony of one language. Its 
dominance asks for an objective form of communication. Yet, the rise of multiculturalism, as an 
organization of segments that are embodied by multiple differencial paradigms, initially resisted such 
an idea by the introduction of multiple languages. The Dutch policy in the 1980’s integration with 
maintenance of one’s identity (integratie met behoud van eigen identiteit) aimed for a multiplicity of 
languages. Official forms and papers were translated in Turkish and Arabic. This first stage of 
multiculturalism thus deterritorialized the symmetry of identity and language, into segments with 
multiple identities and lingual expressions. As Ghorashi (2003) argues, it repeated the pillarization in 
the Dutch society; a pillarization that was already a common factor with Protestants and Catholics.  
With migration new forms of pillarization gave rise to segmented collective experiences of specific 
ethnic identities. The segments however did not occupy the same power in the society. Through this 
differenciation, although by Arendt (1958) defined as private affairs, matters such as femininity, 
economic differences, cultural and social differenciation, as well as personal experiences became 
political. In Arendt’s perspective, this simply implied socialization and economization of politics. Yet 
her analysis is too simplistic. The introduction of these agents in the political realm sensitized different 
ways in which politics defines its citizens and non-citizens in all areas of life. It gave voice to what 
was silenced by politics rather than privatizing differences that needed to express their privateness or 
in terms of Ghorashi (2003) their enforced disconnective pillarization (p. 226). Rancière’s (2004) 
reference as discussed at the end of chapter four, is in that sense to the point. Olympe de Gouge, the 
French feminist and writer executed in 1793 due to her resistance against cliché image of a woman, 
was excluded as a female, not due to her personal life but due to political discourse, Rancière argues. 
Within an exclusive discursive perspective private matters are always political matters. 
 The effect of multiculturalism’s introduction of segmented collectives into the politics 
decreased the power of a hegemonic language, and created a space for freedom of speech through 
multiple forms of language. It created a political sphere in which freedom is sensed on multiple levels: 
freedom of choice and religion, political beliefs, sexual preferences, etc. So, in the first instance 
multicultural thought is based on the political right of individuals to choose freely their own 
subjectivity, i.e. their own relationship to a certain group with its own cultural heritage. This 
diversified idea of freedom appears at the same level where other notions such as empowerment and 
emancipation enter the stage. Multiculturalism is thus based on the idea of freedom of preference for a 
certain community and the need of such communities to empower its participants in order to act on an 
equal foot in a multicultural setting. Nevertheless, the objective tendencies of totalitarian thought were 
not entirely defeated. After 2001 these remerged in the political arena. Yet, multiculturalism remains a 
relative deterritorializing power that however tends to be reterritorialized constantly. Objectivity is 
multiplied within segments that create their own forms of consistency and promote their own 
understanding of expression. Expression in this sense does not create room for heterotopic voices – 
heterophonia – but rather a Voice that starts to multiply itself in a molar rather than molecular way. 
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Spike Lee’s Jungle Fever (1991) is a significant image of the multiplicity of differencial paradigms of 
identification and communication. It thematizes their urge to remain disconnected and their tendency 
to exclusion, despite the empowerment of the subjects in political and social realm. The love affair 
between the Afro-American Flipper and Italian-American Angie is displayed in a milieu of mutual 
racism and culturalism, although one community is defined due to its racial differentiation and the 
other due to its national differentiation. The infidelity of Flipper is condemned not due to its moral 
implication with respect to his wife, but due to the disapproval of the racial features of Angie. And 
Angie is judged due to her intercourse with a black man from her community, rather than her 
intercourse with a married man. The statement of Drew, Flipper’s wife, “It doesn't matter what color 
she is, my man is gone” comments to the negligence towards her personal involvement and betrayal. It 
is within this setting that the concept of apartheid could appear in multicultural settings. The subject, 
that in the first instance seems to be free to choose its community, gets stuck in a discourse of either-
or. This is what Ghorashi (2003) typifies as thick notion of sensing one’s nationality or ethnicity, in 
which a fear for loss of one’s cultural or national identity result in a rigid enforcement of such identity. 
Non-belonging in such a context is neither an option nor recommended. Even partial belonging of 
Flipper and Angie is not an option. Although in this American multicultural setting multiple 
consistencies are simulated and empowered, the consistency within a segment remains a rigid neurotic 
repetition of the anticipated framings. Belonging to a segment, whether forced out of necessity or 
chosen out of free will, in all cases indicates reproduction of a same identity. To rephrase it in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s (1987) terms, multiculturalism becomes a multiple process of decalcomania. Choice of 
identity indicates tracing its features in a segmented community. Mapping in a rhizomatic way aiming 
to transvers the given oppositions creates, within politics of segments, merely confused multipolar 
figures. 
 
This act of tracing has a specific goal, namely installing a sense of equality. It is due to the group-
formation of the black community and not to the openness of other communities that gained African-
Americans in United State a marginal sense of equality in law and social hierarchy. This formation, 
which was not only necessary in the past, but also even within the contemporary United States despite 
its former president with his African-American roots, is highly relevant. Nevertheless, equality, as 
Arendt (1968) suggests, is a tricky concept with a tendency to become a problematic disconnecting 
force. Longing for equality is a main characteristic of our moral and legal system. We strive for 
equality before the law and the norm, trusting the law’s objectivity. In line with Arendt (1968) 
however we can argue that exactly this equality has become an axiomatic or at best differenciating 
paradigm due to the miscomprehended assumption that equality indicates sameness: a homogenizing 
equality. All men are legally equal, so all men are normatively the same, and when one does not meet 
this assumption then one is excluded from the realm of equality before the law, regardless whether this 
considers the law belonging to God, nature or men. This totalitarian symmetry of the law and the norm 
as well as differenciated understanding of it that implies sameness within a group of people, creates 
little room for the inherent plurality of individuals. Arendt states: 
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Equality of condition, though it is certainly a basic requirement for justice, is 
nevertheless among the greatest and most uncertain ventures of modern mankind. 
The more equal conditions are, the less explanation there is for the differences that 
actually exist between people; and thus all the more unequal do individuals and 
groups become. This perplexing consequence came fully to light as soon as 
equality was no longer seen in terms of an omnipotent being like God or an 
unavoidable common destiny like death. Whenever equality becomes a mundane 
fact in itself, without any gauge by which it may be measured or explained, then 
there is one chance in a hundred that it will be recognized simply as a working 
principal of a political organization in which otherwise unequal people have equal 
rights; there are ninety-nine chances that it will be mistaken for an innate quality of 
every individual, who is ‘normal’ if he is like everybody else and ‘abnormal’ if he 
happens to be different. This perversion of equality from political into a social 
concept is all the more dangerous when a society leaves but little space for special 
groups and individuals, for then their differences become all the more conspicuous 
(p. 54).  
 
The destruction of plural equality by equalizing equality is not an omen for the end of civilization. It is 
rather born from within the dynamics of civilization and progress. It is, according to Arendt, exactly in 
the assumption of an evident natural or historical right that men have insisted on inequality. Even 
nowadays this supplementary logic emerges in our neo-liberal meritocraty: is talent an asset that one 
gains or that is given? If the latter is the case naturalness again legitimates inequality. Laws pretend to 
exist beyond human interactions. Arendt suggests that neither nature nor history can justify the 
relevancy of law and norm. Human rights are all about having the right to rights as human beings. 
Having abandoned all transcendent instances (wo)men – whether within politics of exile or politics of 
segments – have become both the object and subject of the law, the maker and the made with all the 
aporatical implications that are produced within this double bind, precisely as Foucault (2005a) 
indicated the epistemic condition of modern man in The Order of Things: “Man, in the analytic of 
finitude, is a strange empirico-transcendental doublet” (p. 318). Derrida (1982) states that we have to 
take this double bind as a supplementary difference for granted in order to overcome inequality in 
history and nature.  
 
This new situation, in which ‘humanity’ has in effect assumed the role formerly 
ascribed to nature or history, would mean in this context that the right to have 
rights, or the right of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed 
by humanity itself. It is by no means certain whether this is possible (Arendt, 1968, 
p. 298). 
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Equality of man is not a given.30 Equality in plurality must be gained. It is an everlasting process in 
permanent need of attention toward deterritorialization of the assumption of sameness.  
 
Equality, in contrast to all that is involved in mere existence, is not given to us, but 
is the result of human organization insofar as it is guided by the principle of justice. 
We are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of 
our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights (p. 301). 
 
5.3.3 Expressive Presumptions and Expressive Ruptures  
Communities are usually based on a sense of shared cultural memory, political history and sensible 
communication in a common language. However, are such formations of identity always inclusive in 
forming a community? Communities are created and endure time due to the affects they produce, such 
as the feeling of belonging. Attachment always has an affective component. Men commune due to a 
sense of security, trust, recognition, compassion and the ability to express such affects through 
language. Language thus allows forms of expression in order to enunciate an affect of a community. 
Setsuko Adachi’s (2015) distinction between empathy and sympathy is a prime example of this 
affective sense of community and of the affective effect of language. Adachi distinguishes between 
two affects, sympathy as a form of compassion concerning those who share the same identity; and 
empathy that concerns compassion towards those who differ from the compassionate subject. 
Sympathy therefore refers to a collective identity and in Adachi’s case even a shared nation-state; 
while empathy refers to otherness and plurality. Adachi also argues that although according to the 
Japanese dictionary empathy can be translated in the Japanese language, nevertheless, the term refers 
to sympathy rather than to empathy as referring to plurality in Arendtian sense of the word. She argues 
that the term empathy does not appear in the Japanese language and the nuance of a relationship 
between sympathy and empathy is not sensed by the Japanese. The loyalty of the citizen is measured 
by the intensity of the feeling sympathy. Oosterling (2016) would argue that this is due to the 
influence of Confucian emphasis on harmony (wa) of the group (pp. 167 & 301).  
Nevertheless, plurality is not merely outside a nation, but also arises within a community. 
Exclusion is not merely an influence of an outside world. As Huijer (2016) argues, membership to a 
community does not only weaken one’s vulnerability in a society, but in its rigid form membership 
itself can become compelling. It creates a sense of exclusion from within (pp. 99-100). Yet, within 
such process of compelling inclusion unintended flight lines are always ahead, not necessarily due to 
                                                     
30 Although it seems that Rancière and Arendt disagree on equality, I think this disagreement is only partial. Both thinkers 
plead for the creation of a space in which politics becomes possible for all whom intend to participate. Both thinkers 
sincerely believe that all men are equal in their potential to participate in such a discourse. Both thinkers agree that this space 
gains its power due to disagreement rather than agreement. When Arendt suggests that equality is not given, she refers to the 
historical evolvement of the right to form a community and participate in politics, instead of the idea that men are not equal 
to one another as such. Both thinkers thus state that equality must not be dependent on an ideology, but politics must create 
an open space where the already existing equality can be lived. The main difference however between Arendt and Rancière 
remains in the inclusion of themes in this political space, such as economy and social differentiation, as well as the fact that 
Rancière would define the struggle for such an open space as a political struggle par excellence. See on this subject also: 
Schaap, 2012.  
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individual actions, but often rather the process itself creates a form implosion. Adachi (2015) gives an 
excellent example here, namely the contradictory character of English lessons given to Japanese 
youth. While the English language is foreign to them, the content of the lessons focuses on something 
familiar, that is to say Japanese history.31  According to Adachi this technique merely strengthens their 
sense of nationality. Nevertheless, I rather argue that Japanese youth, who learns about their Japanese 
history by means of a foreign language, do not necessarily become more Japanese. Since their 
‘Japanness' is expressed in a foreign language, the expression and translation accentuates the 
exteriority of this identity. A good example is the translation of the term 'person' after World War II in 
the discourse of the human sciences. It is translated as 'nin gen' which literally means 'in between 
being', i.e. a relational being (Oosterling, 2016, p. 194). What seems to be internal is immediately 
translated and contexualized within a different lingual milieu. Therefore, the ultimate act of 
confirming their nationality through its expression in a foreign language can also be conceived as a 
decisive act of deterritorialization.  
 Nonetheless, the homogenizing affect of language remains. Why do these Japanese youths 
learn English? Why do I write in English? It is often argued that we need a common language, 
whether it considers a nation or the world as multicultural setting. In politics of segments – nationally 
and internationally – a language or a regime of expression dominates as a neutral connective 
expressive domain. Despite toleration as an affect toward multiple segments within multiculturalism, 
the double discourse of a politics of segments struggles with the connection of different segments 
within a nation-state or global communication. Solution has often been presented, as we have seen 
before by Kymlicka (1995), by urging the minorities to master a common language, which is usually 
the language of the majority, arguing that only through mastery of the majority language the 
presupposed equality can be gained. Within this homogenization of equality via language the multiple 
consistencies thus remain in need of a minimum overall consistency in order to form a multicultural 
society. This totalizing perspective is not only given by xenophobic politicians, but also by thinkers 
who sincerely believe in the multiplicity and plurality of multicultural society. Helder De Schutter 
(2005) is in this sense a good example. In his article, in which he criticized Kymlicka due to his 
homogenization of the vehicles of multicultural society, he nonetheless states:  
 
Of course, some juxtaposition will be unavoidable, as it will be difficult for certain 
institutions (such as cultural centers for the benefit of a particular language) to 
operate in more than one language. However, this is not a problem: the model can 
accommodate monolingual and monocultural mechanisms, as long as they are 
compatible with a general policy that aims to overcome the monoculturalization of 
identities and choice contexts (pp. 35-36). 
 
Can a singular expression overcome monocultural tendencies? De Schutter’s (2005) favorite example 
is Brussels. He published this text in 2005. In the years thereafter, it was specifically this 
                                                     
31  The schizophrenic tendencies in Japanese society can be partly explained to be a result of the accelerated modernization 
Japanese lived through after the World War II. 
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monolingualism and hence monoculturalism that became an issue in Belgium as well as in the city of 
Brussels. The Flemish part of the country gave rise to distinct forms of nationalistic oriented political 
parties. The policies of Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block) that was charged in 2004 with racism and 
changed its name to Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) was mostly focused on anti-migration, anti-
foreigners and anti-Islam rhetoric. The second nationalistic party Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (New-
Flemish Alliance) on the other hand rather aimed their focus on the interest of the Flemish language 
and independency of Flanders in order to maintain the power of the Flemish language. The images of 
‘non-typical’ Belgian faces on the website express their desire to show their nationalism without 
intending to be racists. The overall success of the moderate New-Flemish Alliance’s in the elections of 
2009, however, kept Belgium from forming a government for more than a year.  
 Language, we can conclude, does not produce marginal affects. On the contrary, it is the core 
business of multiculturalism. Belgium has always been a battlefield of mother tongues. This war was 
fought on several fronts: between major languages against minor languages as contenders to become 
the major language; minor languages that contended to become equal to the major language. Why do 
multicultural theorists then emphasize the unavoidability of a common language? The common 
language is necessary in order to communicate beyond one’s specific segmentation. Nonetheless, this 
need of communication is based on a simplified understanding of language. Three presumptions are 
manifest in this simplification: 1) the transparency, 2) non-violent quality and 3) exclusive creativity 
in the use of language.  
 
1) The first states that language is a transparent instrument to transmit data and information to connect 
multiple communities and equalize them by access to the same data. However, this equalization 
depends on a comprehension of data; the knowledge of the data assumes a subject's ability to reflect 
on these data; and finally, the knowledge of language indicates that subjects can communicate their 
interest and relationship to the society. Furthermore, the presumption of transmission of data does not 
only refer to the common language but also to languages of the multicultural segments. Translation 
thus becomes an easy one on one transformation of one sign of regimes to the other. The subject can 
formulate its empowerment and interest within its community and eventually transfer these data to the 
overall discourse via the common language. In other words, the politics of communication in 
multicultural setting depends on an efficient and goal-oriented instrument of communication 
pretending to create a neutral lingual setting. 
Yet, in this setting translation merely becomes an echo: table (English), tafel (Dutch), miz 
(Farsi), mesa (Spanish)…. Do these words indicate the same thing, or are they lingual nodes in a 
discourse, with internal multiplicity and plurality? It is often within translation, or migration from one 
language into the other, that subjects sense loss and because of this become displaced. Loss is however 
a deceitful characterization. There is not less language in migration. Even if we follow the logic of 
clear lingual discourse, migrants’ knowledge of language only accumulates due to the accumulation of 
their knowledge of a new language. What is lost, is not words or vocabulary, but rather an affect, 
namely trust in and control over language. Table and ‘tafel’ become partially incommensurable due to 
their relationship to complex contextual settings. Lawyers table is a different table for a refugee than 
for a divorcee. Translation thus dismantles the transparency and a neutral comprehension of language, 
not only in the foreign language but also especially in the mother tongue. A state of translation shows 
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that language, which in the case of the mother tongue is presumed as an asset, has never been ours. 
Elusiveness of language does not occur in translation, but becomes explicit within it. It is the politics 
of language, an open language, in which even a mother tongue can become fragile. The politics of 
expression must then be distinguished from the politics of Voice as correct meaning. In the latter form 
of politics, migration often equals a sense of displacement, referring to something or someone being in 
a wrong place at a wrong time. Even after years and many generations, men can still feel this affect of 
Unheimlichkeit. Displacement is also felt by inhabitants through time, referring to a past, their history 
has perished and their space is unrecognizably modified (Huijer, 2016). Unheimlichkeit occurs in the 
loss of consistency.  
 Translation is thus not loss but the echo of complexity. As I suggested translation shows that 
words are partially incommensurable and not completely incommensurable. And it is due to this 
partiality, as Derrida argues, that men have the urge to communicate. Neither in complete 
comprehension, where words become unnecessary, nor in complete incomprehension, where words 
become useless, is a need for language. Only within this complexity between comprehension and non-
comprehension language can express its internal playfulness. Translation thus here is neither a strict 
copy nor a total loss. The novelty of the translated is not a negation of the previous expression but a 
transformation of its radiancy of its voices. This translating affect of what is comprehended and what 
is not – a quality that Derrida calls Babylonic – does however not only occur between different types 
of language but also within a language itself (McDonald, 1985). There is an expressive tension within 
and in-between segments of language, there is a Babylonic confusion. 
 
2) Next to the presumption of transparent communication, there is yet a second unwarranted 
presumption that determines the multicultural setting: the nonviolent trait of words and images. This is 
a common argument that was referred to by the Dutch stand-up comedian Hans Teeuwen. This 
nonviolent trait is thus not merely an assumption in language, but eventually also in the journalistic 
imagination of cartoonists like the Danish Kurt Westergaard, who drew images of prophet Mohamed 
holding bombs. Although physical violence is a different type of expression, this does not 
consequently indicate that language is nonviolent in the implementation of its form. Drawings and 
words could lead to physical exclusion as well. The consistent negative emphasis on Middle Eastern 
and North African physical features of young male youth in Europe and the ethnic profiling of 
Muslims and African Americans in the United States is not only a problem of the police. The media 
spectacle is to be blamed too. Political slogans such as Mark Rutte’s typification of youth with other 
ethnic background as rig, feed the segmentalized forms of expression within politics of segments. The 
common language that creates the so-called equality is also the language in which one is typified as 
non-belonging other. The other does not fit the profile of the equalitarian equality. In case of The 
Netherlands the multicultural tendency to reduce differences to cultural differences leads to a targeted 
exclusion of members of a group that is supposed to be typically violent due to their cultural 
background; with their uncontrolled exclusion from the labor market and public space as consequence. 
The violent character of such expressions appears in the act of expression itself. Through its act, 
expression has a performative impact, due to the fact that reference to a so-called reality of ethnicity, 
produces a certain reality in the power construction of a society (Schinkel, 2008, p. 283). 
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How does violence expose itself in orders of expressions? The connection between language and 
violence is already thematized by Friedrich Nietzsche and neo-Nietzschians such as Deleuze and 
Guattari. For Nietzsche the violence of language – as a form of expression, Deleuze and Guattari add – 
lies in its reduction of the plurality of Dionysian life forces to Apollinian concepts and words. The 
violence of language lies in its reduction of a plurality of differences and in the moral implications that 
follow from such a reduction. That is why Deleuze and Guattari (1987), inspired by Nietzsche, state 
that order-words are judgments of God; not a religious God, but a totalitarian political order that aims 
at segmentation – either/or – and exclusion - neither/nor. The question arises whether the image-order, 
which by all means is another order, does not in some cases follow the same logic. In ‘expressing one 
self’, one frames a context in order to compose a certain consistency. De Mul (2017) shows how, after 
the introduction of secularization, romanticism implements via art a sense of community to 
compensate for the loss of religion. Art becomes a practice to sensitize moral ideals, and finally a 
sense of nationalism (pp. 225-228). Even modern avant-garde art has shown that expression is neither 
neutral nor a-political. In deconstructing hegemonic discourses – images, words, sounds – it defines 
and shapes new discourses. It positions itself within this discursive practice. Expression is a 
mesopolitical practice with the affective complexities that each political practice entails. Yet, 
expression is not the outcome of intentions, but the affective articulation of a medium that 
communicates more than just the intentions of the sender anticipating the expectations of the receiver. 
Expression appears in the middle, mediated and mediating. It is an everlasting radicality of 
mediatization, which by Oosterling (2000b) is indicated as radical mediocrity: selfconsciousness is 
rooted (Latin: radix) in the media and ruled (Greek: kratein) by the media.  
What does this inherency of violence within language mean for freedom of expression? Are 
insults and offense not violent? Do they have no political implications? The segmentalization of 
multiculturalism, although implementing a multiple idea of freedom of speech within the segments, 
neglects to map out the space in-between, creating room for inter-speech. Due to the disconnecting 
tendency of a politics of segments – each segment claiming its own truth and consistency as we have 
seen earlier with Meiden van Halal and the comedian – and given the political primacy of the 
autonomous subject freedom of speech is merely referred to as an individualized right to gain, instead 
of a political imperative that must be shared.  In words of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) opinions can 
participate as cartographical elements, yet in other cases they are copied in everlasting sameness of a 
presumed objectified subjective truths. The repetitive comments on the Muslim community, under the 
presumption of so-called courage to be critical, sensitize its audiences to copying. Within this setting 
yet another question arises, too important not to be mentioned, yet too immense to be answered. Is the 
freedom of speech for a cartoonist, novelist, journalist and comedian the same as the freedom of 
speech for a politician? Do these figures not inhabit different levels in the powerhouse and must their 
speech not be differentiated as such? And finally does the homogenization of all speech as freedom of 
speech not give rise to an uncontrolled license for exclusion instead of a plural debate on the value: 
freedom of speech? The freedom of speech is a valuable trait of politics. Nevertheless, the question 
remains whether freedom of speech is appreciated as a fragile impotential connective paradigm or 
instrumentalized as an axiomatically differenciating paradigm where politics of exile and politics of 
segments collapse into one and other. 
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3) Next to the transparency of language within and across segments with their pretension to transmit 
data in an overall language without any bias and the non-violent neutrality of words/images, finally a 
third presumption arises: the other’s creative thinking that could be implemented in the hegemony of 
segmented discourse. This creativity is bestowed on one type of subject within a politics of segments, 
namely the other as migrants and refugees. They must become the agents of change as long as they do 
connect to the hegemonic regime of words and images. The relation between ‘rupture, survival and 
creativity’ is here addressed in order to identify a specific subject of flight, that articulates its creativity 
from within its own ruptured experience. Rupture as a de-territorializing force creates a subject too, be 
it that its form of expression differs from the 'regular' subjects. In the lack of words (aphasic state) and 
the lack of community this subject is forced to create new forms of expression that reterritorializes, i.e. 
composes his experiences on another stratum, creating a plane of consistency within the artistic world 
of Museums or literary work. This creativity is instrumentalized in the hegemonic discourse as 
follows: how do new-comers contribute to 'our' society? The refugee and migrant as extraordinary 
agents of rupture not only become the primary and singular protagonists of the discovery of the new, 
but also the agents of this new in new communities. Self-awareness and creation of a new community 
supplement each other. 
In comparison to ever excluding tendencies of totalitarianism, such argumentation seems to 
integrate a new and inclusive perspective. It seems to imply a shift in power but in essence it repeats 
axiomatic and differenciating paradigms. It creates a reality in which the normalized non-migrating 
citizen – who according to Huijer (2016) is burdened with maintenance of cultural heritage – cannot 
be creative and the refugee or the migrant thus becomes solely responsible for bringing something 
exotic or solving an old problem. We argue for refugees that can solve our problems in caretaking of 
elderly or migrants that can solve our problems in ICT labor market. As we see, in being creative and 
profitable the other is consequently a closed entity as before. First, the other is defined as an entity that 
is unrelated to the inhabitants and felt as a burden that must be excluded; than the other is defined 
through another closed segment of exoticness and utility. In both scenarios of this differenciating 
identification the relation between the multiple subjects are silenced and ignored.  
 Politics of flight creates ruptures in every element of life. Yet the rupture itself cannot be 
pinpointed to a singular from of subject. Nonetheless, politics of segments, due to its urge to 
segmentalize and identify its subjects creates constructive meanings for such eruptive events. Art in a 
sense does not only deconstruct thinking; in some cases, it rather confirms the order of regimes of 
expressions. The respective ‘subjective’ approach to rupture has been cultivated in avant-garde art 
practices, and as such refers to a deeper presumption in the analysis of creativity: rupture as a creative 
experience. This experience has often been appropriated by the eccentric subject, in this case refugee 
or the migrant, in other cases the madman or the avant-garde artist. Still whatever being, it is never an 
ordinary disciplined person. Exactly because creativity is always eccentric and a quality of an 
undisciplined subject, such as in avant-garde, art becomes incapable of escaping the duality between 
the normal and the abnormal. It still cultivates and cherishes this duality in order to be acknowledged 
as creative. As such it remains an essential aspect of hegemonic discourse. Due to its appropriation of 
rupture, its projection of an enlightened subject, it claims to be an in-between being, an intermediary 
and finally its prophecy of emancipation of a subject, I call this the morality of art. In this modernist 
artistic perspective, the disciplined subject has to free itself through art from his chains of normality, 
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presenting this eccentric subject as its hero. Creativity in a politics of flight on the other hand arises 
from the process of relationality rather than from the eccentric subject or the abject Other. In other 
words, disruption on the plane of politics of flight is not merely a trait of the migrant and refugee but 
the effect of a differential participation and communication that sensitizes natality not of an isolated 
subject but as a virtual potential event in the lives of all subjects that are involved on the plane of 
flight.  
 
Let us thus romanticize neither creativity, nor the above-mentioned type of artistic expressivity. Just as 
in case of the rhizome, creativity is not a road to happiness; nor is the by the majority excluded subject 
– abject – destined to be the sole agent of inclusive thinking.  Majoritarian minorities – in their attempt 
to gain power, whether totally or within a segment – can mutually become exclusive. Zadie Smith’s 
(2000) novel White Teeth shows the multiple possibilities of lines of exclusion; whether within a 
politics of exile or a politics of segments. She brilliantly deplores segments – such as religious and 
secular, colonialism and anti-colonialism, different ideologically framed generations and ethnic 
background – in order to deterritorialize their differenciating and axiomatic paradigms of non-
connection. Through the characters Magid and Millat, Smith shows that a radical tendency to 
differenciate oneself from the other, is neither bound to a religion, a country, a sex, or any other idea 
of identity. It is the identification itself that leads to a politics of detached segments. Smith ridicules 
the idea of the extremists from the other side of the world and sensitizes her readers for the manners in 
which the western concept of freedom drives some youth to the madness of radicalism. 
 
Philosophical concepts are always integral aspects of a discourse. Politics of segments is a discourse 
and as suggested by Foucault (1980) each discourse is a network of different dispositives that, as 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) phrased this, create a consistency within an image of thought; which in 
this case we call multiculturalism. Dispositives do not only emerge within politics as paradigms in the 
Kuhnian sense. As we have seen in the second chapter paradigms relate to philosophical concepts, 
scientific functions and artistic affects and percepts. These disciplines however have not always shown 
a critical attitude toward dispositives that give in to the logic of identification. Hegel’s qualification of 
Western thinking as the most viable in connecting being and the mind, neglecting to understand the 
potentiality of African philosophy as fiercely shown by Heinz Kimmerle (1994), is just an example of 
how philosophy itself permanently gives in to rigidity of identities. And as Olúwolé (2014) argues, the 
idea of Socrates as the beginning of philosophical thinking remains in the colonial and binary 
mentality of western idealism. Long before Socrates other figures in the history of thought – such as 
Òrúnmìlà and Confucius – transformed and affected thinking.  
 
As for the scientific functions, within scientific vocabularies time after time the same types of identity, 
based on ethnic differences, are repeated. Scientific investigations of ethnic profiling apply the same 
jargon, not examining those who do the profiling, but focusing solely on those who are profiled. 
Despite efforts of revolutionary scientists to break through such jargons of segmentalized thinking, the 
governmental and scientific statistics persist to categorize illegal behavior in terms of ethnicity. 
Entzinger and Scheffer’s (2012) report on integration is perhaps the most cynical example. Although 
the authors conclude that ethnic background is not an adequate way of differenciation, their conclusion 
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does not result in a reflective judgment to rewrite their own report. The introduction of the term 
superdiversity by Vertovec (2007), Özdil’s (2015) elaboration of categorization by the term 
'allochthonous' which is based on racial profiling, and the analyses of sociologist such as Schinkel 
(2008 & 2011) and Geldof (2013) who accentuate socioeconomic exclusion and education 
backgrounds as elementary factors, all these efforts to break the logic of identity offer a more fruitful 
approach that is in line with my approach.  
 
Whom do these revolutionary scientists categorize and analyze? In order to understand the 
consequences of a politics of segments as well as a politics of exile Ta-Nehisi Coates' (2015) plea is 
simply to reverse the observing eye. It is not a body that shows certain characteristic, but the historic 
stubbornness of a discourse of identification engrained in the observing self-consciousness that 
implements an order of gestures on a body. Let us thus with Coates in mind state that politics of 
segments did not save us from the abyss of exclusion. Even comments on multiculturalism – such as 
Scheffer’s (2000) Multicultural Drama or Huntington’s (1996) Clash of Civilizations – do not surpass 
the process of segmentation. They persist in applying categories – and whether explicitly or implicitly, 
whether willingly or unwillingly – that curve the differenciating paradigm of a politics of segments 
toward axiomatic paradigms of exile: Us versus Them and Here versus There are still on the agenda.  
 
And what about art and its sensations? There are those arts practices that demonize the outsider. Said's 
(1978) orientalism thesis bears witness to the way the arts have collaborated with colonialism, racism 
and imperialism in making the East exotic, cruel and enigmatic. In the history of art women have three 
options: being naked, virgin or deadly. The fourth option is all these three at the same time. Yet there 
are artistic works – just as philosophical and scientific works – that surpass paradigms of a politics of 
segments. Beyond the clash of civilizations, Smith (2000) shows us a clash of affects, of senses, 
percepts, and more than anything: of sentiments. However, in contrast to the previous, she does not 
categorize them into nationalities and ethnicities, or other forms of identities. There is no other over 
there that causes the clash; but the clash of affects appears from within the discourse of a politics of 
segments; in the very heart of its segments.  
 
5.4 Differencial Affects 
 
5.4.1 Witnessing in Shame 
Both Rancière (2004) and Agamben (1991) invite us to hear this cacophony of silence; to hear the 
voices beyond the Voice(s) of totalitarianism and disconnective segments. Except which voices? In 
politics of segments this concerns the voices of multipolar individuals that owe their pathological state 
not to a mental or physical state; but to the discourse of differciated enforced identities. This section 
thus starts with the expression of the pseudo- and complete-witness of the concentration camp – one of 
the biggest victims of politics of flight – and the affectuation of the survivor by shame. Furthermore, 
different groups are thematized: such as war victims of rape. In the second part of this section I will 
argue that the experience of refugees within the multicultural setting is not beyond shame either. Their 
shame refers to their departure, and in the case of refugees also to their survival. It is multiplied in 
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affects such as nostalgia, feeling displaced and homesickness. These affects provide a matter of 
expression that results from segmentalizing impact of form of content – reterritorialized bodies – and 
form of expression.  
 
As I have discussed at the end of chapter two, Agamben (1991) has a comparable critique on the 
history of philosophy in which silence is appreciated more than speech or voice. It is even suggested 
that it is the true form of speech or Voice. Nevertheless, the expression of the excluded subject in 
Agamben’s work remains ambiguous and problematic. His Remnants of Auschwitz (1999b) is on the 
one hand a testimony of such expressions and on the other hand exposition of the silence of the limbic 
lives as the true witnesses of the camps. It is in the expressive non-language of the dehumanized body 
that the reality of witnessing emerges. The pseudo-witnesses, those who did not become 
‘Muselmänner’, as been introduced in the fourth chapter, express themselves in shame of this 
incompleteness, in shame of survival. According to Agamben, this shame differs from the juridical 
understanding of guilt, and moves beyond the normative judgment and political speech from which the 
homo sacer was banned.  
 
Whenever the relevance of speech is at stake, matters become political by 
definition, for speech is what makes man a political being (Arendt, 1958, p. 3). 
 
How do we define politics in relation to matter of expression? As we have seen in Arendt’s analysis 
on the level of form of expression this relation is immediate: Political action and speech appear 
simultaneously. Action speaks in order to articulate itself. Speech is materialized in the production of 
artistic, philosophical and scientific works – such as books, theatre, films, articles and dissertations – 
in order to cherish the memory of its birth, its natality. Yet, each time speech runs the risk of 
becoming silent and action runs the risk of becoming weak in its ability to actualize itself, the 
potentiality to establish relations in the political arena is diminished and forgotten. 
  
Without speech to materialize and memorialize, however tentatively, the ‘new 
things’ that appear and shine forth, ‘there is no remembrance;’ … And without 
power, the space of appearance brought forth through action and speech in public 
will fade away as rapidly as the living deed and the living word (p. 204). 
 
According to Arendt, the recollection of a human action is dependent upon its communication in the 
public space. The materialization of this memory even provides man with immortality (pp. 95-96). The 
struggle for communication within community is in the end immanently political according to Arendt 
(1958). At the same time, Arendt also believes, that some experiences could not be spoken about, like 
the unsaid events that ravage one’s body. She refers to the unspeakable pain and the fleeting nature of 
this experience. Pain, i.e. (bodily) trauma, is wordless and hence without memory. And since Arendt 
cannot think of politics without the revelation of speech, she concludes that these are the most private 
experiences (p. 51). 
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What is then, from this perspective, the meaning of political enunciation as a matter of expression in 
the public arena that, due to the violence that is inherent in regimes of signs, does not coincide with 
forms of expression? In Arendt’s argument in which a voice becomes a private matter, we recognize 
Rancière’s (2004) previous critique. Rancière pleads exactly for a political thinking in which these 
voices of pain do not disappear in the abyss of a private life. Agamben’s (1999b) Remnants of 
Auschwitz is an attempt to listen to testimonies of witnesses, witnessing something that is impossible 
to witness. He argues that it is an attempt to create an ethical territory for future cartographers (p. 13). 
Auschwitz must not remain an enigma. By remaining a mystery, it denies us the ability to reflect upon 
our own time wherein the remnants of this horror are still effective. This is not an instrumental 
argument, but a comprehension that implements the potentiality of incomprehension and as such 
triggers resistance and another image of thought (as we have seen in 2.2). Agamben focuses on the 
experiences of the Jews, as the victims of the nation-state that enforces its own purity on them. He 
plows through the impossibilities of testimonies that must be uttered, memories that must not be 
forgotten, unraveling the contradictory structure of the testimonies in connection with the experience 
of a truth and the impossibility of the implementation of this truth in the simplicity of truthness of the 
either/or mentality of the totalitarian state of mind. For the survivors, these experiences are the truest 
things that exist, the truest parts of their life, i.e. unforgettable experiences. However, because of the 
unimaginable character of these experiences, it becomes impossible to understand the immensity of 
this reality. Thus, the experience is as unforgettable as it is inexpressible within representable 
frameworks of memory. It is matter of expression that has no form. As such it is schizophrenic 
memory: a memory that resists an unambiguous manifestation within regimes of expression of 
segments yet without being able to deny itself. These experiences exceed factual and fascicular 
elements of political thinking. The impossibility of speech and silence occur at the same time, causing 
an aporia: 
 
The aporia of Auschwitz is, indeed, the very aporia of historical knowledge: a non-
coincidence between facts and truth, between verification and comprehension (p. 
12). 
 
The reality of the experiences in camps does only defy segmented thinking within human history; but 
in its connectivity, it transforms life itself. The obscurity of the camp is not the obscurity of plain 
death. It is the inability to distinguish between death and life, between despair and survival. This 
indistinguishability is always present in the testimony.   
 
One of the reasons that can drive a prisoner to survive is the idea of becoming a 
witness … survival can be a matter of convenience (p. 15). 
 
It is difficult to comprehend the concept of convenience here. Is it the witness’ urge to reveal the 
experience? Agamben states that some want to survive no matter the cost, just to be able to bear 
witness, or for the sake of a future retribution. Nonetheless, the cost is endured in order to speak, no 
matter what you do. Agamben is aware of this unbearable dilemma and states: “To justify one’s 
311 
 
survival is not easy – least of all in the camp. Then there are some survivors who prefer to be silent” 
(p. 15). 
 This silence could be the outcome of various forms of experiences, whether that of being in a 
camp or the life after the survival. Primo Levi is Agamben’s witness par excellence. Levi is a witness 
who writes without calling himself a writer, finding peace in being able to witness. But most of all he 
is ashamed of his own survival. He is aware of the dilemma between the betrayal of the unspeakable 
and the obligation to write. Levi is a witness but not in a juridical sense. He is not an uninvolved third 
party who can describe the facts, nurturing the illusion of being neutral, nor is he the sole victim who 
can witness for a specific crime completely. He is the victim witnessing, aware of the fact that the 
victims and executioners are undistinguishable in their being human, both shameful: yet in a different 
sense, one for taking life and the other for surviving while so many others have not. Ghorashi (2003) 
speaks of a survivor’s guilt by not being a ‘real’ martyr. She cites Minoo: “I could not bear to be alive 
when so many people dear to me were dead” (p. 107). This ambiguity of not being victim enough is 
thus blocking the neutrality of judgment, yet demands a judgment. Agamben (1999b) states: 
 
A non-juridical element of truth exists such that the quaestio facti can never be 
reduced to the quaestio iuris. This is precisely what concerns the survivor: 
everything that places a human action beyond the law, radically withdrawing it 
from the Trial (pp. 17). 
 
The survivor thus, although knowing that his or her experience exceeds the limits of a form of 
expression, feels the duty to produce a matter of expression in affecting its audience. The witness is 
the one that schizophrenically remembers. The witness of Auschwitz is in this sense not the one who 
knows the truth and has endured all the horror as limbic body, but rather the one who remembers, or in 
my opinion the container of memory, without referring to a cause or making sense of it. “The 
survivor’s vocation is to remember; he cannot not remember” (p. 26). 
 Remembering is, in this sense, neither an act through which we understand the matter as in a 
full report in which every detail is spelled out. Every testimony as a matter of expression carries in its 
enunciation the inability to speak, the unwitnessability of the matter within forms of expression and 
regimes of signs. Time and again Agamben (1999b) argues that every testimony carries within itself 
the unsayable, as to the experience that cannot be named. This unsayable, however, must not be 
confused with a divine silence in which the sacredness of an experience is beyond the human tongue. 
It is rather human, all too human. The survivors, although gaining some healing through the act of 
remembering and putting these memories into speech, always already realize that they lack something: 
the experience of being ultimate victims, the complete witness. For Agamben this aporetical figure is 
the ‘Muselmann’ in these camps, the absolute limbic life without a story, the one without senses, 
without thought. The survivor is only a pseudo-witness telling the incomplete story of the complete 
witness. 
 It is within this distinction between pseudo-witness and the complete witness that Agamben’s 
analyzes for me become problematic. Remnants of Auschwitz is an ode to the demand of witnessing 
for the sake of the unsayable. It is an incomplete testimony for the sake of the limbic lives whose 
complete story will forever remain unsaid. The survivor – who presents itself as one of the tragic 
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figures within politics of flight – schizophrenically sense this shame of incompleteness and the duty to 
enunciate this incompleteness. Does such a division not lead to a segmented normation through which 
the distinction in-between pseudo- and complete witness can emerge?  
 
However, at the end of the book, Agamben cites pages from individuals stating that they have been 
‘Muselmänner’ without mentioning whether these are complete witnesses or still pseudo-witnesses 
(pp. 166-171). Problematic is that somehow Agamben indirectly claims an essence, that presupposes 
the possibility of complete witnessing and remembering, but unfortunately is always lost in death. 
Why must death carry it all and does this completeness in death not brings us back to the problem of 
sigetics (as I have shown in 2.3.2) that Agamben (1991) himself has criticized? No subject in its 
singularity can define the whole of an event. It is within this expectation that speech becomes lacking, 
broken and incomplete. Within this line of argumentation two segments of belonging appear: the 
survivor as an incomplete being and the dead as its complete supplement. Both are reduced to 
inexpressivity, in which the expression of the first is measured by the absence of the last. However, in 
order to move beyond this segetic impasse, I rather argue that the event is uttered differently in all the 
subjects involved. Thus, I do agree with Agamben that the survivors can never fully witness for the 
ones who have passed, yet the dead cannot testify of the event of survival. In death, there is no 
mentioning of a life in the pain of survival that Levi endured his whole life after the Second World 
War. In this sense Agamben (1999b) is trapped in his own critique on philosophical historical 
discourse in which silence as a void in Voice claims all speech, which was made explicit by Rancière 
(2004). Death becomes the true witness and thus eventually the true homo sacer. Agamben (1999b) 
would even go so far as to suggest: 
 
The human being is the inhuman; the one whose humanity is completely destroyed 
is the one who is truly human (p. 133). 
 
What happens when we reverse the story by surpassing the opposition between completeness and 
incompleteness in stating that a story becomes incomplete, only from the perspective of segmented 
regimes of signs that neglect the singularity of an individual biography. In a rhizomatic sense every 
testimony, although unable to refer to an essence that bears witness to fullness, is in its singularity – 
despite the fact that it does not represent a whole with its urge to differenciate, integrate, and solve a 
so-called inability – complete and more so connective (Deleuze, 1997, p. 211). Agamben (1999b) 
seems to sense this implicit claim when he remarks: “the remnants of Auschwitz – the witnesses – are 
neither the dead nor the survivors, neither the drowned nor the saved. They are what remains between 
them” (p. 164). Each word, according to Agamben, bears witness. A word is always a testimony of 
something that cannot be named. It refers to a sound, pronounced in solitude, yet connected to the 
cacophonic silence of sounds.  
 
How does all this elucidate the positioning of migrants and refugees in a multicultural society that 
forces them to assimilate? How do we surpass the segments of then and there versus here and now. 
Reading Levi’s words or listening to Nina Simone’s songs I experience a sense of belonging, 
belonging to those who do not belong. Yet, from the perspective of politics of segments I do not share 
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their history of being a victim of anti-Semitism or enslavement. Seen from a rhizomatic relationality 
singular stories touch one and each other, through my grandfather’s elaboration on the horrors of the 
Second World War, my father’s narration of the lives of the enslaved people, and even more so 
through the terror of war, flight and exclusion. Despite these stories I was born and live in a world 
with expressions of here’s and there’s. I live in a world of east versus the west; Islam versus others; 
cold and hot war. I was born in a city that for centuries has been a home for many religions – Muslims, 
Christians, Jews and others – and yet I grew up in countries – east and west – that believe that these 
segments can never connect. Political slogans merely result in childish accusations such as ‘they did 
it’ or ‘they started it’. Within the perspective of a rhizomatical ethics – which I will explore in the next 
chapter – we must conclude that we are all involved in lines of exclusion or what Saskia Sassen (2014) 
calls a politics of expulsion. Sassen shows that this does not only consider the horrors of gas chambers 
and slavery in the past. Enslavement and exploitation are still a reality of our lives today: The 
evacuation of refugees from Calais or the transportation of refugees from one border to another 
happened then and still happens now. What insists is a politics of shame32  that touches upon every 
subject on different strata within a politics of flight, often sensed by those, such as Levi, who are least 
to blame. And it is through a historical and territorial connectivity in difference that one senses a sense 
of solidarity: 
 
Solidarity does not assume that our struggles are the same struggles, or that our 
pain is the same pain, or that our hope is the hope for the same future. Solidarity 
involves commitment, and work, as well as the recognition that even if we do not 
have the same feelings, or the same lives, or the same bodies, we do live on 
common ground (Ahmed, 2014, p. 189). 
 
Thus, the claimed a-significance of a testimony veils the problematic tendency of absolute universal 
truth of politics of exile as well as the incomplete truths of politics of segments. The a-significance of 
a testimony most of all refers to singularity of a truth that connects itself to a world in endless 
manners, beyond the homogeneity of totalitarianism and isolated segmentation of multiculturalism. 
 
Only if language is not always already communication, only if language bears 
witness to something to which it is impossible to bear witness, can a speaking 
being experience something like a necessity to speak (Agamben, 1999b, p. 65). 
 
Primo Levi’s voice and Nina Simon’s song do neither leave us with the comfort of clarity nor the ease 
of indifference. They ask us to listen to the chaotic cacophony of heterotopias. Yet, the connectivity of 
heterotopias disappears in a segmentalized analyses and approach. By this I do not mean that we can 
                                                     
32 Here I refer to a different kind of shame than Sara Ahmed’s (2014). In her evaluation of politics of shame, a form of 
national shame becomes a tool that reconciles a nation; shame becomes an instrument to strengthen a community’s 
homogeneity. Here shame gives rise to a form of pride, to approach an ideal of nationhood. It is not a fundamental critique to 
a nation, but a nation in suspense of realizing its ideal self. What I intend to visualize is rather a shame that deterritorialize a 
community, leave its subjects to a loneliness due to political injustice that is done to them. 
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reduce different forms of suffering to one another. My attempt is not for the sake of reduction but 
rather an ode to connection. In a sense, in line with Deleuze’s (1997) idea of virtuality that I have 
explored in the first chapter, I rather suggest that every life-story is in itself complete and at the same 
time endlessly connective to other stories. Politics of segments however presumes that connectivity 
and completeness cannot coexist together. A connection between the limbic lives during the Second 
World War and the contemporary refugee is by no means disrespectful of the suffering of men and 
women in Nazi-Camps. Agamben’s attempt to connect different lines of history in his other works is 
not an anti-Semitic act but quite to the contrary. By linking the Jewish refugees and camp inhabitants 
to all other forms of refugees, discriminated minorities and exiled stateless people, Agamben as well 
as Arendt make a connection in order to oppose prejudicial tendencies against the Jewish community.  
Let me clarify this with an example. In the documentary Blood in the Face (Bohlen, Rafferty, 
& Ridgeway, 1991) a group of Nazi sympathizers argue that supposedly non-white races do not 
become red in their face, mostly due to their skin color. According to this line of reasoning non-white 
people do not feel shame and hence are not human beings; or if they are, they are inferior to the white 
race. However, they do distinguish between two different groups. The first group includes the Asians, 
Latinos, African- Americans, etc. This group is dangerous because they multiply themselves too fast, 
and will become the majority in the United States. The second group according to these neo-Nazis is 
the Jews. They are in control of the government and banks. While all groups are discriminated against 
distastefully, the Jews are special due to the prejudice of being in control of the finance and the 
government. All other groups are apparently not smart enough to do so. While ordinarily there is little 
interest in this kind of absurd logic, the problem of the distinct segments persists in the logic of those 
who fight against such racism. In the next scenes one of the main leaders of this group is captured. The 
TV presenter however does not claim that a racist is captured who is violent against the Chinese, Jews, 
African-Americans, Mexicans, etc. Instead she states that he is an anti-Semite and anti-government 
KKK member, thus seamlessly follows the segmentalized logic of the racist. The proposition that the 
Jewish peoples are dangerous by controlling the government and the banks, blocks their shared 
interest with all other groups in their fight against racism. In other words, this puts them into a pseudo-
adversarial role with regard to other groups with the same interest. Once more politics of exile finds its 
ally for exclusion through politics of segments.  
 
Completeness and connectivity within heterotopias whether then and there, or here and now, is always 
connectivity in difference. Different affects connect and differentiate different experiences and 
expressions. There is difference between the experience of those who remain behind in a setting of 
war and terror; those who flee and lose their lives; those who get stuck in no-man’s-lands of refugee 
camps; those who pass the borders and become illegal; or those who survive the journey and become 
legal citizens. If we want to segmentalize; we must realize that this process is endless. Each segment 
has its own expression; and each segment differentiates itself endlessly from within. There is 
difference between being a single young man in a refugee camp and a married man with a child. There 
is a difference between an elderly woman and a boy. There is a difference in-between those who can 
speak English and those who don’t. Even within the rightless setting of a refugee camp; there are those 
who can express this rightlessness within the order of regimes of signs and those who cannot. The 
horror of such camp defines itself in the permanent inability of each member to give full report of the 
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reality of a life in a camp. Yet, the incomprehensively of the matter must not lead to passive 
endurance; but to comprehension of another kind. That only through connectivity in-between the 
segments we could create a new form of politics in order to survive the horrors of the camps.  
 
Politics of segments does not only create an idea of disconnective segments; but by neglecting 
connectivity and completeness in difference it also creates an idea of a process with a beginning and 
an end through identifiable stories. In case of refugees a line that begins with those who remained 
behind and those who became legal citizens: the ‘true’ victims and the ‘true’ survivors. Yet as we have 
seen in Primo Levi’s case survival is not without cost. The sense beneath the experiences of surviving 
Auschwitz – and for that matter: of any survival – lies, according to Agamben, not in taking the blame, 
or confessing one’s guilt. What lies beneath the unbearable experience of camps and its survival is 
another affect, another matter of expression: the ungraspable utterance of shame, no matter how 
innocent you are. Guilt refers to debt, something that can overcome itself by claiming responsibility 
and thereby entering the domain of the law. Agamben (1999b) therefore argues that the use of the term 
guilt must not be confused with the religious use of it. He gives an example of this paradoxical 
illusion: “Eichmann feels himself guilty before God, not the law” (p. 23). Yet according to Agamben 
neither juridical responsibility nor guilt belongs to the domain of ethics, by defining ethics as the 
doctrine of the happy life, as Spinoza did (p. 24). This is essential for Agamben’s treatise of the 
coming community and his conception of happiness as a political notion, which I will elaborate on in 
section 6.5. 
 
The matter of expression of survival rather maps out an ethical field as a zone of indistinction in which 
it is impossible to draw a clear line of moral argumentation to pinpoint the exact strata through which 
shame, guilt and responsibility are measured.  
 
What lies before us now is a being beyond acceptance and refusal, beyond the 
eternal past and the eternal present … Beyond good and evil lies not the innocence 
of becoming but, rather, a shame that is not only without guilt but even without 
time (Agamben, 1999b, pp. 102-103). 
 
Is the intensity of shame without juridical guilt? In the case of refugees, in words of Schinkel (2008), 
the diagrammatical tendency of law is always implemented. There is a difference between guilt of 
doing something and tragic guilt of being something: an illegal. Yet, let us for the sake of analysis 
start with an analysis of shame. The survivor’s shame is a complex intimacy. Agamben describes how 
a man who is about to be shot by a SS-officer turns red, ashamed to be chosen. However, this is not in 
any case an acknowledgment of one’s inferiority, it is rather the unbearable undesired intimacy 
between the executioner and the victim. Agamben (1999b) claims that the victim experiences the SS-
officer’s shame, because the officer is incapable of feeling it. In the case of the survivor, we could say 
he or she is ashamed to live on instead of someone else. How unjust and undeserved this shame may 
be, because every life belongs to its own. Beyond the duality of just and unjust, shame sensitizes the 
impossibility to distance oneself from the death that one has survived; it intertwines the segment of the 
living and segment of the dead in multipolar ways. Shamed is the one that survives its victims, their 
316 
 
memories and their speech. Shame is penetrated by the unsayable. So, in survival, in their very attempt 
to save themselves, the subjects are always a desubjectified subject. They will never become a whole 
again and will never be at ease with the identification of whatever segment. No segment, complete or 
pseudo, based on sexuality, ethnicity or religion, can create a form of expression that relates to this 
matter of expression.   
 
In shame, the subject thus has no other content than its own desubjectification; it 
becomes witness to its own disorder, its own oblivion as a subject. This double 
movement, which is both subjectification and desubjectification, is shame (p. 106). 
 
Shame subjectifies and desubjectifies. So Agamben’s analysis of shame does not thematize a total loss 
of the subject, but the tension or, as he puts it, a concomitance between possession and loss of the 
subject due to the loss of consistency. The subject is unable to express itself either within a totalitarian 
or a segmented regime of expression. The witness cannot detach himself from the faceless other, the 
limbic life without speech. To regain a face, the witness must confront this facelessness, which is not 
beyond the subject as an outside that can be observed and objectified. The faceless is immanent to the 
witness. It is the immanence as the excess of not-being Dasein. Testimonies of survivors, whether of 
camps, wars and refuge – are articulated within this tension between the event of biological existence 
(content) and the event of enunciation (expression), between zoē and bios. The singularity of matter of 
expression is not merely of someone, but someone’s survival of itself, of its own bare life, homo sacer. 
It is the facelessness of an inhuman existence that mirrors in the face of the hero who survived. The 
tragedy is that the survivor’s survival of the inhumanity implies in the destruction of its own humanity.  
 
The paradox here is that if the only one bearing witness to the human is the one 
whose humanity has been wholly destroyed, this means that the identity between 
human and inhuman is never perfect and that it is not truly possible to destroy the 
human, that something always remains. The witness is this remnant (Agamben, 
1999b, pp. 133-134). 
 
The destruction leaves something behind, not as an object or essence, but rather as a rupture reminding 
us of our being as an affective nowhere between living being and speaking being, between humanity 
and inhumanity, in the non-place of the logos and an everlasting life. 
 
The human beings exist in the human being’s non-place, in the missing articulation 
between the living being and logos (p. 134). 
 
And yet it is within this inhumanity that one must approach the state of the witness from another 
perspective. Just as Agamben, Dirk De Schutter (2005) suggests that witnessing is not about 
transferring information. It is not about transparency; or a clear translation from one segment into the 
other. Witnessing such ruptures is not about knowledge in the classical sense of the word. Witnessing 
expresses a new birth, even a third birth according to De Schutter.  
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To re-begin is not the repetition of what once occurred, but to resume that which 
remained incomplete in that which has happened, to resume that which has not 
happened in the past and has remained something to come. To re-begin is to 
believe in the promise that the new always includes, and always has have included 
(pp. 24, Translation TR). 
 
Although Agamben’s analysis is very radical, it nevertheless is applicable to current situations of other 
kinds of limbic lives that have always been a common factor in wars: victims of rape. In Homo Sacer, 
Agamben (1998) distinguishes between the rape victims in the Nazi camps, in former Yugoslavia, and 
other forms of rape. According to him this indicates the transformation of the nomos of birth. While 
the first believed in purity of the German blood, and thus were forbidden to impregnate their victims, 
this impregnating became the ultimate weapon against Bosnian women (p. 176). I now can thematize 
the affective state in which raped women live as their basic matter of expression within politics of 
flight. In enduring its effects, they do not care why they are raped. In order to acknowledge their 
suffering, one must surpass the boundaries of the segment of the raped women. The discourse on war 
and rape in its consequence for women has hardly changed from one discourse into another. It is 
within a systematic instrumentalization of rape and in the experience of these women that guilt and 
responsibility become indistinguishable on both a moral and a juridical level. In another way than the 
women in Germany who were raped by Russian soldiers and the Jewish women who were despite the 
prohibition raped in the camps, the gang raped women in Sudan, Rwanda, Congo and Bosnia, the 
children that are sexually exploited in refugee camps, and illegal women who are exploited in sinister 
prostitution houses in Europe, do not only sense shame, but also experience a sense of guilt because 
they are considered to be responsible for jeopardizing the honor of their families, countries and sexes. 
In their so-called survival, these individuals are often banned from their homes as self-inflicted and 
therefore responsible victims of war and terror. In some cases, even their juridical plea for justice 
became fatal for them instead of their offenders (Mees, & Van Zeijl, 2008). An illegal woman who is 
forced into prostitution cannot claim justice without the risk of being deported.  
 In contrast to Agamben’s analysis, Bülent Diken and Casrsten Bagge Laustsen (2005) 
comment on the relation between the affects of guilt and shame, in relation to the act of rape in the 
time of war. While the ones who commit the act of rape are bound by a brotherhood of guilt, the one 
who has been raped is ashamed of a passive sin. This shame is not caused by lack of guilt, but arises 
rather the very moment in which it is impossible to distinguish between guilt and innocence. It creates 
through the juridical segments of legality and illegality a new faceless subject with an unidentifiable 
narrative. Every individual who has been raped asks oneself, unjustly, whether (s)he could have done 
or not have done something to avoid the rape. While the rapist moves on in dependency on the group, 
the rape victim stays behind in utter loneliness: “There can be a brotherhood in guilt, but never a 
sisterhood in shame”. Diken and Laustsen argue that the offender is not merely guilty, but is also 
affected by shame. 
 
What, within a closed community of soldiers, is understood as guilt (as a 
transgression which proves one’s manhood and loyalty), is transformed into shame 
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as soon as the soldier leaves this community – which is why he does not and why 
the officers force soldiers to break taboos (p. 124).  
 
However, this shame is never an argument to deny one’s responsibility. And as for the survivors, they 
are haunted by a sense of unimaginable shame for their so-called luck to survive the horrors they 
endured. They too are affectively stuck between survivors’ shame and their exaltation of simple 
survival. Yet, what survives is a body, breathing through the past, experiencing a guilt burdened 
shame. There is no regime of signs that coincides with their matter of expression; nor a segment that 
includes them as part of a community. They are truly homeless multipolar individuals. 
 
5.4.2 Intersectional Gaps  
Rape is a tricky subject. It is not only the horrifying experience that some subjects of politics of flight 
endure; but it is also a horrifying wrongful accusation that excludes other subjects of politics of flight. 
Let us thus begin again, referring to stories that are never told, with the distorted image of migrants 
and refugees that flee wars, while being brandished as rapists and terrorists in their countries of arrival, 
threatening the homes of those that belong. Who was the first rapist and what color did he or she 
have? The rapist is always on the other side; biblically removed from the stories that define 
themselves through purity of one’s segments. Yet let us not be naïve, the purity of our normative 
segments can neither implement the rapist nor the raped.  
 
Let us return to the old book, The Bible, that contains totalitarian and segmented stories; yet in each of 
its stories it defies both totalitarianism and segmentalization. Who was the Biblical Hager? The 
abused young girl, the woman who was betrayed by another woman, Sarah, the forgotten lover of 
Abraham. Hager is the mother of Ismael, and thus the mother of people with the other religion: Islam. 
Hager means the traveller, but she was more than that. Hager was banned. And the moment that her 
banishment was a reality, her story became a mystery. Her story, which virtually affected the reality of 
the world that we live in today, became an enigma for the actual line of historical telling. What Hager 
presents us with is that whenever a singular reality of an individual life cannot be differenciated and 
integrated as functional for a regime of expressions – the moment that Sarah becomes a mother – the 
only solution that rests is banishment. This banishment is thus not merely a physical banishment but 
also an absolute banishment from the order of expression. Still, let us not only mourn Hager. Both 
women – Hager and Sarah – are defined by the order of expression. Their stories are reduced to one 
identity: motherhood. And their motherhood is captured by an everlasting opposition of peoples and 
nations. Motherhood creates an analogy of resemblance until this day.   
 
We have never known those women. We are only acquainted with their representation in a segmented 
identity of womanhood that is reduced to conflicting motherhood: mother of Jewish people and the 
other of Arabic people. Their stories nevertheless are not from the past; nor is the dysfunctional 
manner of their opposing identity. Already in the introduction of Out of Place Edward Said (2000) 
indicates an exposition of the affects of those opposed dualities. For him being out of place is not 
merely a physical matter; but his sense of existence is historically out of place. Describing his multiple 
roots – Beirut, Nazat, Jerusalem, Cairo, Gill (Massachusetts) and more – the Palestinian Said who was 
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born in the arms of a Jewish woman, the man with a Muslim father and a Christian mother accepts not 
merely multiplicity but also his essential historical rootlessness. But Said’s experience of inability to 
voice a sense of home started long before his birth.  
 In case of Said it is not merely an artificial segmented multiplicity in his identity, but also an 
enforced animosity in-between segments. Idea’s, ideologies and life stances historically and 
territorially clash within a form of expression of an individual. We must take care, Said warns us, not 
to contextualize this phenomenon as a problem of the Palestinian people. This clash has spread itself 
around the globe, although it becomes explosively manifest in the Israeli territories. Some Israeli 
youth start to question their state as soldiers and their loyalty to an idea. On the website Breaking the 
Silence (n.d.) numerous testimonies are recorded on the experiences of these soldiers who eventually 
become the next excluded ones themselves. Their thoughts waver traumatically between a sense of 
duty to protect their community and their repulsion of repression of the innocent in the name of this 
protection. In an interview called Shrek Shrek a former soldier states that what in the end shocked him 
the most was what he had in common with the ‘enemy’. While considering ‘them’ merely as enemies 
he was able to distance himself from the Palestinian. But it was humor of the other that showed their 
relationship, which made him aware of his destructive acts towards those who were in a sense 
connected to him. It is within such matter of expression within simple bitter dark jokes – which seems 
merely absurd from the perspective of form of expression of politics of segments – that soldiers shame 
refers to another form of guilt due to their so-called voluntary act.  
 
This also has been the case with American soldiers and European soldiers. They often sense a 
detachment to the ordinary society due to their out-of-the-ordinary experiences. The men who 
operated in the process of exclusion eventually become the new homo sacer themselves. A cacophonic 
silence often seems to be the only remaining expression of homesickness due to a lack of segment that 
can include them. But what is a home? Already in the first chapter I have elaborated on the complexity 
of home, displacement and homesickness. In the previous chapter I have elaborated on the manners in 
which totalitarian regimes of exile create peripheries where the other is permanently forced to 
experience such displacement. How does a politics of segments relate to the idea of a home and to 
affects like displacement and homesickness? As we have seen, it is not only the migrants and refugees 
that sense the duality of opposed identities within their biographies. The clash of civilizations is not 
only destined for those who are banned. The logic of segments also affects those who are positioned to 
enforce such banishment. Soldiers are the witnesses of broken societies, dislocated communities, and 
it is due to these dislocations and their affective confusion that they sense their own detachment, even 
when their home-societies seem to be stable.  
In the documentary Purple Hearts (Van Broekhovens, 2005) Tyson Johnson, whose body is 
literally ripped apart, wants to go back to the army, “I just want to go back to my normal life”, he 
states. It is however not his belief in the war that makes him want to go back. Tyson believes that the 
war was unnecessary and merely led to the death of innocent people. Still, this disbelief did not stop 
him from doing what he was told. The reason why Tyson needs to go back to the war is the 
abnormality of ordinary daily life back home. Emotionally he cannot cope with it; he cannot handle 
his feelings, whether good or bad. He wants to leave his state of insomnia in a world that once was his 
home. Tyson’s mother thus states that boys and girls such as hers were trained to see the other as 
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parasites, as mugged, but when they return home there is no alternative for them than becoming 
parasites, mugged, themselves. There is no life beyond the military for them. Not in a legal sense but 
on a social and political sense they become the stateless.  
 In this documentary, the 21-year-old Sam Ross describes the effect of such a state of war. The 
notion fear is too weak a qualification of what drives him. The complexity is too immense to be 
limited by one word. “You forget everything you ever knew and you can only concentrate on one 
thing, that is either you take care of them or they take care of you.” In such differentiation of segments 
one political problematic citizen is opposed to the other. Ross came back blind, lost one leg, had a 
broken body. Nevertheless, he does not regret his life as a soldier. In the end, it was better than living 
in the deserted mining town where he was born. He replaced one segment of non-belonging for the 
promise of another segment of non-belonging. Ross’s hatred towards Iraqis is immense and not 
surprising. The political discourse gives only one option, given its either/or logic: the other is coming 
to enforce himself into your territorial segment. The other is the cause of your political and 
socioeconomic misfortune. In line with such logic Ross suggests that they should have bombed the 
whole country. Yet there is a flickering moment of clarity of enforced segmentalized thinking when he 
states: “But of course I was an American soldier, that is the way I was taught to feel”. The same 
hatred also devours John Quincy Adams (37), who was injured in his head and finds it hard to speak. 
The Iraqis remain the inhuman, even for some of the excluded people such as John and Sam. Sam 
even calls them “people who accidentally live in Iraq”.  
Only Tyson recognizes aspects of his life in the lives of people in Iraq as having one and the 
same destiny: dying as innocent people. What is so different about Tyson? Perhaps something simple, 
something very old. Something that within Tyson’s life has installed a sense of the complexity of the 
way people are disconnected and the misfortune of being categorized as an objective enemy. Tyson 
belongs to the people of color. He has never been at ease, he has never sensed a sincere belonging to 
any of the acknowledged segments of the United States of America, be it the denomination colonists – 
the White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (W.A.S.P.) of Huntington – the Roman Catholic immigrants from 
Europe that arrived at the end of the 19th century and all the waves of enslaved people, refugees and 
immigrants thereafter. As the offspring of enslaved people Tyson has always been from here and from 
there at the same time. He has never been at Home. He has always been in-between segments or at 
best traversing all sections. His existence has always been an explicit intersectional reality of not 
belonging to a segment.  
There is yet another aspect we should not ignore. Victims of war are often defined as civilians, 
which are immediately opposed to soldiers. Whether voluntary or conscripted service the assumption 
is that soldiers can never become victims of war. The above given examples at least indicate a 
different approach. This voluntary commitment was already criticized by Michael Moore in his 
Fahrenheit 9/11 (2004) in which he shows that the economically disadvantaged part of the society is 
economically pursued and recruited for the war. In other parts of the world the number of child 
soldiers – who are beaten, underfed, humiliated and eventually grow up in order to force other children 
to become soldiers too – testifies to an even higher complexity. Some children are forced to join and 
others do it voluntarily. This voluntary state however is ambiguous. Children choose such a life due to 
a lack of options, whether on political, juridical, cultural, social or economic level. Shervin Nekuee 
(2006) elaborates on such cultural and political lack of possibilities of involvement for the Iranian 
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adolescents during the war between Iran and Iraq. While these adolescents were neglected as subjects, 
in the family as well as in society, the war and religious discourse gave them a political identity. In a 
world where belonging only appears through segments and identifications, the adolescence child – 
with its intense longing for desire – is perhaps the most vulnerable victim of them all.  
 
The critique on politics of segments is as old as politics of segments itself. Even within the 
polytheistic and monotheistic hegemonies critical minds have expressed the explicit connection in-
between humans, and eventually between all living beings. Within the political setting of multicultural 
segments with its racial differenciation Crenshaw (1991) has shown how politics of segments, even in 
its emancipatory expressions, creates overloaded peripheries of life stories that do not belong to a 
defined segment. Crenshaw title Mapping in the Margin shows the rhizomatic connectivity of the 
center and the periphery. Human beings are never rooted within one segment; they are always already 
situated at the margins of segments. This becomes manifest in the lives of certain groups. Crenshaw’s 
example is women of color that endure violence. These women express their belonging in the margins 
of different forms of expression. Crenshaw argues that the voices of these women are never heard by 
white feminist women, with their appreciation of the female segment, nor by emancipated people of 
color, with its segmentalization in ethnicity and physical appearance. These women literally disappear 
in the margins of policies – intersectional peripheries – that are solely focused on an outlined 
segmentary identity.  
 
The problem with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend difference, as 
some critics charge, but rather the opposite – that it frequently conflates or ignores 
intragroup differences (p. 1242).  
 
In other words, identity politics does not only create a permanent clash in-between segments, it also 
fails to understand difference within its own segment. In a feedback loop inter always already appears 
to be intra. As Crenshaw shows difference is everywhere. The problem of homogeneity in form of 
expression is thus not merely a problem of totalitarian axiomatic thinking. Crenshaw states that the 
idea of equality within these segments – whether for all women or for all people of color – does not 
result in equal political and social opportunities for all women and eventually for all people to express 
themselves adequately. It rather creates a transcendental universal idea of the fit between subjectivity 
and segmentary by, for instance, reducing every female story of repression to the same order of 
repression. “We are equal” is translated as “we are eternally described as the same”. Crenshaw shows 
how the illusions of transcendence, universals, eternity and description – criticized by Deleuze and 
Guattari (1994) in What is Philosophy? – create little room for individual stories in which 
intersectional forms of repression – color of skin, sexual preferences, economic opportunities, 
religious affiliation, social status, legal status, education and language barriers – create an immense 
complex context. The women that get stuck in-between become faceless and voiceless. They are not 
denied one form of access, but multiple forms of access in both politics of exile and politics of 
segments. In both forms of politics there is a permanent gap in-between experience and expression. In 
order to explicate this intersectional rhizomatic reality of an individual life Crenshaw (1991) calls for a 
generalized community ethics (p.1257). 
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Crenshaw’s critique is yet even more severe. Just as Arendt (1968), Crenshaw (1991) shows how 
segmented minorities implement an idea of majority within each segment. Thus, segments are not 
merely defined as majoritarian minorities – identifying oneself as a specific minority that is repressed 
by the majority – but these segments also show a majoritarian tendency towards power within the 
minoritarian segments: within feminist movement middle class white women and within anti-racism 
movements male participants. The question of resistance to power within such emancipatory practices 
does not allow a presentation of individuals with all their various cries for justice, but it rather 
becomes a question of who is most representative for a segment. And according to Crenshaw it is 
exactly this one-sided representation that creates a severe exclusion of most participants. In other 
words, in repeating an intersectional gap in its representation it becomes once more a matter of life 
and death, belonging and non-belonging, i.e. of survival on a daily basis. 
 
Thus, the struggle over incorporating these differences is not a petty or superficial 
conflict about who gets to sit at the head of the table. In the context of violence, it 
is sometimes a deadly serious matter of who will survive – and who will not 
(p.1265).  
 
The act of subjectification and desubjectification manifests itself within the order of segments. 
Subjectification eventually is a discursively mediated split in the middle of an on-going process, which 
some thinkers – such as Foucault, Agamben, Arendt, Deleuze and Guattari – prefer to characterize as a 
processual subject or a process of subjectification on multiple strata, as a result of which expression 
and content intertwine continuously on the level of form and matter aiming at a plane of consistency. 
Language gives meaning to our gestures and facial expressions, in short, mediating relations to our 
affecting and affected bodies. Let us thus examine the type of defining an I that is given to us by 
politics of segments. As I have argued in chapter one the subject of flight does not limit itself to 
migrants and refugees. The same applies for each segment of politics of segments that creates a 
discrepancy in-between form and matter within expression. In terms of Crenshaw this politics misses 
an intersectional image of thought. Within the segmented order – with its intersectional gaps – the 
definition of an ‘I’ is always at odd with the expression of an individual as a changing and connective 
storyline. 
The form of expression within a politics of segments is determined by context, culture and 
identity. These mobilize the form of the I’s within a multicultural setting. The matter of multicultural 
expression – the plane of affects – is rather filled with homelessness, a sense of loss, and unclarity. 
This ‘substance’ is characterized by homesickness and displacement. The form is in search of 
consistency and seeks to produce identities as such, while the matter of expression is a yearn for the 
loss of consistency. This re- and deterritorializing urge creates a schizophrenic reality of belonging, in 
which one longs for consistency in order to belong to a segmented community, yet its segmented 
result creates a sense of non-belonging that rhizomatically produces lines of flight.  
 
In artistic practices, such schizophrenic affect is approached in a different way, wrapped in percepts, 
creating sensations. As we have seen in the third chapter, Yousef Doust testifies in her film 
Nahid=Venus of her own sense of non-belonging. The search for the ‘identity’ of her aunt – who is 
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she? – results in her losing her own meaningful identification – who am I? In scientific research the 
experience of migrants and their offspring is frequently and systematically related to schizophrenia. 
Selten, Cantor-Graae and Kahn (2007) affirm the increase of schizophrenia under migrants-groups; yet 
argue that some of the research is based on misdiagnosis due to racial bias. They reason that the 
increase is not caused by biological predispositions but due to social factors and political settings in 
which individuals define themselves. These social factors cannot be reduced to an economic position, 
but refers to self-perception and the social position of migrants in the new world in which they are left 
with two options: assimilate or segregate. Whether it concerns the whole society or a segment within a 
society, the fundament of the two options of assimilation and segregation remains. And exactly this 
form of demands creates a sense of homelessness. In case of Iranian-Dutch women who have intensely 
tried to adjust themselves Ghorashi (2003) states: 
 
Ironically, the result is that these Iranian women who are active participants within 
Dutch society feel an emptiness because they have distanced themselves from their 
own group and are also not feeling as if they belong to Dutch society (p. 230). 
 
The task of a politico-philosophical research is to problematize this unquestioned neutrality of 
belonging through segmented identities within both politics of exile and politics of segments. Still, as 
a politico-philosopher you are never alone in thought. Others, revolutionary scientists and artists that 
defy the temptation of spectacle of exoticism, are the companions that one needs in thought in order to 
break through disconnecting loyalties and schizophrenic damnation that comes afterwards. The 
experiences of schizophrenia of migrants cannot be reduced to a neuro-psychological explanation. 
Schizophrenia rather results from the implementations of political and social paradigms as Deleuze 
and Guattari (1983) already argued in their Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and Schizophrenia. In 
deconstructing the pathological identification of schizophrenia, they propose an affirmative schizo-
analysis. Referring to this de- and reterritorialisation of the schizo, in line with their elaboration, I 
firstly propose that the schizophrenic experience within politics of flight must not be approached as a 
syndrome of disorder. There are no medicines to ease this painful experience of an intersectional gap. 
Secondly, this conflicting experience does not limit itself to disagreement between two or more 
different forms of culture. The schizophrenia is not a banal manifestation of a clash of civilizations as 
a simplistic conflict between binary or segmentalized perceptions on culture. We could even argue that 
ideas such as clash of civilization cause the schizophrenic state instead of explaining it. The sense of 
conflict is not essential to communities, but is born out of moral, political and economic friction that 
forces individuals into a one-sided loyalty toward one segment. Nor is cultural conflict an affect that 
merely appears literally in-between two distinct cultures. As Rancière (2004) suggested politics is 
rather born in this limit-state.  
 
We still need another approach. The antagonism and its tensional force, due to the imposed conflicting 
loyalties and judgments, are the prior catalyst of the act of flight and not something that only realizes 
itself during or after the act of migration. What is called in-between is not a clear space between two 
borders of cultures, but an indiscernible zone. Society is unable to hear the cacophony in this no-
man’s-land of intersecting in-between. Syria and Eritrea are not over there; they are implemented in 
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the here; in the economic, political and environmental setting of the here. It is the misty space in-
between the process of life and the process of thought; in-between ‘I’ on its way to become an other I. 
Or in de terms of expression: the in-between of form and matter of expression.  
 During the flight, the schizophrenic dilemmas reinforce themselves in-between territories, in-
between multiple spaces. Each space contains its own plurality of affects in-between comfort and 
conflict and their contradictory tensions. Although refugees explicitly question some commonalities in 
their mother culture, they remain the products of multiple cultures as well. They carry around these 
commonalities without even noticing it, so to speak. The act of refuge feeds the already installed 
schizophrenia by sensitizing the absurdities of such unconscious self-evidences. The new territory also 
contributes to these multiple, conflicting experiences that result not only from participating in an 
other’s culture, but also becoming an other in every sense of the word.  
 The experience of schizophrenia is sensed in the awareness of deterritorialized territories. 
These territories are, however, more than a reference to an actual space. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) 
redefined territory relationally as “the critical distance between two beings of the same species” (p. 
319). This redefinition emphasizes the tensional aspect of relations. Territory can also be qualified in 
more radiant terms as in Heidegger’s (1996) Umwelt. Each Umwelt is sensed on an affective plane 
through its own form of expression: Stimmung (mood/attunement). A beautiful example is Ahmet 
Kaya’s Dağlarda Ölmek İsterim (I long to die on the mountains). The word for mountains in Turkish 
is dağlar. In this song, this term evokes a double meaning. It sensitizes a sense of home, which is 
personified in the figure of anne (mother). The very same song however also expresses being a gharib, 
a foreigner. Dağlar then expresses a sense of loss of an Umwelt too. This supplements its sense of 
home, melting into another affect: nostalgia as a mood that sensitizes a deterritorialized awareness of 
what has been left behind. Affects such as nostalgia and homesickness thus operate on at least two 
levels. Within a problematic sense of community nostalgia strengthens a sense of loss, pregnant of 
resentment and in a mode of lacking and shortcoming. Nevertheless, it gives the subject a form of 
individuality in order to detach oneself from the homogenous mass called others. Since these affects 
are shared with others, they articulate implicitly another community that is not based on a common 
form of belonging but on an everlasting non-belonging. In this schizophrenic act the subject frees 
itself from the axiomatic paradigm Other and yet attaches itself within a global differenciated 
displacement. 
Again, art sensitizes its readers for this literal double bind. Milan Kundera’s Ignorance (2002) 
sensitizes such imposed lack. When Irene and Josef visit their homeland, the Czech Republic, they 
both sense different forms of shortcoming in connection to others. Irene cannot adjust emotionally, 
mostly due to the fact that her friends seem to ignore her long life in France, while in France her life is 
reduced to the image of how a Frenchman thinks what being a Czech indicates. Irene senses this 
almost physically, imagining that one of her I’s detach her head from her torso, attaching it to her legs, 
while the other ‘I’ stares at her torso blind for other parts of her body. Josef has lost his history due to 
his detachment to the words and handwritings. Reading his writing as a child, he remains a stranger 
to that child all the same. Nevertheless, as Kundera shows, loss is not a product of mere migration – 
an unavoidable outcome of nomadic live – but the product of political and cultural discourse in which 
migration is signified.  
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La piel donde vivo (Valle Robles, 2011) is a yet another tale of such a political and cultural discourse. 
Jeroen Lans is the adopted child of a Dutch couple. He was born in Guatemala and was adopted when 
he was two years old. The boy sensed in the first instance no connection to this assumed homeland. He 
does not sense homelessness. In his puberty, when he is called names and must endure sentences such 
as “go back to your own country” he starts to feel lack. Something suddenly seems to be wrong. The 
boy with a typical Dutch name is forced to respond to the prejudice of others who for no reason accuse 
him of laziness and thievery. It is within this setting that he develops a sense of resentment, “If only 
I’d gone to Guatemala.” Thus, in a sense Jeroen becomes a Guatemalan for the first time. 
Nevertheless, living in Guatemala is not done easily. Jeroen is also a Dutch boy, irritated by the casual 
attitude toward appointment making in Guatemala. In order to feel some familiarity, he introduces his 
old life into his new life, for example, teaching his girlfriend to speak Dutch. He discovers that 
Guatemala has its own forms of harshness – cultural, political and economic. Jeroen learns to 
appreciate his adoptive parents, as guardian angels. Nevertheless, his life in Guatemala distances him 
also from his adoptive family. He must develop new forms to communicate with his parents and 
brother. The sense of homelessness eventually is felt in Guatemala as well.  Or as Theodor Adorno 
once stated: Once you’ve crossed the ocean, you’re always on the wrong side. While Jeroen on the one 
hand states: “I come from Guatemala”, he also believes that he could never become a non-Dutch. Both 
countries define and demolish a sense of home. Eventually home for Jeroen is no longer a nation-state 
but becomes a sense of relaxation. 
 
Although affects such as shame, resentment, and homesickness present themselves as matter of 
expressions, Stimmung in which these affects are articulated, because of the enunciative context 
creates other types of matter of expression. Shame sensed by the inhabitants of camps, or the survivors 
of war, is shame of being alive, shame of survival because others perished. This sense of shame differs 
from the shame of departure; it is a sense of betrayal by leaving behind family and friends. And this 
form of shame in its turn differs from the shame of some European guest laborers living in the ruinous 
pensions and degenerated neighborhoods, being ashamed of lack of achievement in a new country that 
promised prosperity. Homelessness has different modalities too. In case of the Jewish people, and at 
this moment Syrian people, losing their entire families; victims of war who are dispelled of their 
family structures; and migrants that miss their families living far away. In the case of an adopted non-
European child by European adults, it does not only create a displacement in the illusionary there and 
here; but as Van der Tuin et al (2007) argues a reality of long-lasting history of colonialism enforces 
itself in a singular individual story. Jeroen, already in the contrast in-between his name and the color 
of his skin, carries the reality of a complete individual biography with endless different forms of 
connectivity to a history of global politics. Jeroen’s identity is, in terms of Ajit Maan (1999), an 
internarrative identity – or as I rather call it Jeroen is a fine example of an internarrative becoming.  
His life appears in the middle of multiple narratives that connect the world not only territorially but 
also historically. This middle of narratives, as Maan argues, is a middle beyond a starting point, and it 
does not lead to a “resolved ending” (p. 45). Yet, in a world that believes in definable segments of 
identity – without understanding the complexity of the inter within narratives – Jeroen is left to a 
discourse of broken biographies with plural senses of loss, plural senses of nostalgia and finally plural 
sense of otherness.  
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Finally, in this discourse of nostalgia, there is another figure that often has been forgotten in the 
analysis of migration and refuge according to Huijer (2016): those who remain behind. Migration and 
loss of intimacy and certainty does not only effect those who leave or literally travel, but also those 
who see their loved ones leave. The sentiment is paradoxical. They lose the intimacy and closeness, 
they feel a sense of death, but they are not even allowed to mourn this loss. Those who leave, create 
hollowness.  They are absently present within the lives of those who are unfortunate enough to not 
share the adventure of the migrant. Huijer typifies these lives as melancholic lives; they lose their 
sense of freedom, due to the fact that it is more plausible for an individual to choose to leave than for 
an individual to choose to be left behind (pp. 49-69).  
 
Given this plurality of matter and forms of expression – affects and discourses – 21st century mankind 
has to become plural in order to cope with its aporia, contradictions, paradoxes, double binds and 
dilemma's. That multiculturalism is not the final answer that has been argued for. The differencial 
paradigmatic understanding of the other within multiculturalism is still at odd with the concept of 
other as possible world (as we have seen in 3.3.1), which eventually is shared with non-migrants. Both 
the migrant and non-migrant are forced to belong in a sense to the vague community of the other 
segment. As Schinkel (2008) repeatedly argues, any identifiable society or community, is at the end 
not a given but a construction of an order in communication. A segment, an identity, or definable 
community is a product of regimes of expression. The terms wigger or bounty for this ‘hybrid’ 
existence shows the moral of segmentation by literally naming those who pass the borders of segments 
in terms of one and the other. Then again, as we will see, the manner of passing the borders differs 
too. As Pisters (2003) argues, the segmental political struggle “is necessary to create conditions for the 
creation of desire, for actualizations of becomings” (p.114). Becomings are multiple, becoming 
minority is multiple. Some give in to the desire of becoming majority, some to becoming minority. 
Each of these complex expressions is even more so overdetermined by the complexities of a global 
world, be it each time in different ways. There is radiant connection in-between all in this world, the 
research of which, whether done by scientists, artists, or politico-philosophers, demands an integrative 
approach. 
 
Pluralism does not meekly indicate the existence of differences next to each other; 
it rather indicates the enduring of confrontation and dialog in-between differences 
(De Mul, 2017, p. 201, Translation TR).  
 
5.5 Collective Bodies  
 
5.5.1 Adaptation or Consciousness 
Multicultural differenciating paradigms do not only effect expression, but also the matter of content, 
i.e. bodies. An active differenciation is not always for the sake of further segmentation, but also for the 
sake of emancipation. The two emancipatory examples Crenshaw (1991) gives – differenciation due to 
sex and differenciation of people of color – both started in order to put the rights of individuals on the 
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agenda. Yet, the outcome was rather the homogenization of representation of a people. In order to 
focus on the matter of content of emancipation - differenciated bodies – I will start with a semi-
autobiographical text by Arendt (1978a) entitled: ‘We Refugees’ (pp. 55-66). I intend to incorporate 
the fleeing private Arendt into the public thinking Arendt, connecting her private body to a collective 
body.  
 
In this article Arendt speaks of ‘complete assimilation’ and ‘mania’, describing despair and the 
unbearable ruptures in the process of refuge. Having fled to the United States after a short 
imprisonment in a refugee camp in France, she mourns the impossibility to create a community, not 
even as a segment, and hence the impossibility of political (re)presentation and emancipation. In the 
first instance, she discusses the radical distinction between private life and political life as well as the 
difference between body and politics. These distinctions seem to exclude the experience of refugees as 
a political experience. According to Arendt, it is the internalized conflicting feelings – such as shame 
and relief with regard to having survived the Holocaust – that emote the ambivalent attitude of the 
Jewish refugee during the Second World War, especially those who fled to the United States. Arendt 
goes so far as to claim that these individuals refuse to identify themselves as refugees.  
 The text starts with a description of an intense negation through which these refugees trivialize 
their own act of flight. The people, for whom principles such as the Convention of Genève have been 
made in order to protect their lives and status as refugees of wars, paradoxically refused to be 
identified as refugees. Instead, they wanted to be identified as migrants or newcomers. She applies a 
classical distinction between a migrant and a refugee. Migration is not experienced or defined as a 
trauma. Migration is voluntary and due to economic reasons. Refugees are somehow pathetic and 
unfortunate; they flee involuntarily due to political circumstances. In her analysis, the migrant 
becomes a non-political social subject, who merely travels in order to gain a better life. In this line of 
thinking, not only refugees but also migrants become politically passive victims and a simple fortune 
seeker. They too are the ones who are deprived of the ability to form a community because migrants 
travel, be it voluntarily but nevertheless, from one community into the other. 
 In their attempt to become non-traumatized voluntary migrants the Jewish refugees distinguish 
themselves from other types of refugees, who are thought to have fled due to their political actions and 
past. Nevertheless, these ‘migrants’, like the partakers of multicultural society, did not form a new 
segment, but remained disconnected and isolated. Although the German language was commonly 
used, they refused to recognize themselves as a discrete group. Arendt goes along with this negation, 
but for slightly different reasons, namely because of her specific definition of a refugee. According to 
her, refugees do not meet the demands of the convention. The limited definition requires the refugee to 
be a person who has to flee his or her country due to a political past and political activism. Only due to 
such actions in one’s past can a refugee be identified as a political refugee, and not due to his or her 
action during and after the act of flight. According to this, an individual is unable to become political 
in the process of flight. While Arendt acknowledges the fact that these persons are driven from their 
countries because of political reasons, she also points out that this was not caused by a political act on 
their part. Because of Arendt’s belief in politics as inseparable from speech and action, as a result 
refugees as well as migrants become passive, i.e. non-political. They are non-political refugees. 
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In her analysis, there is a fundamental distinction between passivity and activity. Action contains no 
endurance – as in Derrida’s (1982) ‘non-passive endurance’ – nor the complexity of endurance and 
control within an event in which both elements of passivity and activity are political. For this reason, 
Arendt (1978a) argues that the new form of politics of totalitarianism has created a new form of 
refugees. The concept of refugee is transformed due to her redefinition of politics: the politics of 
suppression versus the politics of mercy. 
 
Now ‘refugees’ are those of us who have been so unfortunate as to arrive in a new 
country without means and have to be helped by Refugee Committees (p. 55). 
 
Nevertheless, the refusal to be a refugee hides a tragic truth. These travellers are forced to leave, but 
due to the lack of a previous activity to which to refer, they eventually lack the ability to tell their tale. 
The burden of this passivity is even more intensely felt in the degrading aid of refugee-organizations. 
Being dependent on refugee committees is not seen as an act of resistance, but is the continuation of 
the unbearable shame of a passive flight. This is the reason why migrants in the Arendtian sense, in 
order to avoid this humiliation, often pretend to have left their countries voluntarily in order to not to 
belong to such a degrading segment of identity. This gives them some sense of independence from the 
politics of mercy. They disapprove of a way of life that is forced upon them by such politics. Their 
resistance to and disgust with this form of politics does not stimulate new forms of politics. Neither 
does it produce alternative political argumentation why they left. It favors the negation of politics that 
homogenized them as a group, as an enforced assemblage of bodies, in the country of origin as well as 
the country of arrival.  
Elaborating on Arendt’s line of reasoning, freedom here does not imply political freedom, but 
economic or social freedom and choice of territory. Arendt states that they often denied that their 
Jewish background had caused their problems. This denial covers a will to survive that is in urgent 
need of some sort of voluntary blind optimism in order to move on. Acknowledgement of their initial 
motivation to flee would mean confrontation with uncountable ruptures, disorders, lacks and 
shortcomings. 
 
We lost our home, which means the familiarity of daily life. We lost our 
occupation, which means the confidence that we are of some use in this world. We 
lost our language, which means the naturalness of reaction, the simplicity of 
gestures, the unaffected expression of feelings. We left our relatives in the Polish 
ghettos and our best friends have been killed in concentration camps, and that 
means the rupture of our private lives (pp. 55-56). 
 
Despite their blind optimism; the loss of a home, their pride and moreover the inability to give any 
signification to their experiences brought them the loss of the ability to form a new language and a 
community. They do not even define the segments that they belong to. The choice of territories has not 
brought opportunities to form new communities either, not even in the multicultural setting of the 
United States. The freedom gained by refusing to become a needy refugee did not open possibilities of 
new attachments. In the end, the act of flight is experienced as a permanent loss of homes, a 
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permanent nostalgia, which is accompanied by as Agamben (1999b) suggests: shame to have survived 
instead of others.   
Their private sphere, by Arendt (1958) defined as the sphere of love and inhabited by lovers 
without the political space of in-between33, has been destroyed by the politics of totalitarianism, 
forcing them to leave the loved ones behind, sensing their upcoming death in the gas chambers. This 
reality is logically negated by optimism, i.e. by a determination to survive the pessimism that results 
from acknowledging the bare facts. Arendt (1978a) reports that the refugees were advised to forget. In 
this act of desirable voluntary amnesia, the old memories were driven out in order to adopt the new 
home as no other had done before them. According to Arendt, a new language was created just to deny 
the fact that a new human-being was born, a person who was intersectionally betrayed by friend and 
foe: 
 
Apparently nobody wants to know that contemporary history has created a new 
kind of human beings – the kind that are put in concentration camps by their foes 
and in internment by their friends (p. 56). 
 
This imposed non-communication does not only exist between the refugees and the inhabitants of the 
new country, but this silence also exists among the migrative refugees themselves. Arendt believes 
that this speechlessness concerns more than just the past. Talking of the future is also suppressed in 
this process. While in The Origins of Totalitarianism Arendt (1968) describes the state in which the 
masses of refugees and stateless arise, her short personal note on refugees in the final instance shows 
how she, in the country of arrival, is enclosed in another closed whole without entrances. And years 
later, another refugee, Halleh Ghorashi (2003) writes: 
 
We are people with lost homes and misplaced ideals, people who experienced both 
the nearness of death and the highest moments of joy in life, and people who 
learned to survive (p. 18). 
 
What does this survival in a new society indicate? Does survival ever end? While some define a 
society as segmented, the society itself on a meta-level remains multiple. Yet beyond this distinction 
the newcomer enters mainly a segmented discourse rather than a segmented community. In Arendt’s 
nostalgic writings, produced during the war, mass statelessness and mass migration are not the 
promises of a brave new world. Her article ‘We Refugees’ in a sense, specifically speaks of the 
experience of non-belonging among contemporary migrants despite their immense efforts. An actual 
exemplary case of this tension can be found in the reactions to the candidacy of Nebahat Albayrak for 
the leadership of the Dutch social democratic party PvdA. In the TV show Pauw & Witteman (2012, 
February 27) – discarded by the PVV leader Geert Wilders as left propaganda – the gender and 
Turkish background of Albayrak is at issue. In spite of the fact that Albayrak is a former State 
Secretary and fully participating Dutch citizen, Jeroen Pauw and Paul Witteman focused repeatedly on 
                                                     
33 Love, except love for the world, is by Arendt (1958) even characterized as the “most powerful of all antipolitical human 
forces” (p. 242). 
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the fact that Albayrak is a non-Dutch woman. When Albayrak remains dismissive of the idea, they 
turned to the statistician Maurice de Hond, and when the statistician repeatedly suggests that in the end 
it does not matter whether you are a woman or a man for the final vote, they state that numbers are not 
that important. Then the other segment of her identity – being Turkish – is at issue. The bemused 
Albayrak questions the relevancy of her ethnic background. Pauw’s arguments oscillate between 
sexual appreciation of Turkish women as well as the fact that this will be an issue for the right-wing 
PVV. Albayrak’s question: “but why is this relevant to you?” remains unanswered. In the end, her 
personal life as an extremely active participant within the political discourse and her achievements are 
eclipsed by the obsession of the presenters with her gender and cultural heritage. As for the other 
candidates, gathered round the table, their manhood and whiteness does not seem to influence the 
content of their policy. But in case of Albayrak her femininity and Turkish background seem essential. 
This is merely done under the rhetorical guise of what other parties such as PVV would emphasize, 
but at that very moment the emphasis of Pauw and Witteman themselves is the real problem. Even the 
condescending attempt of Femke Halsema – Chairwomen of Stichting Vluchtelingen (Refugee 
Foundation) and former leader of Dutch Green Party – to express female pride in Albayrak’s 
achievements in spite of her Turkish background confirmed these prejudices. It is also instructive to 
see that the sporadic moment when Albayrak speaks of the content of her policy, Pauw loses all 
interest.  
 
Neither assimilation nor segregation seems to be the answer, despite the illusionary promises of 
politics of exile and politics of segments. And the example of Albayrak is just an example in an old 
process of exclusion and segmentation of identity. Arendt’s comment that no matter how hard the 
Jewish refugees tried to become perfect citizens, and cope with the reality of unreachable assimilation 
which forces exclusion upon them, holds true for the seventy years to come. The refugee and migrant, 
including their offspring, are seen as the unavoidable other and associated with the same kind of 
hostile attitude that has driven them away from the country of origin. Even multicultural societies do 
not have the ability to cope with newcomers and their coming communities. Doubts start to nestle in 
the shared nightmares, when blind optimism is imprudent. In the end, there is something terribly 
discordant with the optimism of the migrative refugees, Arendt (1978a) reckons: 
 
We became witnesses and victims of worse terrors than death – without having 
been able to discover a higher ideal than life (pp. 57-58).  
 
If life is all that there is, if this life is all that one fights and flees for in these mad times, then according 
to Arendt such an individual is far from living in the fullest sense of the word. Becoming merely life 
means becoming inert, i.e. becoming a limbic life without the ability to be reborn (natality). In an even 
more radical turn she states that refugees hoped that their beloved ones did not survive so that they did 
not have to experience this pure nakedness of life. She even envies the dead for their premature 
salvation. Being dead is better than mere survival and suicide is the last that remains for human 
dignity and freedom. Suicide, not as rebellion or a political act, but as a performance just to reject the 
helping hand in a politics of mercy. Suicide made refugees become an individual again and not merely 
a schnorrer, a beggar. It is an autonomous, but paradoxical gesture in order to become active subjects 
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as the only option against the passivity of a needy individual or worse of a mere life. And if the 
drifters have no desire to die, then they create a nice little fairy-tale containing the last remains of a 
truth: once upon a time these people were somebody, persons who were wanted and needed by others. 
Yet Arendt sorrowfully states that we are in a world, a "mad world” in which “it is much easier to be 
accepted as a ‘great man’ than as a human being" (p. 61). Despite the myth that surrounds their lives, 
refugees develop a hyper-awareness: they do not want to act suspiciously. They justify their arrival 
time and again, and at the same time they adapt exceptionally. They try to impress, so that they do 
matter. The question is whether I am guilty of charge. Do I in my hyper-awareness wear a mask in 
order to adjust to a society in order to hopefully break through the parameters of thought? Perhaps a 
dissertation is nothing more than that for me.   
 
Arendt argues that in their attempt to adjust fully, the newcomers wear a mask that conceals the facts 
of their lives. They were exiled before but not anymore. The migrative refugees play the role that has 
been assigned to them, so that they become more French than the Frenchmen and more English than 
the Englishmen. It is not authenticity that matters, but rather the tracing of traits that gain them access 
to the society. Not originality or plural relationality but copying is the trade of the networks. As they 
voluntarily yield loyalty, they have become the first prisonniers volontaires, captured bodies by the 
French because they were Germans and not freed because they were Jews. These voluntary prisoners 
have changed their identity so often that nobody, not even themselves, know who they are anymore. It 
is an escape from the tragic Jewish existence from which they have been expelled. They are stateless, 
but simultaneously refuse to qualify themselves as such. Arendt (1978a) states: 
 
A man who wants to lose his self discovers, indeed, the possibilities of human 
existence, which are infinite, as infinite as is creation. But the recovering of a new 
personality is as difficult – and as hopeless – as a new creation of the world (p. 63). 
 
The problem of identity arises due to the fact that in the act of assimilation one is forced to become 
someone else, and Arendt states that it is impossible to become someone else. I, however, would argue 
that it is not about becoming someone else. The demand of assimilation shows its absurdity by forcing 
a person who is in constant motion, a person who is the subject of permanent change, to become 
segmented and identified as someone. In other words, it is not impossible to become someone else, it 
is impossible to become a segmented someone else. It is the differenciated force of identity that creates 
the pathological state of multipolar individuals. In terms of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) becoming a 
specific body on the level of forms of content merely connects to one type of assemblages of bodies. 
Assimilation blocks the change in any subject, inhabitant and other, and forces them to be some one, 
namely an identifiable existence that fits the image of a segment of society. And exactly here lies the 
impossibility, not of change but in fixation. The subject, in infinite awareness of its otherness, is 
demanded to become a part of a motionless culture of the majority, i.e. to connect to a majoritarian 
minority, a non-existing culture with the illusion of evident characteristics, ignoring the intersectional 
gap as well as the intra-sectional differences that makes Coates (2015) remind his son and us of the 
complexity of an individual life: 
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Perhaps being named ‘black’ had nothing to do with any of this; perhaps being 
named ‘black’ was just someone’s name for being at the bottom, a human turned to 
object, object turned to pariah (p. 55). 
 
It is this becoming pariah – not only within a society but also within the segments within society – that 
defines the existence of refugees, according to Arendt (1978a). On the one hand a politics of segments 
– whether to society or a segment of society – does not recognize the past of the newcomers with their 
vivid experiences, while on the other hand it refuses to recognize common ground in difference 
between the newcomers and the inhabitants. It ignores the complexity of contextuality as well as the 
flexibility of cultures, expressions and finally bodies, reducing everything to one and the same order.  
 
Assimilation did not mean the necessary adjustment to the country where we 
happened to be born and to the people whose language we happened to speak. We 
adjust in principle to everything and everybody (p. 63). 
 
This politics of segments is in denial of the mobility of the experiences of one individual but also 
refuses to acknowledge the turbulence, and pioneering act of its ‘own’ culture. There is no way to 
determine with certainty to whom or to what the newcomers must adjust. Thus, although the form of 
content imagines differenciating territories, nevertheless the matter of content as connective bodies are 
left in twilight state of being. In Agamben‘s (2000) words we could state that just as a politics of exile, 
a politics of segments creates a form of life that does not coincide with life, a life that is not merely 
zoē, but changeable and connective: i.e. alive. Hence politics of segments lacks the ability to become a 
form-of-life, connecting life to its form.  
 
Nonetheless, despite this lack of connection between form and matter, these refugees still wish to 
comply with the demands of loyalty. Arendt (1978a) calls them the most patriotic people in the world. 
They live in times in which they repeatedly, in order to prove their devotion, must reject their 
Jewishness and as well as be aware that they will always be addressed as exceptional Jews. And at the 
same time, they suspect that the more loyal they become and the more they try to assimilate, the more 
they arouse disbelief in the majoritarian population. This is a perfect paranoiac mania, in which each 
form of identity has been undermined by conflicting loyalties. Arendt argues that this loyalty is neither 
eternal nor due to conviction, but sheer opportunistic, born out of necessity not out of freedom. 
Loyalty is not a voluntary act of recognition and familiarity in thought but an act that is urgent in order 
to avoid deportation or isolation. The patriotic refugees adapt physically and mentally as long as they 
believe in the illusion of security in a given area. Arendt compares this kind of loyalty with a precious 
piece of clothing that has been worn for a long time but at a certain moment for obvious reasons is 
thrown away. Safety is the contradictory engine of the defensive attitude of the inhabitants as well as 
the engine of the act of refuge; although safety for the one means something different than for the 
other. When these refugees are forced to relocate themselves, they reveal themselves as loyal citizen to 
another place that gives them the opportunity to continue the ungrounded illusion of safety, the 
opportunity to not be the other, in their case, to be a Jew.  
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If we should start telling the truth that we are nothing but Jews, it would mean that 
we expose ourselves to the fate of human beings who, unprotected by any specific 
law or political convention, are nothing but human beings. I can hardly imagine an 
attitude more dangerous, since we actually live in a world in which human beings 
as such have ceased to exist for quite a while; since society has discovered 
discrimination as the great social weapon by which one may kill men without any 
bloodshed; since passports or birth certificates, and sometimes even income tax 
receipts, are no longer formal papers but matters of social distinction (p. 65).34 
 
From this perspective, involuntary assimilation over and over again is the better alternative. 35 
Assimilation thus contains a paradoxical sense of liberation, liberation of life from the state of 
exception. Nevertheless, through Arendt’s writing the figure of migrative refugees starts to shift. 
While in the first instance it referred to displaced persons who are in search of a new and permanent 
home elsewhere, now it refers to ones who are in constant motion due to obsessive and permanent 
social exclusion. They are the ones who are permanently drifting. Flight is in this perspective – in 
Arendt's terms – “not a political act but merely an instinctive reaction of blind optimism opposing the 
discourse of the killing without any bloodshed” (p. 65). It is a form of being, which is negative by 
nature, a passive physicality. However, if a refugee is seen in another perspective and gets associated 
with a moving flow rather than a forced being, we could wonder at what moment a refugee becomes a 
refugee. Is it before, during or after the flight, or does the act of refuge contain the whole process? Did 
Arendt become a stranger before her escape from Germany, in-between in France or at her arrival in 
the United States? Or is it a consciousness in the making? Is refuge thought in process and its 
articulated subjectivity a conscious pariah? Arendt’s life testifies to an attempt of a refugee to define 
her minor state, between in what she calls political action and what is understood as the passive 
endurance of social exclusion. An exclusion that ironically neither for Arendt nor for Ghorashi was 
something of the past, of the other country with its evil government, but the reality of the present: 
 
My nostalgia did not have much to do with the lost past, but with feelings of loss in 
the present (Ghorashi 2003, p. 5). 
 
                                                     
34 When in December 2010 Robert M., a Dutch man, was arrested and accused of sexual abuse of more than 50 children in a 
day care, the whole system of day cares became an issue. The role of men in day cares became problematic and highly 
prejudicial. The migrants, however, despite the odds, were even now not free of prejudice. In February 2012 the Minister of 
Social Affairs and Employment Henk Kamp, in connection to abuse cases, states that there must be more than one supervisor 
but also that the knowledge of Dutch language of the supervisors must be evaluated and improved by new policy. See: RTL 
News, 2012, March 2, 19:30. 
35 See on this subject the documentary on women from Thailand and their husbands from Friesland, living in the north of The 
Netherlands. Segmentation is sometimes even visible on their dinner tables, one half Thai food and the other half Dutch food. 
Some of the women are in love with their husbands and are as happy as any other couple. Others are there due to the fact that 
life in Thailand is much more unbearable than living in The Netherlands where they cannot adjust. Nevertheless, whether 
conscious or not they have changed the landscape of Friesland forever. See: Thaise vrouwen in Friesland (2012).  
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Yet again, the question remains whether action and endurance are opposites, even from an Arendtian 
perspective. If action is characterized as spontaneous, unpredictable and anonymous, action cannot 
only appear before the flight; it cannot exclude the whole process of flight. In the end of ‘We 
Refugees’ it is within the intensity between endurance and control that different forms of minorities 
are distinguished. According to Arendt (1978a) there are three types of attitude towards the repressing 
majority and by implication we could discern three types of assemblages of bodies in contrast to the 
majority. First, she speaks of a pariah, according to her a social figure referring to a person who keeps 
its identity as an excluded minority. The pariah is the most passive form of majoritarian minority. It 
never resists its exclusion or its identification by the axiomatic paradigm of majority and suffers 
silently, as an isolated majoritarian minority and through a sense of differenciating brotherhood in 
exclusion. Pariah’s thus appear at the margins of politics of exile; but also at the margins of segments 
of politics of segments. The second social figure is in some sense the opposite of the pariah. A 
parvenu is a person who adapts fully to the dominant order in order to defend its own interests. In this 
process parvenu is determined to lose its heritage and identity in order to become one of the we, one 
with the majority. Arendt, however, points out that these adapters, no matter how hard they try, will 
remain associated with the ones they are trying to forget. They will become the exceptional minorities 
or the ones we like. Nebahat Albayrak’s policy towards migration did radicalize the exclusion of 
refugees and illegals. Afshin Ellian and Ayaan Hirsi Ali adopted the fear of the Christian society for 
the Islamic world. In her plea Hirsi Ali (2012), while appearing to reject all forms of religion, 
completes her adjustment to the majority by contrasting one religion to the detriment of the other. It is 
an either-or way of thinking in which the western enlightenment becomes the only form of opposition 
against religious repression. No matter how hard she tries to ignore the past, all her thoughts are 
justified by herself, her sympathizers and her opponents, by her identity with her past as a Somalian 
woman who has been victimized and circumcised. In case of Ellian it is his experiences in Iran that 
apparently makes it justifiable for him to make comments on Islam in general and globally.  
 In the footsteps of Bernard Lazare, however, Arendt (1978a) introduces a third figure, not a 
social but a political figure: conscious pariah. This is the tradition of those who have not denied their 
past, people like Franz Kafka and eventually Rahel Varnhagen; and I rather add Mandela, Manila and 
Patrisse Cullors and many others. They have enthusiastically chosen to become other forms of pariahs. 
Arendt describes them as those with humanity, humor and disinterested intelligence (p. 65). They are 
those who refuse to sacrifice their attitude and their common human sense. In this figure Arendt’s 
view on comprehension and consciousness is sensitized. While the history of the modern nation-state 
did not distinguish between its victims and has forced itself upon the pariah as well as the parvenus, 
only the conscious pariah is the one who dares to face the reality of their shared misfortune. Here a 
different understanding of refugees has been introduced, namely the political option that was missing 
at the beginning of Arendt’s lecture. She speaks of the refugees who, for telling the truth, took the risk 
of being rude or indecent; they took the risk of becoming excluded (p. 66). They are the critical minds 
for whom criticizing the majoritarian minorities does not immediately indicate an adjustment to the 
majority. These critical minds are opposed to all forms of segments and all forms of exclusion. Arendt 
qualified Karl Jaspers, the German non-Jewish professor as such a mind. Agamben is for me the 
conscious pariah who distances himself from majority. This exclusion was intensely felt by Arendt 
herself due to her analysis and critique during the Eichmann trial (Arendt, 1965). The most 
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controversial aspect of her analysis of this process – but also in her other works – is that she refused to 
put the blame on one single community, namely the German. The crime and the criminal are but one 
aspect, the societal structure is another. It was evil indeed, but not exceptional. It was eventually 
ordinary, banal. The Eichmanns are no devils with horns, who can easily be identified. She points to 
the everyday ordinariness: Eichmann was also an ordinary man, a bookkeeper, who had a regular job. 
In being ‘normal’ he achieved the ultimate evil. Evil is banal.  
 And with her analysis Arendt, the conscious pariah, called animosity upon herself from the 
international community. Conscious refugees like her sacrificed their popularity at a price. Due to their 
conscious acts of rebellion history for them is not an inaccessible past; the conscious pariahs do not 
suffer from voluntary amnesia. Moreover, politics is not merely a privilege of those who oppress 
minorities. Conscious pariahs are the political figures of a political historical sense of flight in which 
Europe, by killing its own minorities, leads to its own demise. 
   
They know that the outlawing of the Jewish people in Europe has been followed 
closely by the outlawing of most European nations. Refugees driven from country 
to country represent the vanguard of their peoples – if they keep their identity. For 
the first time Jewish history is not separate but tied up with that of all other nations. 
The comity of European peoples went to pieces when, and because, it allowed its 
weakest member to be excluded and persecuted (Arendt, 1978a, p. 66). 
 
And exactly these lines show that Arendt’s perception differs from her refugee companions. In the act 
of consciousness, the act of resistance, she reintroduces the potentiality of flight within the experience 
of refuge and beyond the differenciating and disconnecting segments. In words of Pisters (2005), 
pariahatic consciousness is not a simple no, nor an uncritical yes, but rather a political act through 
molecular negotiations in order to create different networks in-between forms of lives, as well as in-
between form of life and life itself.  Becoming a conscious pariah is not something of the past, as a 
reason for flight, but rather an act for all times. In the permanent becoming of a refugee the self-aware 
pariah emerges. However, Arendt also emphasizes that critically reflecting on the act of flight is not 
only a task of inhabitants, but also a task of the refugee. Every man and woman must become 
conscious of its potentiality as a pariah and hence as a political subject, operating as multiple within 
the diversity of political connections responsibility. Arendt is in every sense my hero, despite our 
differences and fundamental disagreements.  
 
5.5.2 Resisting Bodies and Segmentary Emancipation 
Politics of segments, as the term already suggests, is not merely a milieu of shame, nostalgia and 
endurance. Nor is it a denial of exclusion. It has its own mechanisms of resistance and segmentation. It 
deterritorializes and reterritorializes bodies rhizomatically through its discourse. Multiculturalism is, 
however, not only a multiplicity of segments, but also multiplicity of forms of segmentation, indicating 
that segmentation is more than merely a nationalistic-cultural phenomenon, but that other groups such 
as women, laborers and even families segment themselves due to their specific understanding of 
political, social, economic and cultural structures. Different people are attached to one another, due to 
the recognition of their identities or recognition of their fate. Individuals segment due to a familiar trait 
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or a common interest with others as nowadays happens in virtual communities. A sense of belonging 
manifests itself in this multiplicity of segments. Forms of segmentation also differ due to their 
reference to different types of axiomatic as well as differenciating identities of we-ness and them-ness; 
and due to their different types of resistance. Segmentation occurs in order to resist exclusion, creating 
isolation and new forms of exclusion, based on axiomatic as well as differencial paradigms such as 
nationality, sexuality, political orientation, cultural and religious distinctions.  
 
The image of different forms of exclusion, even of those who once belonged to the community, is 
poignantly expressed in Neske Beks’ personal documentary Eigen Volk (Own People) (2010). Beks is 
a woman who as an infant was abandoned by her Gambian father and white Belgian mother, and she 
was raised by her maternal aunt Anny. As a child Beks does not feel black. She associates black with 
others, the French Africans who she calls wie-wiekes, and English Africans who she calls the baai-
baaikes. Eventually she notices that her appearance is comparable to those wie-wiekes and baai-
baaikes. This awareness causes an identity crisis. It strengthens due to the sympathy of those who are 
closed to her for the racist party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest). These family members, including 
her own mother, hate migrants’ children who are born in Belgium. A mother with multiracial children 
states: they must go back, while at the same time arguing that they themselves could not be racists 
because of their own children. And Beks states: where should I go back to … I have never doubted 
Belgium. Her image of the past is reshaped. Although the exclusion according to them does not fit her 
personally, Beks feels the exclusion on a personal and interpersonal level. She is involved – she is one 
of them – and nevertheless excluded. It is in such settings that individuals like Beks become 
multipolar individuals; oscillating on the margins of differenciating identity segments.   
 
Multiculturalism does not only multiply totalitarian identity into multiple differenciating identities, 
with the same intensity it also multiplies the unitary exclusion of totalitarianism into multiple forms of 
exclusions. Koole (2006) suggests that populism creates an image of politics that could be 
characterized as caricaturing (p. 13). Eventually, multiculturalism can lead to multiple types of 
populism each with its own tendency not only to transform the image of politics into a caricature, but 
also the image of their own differenciating identity and that of others. Measured against this 
simplification the magnificent achievement of Beks (2010) is that she does not caricaturize the images. 
In her documentary, even those who gave in to populist ideas remain complex subjects with plural 
narratives. This complex and layered image is needed by Beks in order to move on with her life, she 
states; a life that was stagnated by the judgments and the axiomatic and differencial paradigm of I 
versus other. 
 Beks shows that the distinction between confirming an imposed identity and resisting an 
imposed identity is not easy to make. This is clearly sensitized in the case of language courses for 
‘allochtonous’ women. These initiatives oscillate between on the one hand empowerment of the 
women, who are often isolated from the society, and on the other hand the stigmatization of these 
women as illiterate ‘allochtonous’ women. More often is the epithet ‘illiterate’ accompanied by the 
image of repressed Islamic women. The naming of one of those initiatives is extremely illustrative: 
Duizend en één kracht (Thousand and one power). This name, by its reference to the eastern tales of 
One thousand and One Nights, pretends to refer to the rich past from which these women originate, 
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affirming the Orientalism that Said (1978) criticized. Within this name lies the imposed stigma of their 
non-western, enigmatic, sexualized past. The name strengthens their isolation due to the lack of a 
Dutch term, which could include these women as full members of the society. The complexity of 
multicultural society also arises in the battlefield between different forms of exclusion in which 
different types of segmentation demand their space and insist that they could not exist in the presence 
of the other forms of segments. As a result, multiple differenciating paradigms of freedom become 
conflicting.  
Crenshaw (1991) introduced the idea of intersectionality to analyze these conflicts from an 
unconventional angle. While two groups fight for their freedom, each group is incapable of seeing 1) 
how some people's interests inter-sect and 2) how some become the forgotten subjects of both 
emancipatory movements. Crenshaw raises our awareness of how freedom is ambiguously gained. As 
Arendt (1968) already suggested, the minoritarian majorities do not see that the essence of their 
minority lies in the process of exclusion as such due to the desire to become majority. Are minorities 
capable of understanding how different types of exclusion nonetheless are connected? Although our 
exclusions differ, they are yet not opposed. How, in the light of this analysis, should one respond to 
comments in which homosexuals, women, religious and ethnic minorities are rejected and excluded by 
other minorities? Are the slogans of the latter justified by freedom of expression, or do these resemble 
the big mouth of the biggest brat in school, who bullies all the others? Does not freedom instead ask 
for the enhancement of spontaneous interest, a kind of interculturalism? 
 
Is emancipatory segmentation that resists exclusion possible? Arendt often fears segmentation due to 
the paradigm of identity, using the examples such as laborers, women, and racial segmentation like 
Black Power. Yet, she did believe that when a Jew is identified, persecuted, and condemned to death 
as a Jew, one must defend oneself as a Jew. For all clarity, Arendt does not refer to a religious sense of 
Judaism, but to the political implication of the identification as a Jew. From Arendt’s perspective, it is 
not a mystery why women, laborers and Black Americans did not gain the same political privilege. 
They are always identified by their bodily traits: sexuality, physical labor and the color of their skin. 
As we have seen, she excluded bodies from political affairs. In Arendt’s view totalitarianism forces 
itself upon bodies. While for Arendt bodies remain anti-political matters, in the course of totalitarian 
politics bodies and life – eugenics and a pure racial identity – are the political instruments par 
excellence.  
 Agamben, however, contradicts this form of thinking. In his analysis, a Foucaultian 
biopolitical trait of politics is neither merely a contemporary phenomenon, nor an invention of 
totalitarian regimes. Body was a political agent from the start, whether as an instrument of inclusion or 
of exclusion. This being the case for people who were enslaved, women, laborers, or Arabs, Jews, 
Muslims, Native Americans, Romani people and many more. The totalitarian argument to erase the 
Jewish people from the face of the earth was not based on the common interest of these people, nor 
their common political thought. Jewish people are culturally and politically as diverse as any other 
group. This reality is even neglected in contemporary times by those who oppose them as well as 
those who claim to defend them. The horrors of totalitarianism operated through the assumption of a 
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common raciality. It was an assumed bodily trait that defined them as objective enemies, which 
eventually also applied for Romani People, homosexuals, and the mentally disabled.36 Along these 
lines we could argue that the emancipatory segmentation based on such bodily traits in the 
multicultural discourse resists repression and exclusion of these bodies in the totalitarianism discourse. 
In the end, using Arendt’s own words, we could conclude that when people are politically condemned 
as Black-Americans, women or LGBTQQ, they are mutually politically forced to defend themselves 
as Black-Americans, women and LGBTQQ. They have no other option than to appear as such in a 
political discourse. 
 Heroes are those who dare to step forward, Arendt (1958) states. They are not necessarily 
extraordinary, courageous or strong men or women, but their mere appearance in the public space is 
sufficient to approach them as heroes. In this appearance, they are detached from their what-ness. 
They appear as a who in-between other heroes. In this open space, they express their ever-changing 
narrativity in the unfolding story of human interaction. The act of emancipation is in this sense an 
attempt by those men and women – who were condemned to the what-ness of passive political objects 
– to gain subjectivity or to enter a process of subjectification by the exposition of their multipolar 
individuality in the political space. They explicitly exhibit the ways in which their so-called private 
lives or bodily traits were condemned by an excluding political discourse. Some even paid with their 
lives to gain this act of natality.  
 
Identity segments in one form or another, whether for the sake of the liberation of a subject or in order 
to caricatures and exclude, cuts through the body without organs as the ‘primary’ matter of content. 
This splitting takes place on different planes, creating segmentarized individuals. Body without organs 
is not something merely in-between bodies, visible and distinguishable in-betweens positioned 
between two identities. It is this in-betweenness that also penetrates each individual as Beks’ 
documentary bears witness of. It embeds individuality and connects individuals. Thus, in the process 
of splitting – either/or – a subject is forced to accentuate aspects of itself and bind these into a 
consistent identity, while rejecting all other aspects, nuances and fluctuations. Even apparent 
intercultural films such as Alejandro González Iñárritu’s Babel (2006) still fits this logic of identity. 
While figures are introduced in connection to one another, within a global rhizomatic connectivity of 
cultures, they are nevertheless profiled and identified as Mexicans with typical Mexican problems 
such as the illegal Mexican living in the United States, Moroccans with Moroccan characteristics, and 
white Americans with typical cultural traits. Even a Japanese woman stereotyped in relation to her 
father, enters the stage. In this exposition of multiple and complex relations it is rather the distance 
than the interconnectivity that is emphasized: the multicultural is not yet an intercultural.  
 
Multicultural discourse in the end creates images as mimicking bodies. These bodies become profiling 
tools. In their collaborative work, Exactitudes, photographer Ari Versluis and profiler Ellie 
Uyttenbroek (2007) visualize these caricaturized images, which not only expose the appearance of the 
photographed subjects, but more than this accentuate the similarities in their postures. Identity in the 
                                                     
36 Our political discussions about health insurance with the tendency to exclude people with pre-existing illness or smoking 
habits accentuates the role of the body in politics in contemporary times.  
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process of emancipation in a multicultural setting is a process, in which an image has to become 
universal and transcendental in order to trace the multiple similarities of its subjects. The paradigm of 
identity presumes something that is not there – a universal category – that is not even virtual, in order 
to actualize a general discourse on its subjects. The emancipation of the victims of totalitarian regimes 
in some cases needs the imperative of identity in order to resist. In generalizing it will never capture 
the contingency of the subjects and processes of subjectification. The forms of assemblage of bodies 
in a multicultural society is in this sense disconnected from the ungraspable body without organs in 
which human narratives, as Maan (1999) elaborates, cannot be isolated to one form of segment. 
Segmentation creates forms of life that are eventually not in accordance with the fluctuation of life. 
The group formation accentuates the identity in order to dismantle and to reject the totalitarian 
identification and inferiorization of people. In opposing its fragmented collective survival against the 
big segment of totalitarianism, it however implicitly repeats the latter’s very dynamics. Politics of 
segments fails if in this process of complex transformation itself becomes a permanent and isolated 
engine of segmentation, not allowing a body without organs to manifest itself in the very process as a 
political transformative force. Let us thus once more ask a question: 
 
 
What is a politics of a body without organs? 
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Chapter 6: Politics of Life 
On Minorities’ Connections and Ethics  
 
Maybe being powerful means to be fragile.  
(Ai Weiwei) 
 
Out beyond ideas of wrongdoing and rightdoing, 
there is a field. I will meet you there  
(Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī) 
 
6.1 Returning to the Hyphen  
 
This study is an attempt to sensitize multiple hyphens such as the lines that connect life-expression-
politics and politico-philosophy. In short, the hyphen in-between politics and philosophy is used to 
start a critical practice and approach toward the political and philosophical analysis of contemporary 
communities and ideas on communities. This research is thus – although inspired by the state of 
refugees – as has been argued in the introduction, not about refugees. Refugees do not need a politico-
philosopher to analyze the complexity and cruelty of the context that they are living in. This research 
is nonetheless not in order to ignore their voices; it rather intends to accentuate their voice by 
reversing the question. Instead of asking “What is the state of refugees?”, inspired by Agamben I 
rather ask: “What does refugees’ state of being say about the manner in which we think about 
community?” How do these individuals, just as any fundamentally excluded individual within a 
society, confront us with the manner in which we think about societies and conception of political 
identities with their including and excluding effects?   
 
Is politics doomed to create an either/or construction of inclusion and exclusion? I have analyzed 
totalitarianism through a double bind dynamic of international nationalism and inclusive exclusion 
within the contemporary global context. Such a contemporary glocal mindset is a new form of 
persuasion of an old colonial mentality of the so-called civilized west versus the barbaric other. The 
glocal communities are in the spell of an overdetermining affect: fear. Left, right or otherwise we are 
in a state of fear: fear for the Other by the rightwing parties on the one hand and fear for the effects of 
the first fear by their critics on the other hand. Due to the persistence of this dialectics of fear the 
elections in United States are by the media typified as a new era: the era of angry white male. The 
Trump administration presents a politics that has done with the diversity of a country; let alone the 
diversity of a world. Trump’s triumph is celebrated around the world by those who share his sense for 
violence and exclusion. Still, the question is not whether this era is the era of the angry white male; but 
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whether it is a new phenomenon. I rather argue that the victory of such reactive forms of politics 
presents the end of an era rather than a beginning of a new politics. I dare not to speculate on how 
catastrophic this ending will be. Yet, already consumed by fear like others, I wish it to be otherwise.  
 
Angry white man is a segment within the society, a segment that in its vocabulary disconnects itself 
from other segments. Yet, these segments are not silent. Trumps election gave rise to multiple forms 
of resistance from these segments: women, LGBTQQ community and people of color. Each defending 
their rights for existence and equality within community. Such forms of resistance are linked to the 
notion of multiculturalism. Yet as we have seen in the previous chapter, although multiculturalism 
deterritorializes totalitarianism to a certain extent, this deterritorialization is rather relative instead of 
absolute. In chapter five I typified this form of politics as politics of segments. Multiculturalism does 
not fundamentally break through the fundaments of totalitarian thinking of politics of exile. Due to, for 
example, its hold on clarity of context, culture and identity, it has the tendency to segmentalize a 
society in a mosaical way, in words of Helder De Schutter (2005), by disconnecting the members of 
one segment form the other. Furthermore, the double bind of totalitarianism is also noticeable within 
politics of segments. Although it pleads for multiplicity, it also implements general parameters – such 
as a common language and common norms – to hold a society together. Thus, this type of politics 
does not only create disconnective segments due to its differencial paradigms, but within each segment 
and within the society as a whole it holds on to some axiomatic paradigms of politics of exile. Identity 
is perhaps the strongest form of paradigm that functions differencially and axiomatically in both forms 
of politics.  
 
In this chapter I rather argue that we are in need of but also witnesses of another form of politics: A 
politics that affirms the complexity and incomprehensibility of connections rather than segmentalize in 
order to gain clarity. This critical approach through the above-mentioned deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization of the question concerning refugees affects the linkage in-between life-politics-
expression. Ideas on community with their political implications implement different types of 
relationality in-between life and expression. The quadrant content/expression and matter/form that has 
been introduced in the second chapter and implemented in the analysis of politics of exile and politics 
of segments, creates a tool to sensitize the fundamental assumptions of these types of politics. Both 
types of politics, as we have seen in chapter four and five, although each through its own paradigms, 
create a community in which the connectivity in-between matter and form is lost. Due to the clarity of 
their defined identities, both types of politics dehyphenize matter and form in expression and in 
content; as well as in-between content and expression. 
 
The quadrant matter/form and content/expression – introduced by Deleuze and Guattari (1987) – has 
not been the only primary tool to accentuate the hyphen in-between life-expression-politics. The idea 
of the hyphen is already introduced by Agamben’s (2000) terminology: form-of-life. Through this 
hyphenation Agamben pleads for a type of politics that implements life in a different manner within its 
form. In contrast to Arendt – who intends to distinguish life from politics – Agamben sincerely 
believes that the condition of homo sacer is not the only option of politics to connect form of life to life 
itself. Life is an expressive event, and each expression is essentially alive. The question is what kind 
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of politics creates a context for a potentiality of this linkage in-between life-expression. Let us finally 
nuance our hyphens and say: 
 
Life-expression → politics = politics of life 
 
Before I unfold a politics of life I once more have to remind my readers of the specific politico-
philosophical perspective that motivated my research. Although I refer to concrete policies and well-
known media events, my approach is not meant to be scientific – the functions of psychology, 
sociology, political science – but philosophical in the afore mentioned way. It is a research that is 
fueled by questioning the questions – by sensitizing the parameters of thought in political contexts and 
philosophical thinking. This research is an attempt to create a different image of thought through 
which terminologies such as belonging and inclusion become transformative. This chapter is an 
introduction to such transformation in the image of thought. It is an introduction not in search of truth, 
but for the sake of initiation of a different approach. Nonetheless, each thought is in need of 
companions in thought, the critical minds that are everywhere. It needs revolutionary scientists that 
criticize the parameters of science and artists that do not give in to the temptation of romantic 
nationalism or segmentalizing exoticism.  
 
This study, with its introduction of tools of thought in order to analyze a politics of flight, was not 
merely meant to set out the tendencies of politics of exile and politics of segments. The analyses are 
meant to move forward to a politics that approaches life in an affirmative manner. This politics 
however does not strive to acknowledge diversity. Both politics of exile and politics of segments, by 
respectively annihilating and tolerating it, acknowledge diversity in their own manner. Their policies 
do not plead for the diversity of voices within cacophonies. Yet, as Rancière (2004) beseeches, these 
voices cannot be shut down. The voices are always there, be it in the margins of politics. And although 
the spectacle presents them solely as the voice of the brute other such as Islamic State or weak passive 
other who are the victims of Islamic State, I rather prefer not to conceive this state as the presentation 
of a new voice. With its use of western weaponry and rhetoric it still stands for the era of us versus 
them. Islamic State is our product in all sense. The voices of and in the margins are rather the voices of 
what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2005) calls the ‘sub-altern’, i.e. women, men and children who are 
not heard and have no voice and as such have no political existence (p. 429). Their lives are of no 
interest. The voices of the margins are the voices of those who suffocated in the camps or lost their 
breaths on sea. The voices of the margins resound when individuals such as Patrisse Cullors – in their 
plea for black lives to matter – do not segmentalize but rather argue for another form of collectivity. 
Cullors’ sense of connecting the dots rhizomatically brings a hyphen in-between the voices in order to 
resist The Voice in another sense. Cullors does not represent a movement, she does not wish to take 
the seat of in the strongholds of the majority. She rather presents another kind of minority. A coming 
minority presenting a coming community to bring about “a new depth, a new breath” (Peled, 2016). 
 
The political space of this kind of minority is by long not an imaginary or utopic one. It has already 
been occupied by activists, journalist, doctors, artists, thinkers and hackers; all presenting worlds of 
differences. And yes, some of them are even white, male and heterosexual. The catastrophy of their 
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shared world is not due to a skin color, a sex, or a sexual preference; but due to a displaced sense of 
supremacy. Supremacy through which some lives seem to matter more than others. What I wish for is 
thus not a dream. It is rather a politics that affirms the ontological reality of bodies without organs at 
the center of its thinking; a politics that introduces paradigms that do not reduce individual lives and 
political subjects to a stifling identity and hence determines their destruction or non-connectivity. The 
politics that I plead for affirms a relationality of life in its ‘eventuality' beyond individualism. This 
politics does not oppose individuality to the collective, neither the particular to the general. In order to 
give in to the impotentiality of life its plea for singularity moves beyond axiomatic and differenciating 
paradigms.  
 
For in the end, the difference is not at all between the social and the individual (or 
inter-individual), but between the molar realm of representations, individual or 
collective, and the molecular realm of beliefs and desires in which the distinction 
between the social and the individual loses all meaning since flows are neither 
attributable to individuals nor overcodable by collective signifiers (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1987, p. 219).  
 
‘The molecular realm of beliefs and desires’ that defines the relationality of an individual is never 
undividable. An individual is from a schizoanalytical perspective always already a dividu as Deleuze 
and Guattari, in line with Nietzsche, state (p. 341). As has been argued in the first part, the immanency 
of difference and relationality within an individual is not the result of something that a person chooses 
to engage with. The immanency inherently constitutes the existence of an individual. The hyphen in-
between difference-relationality1 is both political and ontological. It is this immanent relationality with 
otherness that cuts permanently through every individual that makes it impossible to reduce any in-
dividual to the order of a totalitarian regime or a segment in a community.  
 
Art practices sensitize this irreducibility. It is this endless act of cutting through – of in-cisions as de-
cisions – in the work of Malaysian theatre director Krishen Jit Amar Singh that fascinates Charlene 
Rajendran (2012). Kirshen combines different types of theatre in order to present the complexity of a 
multiplicity of cultures and religions within Malaysian society. Krishen’s work is contemporary 
through and through; yet within this setting the historical social and political context is always present. 
She argues that Kirshen focuses on an in-betweenness that is omnipotent and the core of the self-
proclaimed multicultural society of Malaysia: 
 
As part of an avant-garde, contemporary and experimental theatre movement, that 
began in Malaysia in the 1970s and responded to socio-political processes of 
nationalism and postcolonial reinvention, Krishen’s theatre played with 
contradictory elements, thus resisting singular, unitary interpretations of culture (p. 
2). 
 
                                                     
1 See also Rahimy, 2011. 
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With this in mind, Rajendran even politicizes the name of the theatre maker by intentionally calling 
him by his first name Krishen. By this she takes apart two assumptions. First, Amar Singh is not a last-
name as is understood by Western standards, but rather the first name of his father. Second, by use of 
his first name she defies this patriarchal construct. It becomes a name without a history and a 
fatherland. Rajendaran de-identifies Krishen by dismantling the presumptions about his identity as a 
clear cultural whole. It is the same disconnection that is articulated in Krishen’s work, in which the 
multiplicity of multiculturalism is sensitized in one body and not merely between multiple bodies. 
Krishen transforms multicultural entities and traits even within a singular body. These entities are not 
individuals but rather dividuals. Krishen visualizes how these entities appear as well as disappear; and 
in this sense instead of giving in to a permanent form he, according to Rajendaran, experiments with 
transformability. Or in terms of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) with body without organs, a non-
organizational entity as a matter of expression that by incisions and decisions, i.e. ethically and 
politically, composes consistency and continuity on the level of form of expression. A trait such as 
being-Chinese is presented as being-English and a woman can easily become a man, Rajendran (2012) 
argues. Although Rajendran, in line with Krishen, indicates this process as an immanent form of 
multiculturalism, I prefer to label it as interculturalism, i.e. cultivating an in-betweennes.2 As Ghorashi 
(2003) states: 
 
Debates on multiculturalism should not only focus on encouraging ethnic 
differences – separate ethnicities lined up next to each other – but on the room of 
multiple identification, or interculturalism (p. 232).  
 
While multiculturalism in its endless differentiation restricts itself to the idea of closed identifiable 
wholes and suggests some form of measurability, interculturalism is demonstrated by plurality of 
relations rather than multiplicity of wholes or relata. This complexity of relationality excludes the idea 
of clear measurability, fundament or identification. As Oosterling (2000a) suggest: 
 
An intercultural ‘experience’ is not an experience that surpasses cultures, but one 
that dissolves their metaphysical foundations and installs its ‘sense’ within 
local/global tension … a continuous coming and going. ‘Intercultural’ seems 
therefore intrinsically connected with the experience of differences (pp. 81-82). 
 
Interculturalism is about relations between cultures within and outside a body. It does not deal with 
opposed identities within a hegemonic culture. Any body is a positive schizo. It is time to see 
multipolar figures not as pathological or social problems – as Schinkel (2008) argues – but as 
productive members of a society and critical minds that justly deconstruct the fundaments of the idea 
of a society as a consistent and logical whole. Within the schizo-analysis, proposed by Deleuze and 
                                                     
2 I do not define intercuturalism here as a plea for liberal idealism, in which individualism and democracy defined by 
Western standards determine how pluralism must function as such. To force ideas such as liberty and democracy, despite 
their open settings, is a camouflaged form of totalitarianism. Interculturalism here is rather used literally, meaning 
inter(between)-cultures.  
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Guattari (1983), double binds become productive paradigms once the basic concept of identity is no 
longer the ultimate criterion. Inserting this idea of interculturality within my approach of a politics of 
flight a third form of community unfolds: a politics of life. This chapter is primarily focused on an 
ontology of relationality, on a being (esse) of in-betweenness (inter), that was labelled by Arendt as 
inter-est. While in the fourth chapter I discuss politics of exile and in the fifth politics of segments, this 
final chapter unfolds in a speculative way a politics of life. This politics differs from the Foucaultian 
biopolitics due to the fact that it does not intend to manage life, but rather gives in to the experience of 
life in its processuality, in its becoming of subjectivity or ‘agencement’. While within a politics of 
exile and segments life operates as merely genitivus objectivus of politics, within a politics of life as 
the impotentiality of a politics of flight, the preposition of is a double binding articulation of the 
relationality in-between politics and life. In a politics of life, life is both genitivus objectivus and 
genitivus subjectivus. Life is not only an object of politics, it manifests a politics of its own. A politics 
of life is a politics that affirms relationality of difference within an ontology of inter. Yet, this inter 
does not limit itself to inter-culturalism. Holding on to the argument of Schinkel (2008), it is time to 
surpass the emphasis on culture as overall defining paradigm. This chapter rather explores the endless 
impotentiality of multiplicity of inter: inter-beings as inter-actions of inter-places, inter-speech, inter-
textuality, inter-contextuality, inter-experiences, inter-thoughts, inter-spacers and inter-times, inter-
sexes. Simply inspired by Deleuze’s (2011) emphasis on a life, we are and have always been in a state 
of inter-life.   
 
Let us thus start a first attempt in unfolding a politics of life while remembering that the process of 
unfolding such politics is an endless process. In 6.2 I will elaborate on the form of content of this 
politics of life, exploring one of Agamben’s (1993b) impotential paradigm called coming community. 
It will be argued that this impotential paradigms, as any other impotential paradigms, does not long to 
end its process, it is not a theological road to an end by longing to actualize its potentiality. 
Impotential paradigms remain faithful to their virtual state in their implementation. As we will see, 
politics of life, just as the other two forms of politics of flight – politics of exile and politics of 
segment – has its own lines of segments and lines of flight. Within the complex and layered milieu of 
flight – just as politics of exile and politics of segments – this politics generates segments and has 
paradigmatic aspects. Nevertheless, these differ due to their explicit exposition of in-betweenness as 
well as their transformability. However, the transformability on this plane is not an undesired by-
product, but rather a desire in its own. A politics of life explores its paradigmatic impotentiality and 
asks for an ethics that moves beyond the excluding and segmentalizing morality of the first two 
politics. An ethics of politics of life gives in to another form of expression. This will be discussed in 
6.3, where I will elaborate on the traits of minoritarian minority. In 6.4 I will discuss the matter of 
expression of this coming community, in which – in contrast to politics of segments – the loss of 
home, or a sense of home does not indicate a lack. Minoritarian artistic expressions bear witness to 
this. In the final part – 6.5 – finally I will attempt to give a voice to life as the matter of content. In its 
communicability life is no longer disconnected from its form of content. In spite of this apparently 
rigorous application of a Deleuze/Guattarian approach, it is nevertheless merely an attempt not the 
attempt to speak of life in politico-philosophical terms. Written words – despite the immanency of life 
within them – will always just remain a single touch on the immensity of life. 
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 Content Expression 
Form 6.2 Coming Community: 
Changing Territory 
- Now-here and no-where 
- Virtual past and impotential future 
- Permanency of plurality 
- Another unity: body without organs 
- Difference-relationality 
- A place of ease 
- Nomadology: mapping multi-
territorial time 
- Passing community: heterotopia 
- Saturated community 
 
 
6.3 Ethical Values instead of Moral 
Norms 
- Power = concert 
- Punctual communities 
- New terra ethica: affirmative dissensus 
- Meso-politics: Inter-est revolution, 
pragmatics, mapping and belonging 
- Memory: multiple entrances   
- Ethical impotential paradigms 
 
 
Matter 6.4 Ethical Expression: What 
Really Matters    
- Singular assemblages: a who 
- Natality 
- Transcendental empiricism 
- Communicability 
- Heterophasia = enemy of grammer 
- Being-into-expression: stuttering 
and sobriety 
- The epos of singular assemblages 
- voices instead of Voices 
 
6.5 Whatever Life May Be … 
- Equality in singularity through futility 
- Dividu 
- Life itself: biopolitical fracture; 
- An immanent outside 
- Eventive assemblages 
- Form-of-life: a life 
- Example 
- Whatever being: the irreparable 
- Belonging as such: happiness 
 
 
 
6.2 Coming Community: Changing Territory  
 
6.2.1 Occurring Community: The No-(w)here of the Future 
Politics of life is a coming community. The coming of this kind of communing does not refer to a 
future utopian scenario. This would reduce it to a politics of exile as a feature of totalitarianism. 
Arendt (1996), with her characteristic sophistication, states:  
 
The future, the ‘not yet’ of the present, is what we must always fear. To the 
present, the future can only be menacing. Only a present without a future is 
immutable and utterly unthreatened. In such a present lies the calm of possession. 
This possession is life itself. For all good exists for life alone, to protect it from its 
loss, from death (p. 13). 
 
In this citation Arendt presents another idea of life than she thematized in The Human Condition. Here 
life is the now moment, an occurrence. The digitalized globalization is already problematizing the 
linearity of historical time as well as its West-oriented interpretation of it. Life has become onlife (De 
Mul, 2017, pp. 255-256). The virtual world is entering the now moments; they have become immanent 
to the actual face-to-face contact. Every sentence I say as a teacher can and will be used against me by 
a student with his or her mobile phone in hand. Every intervention based on an analysis of the 
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immensity of the present is shy in connection to multiple pasts and blind for multiplicity of possible 
futures. As impotentiality a coming community is always already now-here, not due to its disinterest 
in the past and future but due to its acknowledgment of the complex multiplicity of the past and future. 
Arendt’s (1968) evaluation of the past in her The Origins of Totalitarianism remained shy toward 
indigenous inhabitants of South Africa; while somewhere in her guts she did sense that one form of 
voicelessness was related to the voicelessness she experienced in the now-here of her life.   
 
Occurring of a coming community indicates the ability of approaching a now-here as a no-where, as 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987) would phrase it, as the ability of entering a now-here as the virtual space 
of the in-between. Yet, unlike Arendt, Deleuze and Guattari understand this now-here in line with 
Nietzsche and Foucault as a bodily presence; bodies that are defined by power and yet resist their 
definitions. Colored bodies, female bodies, transgender bodies, mad bodies, unwanted bodies, 
unknown bodies. Coming implies the unknown, whether in all that was, or in all that is and eventually 
in all that will come. This demands an approach that favors Arendtian ‘inter-est’ yet criticizes her 
refusal to see bodies as political forces of resistance due to their differentiations such as in the Black 
Power movement, the gay movement or in feminism. In line with Dirk De Schutter (2005) I argue that 
it also demands “an attitude that radically opens itself to time, that reaches out to time in all its 
dimensions” (p. 84, Translation TR). It does not refer to time as a quantitative phenomenon but as a 
qualitative affect. History has an intense effect on the quality of life of minorities, of women, people of 
color and people with different beliefs and sexual preferences. In the final instance, it remains 
impossible to ‘describe’ an open community that takes care of the intensities of bodies beyond the 
intentions of self-consciousness. We can only approach this dimension. Is the intention of forming a 
community not meant to create closed wholes in order to manage our lives and protect us from 
unknown dangers? And if there are unpredictable forces traversing these communities, making it 
porous or allowing it to radiate its in-betweenness, how does one describe this ‘interest’? What does it 
mean to state that the unknown of intensities is a virtual transversality that asks for actualization? Is 
this virtual unknown the impotentiality Agamben writes about?  
 
Deterritorializing movements do not imply that we take off into a transcendental 
‘other’ realm, because all assemblages are formed just as much as other kinds of 
images: both virtually (in memory) and actually (moving our senses in the present) 
they affect us (Pisters, 2003, p. 218). 
 
Coming community is an impotential paradigm due to the fact that – in contrast to the previous 
paradigms – it flaunts its permanent unpredictable impact. While paradigms of identity and security, 
despite their incapacity to control their impact, pretend to have a clear method and policy to cope with 
it, the impotential paradigm of a coming community does nothing more than explore time and again its 
own unknowability in order not to identify and universalize. The unknown is however not a mystery. 
Mysteries long to be unveiled. Coming community instead is a play of masks that do not hide a ‘real’ 
face. Coming community is not the opposite of formation but rather an endless process of formation 
and deformation, of coding and decoding on both levels of content and expression, switching 
continuously between matter to form. There are no pretenses as to the predictability of the emerging 
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connections. I think this is the crucial aspect of a community to come. The contemporary multicultural 
discourse offers a starting point because it does not only focus on identity and sameness, but also on 
differences. What remains unsaid is that difference does not merely indicate disconnection. It does not 
indicate lines of flight but also differences in segmentation and formation of assemblages.  
 
My classrooms are a good example. For future social workers, it is important to think beyond the 
boundaries of meritocratic society. I wanted them to sense the immense impotentiality of the people 
they will meet in their lines of work, people who are pathologically identified as mad, unproductive, 
un-integrated, criminals and illegals. In order to do so, I asked them to remember a moment or 
moments in their past where they were defined in those terms, where they were not seen and merely 
stigmatized as not good enough for the educational system. The classroom was silent for more than 
five minutes. I asked one of the boys – almost wanting to disappear behind his desk – if he was willing 
to share his memories. He told the class that his entire school carrier – even when he was successful 
according to the meritocratic norm – teachers would tell him that he would fail anyhow. While he was 
telling his story, another girl was nodding her head intensely. I looked at her and asked her whether 
she recognized the experience. She said in full surprise: yes. When I asked her why she was surprised, 
she said: he is so different. I said: what do you mean by different? She said: you know, the normal 
things. Normal things were in their case ethnicity, gender, personality, and other differenciated 
identity traits. She was surprised that there was a connection that simply and daily surpassed such 
identities. Along with the boy and the classroom, she realized that in this context identity is just a form 
of connectivity and not the ultimate form of connection. It is due to the chaotic and cacophonic trait of 
this plural connectivity that the content and expression of this community – even within the small 
setting of a classroom – never becomes graspable in one singular form or matter. In each type of 
concept, function or sensation – meritocratic or pathological – an impotential paradigm difference-
relationality insists, creating a variety of perspectives to act upon. Coming community differentiates 
and differenciaties: in actualizing policies it discloses virtual territories, yet at the same time 
constantly radiating new alliances and relations. 
 
Next to the ultimate indescribability of a coming community, there is a second challenge that concerns 
the notion of time: the presupposition that this community is in need of ‘coming’, of an anticipation of 
a future, of – in Derridean terms – as some thing ‘a-venir’, that what comes towards us. A classical 
utopian and idealist visualizes these states of affairs that are not yet there, but are fervently longed for. 
This is not my endeavor. But then, for which future do I plead as a writer? In the fever of heroic ego-
trips, the anticipating idealist never sees the presence of this coming community. Coming community 
is neither merely a virtuality on the brink of becoming actual, nor merely a virtual that hides in the 
actual. My classrooms and their immensity of connections are in front of me. Coming community has 
real meaning in being virtual, not a virtual reality but as a real virtuality. No matter how totalitarian a 
society attempts to be; no matter how many it intends to exclude for the sake of homogeneity, no 
matter how many agents of meritocracy define children as failures, life remains an actual force from 
which ‘new’ compositions emerge. It happened on February 2011 in Cairo when Christians decided to 
join hands in order to protect the praying Muslims and it happened on August 2013 when in the same 
country Muslims joined hands to protect the church with praying Christians and again in April 2017 
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when Muslims united with Coptic Christians after the bombing of the Coptic cathedral. Many cynics 
reminded us of increasing violence towards religious minorities (see: Weber, 2013). Nonetheless, only 
reminding us of totalitarian tendencies of politics remains unfair to the diversity of politics that occurs 
at the very same time, as merely presenting us with hopeful images becomes naïve and unjust toward 
the inequality of the world. Politico-philosophical thinking within a politics of flight becomes only 
effective, not by cynically scorning one event for the sake of the other, but by mapping the emergence 
of a third articulation that takes the quality of life as its ultimate criterion: a politics of life.  
 
Regimes rise and fall, due to the fact that they could never definitely close off their borders. Practices 
of resistance as a matter of fact, i.e. as form of content, are equiprimordial with this urge for totality as 
a form of expression.  The question is not whether and when open community will come, but whether 
we, as mankind, are capable of comprehending the permanent reality of this open community in the 
now and here. In fact, this remains the central plea of Agamben. His politico-philosophy is concerned 
with our interests in a given plurality that always already surrounds us and in which we are embedded. 
Integration, which has unfairly been associated with the newcomer, means nothing more than the 
ability of any political subject at any time in any community to function and to operate within this 
plurality. In line with Schinkel (2008) we could state: who is not integrating? The answer is: those 
who propagate integration for others. In short, understanding plurality in this Nietzschean ontological 
sense means that integration is neither contemporary nor something bound to a specific culture, but 
rather designates the process in which any subject is positioned in relation to changing territories, that 
emerge within, around, but always beyond the subject.3 We are all part of the coming community as 
well as the axiomatic agents of totalitarian thought and differenciating participants in a multicultural 
society. 4  Integration is the acknowledgement of this unavoidable multiple involvement. This 
connectivity has both an ontological and political quality. A rhizomatic approach is both critical and 
concerned and affirms that change is not something that emerges in the future but that it is a process in 
which every one is embedded at any time. Yet, there remains also a truth that every end in history 
necessarily contains a new beginning; this beginning is a promise, the only ‘message’ which an end 
can ever produce (Arendt, 1968, p. 478-479). 
 
If coming community affirms the permanency of plurality, change and birth, how do we then 
differentiate a coming community from those politics that intend to neglect and ‘fix’ this permanency? 
By now it will be clear that this community’s explication asks for another approach and 
implementation of rhizomatic notions such as territory, people, ethics, expression and life. The image 
of thought of a coming community is related to multiple other impotential paradigms. As is argued in 
                                                     
3 In Dialogues Deleuze in conversation with Parnet (1987) eloquently states: “Becomings are not phenomena of imitation or 
assimilation, but of a double capture, of non-parallel evolution, of nuptials between two reigns” (p. 2). This is what he calls: 
“a sort of active and creative line of flight” or in other words “AND…AND…AND” (p. 10). 
4 In line with Tocqueville, Lefort (1988) states that democracy must “look back at what came before it and, at the same time, 
to look ahead to what is emerging, or may emerge, in its wake” (p. 14). Although democracy remains in the middle of the 
process, there is some sort of historical and systematic linearity: totalitarianism and democracy cannot emerge 
simultaneously. This is an important difference with democracy and my analysis of coming community. Lefort thus is right 
to state that Tocqueville “fails to see” the immanent “counter-influence” (15-16). 
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3.4.2.3, impotential is the qualification of paradigms that resist segmentation whether in the axiomatic 
or differenciating manner. They differentiate by resisting the illusion of an end game. They never take 
themselves too seriously; they rather take the critical difference as serious point of departure. These 
paradigms become impotential due to the fact that – in contrast to totalitarianism and multiculturalism 
– they do not create an inside that opposes an outside. There is not an endoconsistency – an internal 
consistency – that results from creating an exclusive exoconsistency – an external consistency that 
also defines the peripheries. The form of content of a coming community is rather a willing porous 
inside that permanently changes, moved by difference in itself. The difference is its transcendental 
component that empirically changes its context, its empiric actualization. Coming community is 
therefore not a philosophical concept; as a transcendental-empirical idea of a community, as an 
impotential paradigm, due to its connectivity to life itself as a body without organs, it is a politico-
philosophical notion. In line with the Nietzschean tendency in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, 
Patton (2000) evaluates their urge for creating untimely concepts (p. 3). But untimely impotential 
paradigm is a pleonastic construction, due to the fact that permanent change of its components is 
already given in its impotentiality. 
 
Yet, it is vital to point out that coming community as an impotential paradigm itself is not anti-unity or 
anti-assemblage. It is not an absolute line of flight. Just as a totalitarian state and a multicultural 
society, this community is also a type of assemblage, connecting different types of multiplicity and 
creating a ‘we’. My classroom in its cacophonic silence did sense a ‘we’. Coming community 
composes a unity.  
 
I am moved by the ‘we’, as the ‘we’ is an effect of those who move towards it. It is 
not an innocent ‘we’, or one that stands still. It is affected by that which it is 
against, and hence also by that which it is for, what it enables, shapes, makes 
possible (Ahmed, 2014, p. 188).    
 
As Patton (2000) states: “The real question is not whether or not there is unity but what form this 
takes” (p. 29). There are different types of unity, be it that they are not subordinating and 
hierarchizing. And while totalitarian and multicultural unities are based on the category of identity and 
hierarchically distinguishing their members by this standard, compositions of a coming community 
rather appear within an inter-est.5 Politics of flight creates these unities, not as a singular framework of 
identity, nor defined by a morality of good and evil. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) argue, that there are 
not only different types of unity, but within these unities, multiplicities emerge that vary on the one 
hand in content and expression, and on the other in their form and matter. Politics of flight is 
multiplicity of unities. 
                                                     
5 This shared interest however must not be confused with Kant’s sensus communis. As Heinz Kimmerle suggests, Kant’s 
reflections common sense refers to a universal sense in which all subjects agree on the aesthetic value of a matter. According 
to Kimmerle in contemporary state of mind we can no longer talk about a universal sense but only about a sensus communis 
that sensitizes a particular community, in which agreement and consensus are always supplemented by the dissensus of those 
who oppose the sensus communis (Kimmerle & Oosterling, 2000, p. 11). 
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Let us return to the story of multiplicity, for the creation of this substantive marks a 
very important moment. It was created precisely in order to escape the abstract 
opposition between the multiple and the one, to escape dialectics, to succeed in 
conceiving the multiple in the pure state, to cease treating it as a numerical 
fragment of a lost Unity or Totality or as the organic element of a Unity or Totality 
yet to come, and instead distinguish between different types of multiplicity (p. 32). 
 
Agamben’s (1993b) coming community is multiplicity as well as connectivity of multiplicities. He 
distinguishes two types. First, the state unites multiplicity by enforcing some kind of identity and 
structures based on this identity. Totalitarianism and multiculturalism are such states. Second, the non-
state differs from the state by creating connective lines while refusing to define an overall identity. 
The non-state does not oppose, it gives in to the occurrence of a coming community, implying a given 
belonging. This belonging is not a matter of identity. It contains belonging as such, a belonging 
without prejudice (pp. 85-87). 
 
What the State cannot tolerate in any way, however, is that the singularities form a 
community without affirming an identity, that humans co-belong without any 
representable condition of belonging (even in the form of a simple presupposition) 
(p. 86). 
 
6.2.2 Multi-Territorial Community 
The heading of the part II of this study is ‘unfolding a milieu’. Up till now I have unfolded three 
milieus: state, society and a coming community. The latter is also an impotential territorial 
engagement. How can we approach this? Ian Buchanan and Gregg Lambert (2005) argue that the 
connection between being and space has become problematic after the territorial First and Second 
World War (p. 1). After these events, the combination of totalitarian and nationalistic ideology 
changed the discourse on territories forever, by the inevitability of the connection between nation-
states, citizenship and territory. The totalitarian colonizing of space in effect led to an exclusive 
displacement, which is shown in the previous two chapters. Space and its inhabitants became 
disconnected to the extreme. As they argue along with Frederic Jameson, space becomes an 
uninhabitable space (p. 4). The problem of being and space is more obvious in Heidegger’s (1996) 
notion of dwelling, space installing the primacy of Being instead of Dasein, where being precedes the 
‘there’. As the Australian philosopher Patton (2000) shows, in the colonial era the contrast between 
aboriginal and indigenous people’s understanding of space and the European understanding of space is 
exemplary for these distinct forms of experiencing space. While the original inhabitants experienced it 
in Heidegger’s sense of the word dwelling – in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense: nomadically – the 
European conqueror colonized and appropriated the space. The nomadic mind concerns itself as a 
component of space while the colonial mind considers space as an object to be owned and modeled by 
its will (pp. 120-131). 
There is yet another aspect we have to take into account. As Buchanan (2005) states, along with Marc 
Augé, classical binary notions such as near and far, inside and outside or public and private become 
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problematic in the global space of our time. Even eventually the idea of a human being, precisely in its 
certainty as the subject imposing his will, has become problematic in the postmodern space of 
globalization. He argues that although postmodern space is often defined as a space of disorientation 
and displacement, it is still not the radical change in space that causes nomadic affects. It was 
precisely the crisis within the subject that exposed this affective nomadology, because of the loss of 
otherness. Through globalization, cities all over the world become all too familiar instead of radically 
different. The subject has lost its sense of experiencing otherness. What capitalist globalization shows 
is that a city like Rotterdam and a city like Teheran have more in common than one expects. They 
disappoint travelers who seek otherness in an exotic world. As Huijer (2016) argues, there are neither 
old worlds that we can return to nor new words that we can discover. Through globalization we live in 
equal time and space (p. 13). This lack of otherness makes it impossible for the subject to distinguish 
itself from all that surrounds it. The disorientation triggers the subject’s inability to cope with 
differences and by implication its ability to integrate and to understand connectivity. This caused a 
sense of becoming imperceptible due to lack of distinguishing itself from others. Nevertheless, as 
Buchanan also argues, such developments do not indicate that otherness has disappeared from the 
realm of postmodern world. The recognizable other such as exotic people, strange costumes or 
eccentric architecture has been replaced by immanent otherness and forms of deterritorialization that 
are now engrained in one’s own community. The other is now, more than ever, within us. 
 
Our sense of disorientation within this ambiguous space of capitalism and globalization is not caused 
by a loss of historical matter-of-factness of an identity, in which I and the other were clearly 
distinguished. It is due to the relation between formation of a community and its understanding of 
territory. Deleuze and Guattari (1983) elaborate on this in Anti-Oedipus. Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia. The socius, which indicates the social machine through which multiple communities 
appear, expresses itself in three forms.  
First, the territorial process in which not the possession of a territory but rather the experience 
of earth itself is the main engine. This is as discussed before the manner in which Aboriginals and 
indigenous people experienced the space in which they live. In this process, random organism creates 
a social body in which kinship codifies the territory and through which a group of organisms, in this 
case human groups or tribes distinguish themselves from others. Nevertheless, the coding act of the 
territorial social machine merely effectuates the process of the earth.  
The second form of social machine - the despot – affects the earth through a process of 
overcoding in which arborescent structures create a hierarchy of classes. The body of the despot finds 
itself in the middle of the earth, surpassing this despotic territory as a divine being. The body of the 
despot in its connection to an unearthly deity or ideal, thus within the religious as well as secular 
processes, transcends the territory called earth. Property, the act of possessing the earth, appears thus 
in the disconnection from the earth as well as the hierarchical state of men in which the despot appears 
at the top of the pyramid.  
In contrast to the coding and overcoding trait of the first two social machines, the third form of 
social machine is called Civilized Capitalist Machine. This is characterized by a process of continuous 
decoding. While the territorial machine is in need of coding the earth into a permanent form of 
habitual space, and while the despot is in need of overcoding through a perfect and immutable deity, 
353 
 
the process of capitalism is not only defined by coding, but also by permanent manufacturing new 
codes. Think of shopping malls, each time they are globally copied all over the place, but once they 
are everywhere, a new format of shopping emerges, as for instance Telnet. Capitalism is not about the 
code but rather the process of (re)coding.6 
 
The strength of capitalism indeed resides in the fact that its axiomatic is never 
saturated, that it is always capable of adding a new axiom to the previous ones. … 
The axiomatic does not need to write in bare flesh, to mark bodies and organs, nor 
does it need to fashion a memory for man (p. 250). 
 
These three types of social ‘assemblages’, as Deleuze and Guattari will label these in Part 2 of 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia. A Thousand Plateaus, are in no sense sequential or bound to a part of 
the world or people. Each society with its different forms of politics is an amalgamation of these three 
types. In an analogous reasoning politics of exile and politics of segments do not only contain forms of 
coding and overcoding through historical, cultural and social processes, but time and again reshape 
and deshape their history and understanding of culture and socius in order to speed up the process of 
coding and overcoding.  
 The politics of life within the coming community is also marked by coding, overcoding and 
decoding. Nonetheless, the coming community differs from the previous two types due to the fact that 
it relates immediately to its act of coding, overcoding and decoding, affirming their interrelations. It 
does not camouflage its own tendency to despotism, but relates to it explicitly by a critical attitude 
toward its own flaws. In short, while the process of totalitarianism and multiculturalism strive for a 
perfect new world or more differenciated homes, the coming community affirms the movement, in 
which past and future blend in multiple ways, being fully aware of flaws as integral part of social 
structures. Finally, coming community differs from the capitalistic process due to the fact that it is not 
indifferent to its process of coding and decoding. This community is instead characterized by its 
critical disinterested ethical engagement. Only through this engagement, based on an ontological 
connectivity, can it affirm the impact of life forces. Yet, the coming community is not an end game. 
The question is not how to await the coming community, but how to notice its presence, no matter 
how difficult it is to spot it.  
 
What differentiates the coming community from totalitarian regimes and a multicultural society is its 
primary relation to territory. Not as the earth, neither as the body of the despot, nor as the flowing 
capital. Changing territory is the initial trait of the form of content of coming community, while 
totalitarianism and multiculturalism define themselves due to conventional historical traits, intending 
to force those upon territories by limiting their extension. Coming community, as Agamben (1993b) 
testifies, starts with an unlimited space of ease in which territories, whether indicating a subject, a 
                                                     
6  See for the distinction between these three forms of social machines mostly the third chapter ‘Savages, Barbarians, 
Civilised Men’ in Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, pp. 139-269; the thirteenth chapter ‘7000 B.C.: Apparatus of 
Capture’ in Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 424-473; and for a lucid amalgamation the fifth chapter ‘Social 
Machines and the State’, in Patton’s Deleuze and the Political, pp. 68-87.  
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collective, or earth, explore its unlimited territorial potentiality. Ease in a colloquial sense is about the 
freedom of stiffness and formality.  
 
Ease is the proper name of this unrepresentable space. The term ‘ease’ in fact 
designates, according to its etymology, the space adjacent (ad-jacens, adjacentia), 
the empty place where each can move freely, in a semantic constellation where 
spatial proximity borders on opportune time (ad-agio, moving at ease) and 
convenience borders on the correct relation (p. 25). 
 
Coming community is not without a past. Nonetheless, the contemporary possibilities of connection 
are always more urgent than the given but outdated historical connections. As Olúwolé (2014) argues 
within philosophical thinking we must criticize the manner in which we refer to the past and the 
manner that we continentalize the process of thought. History of philosophy did not start with 
Socrates; and dividing the history of thought in here and there; creates an unfortunate mind that cannot 
experience the virtual impotentiality of thinking as such. Only through such impotentiality in thinking 
we could incomprehensibly comprehend the historical immensity of a coming community, which 
differs from that of totalitarian nation-state as well as of multicultural society. Communities based on 
so-called ‘factual’ historical ‘events’ reduce the richness of these events in the past to one form of 
narrative. A coming community rather explores the non-conventional possibilities of territorial 
connection as well as the interbreeding and crossovers of historical narratives. In this setting history 
creates knowledge but does not enforce rules of engagement. Untimely thought within coming 
community is more adequately approached by rhizomatic nomadology than by conventional 
genealogy. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) state:  
 
History is always written from the sedentary point of view and in the name of a 
unitary State apparatus, at least a possible one, even when the topic is nomads. 
What is lacking is a Nomadology, the opposite of a history (p. 23). 
 
Nomadology is open to a full virtual reality of what has come to pass, what is present, and what will 
emerge in time.7 It is not limited by knowledge at hand in history books; no self-respecting historian 
would limit itself as such. Time in coming community is thus not a linear given, but a rhizomatic 
feedback loop, in which new events emerge. Time is multi-territorial. Nomadology does not 
specifically concern the knowledge of concrete nomadic traits of tribes. Deleuze and Guattari rather 
label it as a war-machine, not in order to produce weapons, but in order to resist the linear logos of the 
state that defines a territory and history according to one form of narrative. Let me remind my readers 
of an already given example: The Kingdom of the United Netherlands once was the largest Muslim 
state in the world. But it could not identify itself in a nomadological way. Nomadology is in this sense 
a machine of liquidation where history and territory lose the solidity that is forced upon them. 
                                                     
7 In connection to democracy Lefort (1988) states that democracy is “the historical society par excellence” due to the fact that 
democracy “welcomes and preserves indeterminancy” by understanding the multiplicity of history. This is then according to 
Lefort in contrast to totalitarianism that by drawing a clear line in history becomes rather “a society without history” (p. 16). 
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Politico-philosophy in this line of thought needs to be an act of mapping ‘probable geometries’ 
(Harris, 2005) rather than tracing an origin in time. In their transcendental empiric approach, politico-
philosophers must “carry out a vast diversion of wisdom”; they need to implement such wisdom “at 
the service of pure immanence” by replacing “genealogy with a geology” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, 
p. 44). 
 
The earth is a full body without organs. The video and performance artist Lida Abdul demonstrates 
this replacement of genealogy with geology in her short films like White House (2005), What We Saw 
upon Awakening (2006) and In-Transit (2008), deterritorializing the history of war in Afghanistan. In 
White House she simply paints the ruins white in order to create another form of territory. In What We 
Saw upon Awakening men take down the ruins, and in her In Transition children claim the remnant of 
a warplane as their playground. Abdul dismantles the ruins by transforming them with paint through 
which this space could claim endless other forms of significance. Abdul’s art, as is shown in her In-
Transit, is based on the idea that “anything is possible when everything is lost”. The men in a literal 
manner ruin the ruins – deform its deforming and destructive force – while the children install a 
playful community. Abdul (n.d) states: 
 
Whose politics?  In my work, I try to juxtapose the space of politics with the space 
of reverie, almost absurdity, the space of shelter with that of the desert; in all of 
this I try to perform the ‘blank spaces’ that are formed when everything is taken 
away from people.  How do we come face to face with ‘nothing’ with ‘emptiness’ 
where there was something earlier?  
 
6.2.3 Saturated Community 
Coming community is a physical space and not merely a theoretical one. Thought on coming 
community indicates a process of mapping connections within a community. It is not an abstract 
process, nor ideological, but as concrete as it is tentative. Art, as we have seen in Abdul’s case, 
sensitizes its audiences for these topologies. Thinking about such community means touching it while 
looking at it, experiencing it. The haptic qualities of these performances affect thought. Sensations 
affectuate the experience of impotential paradigms. Men and women who merely speak of coming 
community without experiencing it are, as Arendt (1958) would put it, speakers without action, which 
in effect sterilizes speech. Or better: disembodies it. Words are hollow due to a lack of connection to 
the world in which these people are living. While they intend to speak of coming community they fall 
into the trap of ideology, by disconnecting their thoughts from life. Coming community asks for an 
immediate approach, for immediate connection. You cannot think of coming community – or in words 
of Ten Bos (2011) a politics that is drenched of not only ethics but also aesthetics – without putting 
yourself at risk (p. 161). A politico-philosophical approach asks for a political point of view in which 
the experience of such territory transgresses a binary setting of active production and passive 
reception. 
 
Choosing to relate to this community means engaging in its permanent occurrence. There is neither an 
oppositional state between the relata in the relation, nor a hierarchical appreciation of one above the 
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other. Relata are per definition relational, yet relations can solidify in relata such as nationality, 
ethnicity, sexuality, shortly identity. Nonetheless, nothing remains what it is. ‘Repetition’ of the same 
is impossible. As I have argued in chapter one, repetition is always repetition of and in difference. 
This entails an awareness of coming community as an engine of enduring alteration. There are no 
permanent borders. There is no outside, no down here and over there. Passages and peripheries are not 
at beginnings and ends, but through and within the community itself, even that of totalitarianism and 
multicultural society. Territoriality here means to endure other possibilities of formation of its 
landscape not within an exotic object or subject, but through its own virtuality. Thus, this community 
always puts itself at risk due to this relational reflectivity. Self in ‘self’-reflectivity is never an 
individual state or subjective experience, but always a relational given. Limits are immanent 
thresholds in which community changes its face and starts thinking in different directions. It is an 
intensive experience that extends from within. Agamben (1993b) argues: 
 
The outside is not another space that resides beyond a determinate space, but 
rather, it is the passage, the exteriority that gives it access – in a word, it is its face, 
its eidos. 
The threshold is not, in this sense, another thing with respect to the limit; it is, so to 
speak, the experience of the limit itself, the experience of being-within an outside. 
This ek-stasis is the gift that singularity gathers from the empty hands of humanity 
(p. 68). 
 
Ek-stasis is being turned inside out. Combining Deleuzian thought to that of Agamben we could state 
it is out within pure immanence. Coming community ‘presents’ itself in the ever-changing territory as 
a space of ease as suggested by Agamben (1993b), and a space such as in Abdul’s work that is 
deterritorialized and reterritorialized, decoded and recoded at the same time. Coming community as 
space of ease is neither easy nor lazy; it is active and intense. It is engagement in a pure sense. 
However, just as Abdul, Agamben speaks of an empty space. Does openness of coming community 
imply emptiness? Is coming community merely an empty in-between-space on the peripheries of 
thought that causes ‘tiny displacements’? Agamben states: 
 
The tiny displacement does not refer to the state of things, but to their sense and 
their limits. It does not take place in things, but at their periphery, in the space of 
ease between every thing and itself (p. 54). 
 
Is this solely a negative characterization of a coming community, due to and through notions such as 
emptiness, deterritorialization, and lines of flight? Does this appreciation of the negation not bring 
back the oppositional logic within binary thought? Deterritorialization alone cannot bring about 
change; as such it produces either total destruction or total nothingness. Although Deleuze and 
Guattari often warn us to not appreciate one above the other, they do themselves often fall for the 
romantic charms of the rebellious process. Change only appears within the tension between 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Better yet, there are no empty spaces in which 
deterritorialization emerges as a pure phenomenon. As we saw in Mohamed Bouazizi’s case in chapter 
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one, every deterritorialization is an immediate reterritorialization, which explains their non-binary, 
supplementary relation; the one is always imbedded in the other, not as the beginning or end of a 
process, but as becoming one and the same process. Openness in coming community is thus not 
equivalent to emptiness as in nothingness; but in the sense of transformative. The openness in this 
community refers to a non-essential trait of this political milieu. It unfolds so many possibilities that 
we could not comprehend. Politics of life within coming community indicates a possibility of passing; 
coming community means passing communities. There are no eternal and universal positions, but 
merely processes. Still, its potentiality must not fall into the trap of shortcoming. Coming community 
is a heterotopia; it is a politics that engages with each topia in a singular intensity; without reducing 
one particular unity as a shortcoming to a general unity. As a process coming community is always 
saturated. Its emptiness is fulfilled. While being saturated with radiant forces (puissance) that work 
upon each other, connecting everything without yet defining these relations in terms of power 
(pouvoir), it lacks nothing.8  
 
The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our 
falling over each other, so to speak. What makes mass society so difficult to bear is 
not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the 
world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate and to 
separate them (Arendt, 1958, pp. 52-53). 
 
The openness of the public space of coming community is free from double forms of resentment. The 
first – universal resentment – indicates a lack of people involved, thus has the pretense to involve all 
while it can only reach some. This is the resentment of totalitarianism. The second form – localized 
resentment – experiences lack due to the involvement of all while it aspired to the involvement of only 
a few; such as segmentalized multiculturalism. It senses a lack of intimacy. Coming community on the 
other hand in its openness does neither sense nothingness nor congestedness. Its openness is defined 
by the virtuality of connections and it is aware that whether there are two people involved or the whole 
world, whether it is a global connection or local one, a physical or a digital, the immensity of 
connectivity is immeasurable in its virtual possibilities. It is always saturated due to this non-resenting 
attitude, as a result of which it has no fixed focus on the past. As Patrisse Cullors states: “We don’t 
believe that presidency is the way to turn our voices into political power. In fact, local politics changes 
the national” (Peled, 2016). 
 
Belonging to a coming community is not based on ethnicity, as is the case with multiculturalism. In 
order to create diversity in the so-called multicultural debates people with different ethnic 
backgrounds are invited to participate. In contrast, the affirmation of a coming community does not 
manipulate diversity, but creates an open space in which diversity can expose itself. In the city of 
                                                     
8 Defining the open society as empty is also present in Lefort’s (1998) analysis of democracy in which the “locus of power is 
an empty place.” In his analyses, however, the notion empty does not indicate a hollow shell but rather a milieu that cannot 
be owned by certain subjects or individuals or ideology. He states, “it cannot be occupied.” Thus, democracy is not without 
agency, but in the process creates agencies and nevertheless is never captured by those agencies (p. 17). 
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Rotterdam there are a lot of examples of such places. During the last years, due to financial cuts in the 
cultural sector, small libraries in the city, especially in poor areas, had to close their doors. Social 
entrepreneurs such as Maurice Specht and Joke van der Zwaard (2015) dropped the idea of an open 
library, a library without a loan system. People were free to come in, bring books and take books 
without any obligation. The cynics, I am ashamed to say including myself, called it a mad idea. The 
library would never have any books; people would only take out, and never bring them back. I am 
happy to say that we were definitely wrong. The library has now become a social community, with a 
lot of books and volunteers. In no time, it has grown into a cultural center, with music, theatre and 
lectures. Specht and Van der Zwaard didn’t want to plan a type of connection (quality); nor dreamt of 
a quantity of a people. They just created a space of connection; a saturated space whether it is with one 
or the many. It is an open collective: another form of content.  
 
6.3 Ethical Values Instead of Moral Norms 
 
6.3.1 Power in Concert 
The form the content of coming community takes is saturated and changing territory. It is this 
changing character that defines the form of an assemblage of bodies within coming community. The 
same saturation also appears in the form of expression of this community that assemblages its 
expressions. Still, if within such assemblages neither quality nor quantity is at issue, does it indicate 
that politics of life gives rise to any form of action? Such evaluation – thinking beyond the given 
norms of society – refers to fears, old fears of terror and violent anarchy. Nonetheless, coming 
community is not without ethics. I rather argue that this type of ethics – in which the relationality 
instead of the relata are at the center of thought – have been violently silenced by the doublespeak 
morality of totalitarianism and at best segmentalized as spiritual non-sense by multiculturalism in 
order to neutralize its overall impact. Forces within this community do not define themselves as 
stronger and more forceful, because forces are not yet power. For Arendt power in this community is 
in its turn distinct from violence.9 In The Human Condition and On Violence Arendt states that power 
and violence are opposites. While in this study power has been a complex concept with multifarious 
impacts, in this section I accentuate the manner in which Arendt comprehends power. Power is 
potentiality, which is inherent to the political movement. This productive power – in contrast to force 
and violence – does not appear within nations and states, according to Arendt. It emerges only and 
momentarily when plural subjects decide to act due to their momentary common interest: acting in 
concert (Arendt, 1970, p. 44). The term is extraordinarily useful. Concerts are not defined by 
identities, but by multiplicity. It is through the multiplicity of melodies that music becomes highly 
affective. Even when different musicians play the same instruments, multiplicity always emerges. Yet, 
the notion concert not only refers to multiplicity, but also to the common trait of music and Arendtian 
power. Neither a sound nor power could be reserved and saved up for future emergencies, which is the 
case with violent resources. Power is in actu.   
                                                     
9 In comparison with Foucault’s vocabulary the term power in Arendt has more in common with the concept of puissance and 
violence with pouvoir. 
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Obama’s Speech on the State of the Union in 2012, which was discussed in the fourth chapter 
(4.4.1), suggests a containment of power through its forceful instruments, while to Arendt power 
cannot be contained even at its peak. We often notice this after a revolution. The Arab Spring was one 
of the recent awakenings of such a dynamic. Once it lost that singular form of power – Foucaults 
puissance or force, Nietzsche Kraft instead of Macht – it could never be recaptured. However, not 
grasping it does not mean that it loses its effect totally. Years after this event within the movement of 
Black Lives Matter participants speak of a Black Spring. The second form is in no sense a copy. It 
rather repeats an idea of resistance through difference. 
 
Power for Arendt, through its non-violent expression, is connectivity that creates a political reality 
through inter-action and inter-speeches. Power is not constructed. It is dynamic, an infinite with 
potentiality. Power is acting in speaking. It does not belong to some individuals, due to their force, 
strength or the capacity to use violence. Power is not an object or a state of affairs, but a becoming. It 
is the inter-esse that has no fixed eternal or universal materialization. It is an appearance, as Arendt 
(1958) suggests, independent of matter, numbers or means (p. 200). Power in Arendtian sense of the 
word is not comparable. It is not about losing or winning a battle. This is the warning of the activist, 
musician and actor Harry Belafonte (2016) at the aftermath of the US elections in 2016: 
 
Each time it was done, we kind of figured it was the last time we would have to do 
it. During a lifetime of Paul Robeson, Eleanor Roosevelt, Dr. W.E.B. Du Bois, 
those who mentored me and guided me and inspired me, that I should have lived 
long enough to be able to stand here and once again say thanks to all my 
colleagues, to all of my comrades, to all of the people who have sacrificed so 
greatly to make this nation whole – we are looking upon a curious time. But I think 
it’s a time that should be used as an opportunity to know that we have to make a 
much bigger difference than we’ve made up to now. We should not let the current 
state of affairs dull the fact that all that we have done was worthless. Nothing could 
be further from the truth. 
 
Power is the unlimited political potential that keeps people together. It is what human plurality bears 
within itself. It is divisible without diminishing. In Arendt’s (1958) view force, which is more than an 
individual strength, runs the risk of becoming a monopoly and thus become violent reducing the 
power of human plurality. Nonetheless, violence can never be a substitute for power, due to violence’s 
unavoidable tendency to destroy the potentiality of the public space. Tyranny, as Arendt shows, is not 
only frightening because of its cruelty but because of its destruction of everything that exists. “Only 
sheer violence is mute, and for this reason violence alone can never be great” (pp. 26). 
 
Violence in other words, if we follow Arendt’s line of argumentation and comprehending the 
incomprehensive racial, ethnic and sexual violence around the world, is out on disconnecting. It reacts 
to connections that are considered to be threatening for its consistency and continuity. Through its fear 
and desire for security violence becomes the instrument to cut through such relations. Violence is 
instrumental, always for the sake of something else. Power, however, is for the sake of creation of new 
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forms of relationality. Power acts in concert, in Arendt’s optimistic interpretation of the term. Power is 
in her analysis not an axiomatic or differencial paradigm but an impotential paradigm. It is connective 
for the sake of relating. In such understanding of power that relate itself to coming community, power 
however does not become merely a means in order to realize a safe utopian hoped-for future scenario. 
Her domain is not the forthcoming but a shared past that assembles new ways in the present. Just as 
action is for the sake of action, speech for the sake of speech, the legitimization of power is thus not 
generated by attaining a goal but exists merely for its own sake. The recent jargonistic term 
‘empowerment’ gets a pregnant meaning once we apply Arendt’s perspective. Violence is justified as 
a means to achieve a goal in the future. Although Arendt argues that power and violence appear 
simultaneously, she also suggests that the ultimate power is the end of violence and the ultimate 
violence is the end of power. 
 
Power needs no justification, being inherent in the very existence of political 
communities; what it does need is legitimacy. … Legitimacy, when challenged, 
bases itself on an appeal to the past, while justification relates to an end that lies in 
the future. Violence can be justifiable, but it never will be legitimate (Arendt, 1970, 
p. 52). 
 
Although I do agree with Arendt that violence is obsessed with a future state, I find the legitimization 
of power by a common past highly problematic. It is partially due to Arendt’s analysis that this 
problematic aspect becomes visible. First, Arendt’s analysis in The Origins of Totalitarianism shows 
how problematic an idea of a common past or pure origin is. It is not clear how one reference to a past 
could not become non-violent; nor that a reference to a future could simply become merely violent. 
Past and future could even collide in a wishful future by referring to an illusionary past, such as is the 
case with the KKK-members. Yet, within the idea of legitimization Arendt intends to overrule such 
collisions. Nonetheless, our past is not given to us; its virtual state does not bend for a clear 
legitimization. History contains endless untold stories of those who fled, who were enslaved, who 
were raped, who were oppressed and executed. The true story of exclusion is the history that is not 
taught at schools and is neglected in many history books. Yet, the virtual potentiality of the present 
must not lose its natality to a time gone by. Second, a coming community is not a negation of future; it 
rather gives in, in a different manner, to the potentiality of a future beyond teleological totalitarianism. 
As Pisters (2016) suggests, there are different ways of understanding future. Her vision of a future is 
not a simple predictive element of the past, or an impossible vision in the present. She rather envisions 
a future that effects the present as a line of flight; a future that is now as a potentiality (p. 167). 
Therefore, I prefer to emphasize the potentiality of this Arendtian power on multi-temporal territorial 
levels. Power of coming community within politics of life is not merely speculative – referring to a 
time that needs to come and lacks reality in the present – nor simply retrospective – referring to a past 
that needs to be analyzed in order to create a legitimized vision on present actions. Power within this 
politics is rather punctual in which the virtual reality of the past and future collide with the 
territoriality of the present; within the nowhere as a now-here. It is within this punctual understanding 
of time that we must understand the immensity of African philosophy. We are simply in search of 
punctual communities that give in to the sense of difference-relationaliy. Mandela’s sense of Ubuntu is 
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perhaps nothing more and nothing less than this. A sense of community that as Olúwolé (2014), 
quoting Erasmus D. Prinsloo, describes it: “‘A person is a person through other persons’, or ‘I am, 
because you are’” (p. 143). 
 
Power is in this sense a momentary affective vector. Art practices can elucidate what is argued for in 
concepts. Just as music power appears in the moment, causing changes and creating unexpected 
assemblages, inviting its participants to experiment in connecting to the process. In Deleuze and 
Guattari's terms, it composes sensations. While in Arendt’s (1958) view politics is mostly connected to 
theatre (pp. 187-188), I relate her idea of power also to her understanding of music in its vulnerability 
and elusiveness.10 Power is an actuality that does not ignore the virtual field of Nietzschean forces that 
gives rise to its momentary appearance. As Deleuze would say in line with Nietzsche, power is a force 
of metamorphosis (Patton, 2000, p. 50), creating momentary passages in order to enter and act 
differently. Power in this Nietzschean sense appears in order to connect differently is first and for all 
changing affect. Deleuze and Guattari’s sense of power is connected to the concept of becoming; 
indicating that nothing within life remains the same. Change is permanent. Becoming is therefore the 
generative state of life. How does this becoming as a transversal force translate itself to the level of 
community where in the conventional sense power relations are the core business of the political? 
Deleuze and Guattari (1983) share Arendt’s sense of connectivity as a basic element of expression of 
coming community, when they state: “There is only desire and the social, and nothing else” (pp. 29). 
Desire is longing for connectivity and assembling is what gives rise to the social or community. 
Desire, according to them, is not a longing for connectivity as it ought to be. There is no necessity in 
connecting in a specific way, although historical definitions such as identity have determined 
collective desires. Desire, detached from these segmentations, is not affectuated by an inability to 
accommodate oneself to a rule but by potentiality of expression. Desire emerges in the social, as an 
assemblage, as a concerted act and not as a subjective achievement driven by personal intentions and 
feelings. The subject dwells in desire but is not the engine of it.  
 
Lack refers to a positivity of desire, and not the desire to a negativity of lack. Even 
individuality, the construction of the plane is a politics, it necessarily involves a 
‘collective’, collective assemblages, a set of social becomings (Deleuze & Parnet, 
1991, p. 91). 
 
This desire for connectivity differs from Foucault’s understanding of power and desire for that matter. 
This second form of power – in French: pouvoir – refers partially to the social, namely the stratified 
part of assemblage called the social. Desire for Foucault is an effect of normalization. He proposes 
‘plaisir’ as a non-identifiable form of desire. In Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of desire this is 
not the outcome of stratification and segmentarity, but rather the primary engine of the formation of 
                                                     
10 On spontaneity of music and poetry Arendt (1958) states: “In music and poetry, the least ‘materialistic’ of the arts because 
their ‘material’ consists of sounds and words, reification and the workmanship it demands are kept to a minimum. The young 
poet and the musical child prodigy can attain a perfection without much training and experience – a phenomenon hardly 
matched in painting, sculpture, or architecture” (p. 169). 
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assemblages. Assemblages do not only contain the disciplinary rules, the stratified force or regimes of 
expression, but also in answering to lines of flight create new assemblages of bodies and assemblages 
of enunciation in order to connect in a different manner.11 “Desire is revolutionary because it always 
wants more connections and assemblages” (Deleuze & Parnet, 1991, p. 79). In this sense Pisters 
(2003) connects Deleuze and Guattari’s desire to Arendt’s sense of power and political action by 
stating:  
 
Desire never is related to an object (that obscure object of desire). Rather, desire is 
a fundamental wish to live and to preserve life by connecting with and relating to 
those things and persons that give us joy, that is, that increase our power to act (p. 
20). 
 
How do we increase this desire as a wish for a power to act? The dynamics within the social 
assemblage, the intensity between lines of flight and lines of segmentation, becomes useful in 
reflections on an idea of politics as a process aiming at consensus through communication (Habermas) 
versus politics as a process that only results from dissensus (Rancière). Is coming community a 
harmonious state of consensus in which clear communication brings about counter-factual powerfree 
world? The answer is simple. No! Consensus, whatever its intentions may be, always indicates the end 
of multiplicity. Coming community is essentially open due to its need for plurality. Arendt, Agamben, 
Deleuze and Guattari, without a doubt, agree on the importance of dealing with the other from within 
and from without, the necessity of coping with the stranger inside and outside our familiar realm. On 
the other hand, inter-est with the others is a necessary condition for any form of (human) life. Arendt 
believes in the potentiality of the power of man in public space, a power of plurality that is not and 
cannot be translated into the exercise of violence or muted in a peaceful consensus. The public space 
never loses its potential character of multiplicity, whether in subjects, processes or regimes of 
expression. Misunderstanding is not something that can be removed permanently. Misunderstanding is 
the supplement of communication; incomprehension is implemented in comprehension. Could we then 
conclude that coming community is based on pure dissensus as Rancière (2004) suggests?  
 
Consensus means much more than the reasonable idea and practice of settling 
political conflicts by forms of negotiation and agreement, and by allotting to each 
party the best share compatible with the interests of other parties. It means the 
attempt to get rid of politics by ousting the surplus subjects and replacing them 
with real partners, social groups, identity groups, and so on. Correspondingly, 
conflicts are turned into problems that have to be sorted out by learned expertise 
and a negotiated adjustment of interests. Consensus means closing the spaces of 
                                                     
11 “Our only points of disagreement with Foucault are the following: (1) to us the assemblages seem fundamentally to be 
assemblages not of power but of desire (desire is always assembled), and power seems to be a stratified dimension of the 
assemblage; (2) the diagram and abstract machine have lines of flight that are primary, which are not phenomena of 
resistance or counterattack in an assemblage, but cutting edges of creation and deterritorialization” (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987, p. 531, n. 40). See also Patton, 2000, pp. 68-87.  
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dissensus by plugging the intervals and patching over the possible gaps between 
appearance and reality or law and fact (p. 306). 
 
Rancière’s emphasis on dissensus emerges from the reality of exclusion. Dissensus is the force of the 
ones who are unwanted and excluded from the realm of politics. Engagement within dissensus is in 
this sense the counterpart of exclusion and as such the main theme of contemporary politics. In 
connection to such exclusion, Femke Kaulingfreks (2016) refers to the riots of youth in poor 
neighborhoods of Europe – London, Brussels, Paris and The Hague – as a form of dissensus that is not 
implemented in majority’s idea of politics. In line with Rancière, she argues that such riots present a 
voice, a voice that is unheard by those that define and segment civic subjects as representative of 
moral rules of totalitarian thinking, and hence define these actions as barbaric and senseless. In order 
to resists such regimes of signs and gesturality, Kaulingfreks calls these actions unruly politics. Such 
an untimely politics demands the institutions to change their minds; it creates a visibility for those who 
have been invisible for a long time. These acts are not in order to suggest a new regime; they are “acts 
in themselves, without immediately demanding an effective outcome” (p. 13). Understanding their 
state of being thus in Agamben’s (1999b) words demands a different ethics, an ethics that breaks the 
strata by making defundamentalizing questions the fundament of its process, rather than searching for 
answers. We must become the cartographers rather than tracers of a “new terra ethica” in order to 
resist the formation of limbic silenced bodies (p. 69). 
 
In line with Agamben (2000) we could state that just as refugees, these young people are “breaking the 
nexus between human being and citizen” (p. x). Their forgotten existence, by politics of exile as well 
as politics of segments, has for a long time blocked their participants. Although both forms of politics 
rather define them as the enemies of democracy, in the spirit of Arendt (1978a) we could state that our 
sense of democracy only can appear in a space of disagreement: “Every believer in a democratic 
government knows the importance of a loyal opposition” (p. 184). Democracy is in need of the 
irreducible other; it is in need of unruly politics. In this sense, the rise of rightwing parties are not new 
faces of democracy as has been argued; but rather the recent extreme visualization of an old idea of 
supremacy that sacrifices multiplicity. These outrages are not a type of dissensus; but rather 
exploration of a consensus on supremacy of some people. Loyalty for dissensus within coming 
community is rather not a loyalty to an identity; but loyalty to difference. Loyalty within this politics 
of life does not axiomatically break relations, or differenciates segments of reduced connections. It is 
rather devoted to inherent diversity of life itself.  
 
This sense of necessity of disagreement in order to resist the totalitarian forces is pled for by many 
political philosophers of contemporary times. Slavoj Žižek’s (2011) speech on Occupied Wall Street 
proclaims the right to resist. It is a resistance that is not for the sake of destruction, but for the sake of 
blocking the destructive force of capitalism. Stopping the nightmare, as he suggests, by a form of 
awakening in which we westerners do not only make movies about the end of the world, but about the 
end of capitalism. Žižek postulates that the clarity of communication and consensus has not brought 
peace but exclusion of dissensus, of other forms of communication. Dissensus indicates change and 
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transformation. Deleuze (1997) even suggests, “the transcendent object of the faculty of sociability is 
revolution” (p. 208). Patton (2000) emphasizes this thought of Deleuze by stating: 
 
While some Idea or other is immanent in every empirical form of society, the 
properly transcendental Idea of society is only actualized during those periods of 
transition from one solution to the problems which define a society to another (pp. 
41-42). 
 
However, is dissensus as an intense necessary line of flight the only event within the social 
assemblage of a coming community? Dissensus is crucial, but is a politics of flight within the context 
of a community to come for the sake of difference-relationality a sheer state of disagreement? 
Rancière’s plea for dissensus focuses on a formation of another community, a community that does 
not exclude subjects, a community in which we do not fight for equality but acknowledge the fact that 
we are equal as such. Politics thus cannot only rely on the negative, or understand dissensus as a 
negative power, but instead comprehend it as the affirmation of the irreducible other. We must agree 
that there is an other – within and without – that is equal in belonging. In its critical attitude dissensus 
needs affirmation in order to produce connectivity. Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006) even breaks 
through the binary setting between agreement and disagreement in thematizing morality: 
 
When it comes to morality, there is no singular truth. In that case, there’s no one 
shattered mirror; there are lots of mirrors, lots of moral truths, and we can at best 
agree to differ (p. 11). 
 
Appiah’s agreement is an affirmative approach of the dissensus. Yet this affirmation must not be 
confused with consensus. Consensus as well as community based on identity is merely an illusion of 
connection. As Ten Bos (2011) suggests in order to creating a community we do not need to speak the 
same; but speak as such (p. 140). Appiah’s (2006) cosmopolitanism rather installs connectivity of 
difference as its political engine. What consensus on identity does is accentuation of one form of 
connection by cutting through all other forms of connection. Consensus and identity, in order to secure 
their preferred connection, are in essence severe forms of disconnection, of exclusion. Affirmation of 
cosmopolitanism in difference on the other hand is not only an acknowledgement of multiplicity of 
connection but also the radiant force that produces new connections. In order to produce new 
communities dissensus is in need of affirmation. Žižek (2011) already touches upon this point when he 
shouts to the crowd on Occupied Wall Street:  
 
There are truly difficult questions that confront us. We know what we do not want. 
But what do we want? What social organization can replace capitalism? What type 
of new leaders do we want?  
 
The negative revolution took place, even in the United States. Trump won through votes of negating 
an order in a nostalgic way: Make America Great again! And it merely led to nomination of power to 
those that are already representing majority. But what kind of politics will lead us out of this impasse 
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of negation versus negation? Political critical affirmation appears neither within consensus nor 
through sheer negating dissensus but through affirming the tension in-between segmentation and 
revolution as a bundle of flight lines. There is a plea for a basic need, namely for a territory in which 
speech in its plurality becomes possible. In Arendt’s (1958 & 1968) words we need a public space 
where political subjects are neither majorities who impose one form of consensus; nor majoritarian 
minorities that simply disagree with the majority and enforce consensus within a segment. Public 
space of coming community is the space of minoritarian minorities in which subjects agree on the 
productiveness of dissensus, or as Foucault (1989) suggests: On the necessity of parrhesia or the 
courage to speak freely, contesting the power that is implicitly or explicitly criticized. Parrhesia is not 
expressed in the speech of kings12, leaders or lawmakers; it is the multiple speech of minority. It is the 
speech of conscious pariahs. While communism was never realized due to the fact that each so-called 
communist regime betrayed the principles of equality of all its members, neither democracy was 
realized due to the fact that the so-called democratic states never remained true to this minoritarian 
speech of parrhesia. Democracy is nothing without its minorities, and without their possible force to 
dissent. The manner in which mayors in Dutch cities permanently block demonstrations against Black 
Pete, or allow them only in places where their visibility is minimum and the brutal assault of Jerry 
Afriyie in his peaceful protest by the police in December 2016, is an example of the decrease of a 
space for dissensus in democratic states. 
 
The necessity of disagreement indicates that democracy cannot contain only one form of passage, but 
needs a multiplicity of passages. Democracy is becoming, never at its end, never achieved, always in 
the process. As Derrida (1992b) suggests democracy is always democratie à venir.  
 
The same duty dictates assuming the European, and uniquely European, heritage of 
an idea of democracy, while also recognizing that this idea, like that of 
international law, is never simply given … but rather something that remains to be 
thought and to come [à venir]: not something that is certain to happen tomorrow, 
not the democracy (national or international, state or trans-state) of the future, but a 
democracy that must have the structure of a promise – and thus the memory of that 
which carries the future, the to-come, here and now (p. 78). 
 
Thus, coming community as an expression of a politics of life starts with resistance to a binary choice 
between pure negativity and pure consensus, situating itself in between universalistic macro-politics 
and relativistic micro-politics with disconnecting tendencies. Coming communities are porous, which 
in the end implies that the whole world can potentially connect. Nonetheless, the joining of the whole 
world is not necessary in order for this community to be what it is. It is its radiance that enables it to 
become something else. Only totalitarian states are so insecure and paranoid that the occupation of the 
                                                     
12 One might think that the stuttering of King George VI in Tom Hooper’s The King’s Speech (2010) is an example of such 
parrhesia; a king who is unable to speak properly. Parrhesia is more present in the figure Lionel Logue, the teacher. He is the 
servant who resists full obedience to the king. Nonetheless, his resistance is not for the sake of the multiplicity, but in order to 
help the king to be a king and to speak as passionately as other kings.   
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whole world is a guarantee for the truthness of their ideology. Coming community is not a choice 
between objective truthness of universalism or a desire for disconnective subjectivism. By its impact it 
is per definition saturated, whether the whole world enters it, or merely two people inhabits it. For 
some Arab Spring failed. I rather dedicate an ode to those who stood up and lost their lives; rather than 
dismiss their affords for the sake of a wishful outcome. The demand for potentiality to create an actual 
outcome is blind for the impotential force of their political acts.  
 
However, although totalitarianism and multiculturalism are not the only options, the reality of our time 
often shows that open communities remain small due to their non-desire to colonize the whole world. 
In The Human Condition as well as On Revolution Arendt pleads for the anarchy of small 
communities in which the acknowledgement of their own differences leads to the awareness that in 
this difference each man is connected to every other (Arendt, 1958, p. 246). Nonetheless, acting on 
this micro-political level alone is not enough to create connectivity. In order to avoid the closed micro-
political state of multiculturalism we are in need of a third option, namely a meso-politics as is 
suggested by Isabelle Stengers. Neither micro-politics in its peculiarity nor macro-politics in its 
generality make me think, Stengers states. Meso is relational; it connects to a political milieu in which 
differentiation between macro and micro as well as between molecular and molar are not easily made. 
It is the milieu of political practice that engages with the complexity of agencies as living beings. 
Stengers states that the meso is related to the material instead of matter. It is a form of metallurgy in 
which solid matter such as metal breaks, cracks and transforms itself. Meso-politics is not beyond 
micro and macro-politics, but an image of thought in which the solidity of macro- as well as micro-
politics is permanently redefined (Massumi & Manning, 2009). Stengers states: 
 
It concerns not matter, but material. Why does glue stick? Why do metals tend to 
stress and break? This is a science of the interstices and the cracks. It’s a science of 
defects. It is the kind of science where it is always a question of this material, 
rather than Matter, and which encounters ‘procedures,’ like those of metallurgy. … 
The macro is matter in general. … With the meso, on the other hand, it is necessary 
in each instance to redefine topically how the relations between the micro and the 
macro are assembled. In other words, it’s about everything that the macro does not 
allow to be said, and everything that the micro does not permit to be deduced (p. 
3). 
 
Meso-politics does not negate the small community in its saturated state of becoming, nor does it 
attempt to isolate it as such. As Stengers emphasizes: Meso is a rhizomatic force (p. 7). It creates the 
possibility for each community to become plural from within and from without. It is through meso-
politics that coming community becomes not only territorial 13  but also ethical impotential 
paradigmatic in relation to its endoconsistency and exoconsistency. It brings difference-relationality at 
                                                     
13 In this interview Stengers does speak of two forms of history, history defined and controlled by us, and history that escapes 
any control. Although Stengers also speaks of history in the second line, her description is highly territorial, due to use of 
terms such as Gaia and Earth (Massumi & Manning, 2009, pp. 6-7). 
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the center of its form in expression and content in an impotential way. Not the actual potential 
outcome, but the virtuality of impotentiality is appreciated.  
 
6.3.2 Stepping into the Reality of a Terra Ethica  
Meso-politics affirms the in-betweenness that constitutes a coming community in yet another way. 
This ‘inter-est’ implies not a universally based moral, but a contextually driven ethics. Community is 
in need of a non-dogmatic ethics. Non-dogmatic ethics is neither present in a paranoiac totalitarian 
state, nor in the anything-goes of relativism or indifference of multicultural tolerance. Such tolerance 
gives rise to a severe form of subjectivism; in which – as Huijer (2005) argues – modern subject 
typifies itself as mediocre hasting flexible energetic subject. Such subject flows without reflection and 
contemplation toward its own cheerful light success.   
Non-dogmatic does not mean carelessness or rushness, but demands engagement in a world of 
multiplicity. Non-dogmatic is a disinterested open approach toward other. It cares about the other. The 
implied ethics is not exclusively interested in a particular form of relationality, such as has been 
analyzed as the norm by Foucault (1977 & 1978) in his thesis on discipline. This ethics is, in Arendt’s 
(1958) words, literally inter-ested: being in the middle. In the middle always indicates multiplicities of 
connection instead of norm focused mediocrity, i.e. the ruling (kratein) of the means or media 
(medium) (Oosterling, 2000a). The ‘milieu’ I am unfolding is, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) phrase 
it, “a transversal movement that sweeps one and the other away, a stream without beginning or end 
that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle” (p. 25). According to Agamben (1993b) 
this non-oppositional ethics is precisely the non-dogmatic approach that can bring about an ethical 
attitude as such.  
 
The fact that must constitute the point of departure for any discourse on ethics is 
that there is no essence, no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological destiny 
that humans must enact or realize. This is the only reason why something like an 
ethics can exist, because it is clear that if humans were or had to be this or that 
substance, this or that destiny, no ethical experience would be possible – there 
would be only tasks to be done (p. 43). 
 
Non-dogmatic ethics bears witness to man’s freedom to take a stand against the segmentalized 
imperatives. This ethics relates to multiple concepts that problematize dogmatic state of affairs, ruled 
by those imperatives. Ethics is at all times political; and each politics manifest itself through ethical 
attitude. Ethics defines the gesturality of politics. What is the gesturality of politics of life? Let me 
elaborate the contours of such an ethics through five impotential paradigms: inter-est, revolution, 
pragmatics, mapping, and belonging.  
 
1) First, if disinterested inter-est virtually covers all forms of engagement in this community, how 
does then this engagement relate to the concept of deterritorialization? Deterritorialization here means 
neither lack of connection nor the act of disconnection. It can create strong or relative ruptures in 
segmented connections. It can generate extraordinary traits in ordinary connections, but these ruptures 
always emerge in the expression of other forms of connection that put dogmatic connections in 
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perspective. A non-dogmatic ethics withholds us from any appreciation or disapproval of the process 
in normative terms of good versus bad. 
 
Nothing in A Thousand Plateaus is unambiguously good or bad and the line of 
flight is no exception. It is both the line of maximal creative potential and the line 
of greatest danger, offering at once the possibility of the greatest joy and that of the 
most extreme anguish (Patton, 2000, p. 66). 
 
Some deterritorializations are absolute, as we saw in the second chapter, meaning the rupture so 
intense that they bring about changes on a molecular level. Some deterritorializations are relative, 
meaning their transformation happens on a molar level where they are reterritorialized again 
eventually strengthening the molar logic. Donald Trump’s triumph is in this sense a relative 
deterritorialization but does not change the order of regimes that create certain types of assemblages of 
bodies and assemblages of expressions. Also, as we have seen in Crenshaw’s (1991) analysis, 
emancipatory movements often show a molar type of deterritorialization. They still accentuate an 
identity, and demand an acknowledgment of such identity, but do not criticize the rigidity of 
identification as such. Beyond such majoritarian minority movements, the minoritarian minorities 
need to create an absolute form of deterritorialization in which the very idea of majority within a 
society or a segment of a society as such is problematized. However, in both cases – relative and 
absolute – deterritorializations must not be seen as inescapable black holes, but as ruptures or blurring 
of some relations, and not relationality as such. Deterritorialization is thus in the end not a simple 
cutting through connections, but the dismantling of the self-evidence of structures of connections. 
Though not morally biased, there are nevertheless positive and negative types of deterritorialization. 
“Absolute and relative deterritorialization will both be positive when they involve the construction of 
‘revolutionary connections in opposition to the conjugations of the axiomatic’” (Patton, 2000, p. 107; 
Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 473). These connections are revolutionary in breaking with both 
totalitarian axiomatic paradigms and multiculturalism’s desire to disconnect through differenciating 
paradigms such as culture and ethnicity. Abdul’s work does not negate the history of war in 
Afghanistan, but deterritorializes its course by creating another type of connection within the ruins. It 
sensitizes a virtual nomadic past rather than an actual history. 
 
2) Second, this form of politics is in need of another idea of revolution. How do we within the non-
dogmatic ethical politics of life stimulate and maintain revolutionary connections? Do such events as 
the Arab Spring and Black Spring indicate an absolute beginning or rather refer to the old tension 
between lines of segmentation and lines of flight? Jeffrey Bell’s (2006) comparison between Badiou’s 
belief in absolute beginnings and Deleuze’s conception of folding and unfolding within the process of 
history is illuminating. Badiou considers revolutions as actual breakthroughs; while Deleuze considers 
revolutions to be virtual lines that are bound to the double act of thinking through as well as breaking 
through the actual lines. There is, however, no opposition between Badiou’s thought and that of 
Deleuze and Guattari. The fact that actual revolutions do not always live up to their expectations does 
not mean that their event has not been effective, or has produced no new forms of connecting 
processes. Neither does the actual event of revolution mean that virtual lines can from then on never 
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emerge. Revolutions are real events precisely because they create partial actual processes that 
immediately trigger new virtual ones. The events in Tahrir Square in 2011 had actual affective impact 
on its participants and on the audiences all over the world; even if it seems that political discourse has 
gained its original power. Nevertheless, these actual effects are imbedded in layers of virtual affects, 
which gave rise to and emerged from the event in Tahrir Square. Tahrir Square did not have one 
possible outcome but multiple possible outcomes beyond its factual actualization. One of its outcome 
was a connection – thus not a reduction – of an oppression of a people in Africa and Asia to the 
oppression of a people in the United States. According to the conventional media, there are opposing 
political agendas in-between these geographic areas. Nonetheless, through alternative media around 
the globe activists and human right fighters show another political truth: an unprecedented connection 
of multiple people fighting for equality.   
So, do revolutions indicate new absolute beginnings as modernity claims or do they merely 
appear as unfolding the folds of history time and again? Here again there is no opposition. Revolutions 
bring about new beginnings but also fold and unfold within history. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 
was in that sense a good example. The history of resistance in connection to Islam was already a 
common historical fact within this country. The assemblage that emerged within this revolution, in 
which Shia Islam by political personae such as Ayatollah Khomeini was amalgamated with 
communism as well as Heidegger’s appreciation of death (Afary & Anderson, 2005, pp. 57-66). 
Nonetheless, although the event emerged from developments in the past, the assemblage actualized 
something completely different. Deleuze (1995) states: 
 
History isn’t experimental, it’s just the set of more or less negative preconditions 
that make it possible to experiment with something beyond history. Without 
history the experimentation would remain indeterminate, lacking any initial 
conditions, but experimentation isn’t historical (p. 170). 
 
The concept of beginning in Badiou’s thought, however, indicates yet another element within these 
revolutionary processes. Revolutions often emerge from the need to end a certain politically 
segmented authority. The absurd length of reign of Arabic leaders in Egypt and other countries is an 
example of this type of segmentation. However, despite the innovative traits the focus of revolutions 
often falls apart due to their sheer force of negative. Plain negation could never hold endlessly, and 
eventually one dogmatic discourse is replaced by another. The Shah of Iran dogmatically removed 
Islam from public space; Islamic Revolution in return abandoned secularism. While they seem to be 
oppositional discourses, they share a common trait of not affirming the multiplicity. Let us say, that in 
order to remain true to the event in Badiou’s words, revolutions need to see their processes not merely 
as ending-points but strongly as starting-points in which the affirmative overrules the negative. To see 
an event as a starting-point indicates efforts to maintain the event, affirmative on what to do rather 
than merely negation of what was and needs to be abandoned. An event is the very moment that 
ethical fields of connection with their virtualities actualize without closing of other virtualities. An 
event is a virtual space, not due to the fact that it has no reality, but due to the fact that it initiates new 
entrances toward potential worlds. This potentiality is gone once the moral judgment starts to 
370 
 
overdetermine the field. When, in terms I used earlier, the revolt becomes a revolution with an 
ideological focus; we intend to forget about the impotential force of resistance. 
 
3) Third, the ethics of coming community need not only be deterritorializing and revolutionary but 
also pragmatic, although this seems to be a paradox. While the revolutionary trait enforces ruptures 
through old exclusive strata of thought in institutionalized power relations, the pragmatic trait creates 
new practices remaining true to the non-dogmatic multiplicity of connections. Pragmatics thus does 
not indicate a choice between two evils; or a mediocre choice between two extremes. It is not about 
consensus, compromise or a gray zone of concessions that expresses the will of majority. Nor is 
pragmatism a form of toleration of multiplicity. Toleration is not affirmation, but acceptance of 
something that is still morally or affectively disapproved of.14 As Ghorashi (2010) argues, toleration in 
our state of democracy at best gives space for difference – a space in which relationality becomes 
passive in non-speech toward difference – rather than create space and guard the space of difference 
(pp. 26-27). Appiah (2006) states: “Toleration requires a concept of the intolerable ... we plainly need 
to go beyond talk of truth and tolerance” (p. 144). A rheumatoid arthritis patient tolerates the 
unavoidable pain. In pragmatism differences are affirmed as desired and necessary traits of politics 
and ethics. Pragmatics does not start from a dogmatic point of view but is in need of an approach from 
the middle of a multiple ideas on a good life, as Appiah pleads. Pragmatism thus does not befall into 
the trap of a universalizing and eternalizing truthness. In other words, while ideologies start with 
primary rules and try to structure a desired perfect identity and society, pragmatism starts in the 
middle of a milieu, aware of the contextuality of the matter. Yet, in contrast to multiculturalism, a 
politics of life approaches contextuality as an impotential paradigm instead of a differenciating 
paradigm. The complexity of contexuality is a virtual reality and not actually definable. An ethical 
attitude toward such contextuality is thus not self-employed and omniscient; but rather shy and porous.  
Such ethics is not external, but immanent. Within politics of life – a politics that implements 
diversity of life as its basic impotential contextual element – ethics is not a transcendental production 
of norms for conduct, but the creation of immanent approaches within which values lead to reflective 
judgments in which lives in any sense of the word matter. It is not the logic of a certain consensus or 
determinative judgment, whether small or universal, micro or macro. Pragmatism is the political 
                                                     
14 John Schimek (n.d) refers to Derrida’s notion of hospitality in which plurality is shaped by virtue of respect that actively 
seeks to communicate. Schimek suggests that only due to the virtue of respect can plurality endure in a peaceful multicultural 
society. In contrast, I suggest that his way of thinking surpasses the idea of multiculturalism or multi-religions and instead 
creates an inter-religious and intercultural territory. In connection to mutual transformation within difference instead of 
toleration Rita M. Gross (1991) states: “Mutual transformation does not result in new religions or in one universal 
syncretistic religion, but in the enrichment of the various traditions that results when their members are open to the 
inspiration provided by resources of others. How much more satisfying intellectually and ethically than mere tolerance or 
religious ethnocentrism and chauvinism!” Yet, unfortunately her critique merely targets some religions – Christianity and 
Islam – and does not critically points out the inherent ethnocentrisms and xenophobic tendencies of other types of beliefs; for 
example, secularism. As Schinkel (2011) argues secularism itself creates a secular purgatory by paradoxically mono-
defining autonomy.  
371 
 
practice of rhizomatic thinking as acting. It is connective, not finalizing. It is this trait of 
connectedness that, according to Stengers, connects meso-politics to the practice of pragmatism.15  
 
The meso is a site of invention where the pragmatics of the question is much more 
alive, more vivid, more difficult to forget than the micro or the macro, which 
traditionally play a game of truth. The meso must create itself. And each time, the 
meso affirms its copresence with a milieu. This – sticks that’s a relation to a milieu. 
This breaks, this bends, this is elastic – that implies an action undergone. Every 
material is a relation with a milieu. … The contrast success/failure raises different 
questions, pragmatic questions, in experimental relation with milieus (Massumi & 
Manning, 2009, pp. 3-4). 
 
Success and failure in Stengers' analysis indicate productivity; failure brings about transformation 
within the process.16 Or as Deleuze and Guattari (1986) put it: “Each failure is a masterpiece, a branch 
of the rhizome” (p. 39). Freed from the normative and moral gesture thus pragmatics means to 
experiment. It is transcendental empiricism in which a form of life does not negate its living matter, 
but within the movement of this matter, it creates its form and image of thought.  
 
4) Fourth, this idea of pragmatism in which ‘nothing can be said in advance’ does not simply indicate 
a reference to a future actual state. Ethical pragmatic experiment cannot base itself on a common idea 
or rule. It cannot trace or copy a course of action. The rhizomatic ethical approach rather maps out 
connections in the middle instead of copy-pasting eternal and universal ideas of a good life. While 
tracing motivated by long-term memory segmentarizes into identarian structures such as families and 
nations, mapping rhizomatically decentralizes itself by permanent acts of creating nodes in layered 
networks that transversally cohere and are composed. The students in my classroom and I were 
amazed by the process of mapping beyond the traceable identities. That does not mean that the 
meritocratic rejection of the boy was the same as the girl, but rather that they related through 
difference in being and experiences. 
According to Deleuze and Guattari the rhizome is not familiar with notions such as progress, 
progressive or the middle mode, the end of the line or a middle defined by finality and averages. We 
are always already in the middle with variable speeds. Thus, in the end the coming of this community 
of politics of life is not a future sense of utopia. Utopia and progress indicate a trace to follow. The 
mapping out of coming community rather indicates the permanent sensitization of possible forms of 
actions. Communication is crucial. Coming refers to the virtual natality of possibilities of approach 
now here, a possible world that is neither opposed to an actual world, nor defined by one form of 
method or recognition. This form of community is not a final step in a politics of flight. As such a 
                                                     
15 Stengers disapproves with Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis on micropolitics that articulates on the level of the body. As an 
activist and a philosopher of science that studies laboratory practices for her micro is an indication of molecular activity. She 
favors the agency of non-institutionalized groups as a result of which ‘meso’ is the level of political pragmatism.   
16 Stenger states: “immanent tension between succeeding and failing, between succeeding, or working together in a mode that 
creates an experience that sustains us, and failing, which is to say dispersing” (Massumi & Manning, 2009, p. 15). 
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politics of life does not occur at the end of a line, but in the middle of a process. We are already there 
in the middle. Even a totalitarian state could give rise to such processes indicating a deterritorialization 
of totalitarian thought as an ‘inner Emigration’, a term used to describe German writers who were 
opposed to Nazism yet chose to remain in Germany after the Nazis seized power in 1933. Agamben 
(1999a) even radically suggests, “only through an indetermination will it be possible to conceive of an 
indetermination” (p. 217). This means that within the coming community totalitarian exclusion or 
multicultural segmentation could emerge too. Coming community is thus no more rhizomatic than 
other types of societies. It is only explicit, or more expressive about its own unpredictable content. It 
affirms its ontological basis in an impotential mesopolitical way. 
 
5) Finally, the fifth step of the ethics of this politics of life is the acknowledgement of belonging as a 
given. We all – not simply morally or ideologically, but more so ontologically – belong to this world, 
and due to the diversity that this absolute belonging entails there are no entrances to this world that 
can be closed permanently. While totalitarianism and multiculturalism are based on one form of 
entrance and multiple forms of violent exit, the ethical approach of coming community defines each 
gate, even that of totalitarianism or multicultural identity, as a form of possible entrance. Entrance in 
coming community indicates the inevitable possibility of belonging as such, as we will see in the final 
part of this chapter. Belonging, in contrast to ideological beliefs, does not occur due to expected 
characteristics or historical affiliation. Belonging as such is independent of normative structures. 
Subjects belong whether we like it or not. The Dutch distinction in terms of allochthonous and 
autochthonous suggests that there are degrees of belonging. Manufacturing distinctions such as ‘the 
nth-generation migrants’ (Schinkel, 2008) and continuing to define them as allochthonous or a hip-term 
such as people with migration background – men and women who are forced to semi-belong – 
demonstrates the desire to define non-belonging rather than participating in the process of belonging 
as such. Semi-belonging or non-belonging is in denial of belonging to a community.17 Even so, if we 
follow the argumentation of Huijer (2016), there are no people with a migrant-background versus 
people with no migrant-background. In the state of global-being everyone – the traveller and the one 
that traveller leaves behind – have migrant background. These understand of background through 
cliché axiomatic and differencial distinctions arise from the incomprehension of the unavoidability of 
belonging. We are travelling, physically, mentally and digitally. In the realm of speech in Arendt’s 
words, or in de openness of expression in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, each subject belongs with the 
different intensities, whether the normative rules define it as such or not. In this space each person, 
stranger or familiar, participates as an agency in inter-speak and inter-action.  
 
The multiplicity of entrances in politics of life problematizes a rigid form of entering politics of flight: 
it problematizes an entrance that is based on an idea of truthness, in which facts and truths morally 
intertwine with one another; create a unitary recognition and memory. It is within such entrance that 
                                                     
17 Arendt (1968) tells us that it destroys the possibility of belonging: “The calamity of the rightless is not that they are 
deprived of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion-formulas which 
were designed to solve problems within given communities – but that they no longer belong to any community whatsoever” 
(p. 295). I prefer to claim that it neglects the belonging but can never destroy belonging as such.  
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the ethics of multiple entrances, a multiplicity of connections and responsibility is lost. The rhetoric’s 
of war often relies on such collision between facts and truths. Whenever fact and truth become the 
same, the totalitarian force of one form of opinion is not far away. Fact is that Saddam Hussein 
stopped breathing on 30th December 2006. Moral truthness of the matter is within the determinative 
judgment that with his death we have dealt with his responsibility for more than 200.000 civilian 
deaths of Iraqi political and religious minorities. The evil was over there and we westerners cleansed 
our hands in innocence and identified and acknowledged ourselves as saviors. The mess we left 
behind is the result of a collision of facts with truths drenched by ethnocentric moralism. 
 Within such morality responsibility is ascribed to a subject, a people, fed by an idea of 
dismantling an evil agency on the other side of the spectrum of good. Ethics of politics of life rather 
resists such binary setting of responsibility. As we have seen, Agamben’s (1999b) plea for ethical 
territory for future cartographers (p. 13) rather moves through another form of factuality. The 
ontological reality of each of us belonging as such to a world, means that we are – in one way or other 
– all responsible. The term non-responsibility as an impotential paradigm in Agamben’s lecture thus 
does not indicate that there is no responsibility, but rather that there is no fixed agency or subject(s) 
that solely carry the responsibility. This means that while a moral truth due to a set of norms defines 
our conduct and judges whether we are or are not responsible, the ethical reality of rhizome within a 
coming community demands us each time to redefine in which way we are co-responsible.  
 
Facts are given; ethical truth on the other hand is a result of permanent research. How does this ethical 
truth relate to recognition and memory, i.e. to collective identity? What do we recognize and what do 
we remember? Difference and connection: difference-relationality. Next to the non-synchronic 
relation between truth and facts, within the meso-ethical process the relation between recognition and 
facts is mutually non-synchronic. Recognition is a crucial concept in multiple analyses on politics of 
migration, as we have seen in the fifth chapter. Migration is often seen as a process that leads to 
recognition or non-recognition, within identity and loss of identity. Recognition – not as a sociological 
or psychological fact but as a discursive tool of relating to connections – thus appears in multiple 
assemblages of connections. Nevertheless, whenever recognition denies its meso-multiplicity and 
appears as recognition of facts or identity, the reduction of all connection to one form of recognition 
is not far.18 Recognition of an identity as the tool instead of a tool among others leads to the idea of a 
main entrance, destroying a rhizomatic approach. A main entrance refers to a passage that can be 
entered by or closed to an enemy. It is the entrance of the great Signifier that blocks all other 
entrances. Consequently, this Signifier blocks an ability to experiment, to relate differently on multiple 
levels. Deleuze and Guattari (1986) therefor claim: 
 
We will enter, then, by any point whatsoever; none matters more than another, and 
no entrance is more privileged even if it seems an impasse, a tight passage, a 
siphon. … Only the principle of multiple entrances prevents the introduction of the 
enemy, the Signifier and those attempts to interpret a work that is actually only 
open to experimentation (p. 3). 
                                                     
18 See also Patton, 2000, p. 20. 
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An act of signification is an act of reduced recognition. The great Signifier is always embedded in or 
related to an oppositional structure. Within the frameworks of identity, we always recognize someone 
as either this or that, friend or foe. As the result of this oppositional recognition, we decide to grant the 
other entrance or to exclude him or her. And when we do not recognize the other, when we cannot 
identify the other clearly as a result of blurred facts or a blurred memory, we often become scared and 
shut the doors anyhow. Or even more so, we are obliged to shut doors. This was sensible when a 
colleague of mine Naima Chouaati, identified as a Muslim woman with Moroccan background, was 
complimented by her coworkers as inspiring for other Muslim female students. When she waved the 
compliment by stating “why am I not allowed to be inspiring for a homosexual white boy?”; her 
coworkers stated that she must not ask for the impossible.  
However, although recognition can have its roots within the structure of binary identities, yet 
recognition is not outside the rhizome. Could we – in line with my colleague – state that we could 
recognize and inspire through difference. In other words – as we have seen in the classroom before – 
we recognize an inspiration through redefinable connections, rather than through identity. 
 
A politics of life also dismantles the presupposed one-on-one relation between memory and identity. 
How do we remember? Deleuze and Guattari (1986) speak of childhood blocks instead of childhood 
memories.  
 
Memory brings about a reterritorialization of childhood. But the childhood block 
functions differently. It is the only real life of the child; it is deterritorializing; it 
shifts in time, with time, in order to reactivate desire and make its connections 
proliferate; it is intensive and, even in its lowest intensities, it launches a high 
intensity. He also forms a block of deterritorialization that shifts with time, the 
straight line of time, coming to reanimate the adult as one animates a puppet and 
giving the adult living connections (pp. 78-79). 
 
Despite the fact that memory confirms a univocal structure, it is still a passage. Even if memory is an 
impasse – such as remembering the past in full of shame and guilt in the present as we have seen in the 
fifth chapter – it is still according to Deleuze and Guattari a part of the rhizome (pp. 3-5). 
Nevertheless, I would rather argue that memory is not simply a passage within the rhizome; and it is 
not necessarily arborescent either. It is in the end too simplistic to define memories as personal 
experiences, or merely effects of a general discourse. Life-stories often change and connect to the 
impotential contextuality. Ghorashi (2003) analysis of different experiences of and connections to the 
past in California and The Netherlands is exemplary. She argues that the more open a society gets, the 
more individuals tend to have a multiple attitude toward the past. The closer a society the more 
individuals tend to reduce their life-stories to one type of affect, such as shame and nostalgia.  
 
Feeling of home has little to do with your country of origin, but very much to do 
with the place you can revive your memory (p. 249).  
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Memories neither belong to the macro- nor the micro-level, but just as truth and recognition, they 
appear as Ghorashi shows within a meso-level and within an assemblage of connections. Memories 
obey multiple logics. Memory is rhizomatic in the fullest sense of the word. Inspired by Augustine, 
Arendt (1996) writes: “Memory undoes the past. The triumph of memory is that in presenting the past 
and thus depriving it, in a sense, of its bygone quality, memory transforms the past into a future 
possibility” (p. 48). Although Augustine refers to memory of a Creator and the possibility of a future 
salvation, the phrase that memory undoes the past and creates possibilities is arousing.  
 Memories appear and disappear, change intensities, take different tracks and create new 
openings for what is coming. A main entrance appears whenever memories are merely judged by their 
references to known facts. Arendt’s conception of the narrative, as I have discussed in the first chapter 
(1.4.3), is rather a plea for narratives and memories that unessentially connect endlessly.  
 
The animation film WALL-E (Stanto, 2008) is a fine example of the rhizomatic character of 
recognition and memory as differentiating impotential paradigms instead of differenciating paradigms 
of true and false memory. WALL-E is a robot, made to organize the garbage on the planet earth. The 
air has been polluted so badly that no living being can live there. The remaining human beings live in 
a spacecraft. But while the humans have become the object of the machines, i.e. the purpose of 
existence of the machines of consumptions, WALL-E has become a human by creating a home, 
having a plant and a cricket as a pet. He wants to be alive, or in the full sense a subject, and therefore 
he records memories in sounds and visuals. He is a non-human, keeping humanity alive, by falling in 
love and wanting to reveal the truth about their planet. In search of justice he even sacrifices himself, 
not by losing his robotness but rather by losing his memory and hence dying as a man. WALL-E loses 
itself or rather himself because his memory card is violently destroyed. He forgets everything, even his 
love for EVE. Fortunately, the unintentional act of holding hands brings his memory back, his tactile 
rather than lingual or visual memory is triggered. He remembers EVE and becomes the WALL-E we 
know. His identity is recognized again by the thankful viewer.  
 
The simplicity of the end, however, must not fool us. The character of WALL-E is more complex than 
it seems. The memories that where gained by the robot, do not belong to him, they do not even belong 
to his species, let alone the affect caused by these memories. Furthermore, his memories are not 
straight timelines that refer back to an identity or an essence of WALL-E. On the contrary, only due to 
loss of his memory he becomes the robot he was made to be, the garbage robot. WALL-E is truly 
stateless. In a sense, he regains his ‘essence’ and his garbage becomes nothing more than garbage. His 
memories bring out complexities in his character, memories in which useless garbage becomes 
multiple lines within a story. Finally, the memories come back although the memory-card is 
irreparably damaged and is replaced by an empty memory-card that contains nothing of our WALL-E. 
What affects the recollection is a touch. It is the tactile recognition that triggers his memory, by his 
hands rather than by his logical linear brain. It is due to the multiplicity of memory that WALL-E 
turns into a being, instead of being an object, a machine. WALL-E in the end, by connecting on a 
different level, moves beyond the logic of identity. WALL-E is a becoming, he becomes human by 
differing from human-beings. “The act of becoming is a capturing, a possession, a plus-value, but 
never a reproduction or an imitation” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1986, p. 13). 
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6.3.3 Ethical Impotential Paradigms 
What kind of cartography or mapping does this interested, revolutionairy, pragmatical ethical truth 
that bears witness to a different belonging ask for? In line with the reflections of my companions in 
thought, mostly with Deleuze and Guattari I will distinguish an ethical connection from a moralistic 
judgment. Ethics – or in terms of Agamben (1999b): terra ethica – is redefined in an ontological sense 
as the rhizomatic field of connections. This explains its interestedness and pragmatical dimension. 
Everything that is considered to be an isolated subject or object is on this field penetrated and 
composed by lines of segmentation and lines of flight. Imagine an immense layered network of 
networks with nodes and meshes. Every seemingly empty in-between space is at the same time the 
embedding of connections. There are cacophonic silences and an abundance of space of in-between, 
i.e. inter-est. You and I are connected in different ways; in so many ways that we cannot comprehend. 
Ethics is not etiquette or netiquette, but comprehension of this incomprehensive immensity of 
potential worlds of differentiation of connectivity: difference-relationality. Ethics is not based on a 
definable emotion; it is rather the multiplicity of affects of a body without organs passing our bodies 
without permission. As Agamben stated, ethics is non-dogmatic, due to the fact that it maps out all 
actual and virtual forms of connection without judgment. Just as the same air penetrates both the lungs 
of Adolf Hitler and Mahatma Gandhi without distinction, ethics creates and manifests connections 
without preferences and without a specific agenda. Ethics of politics of life – in contrast to politics of 
exile and politics of segments – does not intend to introduce rules and norms in order to tame the 
unending ontological connections into orders of expression. Ethics of this politics rather willingly 
gives in to this ontological reality. The form of expression of politics of life is merely loyal to the 
intensity of différance; not because it does not know formation and segmentation, but rather because it 
always questions its own tendency to formation and segmentation. Ethics is neither vertical nor 
horizontal, but transversal and vectoral due to its multidimensional topology and the emphasis on all 
possible connections made in its act of mapping. The morality of exile and segmentation 
overdetermines the rhizomatic transversality of politics by clearly defined and less fluid 
characteristics, creating in its manifestation of rules a strict sense of traceability. In contrast to this 
politics of exile the rhizomatic ethical vernacular of politics of life happens on a molecular level. 
While morality creates molar connections, in line with Stengers, we could state that ethics as a meso-
political contextual practice is better localized in-between both molar and molecular process. In this 
sense, ethics becomes an impotential paradigm rather than an axiomatic or differenciating norm due to 
holding on to the tension in-between molar and molecular. Enlightenment promised molecular 
intensities through its propagation for freedom and authenticity via autonomy; yet by defining what 
exactly an ideal autonomy looks like, it gave in to molar desire to segment territories and people. It is 
time to enlighten the Enlightenment itself on the meaning of autonomy.  
  
However, we still have to deal with two problems. First, stating there is a difference between molar 
and molecular does not imply that we can easily distance ourselves from a molar state of morality in 
order to act according a molecular state of ethics. Although morality is embedded in the ethical field, 
the transcendental urge of self-consciousness causes man to look at it through moralistic glasses. In 
the context of laboratory practices Stengers observes: 
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The question of how to go from the mode of description demanded by water 
molecules to the molar mode of description, where it’s a question of water that we 
can drink or swim in, is extremely complicated. It’s an open problem, not an 
opposition (Massumi & Manning, 2009, p. 2). 
 
Second, not all molar systems are the same and in each system different forces are at work. Different 
relative deterritorializing forces create different types of moral molar systems, religious, social, ethical 
and political. Negative deterritorialization creates a system in which a strong segmentary whole is 
produced, neglecting positive deterritorializations that enforce affects on a molecular level ‘beneath’ 
the molar systems. The overdetermined moral system and thought still works through the intensity of 
these relative forms of deterritorialization. Some moral rules are more intensely ‘loyal’ to the ethical 
field than others. “Thou shalt not kill”, as one of the oldest moral rules of various religious systems, 
speaks of such intensity. To consider killing as an evil thing is a moral judgment, while the intensity of 
the ethical field is present in the judgment, due to the fact that through such judgment appreciation of 
a life and hence prohibition of the destruction of its potential connections navigate the ethical attitude. 
It is then crucial to state: coming community is an ethical community not due to the fact that it lacks 
moral judgment, but due to the fact that it is not in denial of its moralistic impact, but permanently, 
critically and affirmatively connects this morality to the ethical field, to terra ethica, mapping out all 
other virtualities. It gives in to critical morality. 
 
Ethics begins only when the good is revealed to consist in nothing other than a 
grasping of evil and when the authentic and the proper have no other content than 
the inauthentic and the improper (Agamben, 1993b, p. 13). 
 
Coming community’s morality is aware of its own tendency toward totalitarianism and 
multiculturalism. Awareness here, however, does not indicate a solution or the road to salvation. The 
problematization is chronic and as a result, referring to Deleuze and Guattari, concepts will be 
produced constantly. Awareness therefore indicates permanent engagement, inspiring the alacrity to 
deal with problematizations beyond universalism without falling back on relativism. Appiah (2006) 
eloquently reasons:  
 
For if relativism about ethics and morality were true, then, at the end of many 
discussions, we would each have to end up saying ‘From where I stand, I am right. 
From where you stand, you are right.’ And there would be nothing further to say. 
From our different perspectives, we would be living effectively in different worlds. 
… Relativism of that sort isn’t a way to encourage conversation; it’s just a reason 
to fall silent (pp. 30-31). 
 
We live in the same world, we communicate whether with open or shut senses. And there is always a 
judgment within the experience of a relationality. Even a neutral state is a state. Yet, judgment that 
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remains loyal to the ethical field of coming community is principally contextual and oscillates 
between what Agamben (1993b) calls the common and the proper. 
 
The being that is engendered on this line is whatever being, and the manner in 
which it passes from the common to the proper and from the proper to the common 
is called usage – or rather, ethos” (p. 20). 
 
Ethics within this setting is anchored in ethos, just as Foucault proposed in his last writings. Ethos is 
first and for all connected to the other, to differences. Individual or common actions never abandon 
their potential to be something else, and mutually give rise to other potential acts. Yet, we can never 
speculate on the immensity of an action, as Arendt (1958) puts it. It endures until the end of times.  
 
The reason why we are never able to foretell with certainty the outcome and end of 
any action is simply that action has no end. The process of a single deed can quite 
literally endure throughout time until mankind itself has come to an end (Arendt, 
1958, p. 233). 
 
Nonetheless, ethics of politics of life is not random or without paradigms. Its paradigms rather create 
an ethical attitude toward the unpredictability of actions and ontological belonging as such. They are 
impotential ethical paradigms that form the expression of coming community. Moreover, it is also 
crucial to state that these ethical paradigms never appear individually or hierarchically. While in the 
jargon of totalitarianism the value of security and in the jargon of multiculturalism the value of loyalty 
manifest themselves on the top of a moral pyramid, values within coming community always effect 
one another transversally. They hold on to one another; they stimulate an equal relationaliy without 
reducing difference to homogeneity. Defining this relationality is an immense act; and perhaps a 
subject for another book. But let me clarify my point by evaluating four pairs of impotential ethical 
paradigms. Yet reading my evaluation one must keep in mind that, as Schinkel argues (2008): “we are 
always more valuable than a collection of values” (p. 473). Schinkel justly states that discussion of 
values always remains in the danger of representation of a form of metaphysical neutrality. Thus, let 
us state that within the coming configuration of pairs of values the word and is more fundamental than 
the value itself. It is within this and that the processual as well as relational inherency of a value rather 
than segmentalization of the value is appreciated. 
 
1) Freedom and responsibility 
Patton’s (2000) notion of critical freedom is immensely useful here. He states that freedom, in relation 
to Deleuze’s Nietzschean understanding of it, does not appear due to a personal satisfaction or 
realization of an identity. Freedom does not manifest an essence but rather outflows the idea of an 
essence and identity. Freedom unfolds in change, in self-overcoming. While traditional liberal thought 
gives in to grasp an identity, in Patton and Deleuze’s thought it is rather transformation that is the key 
to critical freedom (pp. 2-3 & 83). “In contrast to the traditional concepts of negative and positive 
freedom, critical freedom thus concerns those moments in a life after which one is no longer the same 
person” (p. 85). It is within this multiplicity and transformability that we place the plurality of political 
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acts and the unidentifiable appearance of men in public space, as indicated by Arendt. Nevertheless, 
despite this freedom to act differently Arendt (1958) also states: 
 
Neither in labor ... nor in fabrication ... does man appear to be less free than in 
those capacities whose very essence is freedom and in that realm which owes its 
existence to nobody and nothing but man (p. 234). 
 
Plurality is due to unpredictable actions through which we are initially confused by instead of enabled 
to choose the right passageway. Or as Appiah (2006) puts it: 
 
Reasoning – by which I mean the public act of exchanging stated justifications – 
comes in not when we are going on in the usual way, but when we are thinking 
about change. And when it comes to change, what moves people is often not an 
argument from a principle, not a long discussion about values, but just a gradually 
acquired new way of seeing things (p. 73). 
 
Seeing thing implies imaginations, which – as we have seen in the first chapter (1.4.3) – Arendt 
defines (1982) as “the ability to make present what is absent” (p. 65). The freedom of this plurality 
comes with a nearly unbearable responsibility. We act in public without guarantees, without the 
ability to comprehend the effects of our deeds, especially in the digital age we are living now. This 
responsibility does not depend on understanding motives or intentions of ourselves or others, and in 
this sense such responsibility differs from that of Kant. It is a pragmatic responsibility in the 
Deleuzean sense. Men are accountable for what they do. At the same time, they are the play toys in a 
web of events that surpass their birth as well as their death. Pragmatic understanding as a form of 
resistance against the totalitarian or segmentalizing consistency, is the acceptance that we belong to, 
are submitted to and nevertheless are anywise responsible for this world we are living in. What we 
must realize is that – despite the fact that the course of our actions is impossible to grasp by humans, 
neither in anticipation nor in retrospection because the very reflection already alters the course of 
events – these actions nonetheless belong to the human world. It is not something metaphysical that is 
beyond our research or doing. It is our way of consumption that dries and pollutes landscapes 
elsewhere. The refugees who bang on our doors are not asking for our mercy but call us upon our 
responsibility. And only through this realization we are able to survive the nightmares of our time 
(Arendt, 1978a, p. 174). 
 
2) Antimemory and forgiving 
This pair relates Arendt’s thought to that of Deleuze and Guattari. Coming community is territorial 
rather than historical, transversal rather than vertical or horizontal. To map it out, it needs what 
Deleuze and Guattari call nomadology. Rhizomatics as an approach is nomadology and, given the 
critical retake of truth, recognition and memory, not in line with generally accepted the standard 
history. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) even suggest some form of antimemory (p. 21). There are, 
according to Deleuze and Guattari only short-term memories. I rather suggest that there is a form of 
transformable memory that implements the ability to remember differently. This creates a space – a 
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historical connective political space – that is free from the historical sentiment of nationalism or the 
utopian response of idealism. Yet, though a coming community is not defined by and thus the outcome 
of historical processes, it is nevertheless related to them. It is not forgetting in a normal sense of the 
past. When Arendt (1958) scorns the act of forgetting the past, she refers to another form of forgetting: 
denial of the past. Antimemroy rather acknowledges the rhizomatic connectivity of the past; by 
resisting the segmented frameworks of written history. Rhizomatic memory is not denial but rather 
something different. It resists history by resisting its force to exclude those who did not belong or 
shared that history; who in Hegelian words had no subjectivity. It is a type of memory that revolts due 
to its nomadological understanding of history. It cuts through historical distinctions such as citizens 
and non-citizens. Within the realm of transformative memory each subject belongs to a coming 
community.  
Only through such open political space of antimemory we could, in line with Arendt, bring 
forth the notion of forgiving. Forgiving remembers the past, not as a road to an essence, but rather as 
an awareness to avoid essentiality. It remembers the political appeal to connect differently. Forgiving 
is for Arendt an act par excellence due to the fact that despite its reference to the past it gives rise to a 
new political relationality, to being interested or 'interesse'. Forgiving is a mode of natality. 
Forgiveness is not the denial of responsibility, nor amnesia of the horror. Forgiveness is not the end of 
judgment. Its natality is the actualization of new possibilities without neglecting violent and 
murderous deeds. The judgement is reflective, not determined. It opens the possibility of a birth of a 
new actor. However, as any other action to forgive is unpredictable and impossible to plan. It is not an 
Oprah Winfrey or Dr. Phil show in which the offenders and offended meet, ask for mercy and forgive. 
As any act forgiveness is spontaneous and beyond the control of the subjects (pp. 236-241). In case of 
South Africa, we could argue that both scenarios were at hand. 
 
3) Respect and disagreement 
Within a coming community each agent is a political agent, entitled to political speech. In line with 
her ethos of friendship19 total negation or total consensus means the end of a coming community. This 
community only emerges due to plurality, and consensus within plurality is by definition a 
contradiction in terms. Nevertheless, as argued before, negation alone will not suffice either. Coming 
community is in need of an affirmative dissensus. Arendt (1958) suggests the notion of respect, which 
just as forgiving is an act that, due to its potentiality, can start something new. Respect by no means 
implies an agreement. It rather creates space for an event of disagreement by mere acknowledgement 
of the other as an interlocutor. Other than toleration, respect is in need of speech and affirmative 
acting. Respect is not a subjective preference but a process in which a political milieu of another kind 
appears. It is a minimum space of sensus communis, without the universalistic pretense. When the 
Dutch parliament tried to prohibit a debate with the Sharia scholar Sjeik Haitham al-Haddad in VU 
University Amsterdam, the organizers complied to the demand. Yoeri Albrecht, the director of the 
                                                     
19 For a comparison between Derrida’s notion of friendship and Arendt’s see the analysis of Dirk De Schutter (2005). He 
clearly shows the resistance of both thinkers towards brotherhood that essentially differs from friendship. While brotherhood 
refers to the necessary condition of labor, friendship emerges from within the openness of politics. Friendship does not 
function through compassion due to an essence that all men share, but through difference that relates (pp. 106-126). 
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debate-center De Balie, offered his center as an alternative, by arguing that disagreement is no reason 
for exclusion. Although Albrecht disagreed with al-Haddad, he nonetheless referred to a meso-
political milieu of respect, beyond his macropolitical preferences (Omstreden sjeik is geland, 2012). 
Yet, his invitations of disagreements remain uncritical toward the idea of freedom of speech in relation 
to power constructions in a society based on racism and sexism; and other forms of exclusion.   
 
4) Hesitation and decisiveness 
Finally, coming community oscillates intensely between hesitation, as an acknowledgement of a lack 
of ultimate knowledge, and the necessity to decide in order to act anyway. This tension is almost 
impossible to bear. Just as freedom brings about the burden of responsibility, hesitation brings about 
the burden to act without certain direction. Deciding to act appears in the process of thinking and as 
Deleuze shows “it is not the reassuring familiarity of the known which should provide us with the 
paradigm of thinking, but those hesitant gestures which accompany our encounters with the unknown” 
(cited in Patton, 2000, p. 19). On the level of cultural, social and economic discourse Arjun Appadurai 
(2001) speaks of a form of approach that initiates from within a milieu, instead of functioning as an 
outside objective view. It is an approach with patience, it rather listens than teaches.  
The tension between the hesitation and the necessity of decision is also shown by Jacques 
Derrida in Force of law (1992a). Derrida first distinguishes between law as a form of institution and 
the ethical concept of justice. While the law defines itself by force and intends to order and predict 
outcomes, justice appears where thought is uncertain. Justice is not an impossible experience, it is an 
experience of the impossible. And yet, justice is not opposed to action. It is not a prediction or 
calculation, justice is rather an appeal, a decision. Although we could never be certain of the outcome 
of our actions or their justness, non-action when it is needed the most, is unjust in every sense. Derrida 
reaches beyond action and passivity in promoting a 'non-passive endurance'. In our diplomatic 
pinpointing the blame there is no justice to be found for refugees that all around the globe try to escape 
the horrors of our world. Dissensus could be potentially connective only when we decide to act 
whenever murder is the case. Decision, however, does not create heroes. It is never an ego trip or done 
for the sake of security of oneself. According to Derrida decision, as any act, befalls subjects. And 
most definitely it befell those men and women who left behind the western luxury in order to approach 
those refugees within the context of refugee camps. 
 
Coming community thus creates a space in which paradigms do not regulate a homogenous structure, 
but instead problematize and challenge one another. They keep each other on the edge and trigger 
thinking, creating impotential paradigms that ask for action. The impotentiality is not a negative space, 
an emptiness; it is difference-relationality. Two courses of action are relevant here: jurisprudence and 
pedagogy. Jurisprudence as law in action and not law in books is not, according to Deleuzian 
pragmatics, about the certainty of the law. It deals with the juridical complexity of a concrete process 
and gives in to the need to decide in course of action. 
 
What interests me isn't the law or laws (the former being an empty notion, the latter 
uncritical notions), nor even law or rights, but jurisprudence. It’s jurisprudence, 
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ultimately, that creates law, and we mustn’t go on leaving this to judges (Deleuze, 
1995, p. 169). 
 
Jurisprudence does not simply trace the law, but if it is done sincerely, it maps out a process unfolding 
its virtualities. Jurisprudence becomes justice in practice. Pedagogy is the practice par excellence in 
coming community. This practice motivates thought rather than structuring it. Here pedagogy does not 
give in to the idea of Bildung, in which only one type of normalized identity can function as an 
example. Pedagogy is neither formation, nor accumulation of factual knowledge, but experiment and 
creation. As jurisprudence, it is thought in practice. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) argue: 
 
The post-Kantians concentrated on a universal encyclopedia of the concept that 
attributed concept creation to a pure subjectivity rather than taking on the more 
modest task of a pedagogy of the concept, which would have to analyze the 
conditions of creation as factors of always singular moments. If the three ages of 
the concept are the encyclopedia, pedagogy, and commercial professional training, 
only the second can safeguard us from falling from the heights of the first into the 
disaster of the third – an absolute disaster for thought whatever its benefits might 
be, of course, from the viewpoint of universal capitalism (p. 12). 
 
6.4 Ethical Expression: What Really Matters … 
 
6.4.1 The Epos of Singular Assemblages 
In this section I will set out the matter of expression of coming community, or politics of life. Just as 
coming community – as a form of content – occurs as multi-territorial saturated community; and 
ethical impotential paradigms – as a form of expression – map out the intensity of plural 
relationalities; the matter of expression of politics of life undergoes the same process. As we have seen 
the form of content and the form of expression of coming community are supplementary to one-
another. The form of content that identifies itself as body without organs inspires the ethics of politics 
of life; and the ethical impotential paradigms of politics of life sensitize the difference-relationality of 
its form. There are ethical layers in which all forms of expression are potentially present. This is the 
virtual rhizomatic underground on which expression differentiates itself in different types, such as 
language, image and gesture, and in this process, creates within different types moral segments that we 
could call grammar or framing. My companions in thought give us tools for decoding and breaking 
through rules so that one can experiment with concepts, functions, senses/percepts as well as 
paradigms. By creating another idea of experiencing minority their images of thought do not only 
deconstruct an attitude towards forms of expression, but also our comprehension of epistemology, 
ontology and politics. Their reflection has immense ethical and juridical implications. 
 
For Arendt (1958) political natality through action is always supplemented by speech. It is the birth of 
the matter of expression in politics; and exactly this birth of action and speech are the elements that 
distinguish us from animals as well as Gods (pp. 22-23). Neither labor nor work is as essential as this 
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part of vita activa for our ability to be a human, for our being-human. Arendt is convinced that a man 
without speech and action is dead for the human world. Our humanity, in other words, ceases to exist 
once our active and speaking relationship, i.e. our discursive virtuality with other people is missing, 
the only plurality in which action and speech are possible. 
 
Men in the plural, that is, men in so far as they live and move and act in this world, 
can experience meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to 
each other and to themselves (p. 4). 
 
Speech and action give rise to a second birth (p. 176). This second always refers to all the births that 
emerge after our biological birth. It refers to our potentiality within the public space of human 
relationality. It is a disorientating kind of birth, unconditioned. It is neither the necessity of labor that 
is keeping us alive nor the utility of work and its worldliness by which the objects are manufactured. 
This birth connects in a multilinear, i.e. transversal and rhizomatic manner to all other subjects of 
politics. Yet, the others are a kind of stimuli but not necessary for birth, according to Arendt. The 
others and the world are impulses for the self to take initiative. Action means taking the initiative or to 
start. This is not the start of a world or a process in the strict sense, but the beginning of new forms of 
political subjectification, of ‘agencement’ as Deleuze and Guattari would label it. There lies the true 
principle of liberty: freedom that is not indicating an initiative based on experiences, but a freedom in 
which each beginning is unexpected and wondrously unannounced, Arendt affirms (p. 177). 
 
Natality of action is accompanied by plurality of speech. Therein unique and differentiated people can 
come to the fore. The birth does not take place previous to the speech but is simultaneous, 
equiprimordial. It is the moment of revelation in which the crucial question: “who are you?” celebrates 
its birth. A who is a multiple expression. Due to the unpredictability of action as well as its 
irreversible effect within the web of human intercourse, this who can never be pinpointed to an 
identity. The appearance of a who in political community does not bring clarification on the nature or 
whatness of the subject but reveals itself in everlasting anonymity (pp. 144, 176-178 & 189-192). 
Unpredictability, irreversibility and anonymity first and for all indicate that politics of the whos can 
never be finalized. It is an ongoing process of connectivity that creates singular assemblages. The 
singular assemblage within this process does not possess a linear narrative, distinguishing its I from 
the others. It experiences rhizomatic narrative, in words of Maan (1999) an internarrative, in which the 
subject itself becomes a singular assemblage with transformative endoconsistency and exoconsistency 
that do not oppose one another, but supplement each other in differing. Singular assemblage, as a type 
of political persona, does not mean to isolate itself from its milieu, nor define itself as a play toy. 
Within the pragmatics of a coming community it operates and interacts with (exo) and within (endo) 
milieus. The unfolding of this layered singular assemblage is an exposition, or in Arendt’s terms a 
performance, within a political public space. Its thinking is that of transcendental empiricism; 
meaning its critical thinking does not appear beyond life, but endures the pain of deterritorialization of 
fundaments of thinking within the practice of living.  
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What is thus the speech of such singular assemblage? In The Human Condition Arendt does not define 
or characterize speech. She is aware that any methodological comment on speech would become 
disloyal to the ethical field of expression of plurality. Nonetheless, within the process of politics of 
flight it is necessary to differentiate different types of expressive matter; even in speech. How to 
approach expression within the milieu of flight is one of the main questions, due to the different 
effects that emerge between the multiple forms of power and regimes of expression. Totalitarian state 
comes along with another intensity within expression than multiculturalism.  While the first intends to 
manifest a single order of expression, the other often inhabits multiple segmented orders. 
Multiculturalism thus implements single regimes of expression within a segment; but, as we have seen 
in chapter five, through the introduction of common language it also creates an overlapping regime of 
expression on all the segments. The expression of a coming community, however, demands something 
else. Agamben (2000) suggests: 
 
It is only by breaking at any point the nexus between the existence of language, 
grammar, people, and state that thought and praxis will be equal to the task at hand 
(p. 70). 
 
Agamben problematizes two pairs – language/grammar, people/state – in order to restore another pair 
– thought/praxis. While I in the previous chapter disconnected relationality from the structure of 
normativity and morality, here Agamben first disconnects language from its given particular structure, 
namely grammar. Second, he disconnects people from a particular political formation, namely a state 
or more rigidly a nation-state. Both disconnections are for the sake of restoring another pair, namely 
thought and practice, or what Agamben also calls form-of-life, in which form of life and life are not 
reduced to one another yet relate to one another. In the final part of this chapter I will elaborate more 
on this relationality that is present within the hyphens of form-of-life. 
 Thus, first there are ethical unformed layers of expression within all possible relations. Then 
there is a formatting layer in which expression differentiates itself in dissimilar types of expression. 
This layer is however still open and fully connected to the first layer, as it has been argued in the first 
and second chapter. Finally, there is the layer of state and order, in which – through normative thought 
– expression becomes segmented, creating oppositions of correct and incorrect, valuable and not 
valuable types of expression, in which the potentiality of expression itself, either as language, image 
or gesture, is lost within the rigidity of a fixed order of expression. Still, is it possible, even within 
such moral setting in which types of expressions are differentiated to surpass the rigidity of this order 
of expression? We can even wonder whether the rigidity of the regimes of expression does do justice 
to multiplicity that is immanent to each type of expression. In line with Heidegger’s affection for 
language, De Mul (1999) states: 
 
‘Language speaks’ … The usual linguistic view, according to Heidegger, misses 
language itself … Only at the moment that language fails, when we cannot think of 
a word and are momentarily speechless, are we forced to consider the effects of 
language. (p. 149). 
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Does this momentarily speechlessness in which, as De Mul argues, language for a moment gives in to 
itself and beyond its instrumentality becomes itself, brings us back to the under-layer as a non-
essential matter of expression? Let us yet not be romantic. De Mul’s point is rather that within such 
experience we comprehend the incomprehensibility of expression. It is human all too human to 
understand the impossibility of understanding the rhizomatic ‘underground’ of expression. 
Speechlessness is in this sense our flabbergasted human condition.  
Yet, once we give in to the virtual reality of a rhizomatic underground of expression, we can 
problematize Arendt’s anthropocentric image of expression. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) suggest that 
everything expresses itself, even stones and air. Expression appears everywhere. Whenever, we speak 
of human expression, we are framing the molecular intensity of expression into a molar image of 
expression. It is there that Arendt’s political open speech unfolds itself. Agamben (2000) proposes 
multiple names in Means without End: being-into-language, communicability, or factum loquendi as 
such. Communicability is not the same as communication. Communication defines and segments the 
rules of engagement by enforcing a grammar and an idea of clear comprehension. In De Mul’s (1999) 
words it is a linguistic view. It is grammar in which identity is defined and explored in the order of 
state. Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call this ‘order-word’ or regimes of signs. Clear comprehension is 
based on a clear idea of identity of signs, their designated meaning, hence an idea of possibility of 
transparent communication. Agamben’s (2000) communicability is not based on a shared expressive 
identity. It is not in actu, but rather alive within an impotentiality of speaking. Communicability within 
Agamben’s coming community means to engage with those singular assemblages who are unable to 
tell a tale within the order and demand of consistency of dominant regimes of expression. Minor 
minoritarian’s expression is born out of a different political life, a life that is not reduced to a linguistic 
view and communicative order, and exactly due to this it creates narratives without a totalitarian and 
disconnective differenciating logical linearity. It is perhaps within such intensity of communicability 
that the words of my companions in thought can intertwine in my mind, surpassing our differenciating 
identities such as ethnicity, gender or generations. 
 
Within the realm of expression this does not merely suggest a loss of a certain linguistic views. It 
means that we must lose and forget rigid views on the order of expressions as such; thus also orders of 
images and order of gestures. Let us be mad and imagine bodies in a different manner, hear the 
cacophonic sounds they produce, and unpredictable gestures they make. This is Ta-Nehisi Coates’ 
(2015) appeal: Never forget the pain of history, yet resist its enslavement and force of identification 
exactly by sensitizing singular assemblages.  
 
I have raised you to respect every human being as singular, and you must extend 
that same respect into the past. Slavery is not an indefinable mass of flesh. It is a 
particular, specific enslaved woman, whose mind is active as your own, whose 
range of feelings is as vast as your own; who prefers the way the light falls in one 
particular spots in the wood (p. 69). 
 
Let us thus within this politics of life not define Heideggerian Holzwege toward National Socialism, 
but toward the singularity of this woman; singularity that she impotentiality remains to sensitize 
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despite the totalitarian forces of homogenization of enslavement of a people. The intensity of roads she 
presents, engages with the prospect of a loss of gesture within a fixed regime of gesturality. This loss, 
or in terms of Deleuze and Guattari, this anitmemory of gestures, according to Agamben (2000), 
connects to the experience of a designated other, migrant, refugee or people of color, but also to that of 
every modern subject (pp. 49-60). In a sense we have all lost, we all suffer from a loss of a specific 
form of language. Huijer (2016) testimonies of this loss in the experience of nostalgia of those who 
remained behind, and whished bitterly for their loved ones to return. While they often did not return; 
their departure fundamentally shaped a sense of belonging of leftover European subject, and the 
manner in which this subject speaks of itself. Nostalgia, melancholy and bitterness shape the words in 
which they describe their lives. And as Deleuze (1995) puts it, as a result we are all becoming more 
and more excluded from the realm of regimes of communication. The entrances are getting narrower 
by the day and we have no passwords in this age of control societies (pp. 176-182). 
 
How do we in line with Coates break through the thick layers of regimes of expression? Coates plea 
for respect appeals us to resists the obstinacy of grammars of expression; not only in language but also 
in other types of expression. Through its rules, grammar creates segments in which moral binary terms 
such as good and evil translate themselves in oppositions such as sufficient and insufficient, correct 
and incorrect use of expression. The sufficiency refers to truthfullness, an adequate meaning, and 
adequate use. Insufficiency thus implies falsity, which differs from the term fiction due to the fact that 
it immediately indicates lies and false intentions. On the level of matter of content insufficiency also 
refers to specific bodies. It refers to a body that does not belong to the ideal state with its imperative of 
transparent communication. The images of scarf wearing Muslim women on the advertising flyers for 
Dutch language courses in The Netherlands are in that sense an excellent example of profiling. In the 
discourse of totalitarianism, it is always the other that is doomed to a prejudice of a lack to speak 
adequately. Here, as Schinkel (2008) argues, a linguistic view and a representative image confirm a 
milieu of exclusion, in which the integrity of the others becomes a matter of discussion merely due to 
the fact that they are not answering to the demands of regimes of expression.  
 
The tension between open rhizomatic thought and binary arborescent judgment, and the relevance of 
this tension in minority’s language, is shown in Deleuze and Guattari’s (1986) analysis of Kafka’s 
work. They take the view that scientists such as psychoanalytics have often maltreated Kafka’s work 
only in order to confirm the binary opposition of sanity and insanity, father and son, oppression and 
repression. In other words, Kafka’s work and Kafka himself have over and over again been victimized 
according to the grid of bifurcating psychological determination. Deleuze and Guattari, however, rebel 
against this univocal interpretation by refusing to see his work as an expression of depression, a 
longing for death, or a superficial revolt against the father figure whomever that may be. Kafka’s work 
is more complex than such simple interpretations want us to belief. These interpretations are in search 
of an original meaning, a hidden message by the author or, as in psychoanalysis, an expression of a 
deep-rooted trauma that symbolically works its way through the text. The analysis is based on the 
distinction between correct/true and incorrect/false interpretation. Or in its structuralist version a 
closer and less closer reading of the Unconscious as a language. It is bound to the distinction of 
subject and object. According to this the subject who has expressed himself – the author – and the 
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subject of the statement – the content of the text – need to overlap, having one and the same identity. 
They remain the same no matter how much time passes. However, if we follow Deleuze and Guattari’s 
rhizomatic way of thinking, we could rather argue that not only the reader lacks a constant identity, 
but neither do the text and the author have steady and continuous identities. We could even argue that 
it is impossible to make a clear distinction between the reader, the author and the work. As is 
discussed in chapter three (see: 3.1), an author’s name is a node in a texture, in a discourse that binds 
and overdetermines inconsistencies. The expressive persona as a substance permanently transforms: 
form becoming matter becoming form, shifting from content to expression. Movement of expression is 
all that matters, it is all that there is. So, while the psychoanalytic reading imprisons Kafka in the 
univocal context of a problematic father-son/sanity-insanity relation, Deleuze and Guattari subvert this 
‘particular’ interpretation of a ‘general’ rule by connecting singularities that move transversally on a 
‘deeper’ level of expression. They deterritorialize, in this sense, a differenciating idea of a context, 
when they argue that Kafka’s work can be approached in many ways. In other words, context does not 
bring in clarity and evident transparency but, as an impotential paradigm, engenders a multiplicity of 
entrances. There is no main doorway, not a great Signifier or culturally differenciating acceptable way 
to understand Kafka. We do not want to understand Kafka in one particular way; we rather want to 
experience its multiple impacts. Kafka has no main Entrance, on the contrary, it is rather a rat hole 
(terrier), a hallway with multiple entrances, as Deleuze and Guattari explain.  
 
Both Coates and Kafka, in their literary gestural image enforce us to sense the multiplicity of approach 
as a plurality of entrances. In his lecture Coates is a teacher; not by defining a right approach but by 
letting us engage with his multiple approaches, his momentary certainties toward political ideas and 
his permanent doubts. It is not the truthness of an ideology; but the truth of an ontological changing 
relationality that inspires this author. In words of De Mul (1999), we could state that being into 
Language, or any type of expression for that matter, has always “ontological implications” (p. 150). 
An encounter with language expresses the truth of ontological foreign variety. In line with Agamben 
(1993a), we could state that we must engage the infancy nature of entering an expression. Translation 
is always there. This is not distinctive for migrants, refugees, people of color and other minorities. 
What differs, is rather the demonization of this otherness and then the enforcement of this 
demonization on bodies of minorities through regimes of expressions.  
 
That wisdom is not unique to our people, but I think it has special meaning to those 
of us born out of mass rape, whose ancestors were carried off and divided up into 
policies and stocks (Coates, 2015, p. 69). 
 
Demonization does not only affect assemblages of bodies on a content level, but also assemblages of 
enunciations on the level of expression. Within the instrumental understanding of expression as 
communication the absence of clear comprehension can only be defined by shortcomings and 
misunderstandings. Linguistic creativity depends entirely on our excellent apprehension of semantic 
and syntax. Hesitation and stuttering in language supposedly make us less smart or imaginative. Out-
of-the-ordinary impoverished speech defects the instrumental imperative. This instrument, this 
medium becomes inefficient to pursue the original purpose of language: clear communication with one 
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another on state of affairs out there or in here. This logic is fueled by the premises of pure language, 
unambiguous meaning, and transparent subjects. Exactly because language has been seen as a 
medium, as an instrument that transmits data from a sender to a receiver, it has become an instrument 
of alienation, isolation and exclusion as well. When speech is seen as a tool that brings clarity, the one 
who hesitates, who stutters, just by the very act of stuttering and not even by opposing a clear 
question, shatters the assumptions upon which speech is based. If someone stutters, it reminds us of 
our own inability, of our own stupidity in language. It reminds us of our shortcomings. So, we fear the 
others and their forced uncertainties. This fear leads us to exclude every person who brings us doubts 
and worries, until there is no one with whom we can talk; until we forget our own complexity, our 
own stories as singular assemblages. 
 Language as an instrument of transparent communication is in the end an instrument of non-
communication. There is no sentence that is clear in all its aspects. Language is too much alive to be a 
docile instrument, a passive transmission of information. Language is neither the slave of the subject 
nor the object of an idea. Subject and object are rather its play tools. Expression in language does not 
merely depend upon our knowledge of it, but rather upon our fearless ability to be intoxicated by it. To 
swim without rescue buoy, for a “word is not something that is, but rather something that gives” (De 
Mul, 1999, p. 151). To express means to believe that one cannot fail, that lack of certainty does not 
indicate loss of expression. A writer does not believe in shortcomings. A writer’s block belongs to the 
one who believes in a subject that can fail. A writer, on the other hand, is the subject who loses its 
identity in order to experience the transforming force of expression. As Deleuze (1990) suggests: “the 
writer has no logos, but only an epos, which states that one can never go too far in the description of 
decomposition, since it is necessary to go as far as the crack leads” (p. 332). Hesitation is not negation 
but rather affection for creativity. Stuttering is an experience one must not and cannot miss out on. It is 
a characteristic element of any speech. If there are still any oppositions, then it is the one between 
clarity and creativity. Clarity is the blockage of multiplicity, while creativity thrives on multiplicity. 
Nonetheless, both are part of an expressive process.  
 
It is language which fixes the limits … but it is language as well which transcends 
the limits and restores them to the infinite equivalence of an unlimited becoming 
(p. 2-3). 
 
If hesitation and stuttering are part of the game, and the rules change and transform every time we 
play, how can we still communicate? In order to understand this possibility, we need to transform the 
structure of our thought, the image of thought on language. Agamben (2000) suggests that 
experiencing language is an experience of pure means. Once the medium becomes the message, as 
Marshall MacLuhan claimed, it becomes invisible, formatting our connectivity and interactions. For 
Agamben, too, language as a pure means is not the same as a means to an end. It is not an instrument 
to send a message, but a means as such. It is mediality, i.e. relationality. This is pure communicability, 
as a being into language (pp. 109-118). 
 
The experience in question here does not have any objective content and cannot be 
formulated as a proposition referring to a state of things or to a historical situation. 
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It does not concern a state but an event of language; it does not pertain to this or 
that grammar but – so to speak – to the factum loquendi as such. Therefore, this 
experience must be constructed as an experiment concerning the matter itself of 
thought, that is, the power of thought (p. 116). 
  
This is the matter of expression. Being into language suggests that we are willing to speak, willing to 
relate while knowing that we cannot communicate fully and clearly. It is the comprehension of 
incomprehension and the will to understand anyway. Language unfolds within the tension between 
comprehension and incomprehension.20 It is a love affair, not for the sake of the perfect lover, but for 
the sake of the affair. How can love become an affair? How to experiment with the experience of 
uncertainties and the creativity of not knowing, like children just putting letters and words next to each 
other without order or purpose? I call this a heterophasia and cacophonic silence in which the order – 
of words, images and gestures as well as the relationality in-between these types of expression – is 
deterritorialized. Heterophasia is the enemy of grammar, not of expression. Minoritarian expression 
expresses the desire for relationality, instead of ideology or closed morality. It is a politics of the 
multiple senses, politics of ‘différance’ and intensities, beyond cruelty of the grammar. It is a politics 
that has not been already stifled by ‘obvious’ identities. It is energized by life itself.  
 
There will be no unique name, even if it were the name of Being. And we must 
think this without nostalgia, that is, outside of the myth of a purely maternal or 
paternal language, a lost native country of thought. On the contrary, we must affirm 
this, in the sense in which Nietzsche puts affirmation into play, in a certain laughter 
and a certain step of the dance (Derrida, 1982, p. 27). 
 
This is Agamben’s (1993b) point on understanding the non-language or silence, as I explained above 
in chapter two (see: 2.3.2). Non-language does not appear because words are lacking in the 
representation of reality outside the language. Non-language is not the negation of language, but a 
field of forces that appears within language creating room for other approaches toward language. In 
line with Deleuze and Guattari (1987) we could state that politics of life is energized by another idea 
of expression, in which: 
 
There is no language in itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only a throng 
of dialects, patois, slangs, and specialized languages. There is no ideal speaker-
listener, any more than there is a homogeneous linguistic community. … There is 
no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant language within a political 
multiplicity (p. 7). 
 
Is such an idea of expression still possible in our mediatized age in which expressions are frame-
worked by Facebook? Although Arendt fears the worst in this age of communication, Agamben 
(2000) states that it is within this total age of pure communication that we could gain access to 
                                                     
20 See also Derrida on translation and Babylonian confusion (McDonald, 1985, p. 125). 
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communicability. Communicability is not the negation of communication just as according to Deleuze 
and Guattari virtuality is not ontologically opposed to the actual. As Bell (2006) states: “the virtual 
enables the becoming-other of the actual” (p. 407). Communicability immanently “hinders 
communication” (Agamben, 2000, p. 115). Yet, this is an affirmative gesture. The peaking 
segmentation of communication, the immensity of its blocking force, creates the desire to break 
through solid segments, according to Agamben.  
 
The age in which we are living, in fact, is also the age in which, for the first time, it 
becomes possible for human beings to experience their own linguistic essence – to 
experience, that is, not some language content or some true proposition, but the 
fact itself of speaking (p. 115). 
 
Expression does not refer to a reality outside itself. Segmentation, grammar and clear communication 
are not outside of and do not negate expression. Grammar appears in language as a possibility instead 
of the possibility. Just as the moral constructions presuppose the multiplicity of ethics, grammar 
presupposes the multiplicity of expression, and not the other way around. Another prejudice concerns 
the idea that all human expression is language or could be contained by language. Given this 
prejudice, the plurality of human expression is reduced to one type of expression, namely language 
and in further processes to one form of language, meaning one form of grammar in which different 
expressions are reduced instead of supplementary to one another.  
 
The lingual gesture is not only mere one form of communication, but in truth it 
rather lays down language in a non-communicative loneliness (Ten Bos, 2011, p. 
153, Translation TR). 
 
When Agamben (1993a) states that the human “voice has never been written in language” (p. 9), he 
implies that in spite of the fact that grammar represents the idea of a Voice, it is only within the 
multiplicity of human expression that we experience voices. It is the multiplicity of voice that breaks 
through the dominancy of one form of expression, and one form of grammar. 21  The ethics of 
expression within a politics of life presupposes next to this multiplicity of expression also the 
cacophony of silence, the probing intensity of the images and a disinterested connectivity of 
gesturality. It is the epos of singular assemblages.  
 
                                                     
21 Verbal communication is a small part of our communication. The tone of our voice and the way we communicate with our 
body are by far more important and affective. Nonetheless, when I speak of multiplicity of expression, I do mean something 
else than a form of differenciation in-between verbal and non-verbal communication. First, because this form of 
differenciation still presupposes transmission of data, and thus judges the communication by the amount of meaningful 
transmission, whether this is intended or not intended by the speaker. Second, the distinction is not in order to stimulate 
creation of expression, but rather to enforce opinion. Thatcher’s effort to manipulate her tone of voice was not for the sake of 
communicability but for the sake of transmission of her ideology. Third, often in these forms of distinctions different forms 
of expression are reduced to language. The term body language is in this sense exemplary.    
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6.4.2 Celie's Blues: A Collective Body 
It is not only the idea of communication that has colonized expression for a long time. The idea of 
silence as non-language or non-expression, which I have discussed in the second chapter, has also 
functioned as an essential affect or sense. What blocks the process of expression is not the desire of 
communication or an idea such as expressionless silence, but the essentialization of one affect or sense 
– or in terms of Ahmed (2014) the emotions and interpretation of emotions of some people – above all 
other affects and senses – above the emotions of all other people. Expression always appears in 
multiplicity of affects and percepts, in ‘sensitizing’ multiplicity. Coming community thus can only 
appear and function within this multiplicity. Agamben (1993a) states that the “first outcome of the 
experimentum linguae, therefore, is a radical revision of the very idea of Community” (p. 10); in 
Ahmed’s (2014) terms the very idea of politics. The expression of coming community can only be 
experimental if it does not limit itself to desire for completion, but remains in movement due to the 
desire of permanent learning. Pedagogy is not for the sake of finalization of knowledge and thus the 
achievement of an ideal state, even worse an idea of an ideal state for some people. Learn to express 
means learn to experiment in expression as well as in creating a community. A community that 
depends on the impotential paradigm of belonging: belonging as such through difference-relationality.  
 
We could speak of a geological experimental community once expression is no longer segmented by 
history and limited to the idea of nationality and citizenship. It then emerges on a differentiated 
territory, escaping segmented processes. Let me once more sensitize this by showing how this is 
expressed in literature. This community of expression has been the main drive of Argentine-Chilean-
American novelist Ariel Dorfman. As Jonathan Rollins (2009) suggests, Dorfman’s life could be 
characterized by serial exile. He affirms the sense of home by negating its segmentation within a 
national border. Home is something that happens in-between and through expression; “multiple 
overlapping communities … overlapping spaces – that’s where home is” (p. 71). Rollins situates 
Dorfman in (inter)textual communities. Belonging to these communities means participation within 
expression, not as a particular language, but as a language of experiencing the sense of home in exile, 
to express beyond the idea of homesickness and typical forms of migration. Exile thus distances itself 
from nostalgia by surpassing the idea of a definable home or nationality. Dorfman’s expression thus is 
not only beyond an expression of majority but also far from a majoritarian minor expression that 
opposes the minor or migrant to that of definable majority. His language is an expression that moves 
beyond the binary idea of majority and minority. It is according to Dorfman “a language that doesn’t 
fit here and yet it fits elsewhere” (p. 72). 
 This is what Deleuze and Guattari (1986) call minor literature. Traits that give birth to minor 
literature, can be transposed to what we could call minor expression. This expression, as one might 
already guess, is not biased by crazy accents, funny words or blurry images. It is not the language of 
the exotic other, or a dialect. The expression, for instance in literature, is not the minor language as we 
conventionally understand it. It is not like speaking Kurdish within a Turkish or Dutch setting, 
Armenian within a Persian setting or Spanish in an American setting. It is not about a ‘typical’ 
minority. This language is rather a minor act within the construction or use of the so-called major 
language. It could be for example the use of German by a Turkish person within the German setting, 
but it could also be the schizophrenics’ use of language within everyday language. This use of 
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language, because of its immanent attack on the major language – unfolding an expressive milieu – but 
also on language as such, has been gifted with a “high coefficient of deterritorialization” (p. 16). The 
expression of singular assemblages has a rupturing power just by being possible and at the same time 
impossible due to its disconnection to the order of language. It is there, without being there as specific 
historical territory. It is a crack. It is a process. It is possible due to the visibility of its impossibilities. 
Deleuze and Guattari (1986) differentiate three impossibilities within this minoritarian expression (p. 
16).  
1. First, it appears in the impossibility not to write. These writers are aware of their minor use of 
language. They are affected by expression as such that formats and modulates them, while this 
expression simultaneously moves beyond their minority. Expression is not a choice. 
Screaming and facial gestures during torture and pain is probably the most known example. 
Expression affects and demands utterance. Expression is not of men, but men rather appear as 
expressive personae in the process. The first impossibility within the minor expression, 
however, always comes along with a second form of impossibility:  
2. the impossibility to write in a major language. Minor expression deterritorializes the order of 
expression and the common binary sets. Thus, although it takes place within the major 
expression it becomes nonetheless another expression. These two forms of impossibility are 
then connected to a third form:  
3. the impossibility to write in any other language. Dorfman cannot stop expressing something. 
And although he cannot express himself in the language of the order, he continues to use the 
major language. In order to break through the concept of strangeness, he must break through 
the same language that defines him as a stranger. It is the only form of expression that is able 
to create the rupture beyond the binary opposition of majority and minority. By becoming a 
minor, one loses his identity as being a majoritarian minority. 
 
Summarized through the vocabulary of Deleuze and Guattari, we could state that minor expression 
implies: 1) impossibility of not-expressing; 2) impossibility of expressing within the order of major 
expression; and 3) impossibility of expressing in any other way than minor expression within the 
major expression. Deleuze and Guattari (1986) also firmly emphasize that these impossibilities within 
this deconstructive expression – the deterritorialization of language within language – is by no means 
a personal matter. From its birth, it is immediately political. This is not only due to the fact that it 
consequently breaks through the hierarchical boundaries. Minor expression is above all political 
because every drop of it, even the most individual and personal one, in its usage of the language, 
implicitly refers to a collective experience. This does not mean that it is a representation of an actual 
experience nor a specific statement that can be generalized. Neither does it refer to a substance of 
thought or ideology that has been agreed upon. Deleuze and Guattari argue instead that the act of this 
form of expression is in itself collective and thus the act of expression itself is political. What is called 
dialect and out-of-the-ordinary use of language does not belong to the domain of comedy or the so-
called cultural apolitical assemblies, but to the domain of politics. Minor language is deterritorializing 
not of a person, but of a collective (pp. 17-18). It is the event of becoming a community, a people, and 
as such a political act. It is an expression of difference-relationality within politics of life.  
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The political domain has contaminated every statement (énoncé). … It is literature 
that produces an active solidarity in spite of skepticism: and if the writer is in the 
margins or completely outside his or her fragile community, this situation allows 
the writer all the more the possibility to express another possible community and to 
forge the means for another consciousness and another sensibility (p. 17). 
 
The literary machine of the minor language is a revolutionary machine, Deleuze and Guattari state, 
exactly because it is without ideology, without a message, yet nonetheless affirming a community. It is 
the pragmatic enunciation of something else, something that has been missed in the order of a 
collective, in an exclusive milieu, namely the minor minority as a mi-lieu in itself, independent of the 
binary code of majority versus minority. In minor literature, there is no cause and effect, there is no 
opposition but difference-relationality in-between the subject of enunciation, the subject that writes, 
and the subject of statement, the I that is written about. Expression in this community “is the people’s 
concern,” as Deleuze and Guattari suggest in line with Kafka, arguing thus: “there are only collective 
assemblages of enunciation” (p. 18). In this collective expression one subject is not isolated from the 
other. Not even in its solitude or isolated imitation in front of the mirror, as for example the bathroom 
scene in Peter Weir’s The Truman Show (1998). Truman imagines himself alone with his own 
fantasies and dreams. He talks to the mirror about another world, makes funny voices and faces, not 
knowing that his entire life is at that very moment broadcasted to a TV audience. Even solitude and 
counter positions are relationalities connected rhizomatically. In Jews as Pariahs Arendt (1978a) 
speaks of dreams, which are in a certain sense the most private things in our lives that are shared 
among refugees. Although their content might not be the same, they share intensity; they share a sense 
of belonging (p. 57). Each singular expression, in its singularity assembles a world. 
 
These forms of interconnected solitudes, a multitude counter positions and relationalities are the 
themes of Alice Walker’s The Color Purple (1982). The novel is written as a fictive autobiography of 
the orphan Celie, in a brilliant form of minor language, namely African-American. Celie has been 
sexually and physically abused by her father, who turns out to be her stepfather, and she is sold to her 
husband who continues the multiple abuses. Celie’s blues is perhaps the melancholy of the loneliest of 
affairs: the maltreated daughter without even having a father. Celie is a song of multiplicity of 
solitude, multiple isolation, and multiplicity of abandonment: an abused child, a neglected wife, a 
descendent of enslaved people, a raped virgin, a shy lesbian lover, a mother without her children, and 
an old woman with scars. And still she is more than this multiplicity of exclusion. Celie is a sister. 
More than abandoned she is a connection. She is not only the lover of her husband’s lover, but also his 
broken-hearted companion. She is an antagonist who breaks through the concept of antagonism. She is 
friend and enemy of the rebelling Sophia. She is not the African-American, but rather the American-
African, her otherness is not from another continent but rather forced upon her in the political milieu 
in which she lives.  She is all that one cannot accept in life and all that is more than our ordinary lives. 
Her expression is the language of minority, not merely by being a black woman, but because in her 
uprooting language, her solitude is the solitude of more than one collective. She is a political 
ambiguity, due to the fact that her desire for freedom does not limit itself to one form of group – 
people of color, women, lesbian, or secondary-citizen. She breaks through the multicultural segments 
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by engaging in multiple communities. Celie is not an identity but a milieu within the multiplicity of 
expression. The language of The Color Purple has a deterritorializing effect by being pure expression. 
It is not the ignorance of grammar, but a disregard for the authority of a regime of expression by a 
collective. At the end of the novel Celie as well as her repressive husband have both left the 
oppositional identity of abuse and the abuser. Her husband as a member of a so-called male majority 
becomes a minor.  
 This literature is, however, neither in search of a symbolic signification wherein the 
minorities’ needs are represented in the major language, nor is it an exotic ‘enrichment’ of language 
and culture. What defines Celie’s blues in Alice Walker’s work – or according to Deleuze and Guattari 
(1986) Kafka and Beckett’s writings – is sobriety. Celie’s blues is gesturing of such sobriety. It is the 
simplicity of expression that endures and breaks through a regime that could not comprehend the 
immensity of their singular writings. 
 
Arrive at a perfect and unformed expression, a materially intense expression. … 
The other [Beckett, TR] proceeds by dryness and sobriety, a willed poverty, 
pushing deterritorialization to such an extreme that nothing remains but intensities 
(p. 19). 
 
Celie’s language contains this sobriety. It is the frankness of the text that captures the reader. There is 
no story behind it. Walker’s writing is in a sense the avant-garde of the contemporary world in which 
migration on multi-temporal territorial levels indicates much more than simplistic movement from A 
to B; from country of origin to country of arrival. The limbo is here and now. Although Deleuze and 
Guattari (1986) make a distinction between being a minor and becoming one, they still do emphasize 
the fact that in the present-day, migration has an enormous effect on the process of becoming a 
minority. Finding oneself distanced from one’s own language however is according to them not only 
an issue for the immigrants or their children, but more so a problem of the majority. “How to become 
a nomad and an immigrant and a gypsy (Romani people TR) in relation to one’s own language?” (p. 
19). I would like to suggest that the question works out both ways. Within the process of migration 
both the so-called inhabitant and the so-called migrant need to find ways to become a minority. The 
relation and the communication with the so-called majority also deterritorialize the migrant’s own 
mother tongue that once upon a time and space had been experienced as a major or majoritarian minor 
language. In a sense, the migrant must let go of its major tendencies or the desire to become a 
majority. The process of migration, which affects all subjects, does not only deterritorialize a specific 
major language or languages, but the concept of a major language as such. In the process of migration 
each subject must learn to speak thin, just as the Dutch poet Jan Arends (1974) once wrote: 
 
I write poems as thin trees. 
Who can talk so thin with language as I? 
Maybe my father was ungenerous with the seed. 
I have never known him, that man. 
I have never heard a real word or it hurts. 
You only need few words to write pain (pp. 32, Translation TR). 
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Consequently, this line of reasoning brings us to the next question: can literature be major at all? Is the 
act of writing not always a minor act? Deleuze and Guattari (1986) would argue that major literature is 
a literature in accordance with structures that are defined in binary sets of forms of content and forms 
of expression, and thus could be written by majority as well as majoritarian minority. Major language 
is ordered around the belief of a specific substance of expression in which form and matter are defined 
by regimes of expressions. There is a message that must be delivered, information that coherently 
passes from one subject to the other in accordance with a well-defined form of expression, or a lack of 
such coherency that must be criticized. Non-nostalgic minor literature on the other hand is in its 
revolutionary act rather an “expression machine capable of disorganizing its own forms” (p. 28). 
Minor literature is not without matter and form, but it instead exposes its formation while writing. And 
due to this con-textual ex-position, it challenges the idea of a universal formation. Furthermore, its 
formation is, due to its appreciation of transformability, open and experienced through multiple 
intensities. While major language is in search of a form to express its already present 
conceptualization or functionalization, minor literature lacks this form of organization. Minor 
language “begins by expressing itself and doesn’t conceptualize until afterward” (p. 28). 
 Minor literature as a political expression can never be based on an a-priori ideology. It is 
politics without identity. It is not about a perfect order or about this unique person who is going to 
save us. Celie is not the one who is going to save us; she is just a collective body. It is the collective 
that moves her. In this collectivity, there is no room for mere critique, mere rejection. Minor literature 
is revolutionary, affirmative and relational. There is no ego. It does not only break through segments, 
but it is creative in production of new forms of connection. The poverty of the language, the sobriety 
of minor expression is not a form of incorrect usage of the language or poor use of it because the 
author lacks knowledge of grammar and syntax. There is a difference between sloppy language and 
creative language. Sloppy language relates to major language due to exploring the lack of love for it. 
Minor expression is not uninterested but it is disinterested. Minor literature is beyond the conception 
of lack and the hierarchy that lies behind it due to its inter-ested attitude. It is a love affair. It is pure 
expression, unfolding another ethics. It is the frankness of life, the visibility of absurdity of an 
ordinary judgment. Even more, it is the ethics of experimentation.  
 
To speak poorly is a becoming, an affective becoming within another sense and another percept. 
Celie’s blues moves in a different direction. She is in other words a narrative persona, an internarrative 
becoming, who does not own stories but is rather unfolded in the process; creating entrances, gateways 
that are not meant to be uncritically followed but to be politically engaged with. Within the idea of 
righteous paths this writing functions in decoding paths, in destructing lines. Minor expression is the 
act of ‘mis’-leading. While leading towards the correct path belongs to the main Entrance with a leader 
that leads, this expression alternates between new gateways. There are no unitary leaders or lonely 
heroes. This is the reason why minors do not need wise men or women telling them what to do. There 
is no supremacy. Expression in its minor use is the act of composition of sound, touch and visuality, 
all in one and all in opposite directions. It is the moment that heterophasia becomes something other 
than a pathology, it becomes the connective force to the ethical base that shrugs expression. Minority 
is an affective assemblage and the novel its political act. There is no minor Answer or minor Solution. 
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There are perhaps momentary minor answers, but there is always an insistent and pertinent question: 
how to become a minor? How to become else? How to experiment in expression without heroes and 
their meaningful grammar or gesture? Without Batman and the Joker, without King Arthur and 
Lancelot, there is only Morgan le Fay’s desire to break free, or Percival’s foolish desire for an 
adventure. But it is a Percival without a holy grail, and a lady of the lake without her Excalibur. It 
needs courage to make a fool of ourselves, becoming clowns; just to break through the logic of sane 
and insane, smart and stupid.  
 
To speak poorly is a becoming, becoming within a sense, wherein the tongue of the other reminds 
philosophy of its inability to clarify the world, and philosophers remind the other how to enter the 
plane of communicability differently. To speak poorly is philosophy on a diet, a philosophy that is not 
enslaved by its past, but uses its age to enter the now here in different ways: a nomadic act. It is a 
politico-philosophy of thinking through the multiplicity by raising voices rather than a Voice. It is a 
nomadic philosophy on a plane of multiplying thought in order to create concepts to endure and 
express tensions and differences. A minor politico-philosopher experiments like Celie. 
 
6.5 Whatever Life May Be … 
 
6.5.1 Political Singular Assemblage 
How to become a minor? How to become else? Perhaps these questions are, given the line that we 
have set, not really smart questions. But stupidity was the goal anyhow. Perhaps the question is not 
how to become; but how to give in to it. We are already minors; we just imagine ourselves at the 
center of the world. Even our sun is merely a futile light in the immensity of the cosmos. And no, this 
is not a hazy spiritual remark, but simple physics. Thus, if minority is our state of being; if becoming 
is our natural state in body and mind – or as De Mul (2017) in line with Schiller presents the reality of 
our tragic sublime existence – than how do we implement such existential futility in our 
transcendental empiric image of thought? Can we think or imagine equality in singularity through 
futility? It is within this state of going through instead of beyond futility that defines the sublime ethics 
of coming community (form of content); the ethical impotential paradigms (form of expression) and 
the minor expressions (matter of expression). I know we are futile, yet I don’t want us to die, perish 
and get silenced. Why? I don’t know. I have never understood myself. Such desire has no why, it has 
no truthness. It is a decision, an unchosen choice; it is the natality of life, of being alive of a body that 
relates beyond me, myself and I.  
 
Difference-relationality is our commonality, which could only be comprehended as a paradox if one 
clings to the binary settings within thought in which identity and difference are defined as opposites. 
As I have discussed in the first part of this study, difference does not only indicate multiple forms of 
disconnection but also implies multiple forms of connection. It is this multiplicity of disconnection 
and connection that gives rise to a commonality within difference. As Arendt (1958) states: 
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Plurality is the condition of human action because we are all the same, that is, 
human, in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, 
lives, or will live (p. 8). 
 
However, while Deleuze and Guattari find and search for this commonality in difference through 
every existing matter, Arendt speaks of a more focused form of shared difference. Difference for her 
refers to difference in-between the human subjects: interest. What connects humans is that each 
member of this so-called human society is a unique character. Combining Arendt’s thought with 
Deleuze and Guattari's perspective we could state that each individual, or rather each dividual in 
Nietzsche’s (1995, p. 59) words, is a singular open amalgamation in the rhizomatic web of narrativity. 
This dividual is immediately ethical. While individual, etymologically refers to that which cannot be 
divided; dividual is the one as a 'partage' in the words of Nancy. And from an ethical point of view, 
while individual opposes itself to others in order to create an isolated identity, dividual exists as a 
becoming, as a connective force.  
 
Subject as a dividu indicates that, within the texture between men, no member can be a representative 
for another, a group, let alone a people. The idea of a person representing a group or a culture and 
characterizing those as bridge-builders refers to the axiomatic and segmentalizing paradigm of identity 
or in best-case identities. And although in the modern process of emancipation identity and 
representation were imperative to make the change to a new world, these paradigms nevertheless have 
become permanent and fossilized in a homogeneous identity, as Crenshaw (1991) argues. Their 
radiations anticipate the isolation of an individual from the multiplicity that gives rise to it, and that is 
immanent to the individual's being: inter-esse. Even the idea of multiple identity in one subject, despite 
its name, blocks the process of transformation within multiplicity. Such multiplicity pretends to treat a 
subject in its complexity, like a concept with multiple components. Yet, in this case the segmentation 
and axiomatic paradigms arise within and not in between individuals.  
Let me clarify this by defining myself as a multiple identity. Tina Rahimy is an Iranian-Dutch, 
middle aged, 'highly’ educated, female politico-philosopher. The multiple here is the introduction of 
multiculturalism within an individual. It introduces the idea of multiple cultural and political strata of 
a society within an individual, which next to common known cultures such as West-European and 
Middle-Eastern culture, also refers to an intellectual culture, an academic culture, sexual or 
generational culture. The relations between these cultures, its multiplicity, are nevertheless identified 
and homogenized within a whole. The segments remain well defined. A notion such as 'highly 
educated' already limits the individual within the borders of this identity. Philosophy, as has been 
argued above, is in itself already a highly diversified multiplicity. What do identifications such as 
Middle-Eastern, West-European, middle aged, highly educated, female and philosopher mean once we 
loosen the contours of the dividual? 
 
A politics of difference requires the conceptual determination of difference and the 
specification of relevant kinds of difference, in an ontological, ethical or political 
sense. … Deleuze’s philosophy … points to a defense of the particular against all 
forms of universalisation or representation: every time there is representation, 
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Deleuze suggests, there is always an ‘unrepresented singularity’ which does not 
recognise itself in the representant (Patton, 2000, p. 46). 
  
The coming community is inspired by the idea of common heterogeneity and not the multiplicity of 
homogeneous paradigms of identity. Dividual instead of identity indicates that a person who is 
considered to be a female, Middle-Eastern or philosopher experiences this naming in such a multiple 
way, resisting this multiplicity to be reduced to general categories. A forced generality camouflages 
the multiple connections between a person identified as a Middle-Eastern, West-European, middle 
aged, female politico-philosopher and a person identified as Spanish-Japanese, young, male truck 
driver. An experience, such as femininity, is not even isolated to what we ordinarily understand as a 
female body. All this indicates that within the coming community neither the matter of expression can 
be molded by its form to one coherent discourse, nor the matter of content of this community can be 
sculpted by its form to an isolated assemblage of bodies, i.e. an organism. This is due to the fact that 
coming community’s matter of content is nothing other than life itself. Politics of life means a politics 
in which any seemingly self-contained thing is in transition.  
 
Difference is not a trait of humans. It is the trait of life. What frustrates totalitarianism as well as 
multicultural segmentation is the pariahtic act of life. This does not indicate that there is life beyond 
politics, or secondary to politics. Life is rather the immanent force that breaks through all segments, 
despite our forced attempts to isolate and identify subjects. Politics, as a formation of community that 
deals with asymmetric relations emerging from life forces, differentiates itself due to its approach to 
life. In the most positive sense politics affirms the multiplicity of engagement in the unavoidable 
endurance of life. Integration is how we commune through life or struggle with its non-escapable 
effects. Arendt’s (1978a) conscious pariah, due to its movement in thought and its vulnerability in 
comprehension, is ‘self’-conscious beyond majority or majoritarian minorities. Conscious pariah is the 
comprehension of the unavoidability of plurality of engagement within and through life. According to 
Agamben (2000) such politics, which is not aimed at the final actualization of identity, stresses the 
possibilities of life. It is aware of the necessity that within any political attitude what remains at stake 
is life itself. A politics of flight too affirms the multiplicity of political attitudes towards life and is 
thus not only occupied with migrants or refugees. A coming community advocates political life that 
permanently emancipates itself from biopolitics and moves beyond the binarity of sovereign and homo 
sacer. In this politico-philosophical approach thought is: 
 
the nexus that constitutes the forms of life in an inseparable context as form-of-life. 
... an experimentum that has as its object the potential character of life and of 
human intelligence. … affected by one’s own receptiveness and experience in each 
and every thing (p. 9). 
 
In this experience, which affirms the plurality of people, community and communication appear not as 
instruments for the sake of a goal but as pure means, as Arendt had already suggested in different 
terms. For both thinkers, this is the only way to practice politics. If language is not determined by the 
state assuming a clear common history, it will become an event, and as such a political experience. 
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“Politics is the exhibition of a mediality” (Agamben, 2000, pp. 116-117). In this line of reasoning 
community is the mediality of life itself, whether politics defines such a right or not. Here Agamben 
radicalizes Arendt’s statements on the concept of human rights. While Arendt never entirely rejects 
the principle of human rights, just its process and outcome, Agamben radically discards the whole 
existence of these rights. In his non-segregating political thought, having rights always assumes those 
who are entitled to have these rights versus those who are not. Coming community is the exhibition of 
life in which form-of-life is not defined through the axiomatic or differenciating paradigm of right-
owning citizen. 
  
And it is this thought, this form-of-life, that, abandoning naked life to ‘Man’ and to 
the ‘Citizen,’ who clothe it temporarily and represent it with their ‘rights,’ must 
become the guiding concept and the unitary center of the coming politics (p. 12). 
 
Imagining a people within a coming community beyond the idea of citizenship implies an envisioning 
of a people who have escaped the binary setting of legality and illegality in which this notion due to its 
connection to the state has been imprisoned for a long time. In the third chapter ‘What Is a People?’ in 
Means without End Agamben (2000) elaborates on this binary setting by referring to a quote from 
Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address in 1863: government of the people, by the people, for the 
people. This phrase according to Agamben unfolds the biopolitical fracture in which the people as a 
governing force distinguishes itself from the excluded people, the poor people, the mob, the third 
world people. This fracture constitutes the oppositional state of homo sacer and Sovereign. It is the 
task of a coming community to deterritorialize this fracture by deterritorializing the fracture in which 
life and its form are separated (pp. 28-35). A people in this form-of-life neither governs, nor is 
governed. A people “who resist the regulation of the population, who try to elude the apparatus by 
which the population exists, is preserved, subsists, and subsists at an optimal level” (Foucault, 2007, p. 
44). Coming community is a community of a people who dares to say: 
 
We do not have, in fact, the slightest idea of what either a people or a language is 
(Agamben, 2000, p. 65). 
 
Dividuals in such a community thus do not engage in a process in which they manifest their identity 
once and for all, or gain freedom to fit into a society as an identity, but they instead unfold themselves 
continuously. As mentioned before, in Arendt’s words they are whos who engage in the process of 
appearing differently within the multiple space of inter-esse. Participation in this sense indicates the 
intensity of transformability within the unfolding politics of life. This unfolding being both an 
exposition and a transformation of appearance is thus not only multiple on the level of expression but 
also on the level of content. The singular assemblage is a discursive expression as well as a connective 
body. It is an expressive affective connective body.  
 
Let me sensitize this thought, using a cinematic example. Kaige Chen Bàwáng Bié Jī (Farewell My 
Concubine) (1993) sensitizes its audience for multiple unfolding moments as well as for the affects of 
change in his characters. Chen’s images express the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of 
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identities in one and the same act. Cheng Dieyi is a boy with girlish face and gets sold by his poor 
mother to a theatre. In this milieu, in which female actors are absent, Cheng must compensate 
convincingly for the lack of this body. He must become, not simply a girl, but a woman, the concubine 
Douzi.  
In this cinematic image Chen sensitizes how lingual as well as gestural images forcefully 
depart from the boy’s body. The expression and content do not resemble one another. Cheng’s 
disappearance and Douzi’s appearance, however, are contrasted by Duan Xiaolou, the theatrical king 
Shitou, who is determined to maintain the separation between his theatrical self as a king and his 
worldly self as a gentle boy and a man who falls in love with beautiful Juxian and not with Douzi. 
While the twentieth century history of China unfolds itself in transformation into another political 
milieu, Douzi lacks political participation due to ‘her’ personal hatred for Juxian, the woman who 
steals her man. However, while the viewer dwells in the theatrical as well as worldly tragedy between 
Douzi and Shitou, it is Juxian who perceives the unexpected. When political terror and intensity 
demand a kingly act of Shitou, he betrays his wife and concubine in order to save his own life. It is 
within this setting that Juxian’s unfolding subject is reflected in the flabbergasted face of Douzi, in 
which she performs the long awaited noble king who saves the concubine. It is Juxian’s politically 
sober act that forces Douzi to experience her unavoidable political engagement within the community 
as well as to amalgamate all her personalities. Douzi kills her/himself thus as a man and a concubine 
on stage.  
 
6.5.2 Happiness of Life 
How do we define life within the milieu of flight? Is politics of flight solely a milieu of exile in which 
bodies are condemned to a commune-less life? Can we start thinking through multiple exiled bodies as 
paradigms without an identifiable milieu? Having come to my concluding statement, I cannot but 
suggest that these lines of thought miss something important in their approach. First, milieus, whether 
damned or not, do not include only one type of body nor do they unfold beyond the community. There 
is no body without community. Agamben’s confrontational analysis already shows that an excluding 
milieu always is prepositioned within a system of law, a regime of expression and a form of 
community. Guatanamo Bay is never over there, the non-citizen state is never beyond the citizen. As 
science extrapolates a not yet rationalized chaos, art anticipates the invisibility in what it unveils, and 
the core of philosophy is the unknown, politics, in any setting it may define itself, always includes its 
apolitical outside, an immanent outside. Coming community’s awareness is the comprehension that 
there is no such thing as a pur sang exclusive milieu. Second, bodies are assemblages, yet as 
assemblages they are not definable by an exilic or segmentalizing order. The assemblage is singular, 
not just because it refers to an individual but because it refers to becoming an individual. Bodies are 
porous matter, their organs are penetrated and transformed, permanently. Bodies are alive, eventive 
assemblages. As Pisters (2003) affirms, bodies testify of another ethics: 
 
The power of the body is not just physical force … This ethics consists of the 
attempt to create as many joyful encounters as possible, which will increase the 
power to act and to live intensively without harming others (pp. 85-86).  
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Bodies are more than biopolitical instruments. Imagining bodies merely as passive objects of politics 
is the problematic assumption in Arendt’s (1958) thought. Although she criticizes Heidegger due to 
his preference for death as the defining moment of thought, and introduces natality instead of 
mortality within the realm of politics, this natality is nothing but life, an eventive beginning that 
belongs to the plurality of life, and that appears in the middle of life processes. Yet, she was so 
horrified by acts of the Nazi regime, the reduction of men to lifeless bodies and the final destruction of 
these bodies, that she fearsomely withdrew the body from the political arena and created a concept of a 
political milieu in which such exclusion became impossible: interest in public space. Natality is an 
implicit attempt to re-experience life within politics. What was and is problematic in totalitarianism as 
well as in biopolitics is not the introduction of life within the political thinking, but the reduction of 
life into limbic lives. The betrayal of life happens within politics when segments – total and multiple – 
dominate the lines of flight, when homogeneity camouflages the multiplicity of life. Criticizing Arendt 
I suggest that plurality is not a trait of humans that solely come to the fore when they politically 
engage themselves, but it is a characteristic of life as an essence-less process. It is not a political but 
first and for all an ontological fact. In a Deleuze and Guattari’s perspective ontology and politics 
coincide. The excluded and murdered figure was not the body itself, but an idea of a political body: 
“What was technologized was not the body, but its image” (Agamben, 1993b, p. 50).  
 
In order to differentiate these multiple understandings of life within politics, as I discussed in the first 
part, Agamben (2000) introduces a trilogy: ‘life’, ‘form of life’ and ‘form-of-life’ (pp. 3-12). ‘Life’ or 
zoē, although multiple, is in science often reduced to the biological organism that strives to survive. 
When Arendt speaks of labor she refers to this necessity that reproduces life in all living beings within 
the same circular movement of eating, defecating, fornicating and dying. ‘Form of life’ is the 
formatting act in which human beings surpass this survival state of ‘life’. It is the political life in 
which these living beings manufacture as well as create plural forms of community. ‘Form of life’ is 
bios, indicating a process of distancing oneself from the factuality of life by creating possibilities to 
choose forms of life beyond sheer survival. This artificial distinction in political thought is still present 
in contemporary thoughts on politics, but was already problematized by Karl Marx’ introduction of the 
economic infrastructure of politics and by Foucault in his analysis of biopolitics. Inspired by this 
critical tradition Agamben shows how the distinction between life and its form creates spaces in which 
not only other forms of living beings but also humans are deprived of their liveliness. Homo Sacer is 
this immanent state of being – human and animal – where life (zoē) and forms of life (bios) are 
imagined to be dissimilar. This dissimilarity translates itself – as we have seen in the fourth and fifth 
chapter – into dissimilarity between form and matter in content and expression. In both forms of 
politics, the form creates lines of exclusion for the matter of content and matter of expression. While 
Homo Sacer is enforced to be a limbic live, the civic subject is imagined to be a lifeless ghost that can 
choose its form but remains without the content called life. 
 
Agamben offers a third option: ‘form-of-life’. Life as form remains in its non-exclusive state 
connected to life as substance. In its non-exclusiveness ‘form-of-life’ differentiates itself from 
biopolitics. Biopolitics defines life in order to isolate bodies within a segment of disciplinary power, or 
include these bodies by exclusion – no identity, sans papiers, secondhand citizen or illegals surviving 
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in public space – through the mechanisms of security and control. ‘Form-of-life’ includes the 
potentiality of life that is expressed in its multiplicity in a political assemblage called coming 
community. This expression has been labeled adequately by the Spinozian title of Deleuze’s (2011) 
very last text: Immánence: a Life…. The actualization of thought within immanence of life affirms the 
virtual immensity of life. Each so-called actual life – human, animal, plant or aliens – is embedded in a 
virtual texture of flight lines that produces differentiation on a virtual level and differenciation on the 
actual level, as we have seen in the first chapter (see: 1.4.2). 
Differenciation indicates that there are different types of formation of organism as well as 
comprehension of these organisms as closed or open forms. Simply put, there are different actual 
assemblages. The three layers that were present in the matter of expression are mutually present in the 
matter of content of a community. The first layer is the undifferentiated earth, or what by Deleuze and 
Guattari is called the ultimate body without organs. The second layer is the layer of differentiated 
organism such as humans, sheep, trees, etc. These organisms are still in connection to the earth that 
engenders these. They continue to be in line with the multiplicity that defines them. I imagine that the 
practice of Yoga was not discovered for the sake of finding one’s true identity or a monolithic idea of 
a self but to gain a cosmological physical connection between the second and first layer of life. The 
third layer is the process in which organism, specifically human organism, makes itself essential as 
well as placing itself above all other organisms in ‘the tree of life’.  
 
The consequences of such ideas are more severe than one thinks, especially for the human species. Not 
only are the environmental elements and the animal world neglected in this hierarchy. It also has the 
fatal tendency to hierarchize: Some lives matter more than the rest. This was not only a characteristic 
of the Nazi-regime, but as we have seen it is also present in the discourse of enslavement and 
misogyny in the contemporary world. As Kimmerle (1994) shows, the philosophical thought of the 
European ‘Enlightenment’ itself, with its plea for human rights, is determined by the opposition of 
barbarism and civilization. These thoughts, presented in highly respected thinkers’ works such as 
those of Hegel and Kant, were even uninformed for their time. The analyses of African cultures, 
treating Africa as homogenous, statistic and lawless, define them as inferior and without history, hence 
without subjectivity. In their works Hegel and Kant justify enslavement of men, women and children. 
Kimmerle argues that their ideas are not even exceptional. Even Rousseau’s reversion of the noble 
savage does not challenge the prejudices about Africa (pp. 85-112). Philosophy thus needs to engage 
with its own political sense of exclusion. Politico-philosophy affirms the transcendental empiricism of 
politics of flight only through a sincere self-criticism. Philosophy becomes political by the 
engagement with minoritarian expression. Kimmerle therefor shows how contemporary African 
thinkers, like Appiah could engage with Hegel’s thought beyond his racism, appealing to the open-
mindedness of these African thinkers in their engagement through different aspects in Hegel’s 
thought. Appiah and Olúwolé in this sense speaks as minor minoritarian by using the speech of the 
majority in order to break through a fixated regime of expression.  
 
How does coming community overcome these dominant approaches? Are the members of this 
community loyal to the first layer, the earth? The first layer could never be experienced on a 
subjective level, due to the fact that such notions as individuation or even dividuation, subject and 
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organism are not present within this layer. In recognizing the immensity of earth, without having the 
pretense to comprehend, let alone manipulate it, the coming community’s concern is rather to break 
through the solidified segments of the third layer in order to experience the potential openness of the 
second layer. Politics deals with the intensity between life and its form. Each milieu within a politics 
of flight – politics-of-exile, politics-of-segments or politics-of-life – expresses different approaches 
toward this intensity and differentiates types of relationality between life and its form.   
 
The dividuality that appears in the eventiveness of life, the singularity that immanently belongs to this 
dividual being, can be compared in Agamben’s (1993b) words with whatever being (quodlibet ens). 
This whatever, despite the populist use of the notion – ‘Whatever!’ – does not indicate indifference. It 
instead signifies that life, whatever it may be, matters as such. It is a singularity that asks for 
recognition within the process of life and “is thus freed from the false dilemma that obliges knowledge 
to choose between ineffability of the individual and the intelligibility of the universal” (p. 1). 
Whatever is that which belongs per se, whether the structure of thought and political discourse define 
it as such or not. In contrast to Shakespeare, Arendt (1968), quoting Proust, reasons, “the question is 
not as for Hamlet, to be or not to be, but to belong or not to belong” (p. 84). Agamben refuses to 
answer both questions. There is no either-or. Neither being nor belonging has a negative. There is 
neither something beyond being, nor a possibility of not belonging. Whatever whatever may be, it 
belongs. The question of political integration as well as philosophical thought – in contrast to the 
multicultural definition of it – is not whether we belong or not, whether we choose to belong or not, 
but how to belong. As Appiah (2006) suggests, in our political thought “death isn’t the only thing that 
matters. What matters is decent lives” (p. 167). Life teases, it laughs at us when we intend to forget 
about her. It is determination and voluntarism at the same time. It determines the fact of belonging but 
not the form of belonging. 
 Coming community’s starting point is the virtual as well as actual viable assemblages of such 
belonging. Agamben’s (1993b) whatever is the experience of love as such, in which the love for that 
which belongs is neither defined by characteristics nor emerges as an object of possession (pp. 1-2). 
Whatever is an example, Agamben states, irreducible to a class, an identifiable group or a scientific 
category. Paradoxically it is this detachment that strengthens its connectivity. In the end identity, 
classes and collection are not forms of attachment, but forms of detachment. By calling oneself a white 
male, one cuts off the myriad expressive forms of connection that are virtually at hand to be 
actualized. Example on the other hand explores all connections, whatever they may be.  
 
These pure singularities communicate only in the empty space of the example, 
without being tied by any common property, by any identity. They are expropriated 
of all identity, so as to appropriate belonging itself (pp. 10-11). 
 
What remains problematic in the politics of totalitarianism and multiculturalism is the idea of 
reparability of being and belonging. Totalitarianism tends to repair the original or perfect state of 
being, the perfect state or identity. Multiculturalism aims to repair the state of belonging. Repair 
indicates lack, not enough, not good enough. When Agamben speaks of the whatever within coming 
community he speaks if the Irreparable (pp. 90-100). A being cannot be more or less, it cannot belong 
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more or less. Despite our approval or disapproval, happiness and unhappiness, Agamben’s point 
remains that there is no hierarchy in being or belonging. Not only the whatever but the world itself 
cannot not be what it is, and as such it is thus irreparable. 
 
The Irreparable is that things are just as they are, in this or that mode, consigned 
without remedy to their way of being. States of things are irreparable, whatever 
they may be: sad or happy, atrocious or blessed. How you are, how the world is – 
this is the Irreparable (p. 90). 
 
Yet, irreparable does not indicate that whatever-being is absolute and defined. It is rather the 
permanency of transformation that defines this whatever. In order to repair something, we need to 
have an idea of an origin; toward which we repair things. Whatever being is this lack of essence; 
incapability to segment absolutely; thus the impotential force that makes things, people and a world 
change constantly. Being indicates permanent becoming something else. To be brings about a being 
that experiences its being as a permanent becoming in differentiated modes. Refugee or not, migrant or 
not, stateless or not, illegal or not, other or not, people of color or not, women or not, LGBTQQ or not, 
mad or not, … dividuality is not a choice. So, get used to it.  
 
A being that is never itself, but is only the existent. It is never existent, but it is the 
existent, completely and without refuge … Without refuge and nonetheless safe – 
safe in its being irreparable (p. 100). 
 
How does this irreparability relate to politics of flight? The jargon on refuge and migration is a jargon 
of reparation. The rightwing parties try to repair a society toward a homogenous morality, ethnicity, 
sexuality or raciality. The past is a one-dimensional time in which everything seems to be great and 
safe. Yet, other forms of politics are not far from an idea of reparation. Idealists, believing in 
communism, neoliberals believing in the free market, intend to repair a society towards its future 
image. A politics based on an ideal image of a society – whether progressing towards a past or a future 
– is always threatened by those people and those events that force them to change course. They force 
them to walk another path than that of the linear road of reparation. Politics of flight is thus not only 
about those who refuge or migrate; nor merely about those events and experiences that shock our 
intuitions and ideals. Politics of flight is a politics that through politics of life as political thinking 
creates an idea of refuge within idealist tendencies everywhere and anytime. Politics of life is a 
politics that flees from idealism, essentialism, universalism as well as disconnective relativism. This 
study never intended to say something about refugees. Refugees already know the sinister cost of 
dogmatism of ideas. This study intends to circulate the observing eye. A politico-philosopher who 
observes a refugee; but a refugee that challenges a politico-philosopher in her image of the world, 
justice and society. I am truly schizophrenic.  
 
Let us return to the introduction where I cited Agamben (2000):  
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The refugee, formerly regarded as a marginal figure … has become now the 
decisive factor of the modern nation-state by breaking the nexus between human 
being and citizen (p. x). 
 
Agamben thus urges us to see that within the image of the other lies the fragility of the image toward 
ourselves. Our own humanity is nowhere at stake. Nowhere, we do not long for something in the past 
nor dream of a utopian future. See the whatever being nowhere and as irreparable. But does this plea 
for an acceptance of what there is? Is this a stoic propaganda? No. Politics of life is in absolute sense 
politics of resistance: resistance toward repression and exclusion. It is a politics that resist in order to 
create safety and security; not safety and security for merely some people, but safety and security for 
all life. We must not let the exclusionist be the sole owners of these values.  It is due to this urgency to 
fight for safety that I connect to Arendt. Just as Arendt did not wish to banalize the cruelty of her time, 
I do not wish to justify, clarify or dignify the cruelty of my time. We both comprehend the necessity 
for change. Politics of life longs for change, change in order to include in a different way. In the final 
instance, it longs for happiness. It is not a politics that hopes to do it in a future, resenting the present 
by wishing it to resemble a time gone by. Politics of life is now, is changing now, acting now; living in 
difference now, sensing the happiness of difference-relationality now. Whatever being is here, not 
only in front of you, but also within your changing cells.  
 
Happiness is what remains crucial for understanding Agamben’s (1993b) ethics and ontology. 
Happiness emerges in an understanding of being as becoming and irreparable. Agamben explores this 
idea in the notion maneries, which is neither essential nor universal, but rather singular. The manner in 
which whatever being experiences life is the manner in which this being experiences its connectivity 
within the space of ease, as a connectivity that changes constantly. Manner means a singular 
participation within the process, whether in life or within the coming community.  
 
That manner is ethical that does not befall us and does not found us but engenders 
us. And this being engendered from one’s own manner is the only happiness really 
possible for humans (p. 29). 
 
Within this thought Agamben (1999a) in the end combines Spinoza’s idea of conatus, in which each 
being longs for its own way of being, with that of Marxism in which each subject is in need of 
engendering its manner of being, without the alienation of capital from this singular manner of being. 
The way of being, however, is not realizing one’s true identity or giving in to one’s essential 
characteristics. Being here does not indicate permanency but rather multiple becomings due to its 
potentiality not-to-be that what it ought to be. Not to give in to the actuality and “to be capable of 
one’s own impotentiality” (p. 183). This is what Agamben (1993b) indicates with the concept 
happiness when he refers to a being and states: “Whatever is a resemblance without archetype – in 
other words, an Idea” (p. 48). 
This idea is neither a platonic reference to some transcendent essence nor does it refer to any 
opposition between thought and affect. Whatever is an experimental experience in which affect and 
thought affectuate a process. Within this process whatever endures all the possibilities and non-
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possibilities that define its course and its singular state of being or becoming. That, which lies beside 
it, on the threshold on which it changes and multiplies, shapes its state. According to Agamben 
(1993b), “whatever, in this sense, is the event of an outside” (p. 67). This event of an outside is a 
passage, within the experience of a limit instead of the factuality of a visible border. The outside is 
still a part of. It is partage that creates the sharing in difference (Nancy & Ten Kate, 2011). It is within 
this immanent limit that life and form, body and politics amalgamate, indistinctively. It is within this 
immanency that whatever-being experiences a belonging as such, a politics in which neither formation 
of the body nor reduction of life but, as Agamben (2000) often argues, happiness as such is at stake. 
 
The ‘happy life’ on which political philosophy should be founded thus cannot be 
either the naked life that sovereignty posits as a presupposition so as to turn it into 
its own subject or the impenetrable extraneity of science and of modern biopolitics 
that everybody today tries in vain to sacralize. This ‘happy life’ should be, rather, 
an absolutely profane ‘sufficient life’ that has reached the perfection of its own 
power and its own communicability – a life over which sovereignty and right no 
longer have any hold (pp. 114-115). 
 
Coming community creates a people, an irreparable people, a people that does not need to adjust on 
the norm and the will of majority. A cynic would say that it is a politics where pedophiles and abusers 
can beat their spouse and abuse their children. Let us not comfort the cynic, but let them fear more. 
They are so naïve still in thinking that these types of abusers are not the majority. Not only in 
numbers, but also in their attitude, they define other lives through their own. Minoritarian minority 
despises those who sacrifice another life for the sake of their own. Their happiness and sense of 
security is always seriously inclusive, related, connected, and not narcissistic. Minoritarian minorities 
are a people – a we – to come, the living beings that care. Are we naïve? We really don’t care. Are we 
dreamy? Well our answer will be: open your eyes and see. We have spoken to them all over the place, 
we have met them in the middle of a warzones, we have whispered with them in the heart of 
totalitarian horror. We are neither invisible nor countable. Statistics never see the margins, but we are 
in the corner of your eyes. We believe in life itself, not in an idea how life should be. Coming 
community’s credo, its verb, its question and action, is to believe independently, without metaphysics, 
without order. To believe in life instead of order means to care, to love the desire itself as “the lover’s 
particular fetishism” (Agamben, 1993b, p. 2). The question of philosophy always is: how to live a good 
life? I’ve been limbic life, I know how to survive, I have been reduced and cursed by many 
multicultural segments, and I have a love for the worlds of coming communities. Yet, after all these 
sentences I still do not know: 
 
How to impotentially live a life? 
407 
 
 
 
Recapitulation: How to Leave? 
 
Life promised me nothing other  
than her endless modalities, 
And I wrote and wrote about it, 
Until I forgot her promise. 
 
 
 
With the current state of affairs of refugees in mind, there is no doubt that a reflection on the notion of 
flight is even more urgent than 11 years ago, the starting point of this research. In all those years a 
dilemma remained. Is philosophy an answer or an adequate discipline in order to expose the political 
reality of today? Do my philosophical considerations not unnecessarily abstract problems? Am I not 
wasting my time on words instead of helping to reduce the urgent needs for food, shelter and security?  
 
This dilemma was not something that was posed to me by others. Mentioning it now, is not meant to 
convince the reader of something. This dilemma was given to me, endured by me, during these last 
years. How do I experience a kind of ease with the intersection of two important phenomena in my 
life: refuge and philosophy?  
 The manner of intersection, in-between these two phenomena, was not easy to identify. Each 
day it changed its face; each day it confronted me with another affect. Emotions crawled into one 
another: anger, bitterness, despair, empowerment, happiness, sorrow, joy, madness, disgust, 
frustration, and the will to resist. Refuge, no matter how long ago it was experienced, has affected this 
body on a cellular level. It is in my bones. And although each day I experience this cellular reality on 
another level, it is a reality that I neither can escape nor deny. Refuge is my physical space of 
uneasiness. And perhaps the only comfort that I could find, was a way of thinking that did not refute 
this uneasiness; but rather affirmed it, gave words to it. As crazy as it sounds, I never wanted to 
surpass my trauma. I never wanted it to be treated. I needed a voice, words, gestures and images to 
affirm its existence. The trauma must remain, the sorrow must not be forgotten, that is my 
responsibility; that is my empowerment; that is what I owe to those who I left behind. The place of 
ease was not a choice in-between one of these conflicting emotions; but rather the experience of it at 
the same time. So, it was not only refuge or philosophy separately that gave me something. The 
intersection itself, the battle and the love affair in-between them, finally gave me the courage to write 
these final words.  
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The ideas of philosophy and refuge are not unfamiliar toward one another. Flight, not only as a double 
binding act of departure and arrival but also as a form of resistance to a sedentary life, is a recurring 
notion in the philosophical tradition. Among those who inspired philosophers, are not only iconic 
ancient Greek figures such as Icarus who flees in order to escape captivity; Oedipus, the banned infant, 
who departs from his fatherland for the second time in shame; and father of Antigone who refused to 
follow the rules of Creon. Philosophers were not only inspired by such figures but they themselves 
often became forced travellers. Karl Marx was driven from country to country while revolutionizing 
the political discourse of his time. Hannah Arendt, Walter Benjamin, Theodor W. Adorno, Max 
Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse escaped towards a state of statelessness and even death in order to 
avoid being murdered in the gas chambers. And nowadays Tariq Ramadan, former distinguished 
professor at the Erasmus University Rotterdam, endures living in multiple exiles.  
The examples are countless. Nevertheless, in this study I have wondered how this so-called 
basic practical act of fleeing relates to abstract thought. Flight is a practice in which the sustainment of 
life or form of life takes precedence over all other activities. Flight often tends to be categorized as an 
extremely private act and also to some degree as a self-interested operation. Is flight therefore a means 
to an end? Is it a personal f(l)ight for the sake of survival? Is it a mere endurance of an experience, 
praxis without theory? Did these displaced philosophers disconnect from their personal experience in 
their thought? What did they have in mind while fleeing? Does the experience of flight become a 
source of embodied knowledge within the philosophical tradition?  
 
For some philosophers such as Arendt (1994) a connection between a politics of flight and the 
tradition of philosophy remained problematic.   
 
I have said good-bye to philosophy once and for all. As you know, I studied 
philosophy, but that does not mean that I stayed with it (p. 2). 
 
Arendt’s remarks don’t merely affect me on an intellectual level, but also on a personal level. Despite 
the many disagreements that we have on the level of philosophy, politics and the place of the body 
within politico-philosophical thinking, she is more than any other philosopher in this study, not only 
my companion in thought, but also in an attitude towards life, a political life. Her choice to distance 
herself from philosophy was not merely intellectual, but more so on an affective level. The thing that 
breaks you the most, the thing that makes life unbearable the most in a totalitarian state of being, is not 
the enemy. As Judith Herzberg once said, enemies never come so deep. What breaks you the most is 
the betrayal, of friends; of those you respected and loved. Philosophers, those who inspired her the 
most, were also the ones who remained silence, or even worse collaborated with those who enforced 
her people in exile and to death. Remaining loyal to such friends is an impossible task. And although 
she revisited her old teacher, Martin Heidegger, only a simplistic vision on her biography can 
conclude that she simply forgot and forgave the betrayal.  
 
Yet, at the end of her life, something made her to look back, to relive her old love for philosophy. 
Perhaps the wisdom of her old age made her care more for those friends – such as Karl Jaspers – who 
refused to betray her, despite the consequences. The history of philosophy is perhaps full of those 
philosophers that segmentalized ideas on life and thought; but it is also full of those thinkers who have 
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resisted a segmentalized thinking. Philosophy eventually also gave rise to words of men and women 
who resisted the rigid regimes of expressions. Jaspers was a friend in thought for Arendt; Agamben, 
Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Ahmed and Olúwolé are friends in thought for me. No matter how 
deep the betrayal goes; you are never alone in challenging rigidity.   
Thus, there is something in philosophy that creates room for difference. It is not its history, but its act 
of questioning; its desire to create breakpoints in thought. And perhaps, at the end of her life, in her 
experience of liveliness of the mind, Arendt finally distance herself enough from those cowardly 
philosophers in order to make a distinction in-between the philosopher and the philosophical 
approach. Arendt returned and I never was able to leave. A philosophical approach is not something 
that we only learn at the university, but something that we experienced with our bones. Philosophy 
became the place of queries, the place of doubts, a place that we loved, due to the fact that we both 
know how catastrophic the place of certainty is.  
 
It is through her, that every moment of lonely despair in this study, was always accompanied by the 
stubbornness to fight. We will not surpass our sorrows, yet we both refused to define politics as simple 
politics of exile, or a politics of segment in which we would isolate ourselves form those others that 
differ from us, yet suffer. And although we imagine it differently, in different times, in different 
places, through different internarratives and interwars, we found something in philosophy that made us 
want to imagine a different form of community, a different form of political existence and 
relationality. 
 
What does this desire to remember the trauma as well as imagine something different mean for this 
investigation? Although I have written many pages, confide different thinkers and sources, and 
childishly hoped for an academic degree, I have to conclude that a politico-philosophical approach is 
not simply gained in the academic world or through accumulation of knowledge. Politico-philosophy 
is more than anything – if it is true to its endless love for wisdom instead of to its teleological affection 
for knowledge – a matter of attitude. It demands a certain yielding to something beyond one’s 
individuality; not by forgetting or distancing oneself from the personal, but by sensitizing the manner 
in which the so-called personal is interwoven with something that surpasses any form of individuality. 
Such sensitization is in need of imagination, not because it is less real, but because its reality cannot be 
comprehended by our limited perspectives. A politico-philosophical attitude testifies not of arrogance, 
but of stubbornness in humility. It is not soft, but radical, radical in the implementation of the 
complexity. It is radical nuanced differentiation.   
 
At the end, I did not surpass my dilemma. Giving in to the dilemmatic state of politics of flight and a 
politico-philosophical approach is my way of relating to its terra ethica of the reality of difference-
relationality. I did not calculate my way out. I did not find myself, because there was nothing to find, 
neither here, nor there. The political expression of this life, as any other, leaves no option than a 
dividual existence. We are not the other; we are the everlasting changing assemblage of endless 
connections of this world. Responsibility is not to enforce clarity of communication but through a 
sense of communicability in politics of life embraces the relationality of the ability of expression: the 
responsibility of being open to difference as such. It is not giving in to the order of the Voice, the 
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virtuous dogma, but a silence in which a cacophony of voices is immanent; in which multiplicity of 
expression – words, gestures, images – is given. Welcome to the madness of heterophasia that no 
grammar in a dissertation can capture. The experiment of expression, beyond the fancy vocabulary of 
this philosophical experiment; where sobriety of images, gestures and words become supplementary to 
the breath of life, a life; form-of-life.  
 
A life, whatever it may be; a politics of life. Imagine that: we are, just as the wasp zooming around us 
in search of an orchid, whatever beings, irreparable beings. Stop fixing us. Stop defining us, defining 
you and I. We are eventive assemblages. We are assemblages of ideas, air and water that flow through 
our veins. I am not your exotic other, I am not your objective enemy, whether you like it or not; 
whether you find me smart or devastatingly stupid; I, just as you, belong as such. Inclusion was never 
a matter of choice; it was never a matter of policy. The decision was made long ago; it was an earthly 
reality. It is the spirituality of simple physics. Whether I am abstract ‘or’ concrete, theory was never 
without practice. Welcome to the experience of politico-philosophy. There is the hyphen where my 
happiness lies. The crisis was never there. That is what the eyes of the refugees – the abandoned lives 
in the refugee camps – are telling us. The crisis is here; the outside is immanent. See the meat that we 
consume, feel the cheap clothes that cover our body, and look at the bankcard entering the machine. 
And now experience the despair of the enslaved laborer, the fear of victims of war with weapons that 
your bank has paid for. Feel the thirst in the dry lands that individuals flee form. Just a couple of 
seconds in the history of earth and she will become her sister: Venus. It is time to be brave, take a risk, 
and look one more time in the gaze of Nahid. The repetition of difference. It is time to embrace our 
existential crisis. Walk through it. Gone with Margret Thatcher alike. There Is No Alternative than 
difference-relationality. We are already within the rhizome. It is neither a matter of staying or leaving. 
It matters as such. The question is: 
 
 
How do I start in the middle again?  
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Politics of Flight – English Summary 
A Philosophical Refuge 
 
 
The notion refugee-crisis sensitizes discomfort: the state of exception in which the fleeing individual 
finds him/herself, a condition that is habitually imagined via media every day. Crowded refugee 
camps are a day-to-day reality that we know of, yet cannot comprehend. Even individuals who 
volunteer to travel to these camps, despite their thorough investigation in advance, come away 
perplexed. They can hardly find the words for their experiences. A colleague – Anne Kooiman – after 
returning from Lesbos whispers: I can utter nothing else but silence. How could this so casually 
happen? The evoked discomfort within this crisis does not only arise from the forced marginalized 
existence of the refugee, or the fear Europeans have for the stranger. For Anne, the inconvenience also 
resides within the dissimilarity in-between the everyday self-evident inhuman condition of life in 
refugee camps and the comfort of life in the Western world. Anne's silence is saturated by shame. And 
here I am, in my safe harbor. She feels the discomfort of her nationality. When I asked her if she 
regretted her trip, she decisively said no. She rather experiences this distress instead of the 
convenience of denial. 
 
This discomfort is deprived from a discourse. The current European political discourse, which makes a 
self-explanatory link in-between the two words refugee and crisis, defines this crisis as a self-evident 
feature of the other, as a state that happens to Europe. The deconstruction of this assumption is 
elementary in this research into a politics of flight. This is not a study of a politics about refugees. 
Already in my introduction, I suggest that neither refugees nor social workers such as Anne need an 
academic analysis in order to realize that more than 60 million people on this earth fall disenfranchised 
in-between the cracks. Their marginal existence within a political limbo cannot be expressed in a 
linear research with an introduction, conclusion and summary. Politics of flight – in which the 
discomfort is rather endured instead of evaded – attempts to map out a discourse for the uneasiness. In 
this endeavor, the perspective is reversed. The analysis does not depart from here to there, but 
redirects from there toward here by reflecting on our politically privileged way of life. The so-called 
crisis of elsewhere is immanent to the European history. Politics of flight shows itself by unraveling 
the complexity of political global webs. 
 
The confrontation with the discomfort of the crisis and the disentanglement of political existence are 
not only experienced daily. They have also been passed on worldwide in the initiation into the 
philosophical thinking. Philosophy, as a practice of questioning the most self-evident matters – as 
Cornelius Verhoeven defines it – does not only problematize the answers but also critically scrutinizes 
the construction of questioning itself. The fundamental assumptions within the manner of formulating 
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questions and the uncritical use of concepts create the framework of our ideas on society and they 
define our attitude toward others. Before we can answer the question "What should we do about the 
refugee crisis?", the philosophical practice of questioning challenges us to evaluate our definitions of 
the term refugee-crisis as well as the self-explanatory link in-between the two notions: refugee and 
crisis. 
 
Philosophy does not only involve critical thinking about the world and thinking, but demonstrates 
itself especially as a reflection that constantly questions its own manner of thinking. The oeuvre of 
four thinkers – Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Giorgio Agamben (1942), Félix Guattari (1930-1992) 
and Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) – has been an inspiration in the interest of mapping out this radical 
self-examination of philosophy in relation to the world and to its own thinking. These four 
philosophers do not only question the framework of thought; but also the manner in which philosophy 
relates to political reality. Each of these thinkers has, in his or her way, confined the link between 
politics and philosophy as a politico-philosophy. This affirmation – in which politico-philosophy is 
not a sub-discipline but rather determines the essence of philosophy – confirms the fundamental 
attitude of this research. It is a critical affirmation in which the researcher draws connective lines in-
between the discomfort of flight; the crisis of social thinking; and the philosophical stamina to endure 
existential crises. It is within this relationality that a discourse of discomfort instead of a discourse 
about discomfort can be mapped out.   
 
 
Part I of this study is an exploration of a vocabulary; it is in search of a language in order to initiate 
this discourse. The first chapter, in which an approach toward flight is explored, begins with an 
analysis of the idea of methodology. The liaison between the crisis experienced by refugees and world 
politics displays flight as an event that cannot be unambiguously explained by a single method. 
Second, throughout a critical attitude toward legal, political and psychological identification of 
refugees, it is here argued that refugees are not definable as and by an unambiguous identity. Refugees 
are not a particular type of people, but an indefinable multiplicity of people. Despite the fact that their 
lives have been influenced and identified by the macro-political reality, each of them lives an 
exceptional life. The homogenization of millions of people as one and the same is perhaps the first 
injustice being committed to them. To chart this injustice while maintaining the global nature of the 
problem, a politics of flight cannot be limited by evaluating one subject: The Refugee. Indeed, the 
crisis does not only concern the other. In terms of Arendt, it creates an intersubjective political reality 
that sheds light on how we can relate to the discomfort of the crisis. This chapter distances itself from 
the simple opposition between myself and the other. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari, people are 
rizomatically linked in infinite ways. 
In the second chapter a few exclusive oppositional ideas will be problematized. First, there is 
no conflict between theory and practice with regard to the discourse of politics of flight. The analysis 
of this politics cannot be found in an “ivory tower” setting, but forms an immanent practice in which 
the thinker is immediately involved. Second, it is argued that this research does not intend to give a 
non-connective and objective description of the condition of the other. In line with the above-
mentioned thinkers, it will be stated that, beyond the opposition in-between difference and identity, 
413 
 
difference is relational at all times. The analysis in this study is not about an objective analysis with 
universal claims about the nature of mankind, but neither will it be an exoticizing description of a 
subjective perception of the other. This philosophical exegesis is an affirmation of thought in which 
differences are supplementary to the relational responsibility of each subject with respect to this 
political crisis. This responsibility demands that the cacophonic silence of the refugee camps be given 
a hearing. This silence does not indicate that it is quiet on the other side of the spectrum; but that the 
hearing on this side of the world must open itself to the discordant sounds elsewhere. 
This opening up of the ears for the cacophony as a deafening silence not only asks for a 
political analysis of the crisis and the discomfort, but also puts forward the question: “What is meant 
by the term politics?” and “What does politics mean in the construction politics of flight?”. The third 
chapter is an extensive exploration of the complexity of this question. Although politics relates to 
philosophical concepts and in its policies makes use of scientific observations; in this chapter it is 
argued that political practices have their own dynamic that cannot be unambiguously understood 
through philosophical and scientific analysis. The dynamic of politics is according to Agamben 
paradigmatic. According to this thinker political paradigms bring a reality to the fore out of the 
political frameworks that cannot themselves be explained through this reality. Security and integration 
are such paradigmatic notions. Although, they create policies such as safety measures and integration 
courses, they cannot be legitimized by these practices. In order to expose this aporatic multiplicity 
within a politics of flight; I portray in this chapter several types of paradigms and different types of 
political practices that are at work in the so-called refugee crisis. I make a distinction between the 
politics of exile, the politics of segments and the politics of life, each of which is dealt with 
respectively in the three chapters of the second part.  
 
After mapping out the necessary discursive tools in part one, in which additionally the contours of a 
different discourse is presented, I differentiate in part two the paradigms according to these three types 
of politics. In chapter four – where the politics of exile is laid out – axiomatic paradigms are crucial. In 
their effects these paradigms enforce oppositional territories and subjects: here versus there, country of 
origin versus country of arrival, us versus them. In this chapter, I show the pretentions of this politics 
to address exclusive dualities while extinguishing every form of difference. The consequences of this 
xenophobic exilic trait do not only touch the so-called stranger from elsewhere. Even within a society 
these paradigms draw lines and create here antipathies through which the citizenship of certain 
population groups is permanently in question. The moment that the fleeing individual is no longer 
characterized as a passive victim; their desperate situation becomes a demand for a different kind of 
politics.  
 In chapter five the question whether multicultural society offers an answer is examined. 
Multiculturalism attempts to break through the destructive tendencies of politics of exile by not 
approaching the difference in-between individuals in an exclusive oppositional manner. 
Multiculturalism distances itself from the idea of an ultimate duality between the one here and the 
other there, through which the multiplicity of visions and plurality of communities is tolerated. Yet, 
within the use of notions such as ‘allochthones’ and ‘people with migratory background’ axiomatic 
paradigms remain in force. Although, it does not divide the world in a simple here versus there, or we 
versus them; still the thinking in identities persists in this politics by multiplying the segments: social, 
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economic, racial, sexual, cultural and meritocratic. Therefore in this chapter a politics of segments will 
be explored. The paradigms that shape these segments are not axiomatic but rather differencial. With 
the aid of Deleuze, I distinguish between differential and differencial. The idea of differencial is not in 
the interest of respecting difference as such, but it refers to differences produced in politics via 
policies. Differential on the other hand refers to differences that cannot be reduced to identifiable 
categories. This is why Deleuze speaks of virtual differences, not because these are fictional or unreal, 
but because the reality of such a difference surpasses our actual framework of thinking managed by 
policy – i.e. differencial. The politics of segments identifies communities as minorities. Paradigms 
such as safety and integration and crisis become because of this logic an identity trait of certain 
communities. The discomfort is externalized.  
 The discourse that has this discomfort at its core stresses a deconstruction of political vision 
that segmentalizes the world and individuals permanently. In the sixth chapter – in which I sketch a 
politics of life – is an ode to a coming community that affirms the unpredictability of life and 
temporary condition of all forms of identity. This politics affective-ontologically fortifies difference 
and ethical relational responsibility. By means of a critical self-evaluation such a politics en‘forces’ 
self-practices that are inspired by engagement, involvement, and inter-esse; which, in principle, stand 
open for the impact of singular life. This politico-philosophical self-criticism demands another 
language and another image than the one that modern thought has produced. Due to its rhizomatic 
approach, it breaks through the academic disciplinary – thus disciplining – limitations. So are the 
contemporary art-practices, in which literature, cinema and visual arts strengthen one another, more 
capable of making the affective dimension of cacophonic silence to be heard. Inspired by Agamben, I 
speak of impotential paradigms. This paradigmatic dynamic invalidates progressive-linear realizations 
such as: from potential to the actual, from imperfection to perfection. It fortifies the inspiration of the 
virtual that is lacking in the differencial paradigms of multiculturalism. A politics of life based on a 
radical affirmation of differential difference resists the assumption of ‘our’ refugee crisis. In this 
politics it is no longer the case of belonging or not belonging. It acts beyond inclusion and exclusion. 
Life, whatever it may be, is: to belong. To be is by definition relational: inter-esse. A politics of life 
refines the contours of this other discourse on community and commonness. This closing chapter is an 
ode to singular lives, whatever that may be.     
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Politiek van het vluchten – Nederlandse samenvatting 
Een filosofische toevlucht 
 
 
Het begrip vluchtelingencrisis spreekt over het moment van ongemak, de uitzonderlijke staat waar het 
vluchtende individu zich in bevindt, een toestand die elke dag weer routinematig mediaal verbeeld 
wordt. Overvolle vluchtelingenkampen zijn een dagelijkse realiteit die we kennen, maar niet 
begrijpen. Zelfs mensen die vrijwillig afreizen naar deze kampen keren, ondanks hun grondige 
onderzoek vooraf, perplex terug. Hun ervaringen kunnen ze moeilijk verwoorden. Een collega – Anne 
Kooiman – vertelde na haar terugkomst van Lesbos: ik kan niets anders uiten dan stilte. Hoe kan dit zó 
gewoon gebeuren? Het ongemak dat deze crisis oproept, komt niet alleen voort uit het gedwongen 
gemarginaliseerde bestaan van de vluchteling, of uit de angst van Europeanen voor de vreemdeling. 
Het ongemak ligt voor Anne ook in het contrast tussen de alledaagse vanzelfsprekendheid van de 
onmenselijke toestand waarin vluchtelingen leven en het comfort van het leven in de westerse wereld. 
Annes stilte is vervuld van schaamte. En hier zit ik dan, in mijn veilige haven. Zij voelt het ongemak 
van haar nationaliteit. Toen ik haar vroeg of ze spijt van haar reis had, zei ze resoluut nee. Ze ervaart 
liever dit ongemak dan het gemak van de ontkenning.  
 
Dit ongemak ontbeert een discours. Het huidige Europese politieke discours dat een vanzelfsprekende 
koppeling maakt tussen de twee woorden vluchteling en crisis, definieert deze crisis als een 
vanzelfsprekend kenmerk van de ander, als een toestand die Europa overkomt. De ontkrachting van 
deze aanname staat centraal in dit onderzoek naar de politiek van het vluchten. Dit is geen analyse van 
een politiek over vluchtelingen. Ik stel in mijn inleiding dat vluchtelingen noch betrokken 
hulpverleners als Anne een academische analyse nodig hebben om te beseffen dat meer dan 60 
miljoen mensen rechteloos op deze aardbol schip noch wal kunnen bereiken. Hun marginale bestaan in 
een politiek limbo is niet te duiden in een lineair onderzoek met een inleiding, conclusie en 
samenvatting. Politiek van het vluchten – waarin het ongemak niet vermeden maar aangegaan wordt – 
tracht een discours voor het ongemak in kaart te brengen. In deze poging wordt het perspectief 
omgekeerd. De analyse vertrek niet van hier naar daar, maar denkt ook van daar naar hier over onze 
politiek geprivilegieerde bestaanswijze. De crisis die aan iets elders verweten wordt, is immanent aan 
de Europese geschiedenis. Politiek van het vluchten toont zich in de ontrafeling van de complexiteit 
van politiek wereldwijde webben.  
 
De confrontatie met het ongemak van de crisis en de ontrafeling van het politieke bestaan worden niet 
alleen dagelijkse ervaren, maar zijn ook al eeuwenlang in verschillende delen van de wereld 
doorgegeven in de initiatieriten van de filosofische denkwijze. Filosofie, als een praktijk van vragen 
stellen over het meest vanzelfsprekende – zoals Cornelius Verhoeven het aanduidt – is niet louter om 
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antwoorden ter discussie te stellen maar ook om de gestelde vragen kritisch te ontleden. Juist in de 
wijze waarop we vragen stellen en in het onkritische gebruik van begrippen liggen fundamentele 
aannames die onze ideeën over samenleving en de relatie tot het vreemde vormgeven. Voordat we de 
vraag “wat moeten we doen aan de vluchtelingencrisis?” kunnen beantwoorden, daagt de filosofische 
praktijk van het vragenstellen ons uit om na te denken over wat we aanduiden met het begrip 
vluchtelingen-crisis en met de relatie die we vanzelfsprekend leggen tussen de twee begrippen 
vluchteling en crisis. 
 
Filosofie behelst niet alleen kritisch denken over de wereld en het denken, maar vooral een denken dat 
permanent zichzelf bevraagt. Het oeuvre van vier denkers – Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Giorgio 
Agamben (1942), Félix Guattari (1930-1992) en Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995) – heeft als inspiratie 
gediend om deze radicale zelfdoordenking van filosofie in relatie tot de wereld en tot haar eigen 
denken in kaart te brengen. Deze vier filosofen bevragen niet alleen de wijze waarop we denken; maar 
ook de wijze waarop filosofie zich verhoudt tot de politieke werkelijkheid. Ieder van deze denkers 
heeft, op haar of zijn eigen manier, het koppelteken tussen politiek en filosofie als politico-filosofie 
geaffirmeerd. Deze affirmatie – waarin politieke filosofie niet een sub-discipline is maar eerder het 
wezen van de filosofie bepaalt – bevestigt de grondhouding van dit onderzoek. Het is een kritische 
affirmatie waarin de onderzoeker het ongemak van het vluchten, de crisis van het maatschappelijke 
denken en het filosofische uithoudingsvermogen om existentiële crises te doorstaan aan elkaar 
relateert. Het is in deze verweving dat een discours van het ongemak in plaats van over het ongemak 
in kaart gebracht kan worden.  
 
Deel I van dit onderzoek is een uiteenzetting van een vocabulaire; een zoektocht naar een taal van 
waaruit dit discours geïnitieerd kan worden. Het eerste hoofdstuk dat een exposé van een 
benaderingswijze – approach – is, begint met een analyse van het begrip methodiek. De relatie tussen 
de crisis die vluchtelingen meemaken en de wereldpolitiek toont dat vluchten een gebeurtenis is die 
niet eenduidig te verklaren is met behulp van enkelvoudige methodieken. Vervolgens wordt, in een 
kritische verhouding tot juridische, politieke en psychologische identificatie van vluchtelingen, 
beargumenteerd dat vluchtelingen niet te vatten zijn als en in een eenduidige identiteit. Vluchtelingen 
zijn niet een bepaald menstype, maar een ondoorgrondelijk veelheid van mensen, die ieder – ondanks 
dat hun leven beïnvloedt en geïdentificeerd wordt door de macropolitieke realiteit – een uitzonderlijk 
leven hebben. Het homogeniseren van miljoenen mensen onder één nummer als een totaliteit is 
misschien het eerste onrecht dat ze wordt aangedaan. Om dit onrecht in kaart te brengen met behoud 
van het globale karakter van de problematiek, kan een politiek van het vluchten zich niet beperken 
door te spreken over één subject: De Vluchteling. De crisis betreft namelijk nooit alleen de ander, 
maar creëert in termen van Arendt een intersubjectieve politieke werkelijkheid die een andere licht 
werpt op de wijze waarop we ons kunnen verhouden tot het ongemak van de crisis. In dit hoofdstuk 
wordt afstand genomen van de simpele tegenstelling tussen ik en de ander. In de woorden van Deleuze 
en Guattari zijn mensen op oneindig veel manieren rizomatisch met elkaar verbonden.   
 In het tweede hoofdstuk worden opnieuw een aantal tegenstellingen geproblematiseerd. Ten 
eerste is er geen tegenstelling tussen theorie en praktijk in het discours van de politiek van het 
vluchten. De analyse van deze politiek vindt niet op gedistantieerde wijze plaats, maar vormt een 
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immanente praktijk, waarin de denker direct betrokken is. Ten tweede wordt beredeneerd dat dit 
onderzoek niet de intentie heeft om een niet-connectieve en objectiverende uitleg te geven van de 
toestand van een ander. Daarbij wordt er, refererend aan de bovengenoemde denkers, vanuit gegaan 
dat, voorbij de tegenstelling tussen verschil en identiteit, verschil te allen tijde relationeel is. Het gaat 
hierbij niet om een objectieve analyse met universele verklaringen over de aard van de mens, noch om 
een exotiserende beschrijving van de subjectieve beleving van de ander. Deze filosofische exercitie is 
een affirmatie van een denken waarin verschillen supplementair zijn aan de relationele 
verantwoordelijkheid van elk subject met betrekking tot deze politieke crisis. Deze 
verantwoordelijkheid vraagt erom gehoor te geven aan de luide stilte van de vluchtelingenkampen. 
Deze stilte houdt niet in dat het stil is aan de andere kant van het spectrum, maar dat het gehoor aan 
deze kant van de wereld zich moet openstellen om de kakofonie van elders toe te kunnen laten.  
 Deze ontsluiting van het gehoor voor de kakofonie als oorverdovende stilte vraagt niet alleen 
om een politieke analyse van de crisis en het ongemak, maar stelt ook vragen als “wat wordt er 
bedoeld met het begrip politiek?” en “wat betekent politiek in de constructie politiek van het 
vluchten?” Het derde hoofdstuk is een uitgebreide ontleding van de complexiteit van deze vraag. 
Hoewel politiek zich verhoudt tot filosofische concepten en haar beleid toetst aan wetenschappelijke 
observaties, wordt er in dit hoofdstuk beargumenteerd dat politieke praktijken een eigen dynamiek 
hebben, die niet eenduidig te vatten is in filosofische en wetenschappelijke analyses. De dynamiek van 
de politiek is volgens Agamben paradigmatisch. Volgens deze denker brengen politieke paradigma’s 
een realiteit tot stand vanuit een politiek denkkader dat zelf niet verklaard kan worden vanuit deze 
realiteit. Zo zijn veiligheid en integratie paradigmatische begrippen: zij creëren praktijken door 
bijvoorbeeld veiligheidsmaatregelen en integratiecursussen, maar kunnen niet vanuit deze praktijken 
gelegitimeerd worden. Om deze aporetische meervoudigheid van de politiek van het vluchten te 
verduidelijken, schets ik in dit hoofdstuk meerdere typen paradigma’s en verschillende soorten 
politieke praktijken die doorwerken in de zogenaamde vluchtelingencrisis. Ik maak een onderscheid 
tussen een politiek van ballingschap, een politiek van segmenten en een politiek van leven, die ieder op 
zich respectievelijk in de drie hoofdstukken van het tweede deel uiteen gezet worden.   
 
Na de uiteenzetting van het noodzakelijke begrippenapparaat in deel I, waarin tevens de contouren van 
een ander discours worden geschetst, differentieer ik in deel II de paradigma’s naar deze drie typen 
politiek. In hoofdstuk vier waarin een politiek van ballingschap wordt geschetst, staan axiomatische 
paradigma’s centraal. In hun doorwerking dwingen deze paradigma’s oppositionele territoria en 
subjecten af: hier versus daar, het land van herkomst versus land van aankomst, wij versus zij. In dit 
hoofdstuk laat ik vooral zien dat in pretenties van deze politiek om over exclusieve dualiteiten te 
spreken juist elk vorm van verschil teniet wordt gedaan. De consequenties van dit xenofobe 
verbanningskarakter raken echter niet alleen de zogenaamde vreemdeling van elders, ze trekken ook 
binnen hun eigen samenlevingen scheidslijnen en creëren hier tegenstellingen waardoor het 
burgerschap van sommige bevolkingsgroepen permanent ter discussie staat. Zodra het vluchtende 
individu niet meer als louter passief slachtoffer wordt gezien, vraagt hun wanhopige toestand om een 
andere type politiek.  
In hoofdstuk vijf wordt onderzocht of de multiculturele samenleving een antwoord op die vraag biedt. 
Multiculturalisme tracht de destructieve tendensen van de politiek van ballingschap te doorbreken 
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door het verschil tussen individuen niet op een exclusief oppositionele manier te benaderen. 
Multiculturalisme doet weliswaar afstand van het idee van een ultieme dualiteit tussen het ene hier en 
het andere daar, waarbij de meervoudigheid van visies en verscheidenheid van gemeenschappen 
getolereerd worden, maar in de begrippen ‘allochtoon’ of ‘mensen met een migratieachtergrond’ 
werken de axiomatische paradigma’s nog door. Het verdeelt de wereld niet in een simpel hier versus 
daar; of wij versus zij; het herhaalt niettemin het denken in identiteiten door deze in segmenten te 
vermenigvuldigen: sociaal, economisch, raciaal, seksueel, cultureel en meritocratisch. In dit hoofdstuk 
wordt daarom een politiek van segmenten uiteengezet. De paradigma’s die deze segmenten ingeven 
zijn echter niet axiomatisch maar differencieel. Ik maak – met behulp van Deleuzes denken – een 
onderscheid tussen differentieel en differencieel. Het gaat bij differencieel niet om het principieel 
respecteren van verschil, maar om de wijze waarop het verschil in de politiek via het beleid worden 
geproduceerd. Differentieel duidt echter op verschillen die niet te reduceren zijn tot identificeerbare 
kaders. Het is om deze reden dat Deleuze spreekt van virtuele verschillen, niet omdat deze fictief of 
irreëel zijn, maar omdat de realiteit van zo’n verschil voorbij gaat aan onze actuele denkkaders die 
door het beleid – dus differencieel – worden aangestuurd. De politiek van segmenten identificeert 
gemeenschappen als minderheden. Paradigma’s als veiligheid en integratie, en crisis, worden vanuit 
deze logica geïdentificeerd tot bepaalde segmenten. Het ongemak wordt geëxternaliseerd.  
Het discours dat het ongemak centraal stelt, vergt een deconstructie van de politieke visie die 
de wereld en individuen permanent segmenteert. In het zesde hoofdstuk schets ik deze als een politiek 
van het leven. In een ode aan een te komen gemeenschap die de onvoorspelbaarheid van het leven en 
de voorlopigheid van alle vormen van identiteit affirmeert, wordt affect-ontologisch het verschil en 
ethisch de relationele verantwoordelijkheid - bekrachtigd. Door middel van een kritische zelfevaluatie 
‘forceert’ zo’n politiek door engagement, betrokkenheid, en inter-esse geïnspireerde zelfpraktijken, die 
principieel openstaan voor de doorwerkingen van het singuliere leven. Deze politico-filosofische 
zelfkritiek vraagt om een andere taal en een andere verbeelding dan die door het moderne denken zijn 
geproduceerd. Zij doorbreekt door haar rizomatische benadering ook de academische disciplinaire – 
dus disciplinerende – afgrenzingen. Zo zijn hedendaagse kunstpraktijken waarin literatuur, cinema en 
beeldende kunst elkaar versterken beter in staat om de affectieve dimensie van kakofonische stilte te 
laten opklinken. Geïnspireerd door Agamben spreek ik van impotentiële paradigma’s. Deze 
paradigmatische dynamiek ‘ontkracht’ progressief-lineaire realisaties van potentie naar actie, van 
imperfectie naar perfectie, en bekrachtigt de inspiratie van het virtuele die differenciële paradigma’s 
van het multiculturalisme ontberen. Een politiek van het leven gaat vanuit een radicale affirmatie van 
het differentieel verschil in tegen de aannames van ‘onze’ vluchtelingencrisis in. In deze politiek is er 
geen sprake meer van erbij horen of niet erbij horen. Zij handelt voorbij inclusie en exclusie. Het 
leven, wat het ook moge zijn, is: erbij horen. Zijn is per definitie betrokken zijn: inter-esse. Een 
politiek van het leven verfijnt de contouren van dit andere discours over gemeenschap en 
gemeenschappelijkheid. Dit afsluitende hoofdstuk is een ode aan singuliere levens, wat dat ook moge 
zijn.  
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